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Abstract 
The standard view of Greek tyranny is that it was a unique phenomenon in the 
ancient Greek world, representing neither continuity nor a long-lived institution. The 
turannoi are generally described as illegitimate leaders who seized power with the 
support of the lower classes, usurping the rule of the aristocrats. This school of 
thought locates the origins of Greek tyranny in the supposed changes in the 
economic and social climate around the seventh and sixth centuries B.C. Although 
the image of the tyrant as a populist leader has come under attack in recent years, 
there has been no attempt to challenge the theory that tyranny was a new 
phenomenon in the seventh and sixth centuries. This thesis contends that the 
turannoi were not a new form of ruler born from the supposed turmoil of this period. 
In reality, the word turannos came to represent a new way of thinking about an old 
style of leadership. This thesis shows that the Greek tyrants represented a 
continuation of the form of leadership practised by the Homeric basileis. As new 
ideas about law and order were formed in the seventh century, such as limited terms 
of office and magistrates with divided powers, these basileis began to be seen as a 
negative force by those engaging with the new political concepts and institutions. 
This change in attitude caused the traditional basileis to become the polar opposite of 
what was thought to be good for the polis, and not at all compatible with eunomia. 
Their apparent irreverence towards dikaiosune was at odds with the political 
atmosphere of the Archaic and Classical Greek polis. These rulers were not seen as 
representing continuity or a traditional form of rule, but became abhorrent to those 
practising the new ways of law and politics, attracting the label turannos.  
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Introduction 
a) Previous scholarship 
Archaic and Classical sources mention many tyrants taking power during the 
Archaic period. The word turannos is not present in Homer or Hesiod and its sudden 
appearance in poetry from the seventh century combined with the presence of 
numerous tyrants in Herodotus’ account of the Archaic period has given the 
impression that turannoi were a new phenomenon. Historians have viewed these 
tyrants as a new form of ruler and have tried to explain the rise of tyranny in various 
ways. None of these theories is satisfactory and a new approach to Greek tyranny is 
clearly required. Recent developments in the study of Archaic Greek archaeology 
and historiography have made the traditional theories regarding the rise of tyranny in 
Greece untenable. In the fields of Greek archaeology and history, new discoveries 
have totally undermined the reliability of established ideas, such as the Archaic 
‘hoplite revolution’ and ‘population explosion’ that were widely accepted and 
consequently factored into the course of Greek political history. As the study of 
Greek, particularly Archaic, history developed in the late twentieth and early twenty-
first century, phenomena such as the hoplite revolution were either recognised to 
post-date the first recorded tyrant or, like the so-called Archaic population explosion, 
demonstrated to have never occurred. As the socio-economic factors that were 
originally believed to have caused the phenomenon of tyranny have been disproven 
or shifted chronologically, it has become clear that a new examination of the origins 
of Greek tyranny is necessary. This thesis shows that the Greek tyrants were not a 
new form of ruler born out of a period of socio-economic crisis, but an old form of 
ruler that was demonised by those Greeks who subscribed to the rule-of-law 
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ideology that began to emerge in Greece c.650.
1
 This introduction will review the 
most recent scholarship that has contributed to the debate on the origins of Greek 
tyranny. This will not be a comprehensive review of all scholarship concerned with 
Greek tyranny, but aims to provide an accurate picture of the development of 
scholarly explanations for the supposed rise of tyranny in the seventh century. The 
remainder of the introduction will then provide a summary of the four chapters of the 
thesis and a section on the methodology for working with the various forms of 
literary sources.  
 
Scholarship on Greek tyranny, and particularly its origins, has attributed the 
rise of tyranny in Greece to a number of factors. There is no single linear 
development of scholarly thought regarding Greek tyranny but several theories have 
generally dominated the field. Andrewes’ (1956) book on tyranny was a highly 
influential work that arguably first popularised the question of the origins of Greek 
tyranny among Anglophone scholars. Andrewes cited three main factors that caused 
the rise of tyranny in Greece. These were military, racial and economic factors 
combined with Anderson’s confident belief in the existence of a fixed class of Greek 
nobles.
2
 The racial factor, which described simmering resentment between Dorians 
and other Greeks never found any real traction among scholars.
3
 The idea was 
discarded due to the almost total lack of evidence for an association between Archaic 
tyrants and racial tensions. Andrewes’ argument was compelled to lean heavily on 
one or two anecdotes, such as Cleisthenes’ animal epithets for Dorian tribes, rather 
                                                          
1
 All dates are B.C. unless otherwise stated. 
2
 E.g. Andrewes (1956) 84-85. 
3
 Andrewes (1956) 54-66. Bicknell (1982) 200, for example, has noted that there is no positive 
evidence for this phenomenon. See also Will (1956) 39-55 and Roussel (1976) 251-253.  
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than any broad pattern of substantive historical or archaeological evidence to 
advance this theory.  
 
Andrewes’ military factor, which depicted the tyrants leading the hoplites 
against the local nobles, has been promoted by a number of scholars since 1956 and 
the theory of strife between tyrants and an established class of aristocrats is still very 
popular.
4
 Berve (1967) also subscribed to the idea that tyrants were the new leaders 
of the hoplite militias whose participation in combat had destroyed the nobles’ 
monopoly on community defence. Berve envisioned the hoplites raising men as their 
champions to draft new legislation to suit their interests, some of whom inevitably 
became tyrants.
5
 Pleket (1969) continued the theme of class struggle articulated by 
Andrewes and Berve, but combined it with significant mercenary support, to create a 
picture of Archaic tyrants as leaders of the poor, backed by hired troops, against a 
closed class of aristocrats and landowners.
6
 A paper by Drews (1972) argued against 
Andrewes’ stance, providing one of the earliest arguments against the view of tyrants 
as social and economic reformers.
7
 Furthermore, Drews rightly dismissed the hoplite 
revolution as a serious catalyst for the appearance of Greek tyrants.
8
 Drews however 
retained the assumption that Greek tyranny was essentially a new phenomenon that 
arose in the seventh century, insisting that hoplite-style equipment was used for the 
first time in the seventh century, and that tyrants were men who gathered epikouroi 
armed with these weapons to seize control of the community.
9
 This view ignored the 
evidence for arms and armour in Homer, where the warriors wore a panoply identical 
                                                          
4
 Andrewes (1956) 31-42.  
5
 Berve (1967) 10-11.  
6
 Pleket (1969) on mercenaries, 26-29; on Pisistratus’ followers being ‘undoubtedly the poorest’, 29; 
opposed by the ‘aristocrats’, 32.   
7
 Drews (1972) 132.  
8
 Drews (1972) 136.  
9
 Drews (1972) 143-144. 
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to that depicted on Archaic pottery, and omitted any discussion of the plethora of 
methods and social practices Greek tyrants used to gain power outside of military 
force. Despite the validity of Drews’ argument against the socio-economic struggle 
as the main catalyst for the rise of tyranny it failed to gain widespread acceptance 
among historians. Indeed the work of Luraghi (1994) on tyranny in Greek Sicily and 
Italy, while providing a welcome study of western Greek tyranny that would be 
omitted by de Libero’s later work, ultimately fell back on the established ideas of 
social crisis and violent class struggle.
10
 A paper by Parker (1996) dealt directly with 
the question of the emergence of ancient Greek tyranny. It proposed that the tyrants 
were part of a process of linear development through kings, aristocracies and tyrants. 
According to Parker, the first tyrants presented themselves as legitimate kings and 
appealed for a return to ancestral rule.
11
 While this ‘reverses’ Andrewes’ original 
theory of tyrants as social reformers, it ultimately subscribes to the same view of an 
Archaic Greek society divided into distinct classes. A paper by Anderson (2005) 
reacted against the notion, held for example by Andrewes and Pleket, that tyrants 
were unorthodox usurpers. ‘Prior to the late sixth century, I contend, there was in 
fact no absolute distinction between turannoi and orthodox leaders in Greek poleis. 
The former aimed to dominate established oligarchies, not to subvert them. A 
turannis was not yet a species of political regime, illegitimate or otherwise. Rather, it 
was mainstream oligarchic leadership in its most amplified form, conventional de 
facto authority writ large.’12 While Anderson correctly argued against the idea of 
tyrants as usurpers opposed to an orthodox oligarchy, his view of tyranny as 
representing conventional leadership in the Archaic period is unconvincing. While 
personal rule had existed since at least the eighth century, Anderson’s view that 
                                                          
10
 E.g. Luraghi (1994) 71.  
11
 Parker (1996) 165-186.   
12
 Anderson (2005) 173.  
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naked power constituted a form of rule that was socially acceptable does not fit the 
evidence. As we shall see in Chapter II, the evidence of Archaic poetry and of 
Herodotus suggests that by the Archaic period tyranny was not socially acceptable to 
the Greeks. Indeed, Chapter I will discuss certain behaviours of Homeric basileis 
that were deeply unpopular and even unacceptable to the communities they ruled. A 
volume of collected essays edited by Lewis (2006) provided scholars with a wide-
ranging collection of papers on Greek and Roman tyranny but none of these 
addressed the enigma of the origins of tyranny directly. Like Drews, Lewis (2009) 
went on to reject the support of a hoplite class as a fundamental factor in the rise of 
tyrants.
13
 Lewis, however, also subscribed to the theory of tyrants as social reformers 
and redistributors of power from the traditional nobles to the demos. Lewis also 
adhered to the concept of fixed classes in Archaic Greece, particularly an upper class 
nobility that fought among itself with the victor emerging as a tyrant.
14
 A paper by 
Cawkwell (1995) joined Drews in reacting against the view of the tyrant as a ruler 
raised up by the masses; essentially propelled into power by a wave of popular 
support and resentment against economic exploitation. Cawkwell rightly noted that 
‘tyranny had nothing to do with the alleged hoplite class.’15 However, Cawkwell’s 
conclusion that ‘The People did not come into it’ is perhaps not satisfactory.16 The 
significance of popular support for tyrants will be discussed later in this thesis.  
 
For Andrewes, the ‘economic factor’ meant an Archaic landscape where 
small landowners were indebted to the rich and where the introduction of coinage 
had made borrowing and lending easier but encouraged more farmers to fall into 
                                                          
13
 Lewis (2009) 25-27. 
14
 Lewis (2009) 21. 
15
 Cawkwell (1995) 82. 
16
 Cawkwell (1995) 86.  
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debt.
17
 Such a situation supposedly made tyranny attractive to the poor who expected 
a redistribution of land. This theory was based on a particular interpretation of 
Solon’s poetry as describing land reform or a cancellation of debts, which has since 
been decisively refuted by Harris.
18
 Andrewes’ description of an Archaic Greece 
devastated by economic catastrophe and social turmoil has been adopted and 
promoted by several scholars since 1956, including Oliva (1960)
19
 and Berve. Mossé 
(1969) did not attempt a comprehensive study of Greek tyranny in the style of Berve, 
but selected individuals to study from each period of Greek history. While the book 
discussed the various theories behind the rise of tyranny, Mossé declined to commit 
to one herself, although the work generally leans towards economic tension between 
rich and the exploited poor.
20
 Smith’s (1989) handbook on the Athenian tyrants did 
not take into account the valid criticisms made by Drews in 1972 and persisted in 
viewing tyrants as enemies of the traditional aristocrats, despite some supposedly 
being aristocratic themselves. Smith saw the tyrants as being propelled into power on 
a wave of economic resentment.
21
 Smith’s use of Aristotle and Thucydides to discuss 
Archaic society and Archaic problems, instead of the poetry of Hesiod, Solon and 
Theognis, illustrates the danger in using anachronistic later sources which encourage 
the historian to draw conclusions which are contradicted by the earlier evidence.  
 
A volume edited by Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2000) provided a fresh look at the 
evidence for the tyranny of the Pisistratids, drawing on the work of scholars from 
                                                          
17
 Andrewes (1956) 82.  
18
 Harris (1997) 103-112.   
19
 Oliva (1979) 236: ‘In dieser Zeit des ökonomischen Aufschwungs und der sozialen Wirren 
kommen in mehreren griechischen Gemeinden Männer an die Regierung, die mit dem seltsamen und 
dunklen Namen τύραννοι bezeichtnet wurden.’ In Kinzl’s 1979 volume but originally published in 
1960.  
20
 Mossé (1969) 3-9.  
21
 Smith (1989) 2, 12-15. 
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several disciplines. The essays in this volume made several well-informed points. 
Sancisis-Weerdenburg, for example, joined Drews and Cawkwell by arguing that the 
Pisistratid tyranny was built on personal power rather than a semi-constitutional 
office of tyrant,
22
 although she remained tied to the idea of an Archaic aristocracy.
23
 
The volume’s focus on the Pisistratids resulted in a lack of comparative data with 
other Archaic tyrants, whose behaviour can be used to corroborate the accounts of 
the Pisistratid tyranny and help identify anachronisms in the post-Archaic sources. 
The work of Lavelle (2005) on the Pisistratid tyranny took the opposite view to 
Cawkwell’s 1995 essay, citing Pisistratus’ personal popularity among the Athenians, 
garnered largely from his success as a war-leader rather than socio-economic 
resentment, as the main ‘springboard’ for his tyranny.24 Lavelle also offered a 
welcome discussion on the importance of wealth (chremata) for the success of the 
tyranny,
25
 but did not explore its specific uses or make extensive comparisons with 
other Archaic tyrants. Mitchell’s (2013) book on the rulers of Greece promoted the 
important and useful view that the tyrant’s means of taking power were essentially 
personal by discussing the use of family and the accumulation of support through 
displays of personal prowess. Mitchell’s focus, however, tended towards nebulous 
ideas, such as the prestige of ancestry,
26
  rather than the practical methods that the 
tyrants used to gain and maintain power. Mitchell also concurred with Anderson’s 
suggestion that tyrants were members of a closed oligarchic elite which competed 
among itself for power.
27
 This view has also been adopted by the recent work of 
Carty (2015). This monograph on Polycrates states that elite factionalism provided 
                                                          
22
 Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2000) 14-15. 
23
 E.g. Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2000) 10. 
24
 Lavelle (2005) 155-157.  
25
 Lavelle (2005) 159. 
26
 Mitchell (2013) 58-59.  
27
 Mitchell (2013) 60-61. 
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the background for the tyranny,
28
 while the theory that Polycrates was enriched by 
supplying large numbers of slave-soldiers to Egypt is original but unconvincing.
29
 
The lack of Greek evidence for this practice combined with the comparatively 
abundant evidence for the nature of Homeric and Archaic epikouroi contradicts this 
theory.  
 
Stahl’s (1987) book on aristocracy and tyranny in Archaic Athens is difficult 
to categorise thematically as it did not commit wholly to military revolution or class 
conflict. Stahl argued for an unstable society of competing aristocrats where a state 
of stasis was more or less the norm until one supremely successful aristocrat 
established himself as tyrant.
30
 Furthermore, Stahl’s argument that tyrants and other 
influential individuals relied on their own resources and personal efforts to gain 
power was correct, as this thesis will show. We shall also see, however, that the 
normalisation of stasis as a feature of Archaic society is not supported by the 
descriptions of the phenomenon in Archaic poetry. Barceló’s (1993) view that the 
early Archaic political landscape was dominated by intensely agonistic, competing 
aristocrats, the most successful of whom might become a tyrant, indicated a 
scholarly shift away from the economic arguments of Andrewes that had been 
anticipated by Stahl several years earlier. Like Stahl, Barceló retained the rigid 
theory of class and the ubiquitous but vaguely defined Archaic aristocracy.
31
 The 
strong belief in an Archaic aristocracy and its link with tyranny culminated in a book 
by Stein-Hölkeskamp (1989) on aristocratic culture and polis society. Although 
tyranny itself was not the focus of this work, Stein-Hölkeskamp saw the Pisistratid 
                                                          
28
 Carty (2015) 23. 
29
 Carty (2015) 155-169. 
30
 Stahl (1987) 56-105.  
31
 Barceló (1993) 89-90.  
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family and their behaviour as a continuance of Greek ‘Adelskultur’,32 arguing for 
tyranny as an aristocratic phenomenon. This stance was also taken by de Libero 
(1996). Stein-Hölkeskamp’s book offered no alternative to the theories of Stahl and 
Barceló on the nature and background of Greek tyranny, although Stein-Hölkeskamp 
later cited a land shortage as the cause for severe impoverishment and indebtedness 
in the Archaic period.
33
  
 
While there has been no linear development of scholarship on Greek tyranny, 
scholars have become more inclined in recent years to see tyranny as the result of 
personal power. Scholars such as Andrewes and Lavelle, who have searched for the 
practical methods through which tyrants took power, ultimately prepared the way for 
the question addressed by this thesis. Indeed, Andrewes provided a short but useful 
section on the maintenance of Pisistratid power at Athens which discussed several 
practical methods for securing power.
34
 It is, however, clear that none of these 
theories above adequately explains the supposed appearance of tyranny in seventh-
century Greece. Each one can be refuted by the discoveries of recent archaeology, 
the historicity of Homeric society, and by treating the Archaic sources critically. 
Furthermore, previous scholarship has not acknowledged the significance of the rule 
of law in creating a political atmosphere in Greece in which monarchy was regarded 
as dangerous, threatening and fundamentally unjust. To explain the phenomenon of 
tyranny a new approach to the subject is clearly needed. This thesis provides this 
approach by showing that Greek tyranny was not in fact a new phenomenon, but an 
                                                          
32
 Stein-Hölkeskamp (1989) 152: ‘Überhaupt muß man die Baupolitik der Tyrannen auf jeden Fall in 
den Kontext der überkommenen aristokratischen Selbstdarstellungsrituale stellen und sie somit als 
Fortführung und zugleich höchste Steigerung eines zentralen Aspekts der griechischen „Adelskultur“ 
interpretieren.’ 
33
 Stein-Hölkeskamp (1996) 656-657.  
34
 Andrewes (1956) 107-113. 
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old form of ruler given a new name by the Greeks who adhered to the rule-of-law 
ideology.  
 
This thesis represents an original approach to the phenomenon of Greek 
tyranny. First, it does not begin with the unsupported assumption that tyranny was a 
new phenomenon in seventh-century Greece. Instead it traces the behaviour of Greek 
rulers from the eighth century to the fourth and finds their behaviour to be consistent. 
Second, it does not subscribe to the established assumptions regarding the socio-
economic conditions of Archaic Greece. Instead, it treats Homer, Hesiod and the 
Archaic poets as a body of evidence from which it is possible to discover the 
substantive problems faced by Greek society from the eighth to the sixth century. 
Third, it does not attempt to narrate the careers of individual tyrants in chronological 
order. Instead, it collects sources that provide evidence regarding the behaviour of 
Homeric basileis and tyrants. This approach increases the amount of evidence 
available and avoids the need to use untrustworthy, late or heavily biased sources to 
create a biographical account of a single tyrant. Several monographs on specific, 
particularly Archaic, tyrants have accepted the statements of late or hostile sources 
despite the fact they cannot be corroborated. Consequently, they have struggled to 
explain anomalies caused by anachronism or to fit anachronistic statements into their 
narrative.
35
 Their attempts to plug the extensive gaps in the historical record have 
also led to a great deal of speculation, rather than evidence-based discussion.
36
  
Fourth, this thesis focuses on the clear continuity represented by the Greek tyrants, 
                                                          
35
 E.g. Lavelle (2005); Carty (2015); Strauss (1963) 28-29, for example, noted the difficulty in 
discovering the intent of the author of Xenophon’s Hiero through investigating the work’s content.  
36
 This is not true of every monograph on tyrants. For example the works of Caven (1990) and 
Sprawski (1999), on Dionysius I and Jason of Pherae respectively, make extensive use of the 
available evidence and led these scholars to question some of the established assumptions regarding 
tyrants. E.g. Caven (1990) 78-79.  
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and shows that the means by which sole rulers took power in Greece remained 
consistent from the eighth century to the fourth. Fifth, this approach does not focus 
on the works of the philosophers as evidence for Greek tyranny. Whilst the 
philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle, have been heavily utilised by previous 
scholars, the philosophical writings of the Classical period are, as we shall see, 
demonstrably anachronistic when applied to Archaic Greece. Over-reliance on these 
sources by historians of Archaic Greece led, for example, to the construction of the 
Archaic economic crisis that finds so little support in archaeology and contemporary 
sources. Classical philosophical sources, however, remain useful in discussing the 
Classical view of tyranny, particularly from the perspective of those Greeks fully 
immersed in the-rule-of-law ideology. These texts also raise interesting questions 
about the relative popularity of monarchy among Classical Greek thinkers and the 
general citizenry. However, as the purpose of this thesis is to understand and explain 
the rise of tyranny in the Archaic period, Archaic sources will be utilised as far as 
possible in the second and third chapters. The fourth chapter, which discusses 
Classical tyranny, will utilise philosophical sources where appropriate but will give 
them no position of pre-eminence. To answer the question raised by this thesis, it is 
crucial that the practical methods through which tyrants took power are identified. 
Philosophical texts generally focus on the moral degradation of the tyrant rather than 
recording the steps he took to seize power. Therefore the philosophical texts offer 
limited opportunites for gathering the evidence required by this thesis.  
 
b) Summary of chapters 
Chapter I investigates the methods used by the Homeric basileis to gain and maintain 
power. The first part establishes the historicity of Homeric society and its date as late 
18 
 
eighth century. The chapter then shows that the basileis achieved power through 
military success and maintained power through private wealth and certain social 
practices. The third part discusses the private ownership of slaves, land and the 
agricultural surplus they produced for the basileis that could be exchanged for luxury 
goods or distributed to friends and followers. The fourth part of the chapter discusses 
certain social practices that the basileis employed to gain, increase or maintain 
power. The approach of this chapter is unique as it opposes the interpretations of a 
quasi-feudal Homeric society, shows that there were alternative methods of taking 
power rather than inherited status, and does not attempt to impose an institution of 
kingship on Homeric Greece. Instead, the chapter focuses on the personal nature of 
the rule of the basileis and the practical methods that secured their position at the 
head of the community.  
 
Chapter II is a discussion of the state of Greek society in the Archaic period 
and identifies the particular problems that it faced. The purpose of this chapter is to 
show that the evidence does not support the socio-economic causes for the rise of 
tyranny. It will then identify the actual problems faced by the Archaic Greeks, 
showing that these were combated by the rule-of-law ideology that in turn 
demonised and discredited monarchy. In the first part the chapter shows that the 
existence of the supposed socio-economic crises of the Archaic period is not 
supported by any compelling evidence. These issues have traditionally been 
identified as overpopulation; the rise of a trade or craft-based nouveau riche who 
demanded a share of power from the landed aristocracy; the supposed rise of a Greek 
middle-class composed of hoplite soldiers whose contribution to warfare suddenly 
provoked them into becoming politically aware; discontent caused by an unfair 
19 
 
system of land tenure. These are the most significant factors that have been 
suggested as major causes of civil strife and political upheaval in the Archaic period. 
The second part of Chapter II then identifies and discusses the actual crises 
experienced by the Archaic Greeks. These problems were a lack of labour to work 
the lands of the rich; hybris (meaning aggression and flagrant corruption motivated 
by greed); a lack of preventative measures against violence and corruption. This part 
also shows that these problems existed because the very practices that individuals 
used to gain power in Homeric society, as discussed in Chapter I, and the Archaic 
period demanded the consumption of large amounts of wealth and therefore 
incentivised violence, theft and corruption. The third part of Chapter II discusses the 
rise of the rule-of-law ideology in Archaic Greece and shows why some Greeks 
found it to be a desirable system to implement. It then identifies the features of the 
rule of law, such as separation of powers and term limits for offices, which were 
obviously incompatible with the rule of one man, and which led to the demonization 
of the style of rule practised by the Homeric basileis.  
 
Chapter III identifies the methods used by Archaic tyrants to gain and 
maintain power. The aim of this chapter is to show that the behaviour of Archaic 
tyrants remained consistent with that of Homeric rulers, and that Archaic tyranny 
represented continuity, not revolution. Consequently, Chapter III follows a broadly 
similar structure to the sections of Chapter I on military success, wealth and social 
practices in Homeric society. The Archaic tyrants maintained the practices of the 
eighth-century basileis to increase their personal wealth and power while cultivating 
popular support. Chapter IV identifies the methods used by Classical tyrants to gain 
and maintain power. The aim of this chapter is to show once again that the behaviour 
20 
 
of Classical tyrants represented continuity, not revolution. It therefore continues to 
follow a broadly similar structure to chapters I and III on military success, wealth 
and social practices. Chapter IV deviates slightly from the structure of Chapter III by 
explaining the relatively small differences between Archaic and Classical tyranny.  
Following the evidence, this chapter shows that the supposed differences between 
Archaic and Classical tyrants vanish on closer inspection and that their behaviour is 
once again entirely consistent with their predecessors. The thesis concludes by 
summarising its argument and by offering concluding remarks on the nature of 
Greek tyranny. It then explains the significance of this thesis’ argument for wider 
Greek history. 
 
c) Methodology 
This thesis utilises sources from a number of different genres, such as 
Homeric oral poetry, Archaic poetry, fifth-century prose, historiography and 
philosophy. Each genre poses a unique set of challenges to historical enquiry. 
Homeric poetry represents an oral tradition, not a historical record. As will be 
discussed in Chapter I, anthropology tells us that a record of actual events would 
have been subservient to the poet’s need to conform to the expectations of his 
audience and to the structure of the plot. Furthermore, elements of myth and magic 
must be disentangled from actual descriptions of society, ritual or warfare. Archaic 
poetry offers a different set of problems. The poets, or their personas, engage in a 
moralising discourse, attempting to convince their audiences of the best way to live 
or organise a community, in their view. Some, for example Theognis, were openly 
hostile to individuals they would accuse of tyranny, raising the question of whether 
or not these individuals were genuinely tyrants and actually guilty of the acts of 
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which they were accused. In addition to the potential issues of oral deformation 
found in the anecdotes preserved in, for example, Herodotus, the later prose and 
historiography of the fifth century was created at a time when the rule-of-law 
ideology was already two centuries old. Hostility to, and fear of, tyranny was deeply 
ingrained by this time, as we shall see. It is not difficult to suspect that Classical 
sources allowed their horror of tyranny to influence their descriptions of monarchical 
figures. Furthermore, the interests of Greek historiography usually lie elsewhere 
other than the means tyrants used to take power. For example, Thucydides was 
concerned with the causes and effects of the Peloponnesian War, not the 
phenomenon of tyranny. The evidence gleaned about tyranny from his history is 
usually found in descriptions of peripheral figures and chance descriptions of 
political activity in foreign states. The philosophical texts are particularly 
problematic. While the philosophers present a similar problem to that of Archaic 
poetry, in that they attempt to promote particular modes of living and governance, 
they pose a new challenge by imposing the social, legal and economic conditions of 
the Classical period onto the Archaic past.  
 
Despite the challenges presented by these genres, this thesis approaches these 
sources as a body of evidence from which it is possible to source substantive 
evidence for Greek society from the eighth to the sixth century. The problems they 
pose can be mitigated by adopting an evidence-based methodology when using the 
Homeric poems or the literary sources. Where possible, this thesis employs the 
sources that are chronologically closest to the periods it is investigating. It avoids 
using isolated examples of events or practices, instead gathering pools of evidence 
that can be corroborated. These two simple approaches reduce the chances of 
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anachronisms creeping into the historical account and mitigate the effects of oral 
distortion and folk memory by checking the consistency of accounts with a large 
number of similar instances. This also increases the amount of evidence drawn from 
contemporary sources and avoids the need to rely on the testimony of much later 
sources. As we shall see, Classical and later sources often projected the conditions of 
their own times onto the Archaic period and depicted societal conditions that are not 
present in any Archaic source, such as Aristotle’s description of the rise of a hoplite 
class (Arist. Pol. 4.1297b.14-29). This thesis will attempt to use as much evidence as 
possible while not being overly reliant on the later material.  
 
While there is certainly a strong bias against tyranny in the majority of the 
sources, this does not necessarily pose a major problem to the question of this thesis. 
A number of sources are openly hostile to tyrants and some besmirch their enemies 
or individuals they disapproved of with accusations of tyranny. These accounts, 
however, still represent Greek views of how tyrants were expected to behave, and 
unbelievable accusations levelled at one’s enemies and opponents would have had 
no meaning. Regarding the broader content of Archaic poetry, it is certainly 
necessary to maintain an awareness of the fact that the poet worked to convince his 
audience of a particular idea or of his hostility to certain behaviours or individuals. It 
is, however, also possible to corroborate the concerns of Archaic poetry with 
tyranny, violence, and corruption with legal inscriptions and their substantive 
content; the archaeological manifestation of the Greek solution to these problems. 
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Chapter I: Gaining and Maintaining Power in Homeric Society 
The first Greek tyrants were the same style of leader that had traditionally ruled the 
society depicted in the Homeric poems. These rulers, usually referred to as basileus 
and sometimes anax,
37
 were wealthy and successful warriors who maintained order 
and defended their people in return for gifts and parcels of land. In order to prove 
that the Homeric leaders and the early tyrants used the same practices it will be 
necessary to examine and compare the means through which they took power. This 
chapter will discuss the means of taking power in Homeric society and show that 
these constituted a personal series of methods and arrangements. 
It must first be noted that the word ‘king’ is deliberately not used in this 
chapter and Homeric ‘kingship’ is not the term used to refer to the phenomenon of 
Homeric leadership. This is because the word ‘king’ inevitably projects a form of 
monarchy resembling those of early modern Europe or of Eastern despotism onto 
Homeric society. In practice the Homeric basileis resemble neither of these 
institutions. The autocratic nature of the monarchs of early modern Europe, and the 
accompanying institutions of hereditary monarchy and divine right, were not found 
in Homeric society. Although some ceremony was observed around the basileis, 
such as special seats, sceptres, and portions of food and drink, this does not approach 
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 These terms have been investigated by Carlier and Lévy. Both scholars generally agree that anax 
describes a leader with great power over subordinates, possibly equating to ‘master’, as one could also 
be anax of the household, and over one’s slaves or animals. This would also explain why anax was 
not used as a title for living men in later periods in Greece, but was applied to gods, as such a position 
over free men would have been unacceptable. Neither scholar regards basileus and anax as 
interchangeable. Their understanding of basileus differs slightly. Lévy interprets basileus as a first 
among equals within a political system, with an anax wielding the greater power. Carlier argues that 
basileus describes a hereditary position within a hierarchical system, with a man being more or less 
basileus. See Carlier (2006) 101-103. Cf. Levy (1985) 300-301, 313-314. In particular regarding  
anax: ‘Avec les progrès de la liberté dans les cités grecques cette domination, qui s’exerce de la même 
façon sur les hommes libres…et sur la domesticité, voire les animaux, ne paraîtra plus tolérable.’ 
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the scale or elaboration of court ceremonies encountered, for example, in medieval 
Europe. 
    Before discussing the practices of the Homeric world and their significance 
for understanding the first Greek tyrants it will be necessary to summarise the recent 
scholarship concerning the dating of Homeric society. This scholarship dates the 
society depicted in Homer to the eighth and seventh centuries BC. This raises serious 
questions about the connection between the Homeric basileis and the appearance of 
the first tyrants in seventh-century Greece. It is also imperative that what is meant by 
‘Homeric society’ is now explained. In this thesis ‘Homeric society’ refers to the 
Greek society that existed in the eighth century, which practised the various social 
norms depicted in the Homeric poems and lived among the archaeological 
phenomena described therein. The grounds for historicising the content of the 
Homeric poems are twofold. Firstly, this introduction will discuss the material 
phenomena in the poems that can be corroborated with archaeological evidence to 
date the poems. Secondly, it will summarise the anthropological view of the poems 
as a vehicle for the social practices the poems depict and the grounds for accepting 
these depictions as historical.  
An effective and inclusive approach to the evidence for the dating of 
Homeric society has been adopted by those scholars opposed to the view that 
interprets the poems as an amalgam of social practices or a poetic construction.
38
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 E.g. Andrewes (1967) 40: ‘We may expect that the background of the story will reflect an earlier 
stage than the poet’s own, but we need not expect that all features of it will derive from the same 
time.’ Geddes (1984) 35, argued that Homer is unhistorical because one cannot identify the usual 
trappings of ‘kingship’ such as royal regalia or hereditary right to the throne: ‘The Homeric world was 
lying alongside a world which understood kingship very well. The kings of Assyria and Egypt were 
set off from the rest of the people by ceremony and regalia, pomp and circumstance of every kind. In 
Homer the kings are not distinguished in any way at all from the rest of the community, not in the 
way they are addressed…nor the way they are approached, not in their clothes nor their seating 
arrangements…with no insignia, nothing.’ On grounds such as this Geddes argued against a historical 
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Recently, convincing dates of the eighth and seventh centuries for the setting of 
Homeric society have been offered by Crielaard and van Wees. Their dates are 
corroborated by extensive use of archaeological evidence. Rather than ignoring or 
dismissing as late interpolations phenomena that contradicted their views the 
approaches of these scholars are characterised by their broad inclusivity of features 
and patterns of evidence from the Homeric poems. Rather than attempting to 
highlight individual artefacts within the poems and then locate them in the 
archaeological record, Crielaard reversed this methodology and identified securely 
dated archaeological phenomena and then searched for these in the Homeric poems. 
In doing so Crielaard avoided the pitfall of basing a date for Homeric society on 
artefacts that cannot be securely dated. Instead of focusing on individual artefacts 
that cannot be reliably assigned to a single period, such as the notorious boars’ tusk 
helmet,
39
 Crielaard’s superior methodology draws attention to the fact that 
developments and innovations that certainly began in Greece in the eighth and 
seventh centuries can be easily and consistently identified throughout the Homeric 
poems. These include the adoption of an alphabet, an increase in the quantity and 
complexity of figurative, narrative visual art, an increase in overseas contacts and 
Greek settlement overseas, the appearance of stone altars and monumental temple 
architecture, and an increase in the religious use of votive offerings and cult statues. 
Each of these archaeological features will now be briefly summarised.  
                                                                                                                                                                    
Homeric society. Snodgrass (1974) 124-125, attempted to prove that Homeric society was not 
historical because the poems did not match the archaeological remains of the Dark Age. Snodgrass 
claimed that the depictions of wealth in Homer could not be taken seriously due to the supposed 
poverty of Dark Age Greece, which he assumes was the setting for the Homeric world.  
39
 Crielaard (1995) 208, points out the flaws in this particular approach: ‘This method focuses on 
individual artefacts instead of broader patterns; in addition, it relates undated and sometimes 
undatable artefacts occurring in the texts to archaeological objects, instead of comparing securely 
dated archaeological evidence to written information. It is not archaeology itself which is an 
unreliable tool for dating the setting of the epics: rather, the difficulty arises from the category of 
archaeological data which is employed and the way these data are used in relation to the textual 
evidence.’  
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Writing is mentioned certainly on one, possibly on two, occasions in the 
Iliad. Bellerophon carries a written message containing a request to execute him (Il. 
6.167-169) and the Achaians make marks on lots to determine who will fight Hektor 
(Il. 7.175). The earliest surviving examples of Greek script, probably derived from a 
Semitic alphabet, appear in the archaeological record in the form of graffiti on 
pottery finds from sites such as Lefkandi,
40
 Athens, Rhodes and Pithekoussai,
41
 and 
are dated to the eighth century. Considering the dates of these archaeological finds, 
and the logical conclusion that literacy reappeared in Greece about 800BC, 
becoming more widespread over the course of the eighth century, the Iliad must have 
been created at some point after this date.
42
 
The production of figurative, narrative art intensified and became more 
sophisticated during the eighth century.
43
 Archaeological finds from the eighth 
century, such as the examples of painted pottery attributed to the so-called Dipylon 
Master, depict large-scale dramatic scenes featuring combat, athletic competition and 
burial.
44
 Particularly complex scenes also appear on metalwork from the late ninth 
and eighth centuries. Gold diadems retrieved from Eretrian cemeteries depict 
subjects such as combat and the hunting of lions with hounds. A particularly 
complex eighth century example discussed by Coldstream depicts a deer feeding her 
young and two lions tearing apart a man.
45
 This artefact is of particular relevance 
when considered alongside the description of Odysseus’ brooch, ‘a hound held in his 
forepaws a dappled fawn, preying on it as it struggled; and all admired it, how, 
though they were golden, it preyed on the fawn and strangled it and the fawn 
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 Popham, Sackett and Themelis (1980) 368-369. 
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 Coldstream (2003) 298-299. 
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 Crielaard (1995) 214. 
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 Crielaard (1995) 214-224; Whitley (1991b) 45-53. 
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 Coldstream (2003) 110. 
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 Coldstream (2003) 198. Whitley (1991b) 143-144. 
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struggled with his feet as he tried to escape him’ (Od. 19.226-231). Further examples 
of such complex narrative, visual art can be easily identified within the Homeric 
poems. Herakles’ belt (Od. 11.609-612), Agamemnon’s corselet (Il. 11.26) and the 
shield of Achilles (Il. 18.478-607) all suggest that the poet’s audience was familiar 
with examples of figurative and narrative art. Examples of figurative statuary in 
Homer, such as the cult statue of Athene at Troy, the fantastic examples on Phaiakia 
(Od. 7.91-94, 99-101) and the ‘living’ statues of Hephaistos (Il. 18.417-421), further 
suggest that the poet’s audience were acquainted with sophisticated pieces of 
figurative statuary.  
Although there is evidence for Greek trade with the East prior to the eighth 
century,
46
 Greek contacts with the wider Mediterranean appear to become more 
regular during the eighth and seventh centuries.
47
 Small luxury items exported from 
Egypt appear in eighth-century sites and tombs in Corinth, Athens and Sparta and 
even as far west as Pithekoussai and Etruria.
48
 In the Homeric poems several 
Achaians make journeys to the East and to Egypt. Agamemnon has a guest-friend, 
Kinyras, who is a Cypriot (Il. 11.17-23) and Menelaos visits many regions and 
peoples. ‘I wandered to Cyprus and Phoenicia, to the Egyptians, I reached the 
Aithiopians, Eremboi, Sidonians, and Libya’ (Od. 4.83-85). Odysseus’ herald, 
Eurybates, is also described as ‘black-complexioned, wooly-haired’ (Od. 19.246-
247), suggesting that he originated from the African continent. The Egyptian city of 
Thebes is also mentioned in the epics (Il. 9.381-384, Od. 4.126-127)
49
 and Achaian 
raids on the Egyptian coast are described by Odysseus (Od. 14.245-265, 17.423-
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 Popham, Sackett and Themelis (1980) 249-251. 
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 Crielaard (1995) 224. 
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 Boardman (1980) 111-113. 
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 Hainsworth (1993) 113, questions the Greek name for the Egyptian city of Thebes but not that the 
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434). Pottery finds indicate that Pithekoussai, just off the coast of Italy, is the oldest 
known Greek settlement in the West, with Cumae on the Italian mainland and Naxos 
in Sicily following a few years later. Prior to the founding of permanent Greek 
settlements in Italy and Sicily Euboean pottery was already arriving in the form of 
trade goods.
50
 Sicily is mentioned by Odysseus when he pretends to be Eperitos of 
Alybas (Od. 24.307), and Laertes keeps a female slave originally from Sicily (Od. 
24.210-212). That Laertes was able to acquire a Sicilian slave, and that the suitors 
threatened to sell Odysseus to the Sicels (Od. 20.382-383), matches the 
archaeological evidence that trade occurred between Greece and Sicily in the eighth 
and seventh centuries, and suggests that the poet’s audience was aware of this 
region.
51
 
The Phoenicians were also active in this period and expanded their activities 
and settlements in the western Mediterranean in the ninth and eighth centuries,
52
 
establishing settlements in Sicily, North Africa and the Iberian Peninsula. Phoenician 
contact with the Greeks appears in the archaeological record in the form of luxury 
items deposited in ninth and eighth-century graves at sites such as Lefkandi, the 
Kerameikos of Athens, and on the islands of Crete and Cos.
53
 The presence of the 
Phoenicians in the Mediterranean and their contact with the Greeks is reflected in the 
poems. Phoenician craftsmen (Il. 23.741-745) and traders (Od. 14.287-297, 15.415-
16) are mentioned and some Phoenician women brought from Sidon (Il. 6.289-292). 
Another Phoenician woman, a slave, lives in the house of Eumaios’ father (Od. 
15.417-419). Menelaos receives a silver bowl as a gift from Phaidimos of Sidon (Od. 
4.615-619, 15.115-119). These passages not only suggest a familiarity with these 
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regions but also a familiarity with the concept of travel between them, the 
establishment of social contacts and the movement of goods. 
The earliest Greek overseas settlement is Pithekoussai, which was probably 
founded in the first half of the eighth century, with others such as Cumae and Naxos, 
and Catane and Syracuse in Sicily following shortly after.
54
 The process of settling 
overseas was clearly familiar to the audience of the Iliad and the Odyssey. The son of 
Herakles, Tlepolemos, is forced to found a new community in Rhodes. ‘Now when 
Tlepolemos was grown in the strong-built mansion, he struck to death his own 
father’s beloved uncle…At once he put ships together and assembled a host of 
people and went fugitive over the sea, since the others threatened, the rest of the sons 
and the grandsons of the strength of Herakles. And he came to Rhodes a wanderer, a 
man of misfortune, and they settled there in triple division by tribes’ (Il. 2.661-668). 
Odysseus admires a nearby island with the eye of a man who knows where to 
establish a settlement. Not only does he note the fertile soil (Od. 9.131-135) and 
freshwater springs (Od. 9.140-141), but also the fine harbour (Od. 9.135-139). 
Nausithoös took the Phaiakians to Scheria and performed all the functions of an 
oikist, a formal leader and founder of a settlement. ‘From here godlike Nausithoös 
had removed and led a migration, and settled in Scheria, far away from men who eat 
bread, and driven a wall about the city, and built the houses, and made the temples of 
the gods, and allotted the holdings’ (Od. 6.6-10). This description even suggests a 
foundation built according to formal plans and a premeditated design. It is not 
unreasonable to state that the poet’s audience appears to have been familiar with the 
practice of settling overseas and that the city of the Phaiakians contains the same 
features, as will be shown, as an eighth or seventh-century Greek settlement. 
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Stone altars and free-standing monumental temples become a feature of Greek 
religion in the eighth century. Thucydides writes that an altar to Apollo Archegetes 
was built by the Greeks who founded Naxos (in 734),
55
 and an altar to Athene was 
built by the founders of Syracuse (Thuc. 6.3).
56
 A large number of stone altars are 
encountered in the Iliad and the Odyssey. Apollo’s altar on Delos is briefly 
mentioned (Od. 6.161), the Phaiakians sacrifice on an altar to Poseidon (Od. 13.187), 
there is an altar to the Nymphs on Ithaka at which travellers offer sacrifice (Od. 
17.210-211) and Aigisthos burns offerings on the altars of the gods at Mycenae (Od. 
3.273). The Achaians sacrifice around an altar to Apollo, called eudmetos or ‘well-
built’ (Il. 1.440, 448) and burnt offerings are made at the altar of Zeus at Troy (Il. 
4.48). Although monumental temples are fewer in number they still appear in the 
epics. A temple to Athene, housing the image of the goddess, is found in Troy (Il. 
6.88). Apollo’s priest, Chryses, builds a temple of Apollo and receives the god’s 
favour as a result (Il. 1.39). There is a temple of Athene at Athens (Il. 2.549) and a 
temple of Apollo at Troy (Il. 5.446). Odysseus’ crew promise a temple to the sun 
god to atone for destroying his cattle (Od. 12.346). There are a number of temples in 
Phaiakia including a temple to Poseidon (Od. 6.10). Building these was one of the 
first acts of Nausithoös on founding the city. The archaeological record also 
indicates an increase in the use and quality of cult statues and of votive offerings in 
religious practice in the eighth century.
57
 In the epics, a cult statue of Athene is kept 
in her temple in Troy to which the Trojan women make an offering of a peplos (Il. 
6.269-273, 279-303). Odysseus makes an offering of the spoils from Dolon’s body to 
Athene (Il. 10.462-463) and Aigisthos made votive offerings to the gods. 
‘[Aigisthos] hung up many dedications, gold, and things woven’ (Od. 3.274). The 
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temple of Athene at Athens is called ‘rich’ or ‘wealthy’ (Il. 2.549) and the Achaians 
bring dora (gifts) to Poseidon at Helike and Aigai (Il. 8.203). The practice of making 
votive offerings is clearly commonplace in the society depicted in the Homeric 
poems. As this summary has shown, Crielaard’s study consolidates the evidence 
from the Homeric epics and archaeology and that evidence overwhelmingly presents 
a date of the late eighth or the early seventh century for Homeric society.
58
  
A major feature of the Homeric world not covered comprehensively by 
Crielaard, warfare and military equipment, has been discussed at length by van 
Wees. Van Wees has argued forcefully that the depictions of Homeric combat and 
the equipment of the warriors are consistently portrayed and datable to one specific 
period, that is, to the eighth and seventh centuries.
59
 Van Wees’ methodology is 
similar to that of Crielaard and includes a large body of evidence comprising 
archaeology, lyric poetry, and the Homeric epics.
60
 Following on from scholars such 
as Latacz, van Wees accepts the Homeric portrayal of combat as a serious and 
consistent depiction of warfare. Unlike Latacz, however, van Wees defines Homeric 
combat as a primitive style of combat not inconsistent with the depictions of warriors 
and combat in Late-Geometric and seventh-century vase paintings. As van Wees 
states, securely dated archaeological artefacts, such as the Chigi Vase, contain 
depictions that recall the style of combat and the military equipment described in 
Homer. The warriors depicted on this vase, for example, are, unlike the Classical 
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 van Wees (1994a) 2: ‘Again, a long oral tradition might well produce confused images, but we 
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hoplite, equipped with two spears. The Homeric warrior bears a crest of horsehair on 
his helmet and wears a bell-corselet, as do those on the Chigi Vase, and unlike those 
of the Mycenaean period or the Dark Ages.
61
 Van Wees addressed the question of 
the bronze arms of the Homeric warriors by stating that these need not be taken as 
deliberate archaization as bronze is worn alongside gold and tin (Il. 8.193, 18.6.11-
12, 21.592), metals not as suitable for combat as iron or even bronze.
62
 Van Wees 
points out that these metals recall the precious dedications made to the gods and are 
probably mentioned by the poet to glorify the heroes who are already made 
impossibly bigger, stronger and faster than normal men.
63
 Iron is of course present in 
the epics as well as bronze, in the form of weaponry, tools, and as a metaphor. An 
expression in the Odyssey even suggests that weaponry was commonly forged from 
iron (Od. 16.294, 19.13). Van Wees’ interpretation of the evidence largely points to 
an early seventh-century date for the style of combat and the military equipment 
depicted in the poems.
64
 
The fact that the Iliad and the Odyssey are the products of an oral tradition 
does not necessarily pose a problem for their use as historical evidence.
65
 As Morris 
notes, the Iliad and the Odyssey should be viewed partly from an anthropological 
perspective that recognises the connection between the poems and the society that 
produced them.
66
 Perhaps the most important point highlighted by Morris’ argument 
is that oral poetry does not preserve outdated social institutions, but reflects those 
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that are contemporary with the poet’s audience.67 The evidence collected by 
individuals such as Lord and Ong strongly suggests that the fluid and ever-changing 
nature of oral poetry is incapable of preserving an amalgamation of ‘dead’ social 
norms, institutions and practices, as they would have no relevance to an audience 
who would be unable to comprehend them.
68
 Although this argument largely focuses 
on the negative aspects of oral poetry, that is, what oral poetry does not record, the 
positive side of this argument is that oral poetry will generally reflect the social 
practices of the current audience.
69
 This is evidenced by the fact that oral poetry 
serves a number of practical functions for the community who provide the 
audience.
70
 Finnegan writes that oral poetry ‘frequently serves to uphold the status 
quo’71 but it also reinforces, and teaches, the social norms and practices accepted by 
the audience. In the Iliad and Odyssey there are a number of recognisable social 
norms clearly operating within the society depicted in the poems, such as a concept 
of private property, fair judgement, guest-friendship and slave ownership. 
Considering the evidence regarding the dating of Homeric society and the firmly 
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established anthropological significance of oral poetry, the Homeric epics can and 
should be used to study the social practices of the period between 750-650 BC. 
The archaeological and anthropoligcal evidence discussed above leaves little 
room for anachcronisms in the Homeric poems. This is not to say that there are 
absolutely no anachronisms whatsoever or any scope for investigating post eighth-
century insertions or later corruptions of the text. It can, however, be confidently 
asserted that the material culture presented in the poems is that of the eighth century.  
Furthermore, the conspicuous absence of Archaic and Classical polis institutions 
such as boards of officials, military officials assigned by rotation and magistrates 
selected by lot, suggests that the poems represent a stage of Greek society prior to 
c.650 BC. The work of scholars such as Lord, Parry and Vansina has promoted the 
idea that the oral tradition the poems represent was unlikely to have recorded 
practices alien to that society. Furthermore, the consistency with which social 
institutions such as slavery and religious dedication are presented by the poems 
suggests a representation of a single period of Greek history rather than an amalgam 
of unrelated customs or chronologically separate periods.  
 
I 
Power in Homeric society
72
 has been thought to originate from several different 
sources. Nilsson argued that Homeric leaders held their lands from the paramount 
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 A brief summary of the movement to see Homer as post Bronze Age can be found in Bennet (1997) 
511-534. Morris (1986) 81-138, generally accepting the epics as consistent and reflecting the poet’s 
own age, has concluded that the poems are essentially an attempt by the aristocrats of the eighth 
century to manipulate a heroic ideology to legitimise their position. 
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basileus, Agamemnon, and being his vassals owed him military service.
73
 This 
feudal system of obligation has not found favour with scholars since the 1930s. 
Finley then stated that power could be traced to bands of armed retainers maintained 
directly by the individual households of basileis such as Agamemnon, Nestor and 
Odysseus.
74
 This theory has been challenged by van Wees on several occasions, for 
example, in his examination of the practice of feasting in Homer. Van Wees argued 
that these events were characterised by ‘equality, not dependence’ and highlighted 
the social importance of feasting.
75
 Van Wees has since suggested, in opposition to 
Finley’s theory of dependent bands of retainers, that Homeric leaders occupied ‘a 
formal, public, hereditary position’76 and has reviewed certain practices such as gift-
giving, guest-friendship and feasting as means of forging obligations and alliances 
between Homeric leaders and lower ranking individuals.
77
 In battle, however, van 
Wees has concluded that authority came from ‘a personal relation to those who 
follow, rather than being derived from…an institutionalised hierarchy of 
command.’78 Raaflaub has cautiously suggested that the ‘paramount basileus holds 
an inherited, though precarious, position of pre-eminence’.79 The contrasts within 
van Wees’ and Raaflaub’s interpretations are difficult to reconcile and perhaps not 
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 Nilsson (1933) 158-159, 229-235: ‘The power of the king was especially based on this retinue, and 
the more retainers his wealth permitted him to entertain, the greater was his power.’ Nilsson also 
believed that substantial elements of the Homeric poems referred to the Mycenaean period.  
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 Finley (1977) 58-59.  
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 van Wees (1995) 172. This is not to say that personal retainers, sometimes referred to as 
therapontes, do not exist in the epics. Phoinix, Patroklos, Theoklymenos and Philoitios could be 
examples of this phenomenon. With the exception of Philoitios all are exiles that have been taken in 
by a wealthy household (Il. 9.478-491, 23.85-90. Od. 15.272-278). The services of these men are 
clearly valued but their numbers are extremely small. In the epics only one or two are encountered 
serving a single man. Therefore they could never, as Finley implies, amount to bands of warriors large 
enough to drastically increase the military might of their leader. 
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 van Wees (1992) 32-35, cites the existence of demioergoi (public workers), meals eaten at public 
expense and the nature of booty distribution as evidence.  
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 E.g. van Wees (1992; 1995). For other examinations of Homeric social practices see Donlan (1982; 
2007). 
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 van Wees (1986) 303. 
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 Raaflaub (1993) 50. 
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entirely satisfactory explanations.
80
 Raaflaub’s work in particular raises questions 
about other paths to power and fails to address the problem of partible inheritance. It 
will be shown in this chapter that the transfer of wealth had serious consequences for 
the pursuit of power in Homeric society. Ulf has opposed the theory of inherited 
status and cited personal achievement as the primary means of gaining status.
81
 Ulf, 
being largely concerned with military organisation and the role of the basileus, did 
not review social practices such as marriage and the institution of slavery as 
alternative means of gaining and maintaining power. The above scholars, despite 
their different conclusions, have been largely concerned with examining the structure 
of ‘government’ in Homer, and the extent and nature of the Homeric leader’s 
authority. Generally little space has been devoted to discussing how men like 
Odysseus and Achilles came to power in the first place. This chapter will show that 
power was achieved through military success and sustained by private wealth and 
engaging with significant social practices. The approach of this chapter is distinct as 
it opposes the older theories of a quasi-feudal Homeric society, suggests an 
alternative means of taking power in place of inherited status, and does not attempt 
to impose a formal institution of kingship on Homeric Greece.  
This chapter will now examine the means by which the Homeric leaders took 
and held power in their society. This will be discussed in the following sections. Part 
II will discuss the role of warfare in sustaining and enhancing the status of a 
Homeric leader as well as providing a source of wealth and slave labour. It will also 
review the use of violence in general to maintain dominance. Part III will review the 
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 The contrast between public position and private authority (van Wees) and between inherited power 
and a perilous position within society (Raaflaub). 
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 Ulf (1990) 117: ‘Doch jede Situation, die den Beweis individueller Fähigkeiten verlangt  - und 
solche sind von der ersten Phase der Erwachsenenzeit an gegeben -, führt zur realistischen 
Beurteilung einer Person und damit gleichzeitig auch zu ihrer realistischen Einstufung in der sozialen 
Hierarchie zurück.’ 
37 
 
extent of slave ownership among the basileis. Part IV will discuss the following 
social practices: feasting, religious practice, marriage alliances between powerful 
families, xenoi, the significance of gift-giving and largesse, the sponsoring of athletic 
competition, and protection payments. It will illustrate the reliance of these practices 
on the surplus produce of slave labour and show that power in Homeric society was 
neither inherited nor awarded through a recognised public office. 
 
II 
Homeric warfare has been discussed by a large number of scholars and much of this 
scholarship has been concerned with establishing the nature of warfare in this period: 
the tactics, equipment and participants.
82
 Though this debate is not the primary 
concern of this chapter, the role of the basileus in war will be discussed as the role of 
the warrior in Homeric combat had implications for his position in society.  
The poet often depicts the basileus fighting among the foremost fighters in 
the wider setting of massed combat. The basileis were expected to take up their 
position at the front of their followers and from there they hurled missiles and 
engaged in hand-to-hand combat, retiring to the rear when they were injured, tired, 
or simply afraid. The poet exhorts the heroes to fight meta protoisin (Il. 4.341, 
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 The scholarly view of warfare in the epics has changed drastically in the last fifty years. Finley 
(1956) held that only aristocrats made any meaningful contribution on the battlefield. A ground-
breaking study was published by Latacz which argued that the mass of warriors decided the outcome 
of Homeric battles, not duels between heroic champions, (1977) 45: ‘Der allgemein verbreitete 
Eindruck fachkundiger wie fachfremder Homerleser, die zur Entstehungszeit der Ilias vorherrschende 
Kampfesweise sei der ritterliche Einzelkampf gewesen, ist, wie im Folgenden gezeigt werden soll, das 
Ergebnis einer perspektivischen Verzerrung der Realität’.  In the same study Latacz also argued for 
the presence of hoplite infantry tactics in Homer. As noted by Snodgrass (2013) 86: ‘For Latacz and 
for many of his converts, not only was there a coherent Kampfdarstellung of massed battles, but it 
was historically a realistic one, rather than some kind of poetic construction; not only was it real, but 
it was based on a type of phalanx formation familiar from historical times...’ Raaflaub (1997) 
assigned a significant role in warfare to non-elites and van Wees (1988, 1994a, 1994b, 1997) has 
taken this further and dated ‘mass-participation’ in Greek warfare to the pre-Archaic period, 
identifying this phenomenon in Homer.  
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12.315, 321, 13.270), or talks of the heroes standing eni promachois (Il. 4.253). The 
greatest warriors, such as Hektor (Il. 4.505, 16.588), Agamemnon (Il. 11.188, 203), 
and Nestor in his youth, are found among the promachoi (Il. 11.744). If a hero 
wishes to hurl a missile at the enemy he takes his place among the promachoi or 
strides through them to the front, as does Odysseus when he kills Democoon (Il. 
4.495).
 83
 When Hektor wishes to find three Trojan leaders, Deiphobos, Helenus and 
Asius, he searches for them first among the promachoi, clearly expecting to find 
them there (Il. 13.760). Echepolus is described as esthlon eni promachoisi before 
being killed by Antilochus (Il. 4.458). When two leaders, such as Aeneas and 
Achilles, engage in combat, they advance against each other through the promachoi 
(Il. 20.111). Idomeneus states that a brave man, unlike a coward, will be found 
pressing forward among the promachoi (Il. 13.291). When Odysseus, disguised as a 
beggar, wishes to boast of his skills to Eurymachus he claims that, should he regain 
his arms and armour, he would certainly be found among the promachoi (Od. 
18.379). Some particularly brave warriors dash out beyond the promachoi, as does 
Menelaus when he kills Peisander, returning to the promachoi once he had stripped 
off Peisander’s armour (Il. 13.642). Some do not return safely to their comrades but 
are killed or wounded as they turn their backs on the enemy (Il. 15.342). Homeric 
leaders were clearly expected to take their place conspicuously at the front of their 
men, exposing themselves to danger, to push forward among the promachoi, and 
inflict as much damage as they could to the enemy. An interesting comparison can 
be made between how a Homeric warrior was expected to behave and why he was 
praised, and Herodotus’ later description of the warriors who fought at Plataea at the 
close of the Archaic period. This suggests a change occurred in the attitudes of the 
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 van Wees (1994a) 7: ‘The promakhoi are simply that section of the mass which at any given 
moment is closest to the enemy, and engaged in actual combat, while the 'multitude' are those who at 
that particular moment are keeping their distance from the fight.’  
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community between c.700 and 479, and will serve to highlight the significance of 
Homeric norms in combat. The manner in which a praiseworthy Homeric warrior 
was expected to fight should offer a stark contrast with the praiseworthy warriors of 
Herodotus. Agamemnon gives an impression of an ideal Homeric warrior when he 
attempts to shame Diomedes into fighting the Trojans by recalling the prowess of 
Tydeus, his father. ‘Such was never Tydeus’ way, to lurk in the background, but to 
fight the enemy far ahead of his own companions’ (Il. 4.372-373). Brave Homeric 
warriors choose to step forward from the promachoi when they spot an opportunity 
for glory or spy an enemy who is particularly hateful to them, as when Menelaos 
spots Paris among the Trojans (Il. 3.21-37). They could also choose to behave in the 
opposite manner, falling back through their men when injured or cowering among 
them in fear (Il. 3.30-37). The distribution of awards at Plataea, recorded by 
Herodotus, offers a contrast with the behaviour of the Homeric warrior. The man 
who was not formally recognised for valour, Aristodemus, rushed out alone and 
hurled himself against the Persians (Hdt. 9.71-72). Herodotus also tells the story of 
an individual called Sophanes who physically anchored himself to the ground, 
presenting himself as an immovable obstacle to the enemy. Although probably 
apocryphal, Herodotus nevertheless thought the story worth retelling, and it is 
remarkable that Sophanes had essentially rendered himself incapable of behaving 
like a Homeric warrior on the battlefield (Hdt. 9.74-75). Sophanes was physically 
unable to behave like the Homeric warrior who returns home carrying the bloody 
spoils of the man he has killed, having chosen to push his way to the front and fight 
among the promachoi (Il. 6.480-481). Although the Greeks of Herodotus’ time 
honoured the man who kept his place and displayed discipline as well as courage, 
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Homeric society clearly valued the brave warrior who jostled to the front and 
enthusiastically attacked the enemy. 
Homeric leaders went into battle equipped according to their means and 
personal preferences, using chariots to move to or from combat.
84
 These vehicles 
were a convenient mode of battlefield transport for flight or pursuit and were 
powerful symbols of wealth and prestige.
85
 Although the presence of these vehicles 
has been treated sceptically by several scholars, their importance as markers of 
wealth and status should not be underestimated. Care is taken over the chariot in 
which Telemachus and Peisistratos arrive at the house of Menelaos (Od. 4.39-43). 
Asius is clearly differentiated from the dismounted Trojans by his chariot, which he 
insists on riding into the confined space of the Achaian camp as it will make him 
agallomenos (Il. 12.113). The gods themselves also make chariots their vehicles (Il. 
8.432-435), and Hektor offers a chariot and horses as a reward for a particularly 
dangerous task (Il. 10.303-307). So precious are the horses and chariots that warriors 
will sleep hard by them when forced to camp beyond the protection of walls (Il. 
10.473-475), and will generally not plunge into combat and risk losing their horses 
and chariots, but have them held some distance behind. Chariots in Homeric society 
were clearly as much an expression of wealth and status as they were a military tool. 
Wealthy individuals were under pressure to not only acquire and ride these vehicles 
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 Finley’s (1956) 142, dismissal of ‘the nonsense we read in the poems about military chariots’ is 
particularly unhelpful here. Greenhalgh (1973) 7, also concluded that ‘the Homeric poems reveal no 
conception of the proper tactical role of massed chariotry…’ This view has been vigorously 
challenged by van Wees (1994b) 140: ‘If armed men paraded on chariots, then it is likely that chariots 
were used in a military context, and if a military use is consistently and plausibly portrayed in poetry 
and painting, it would seem perverse to deny its historicity.’ See also van Wees (1994a) 12: ‘If the 
heroes do not use chariots in the theoretically most effective way, it is because their fighting habits are 
shaped by social, cultural, and economic conditions. The cultural pressure to attain prestige drives 
men to acquire chariots and use them even in battle; the social fact that these men are leaders forces 
them to use their chariots singly, rather than in battalions; and the economic fact that they can ill 
afford to lose their horses makes them employ their chariots with great caution. If Mycenaeans, 
Egyptians, or Hittites used chariots differently, that is because their societies were different.’  
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to war, but to do so in the most conspicuous manner they could. This chapter will 
now investigate the social and personal consequences of a basileus’ military success. 
Warfare gave the basileis opportunities to justify and increase their status and to 
seize people as slaves and accumulate large amounts of wealth. The use of violence 
at times when open warfare is not occurring will also be investigated. This 
phenomenon must also be discussed as a Homeric leader resorted to violence to 
maintain his dominance remarkably quickly and was prepared to use deadly force to 
maintain order, encourage obedience, or take revenge. 
Homeric leaders could validate their power and status by leading their 
communities in war, by displaying their prowess and courage on the battlefield, and 
by fighting on behalf of their people as well as for their private interests.
86
 Sarpedon 
asks a rhetorical question of Glaukos, ‘why is it you and I are honoured before others 
with pride of place, the choice meats and the filled wine cups in Lykia…?’ (Il. 
12.310-312). He answers his own question by stating that it is ‘since indeed there is 
strength and valour in them, since they fight in the forefront of the Lykians’ (Il. 
12.320-321).
87
  Later, the Trojans are stunned with grief at the death of Sarpedon, 
although he was a foreigner, because ‘he was the best of them all in battle always’ 
(Il. 16.552). The crucial reason why the Trojans mourn Sarpedon is that he was a 
mighty warrior, bringing many followers with him, and therefore was a great asset to 
their cause.
88
 Similarly, once Odysseus has killed the suitors he remarks that ‘we 
have killed what held the city together, the finest young men in Ithaka’ (Od. 23.121-
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 The significance of participation in warfare to increase social standing is also acknowledged by 
McGlew (1989) 287: ‘Yet heroes such as Aeneas, who are not bound to the war through family ties or 
personal destiny, fight to gain the conspicuous recognition that war alone offers.’ 
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 For a brief analysis of these lines see Adkins (1997) 700. The translations of the Iliad and Odyssey 
used throughout are those of Lattimore. 
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 For the poetic technique of reflecting a leader’s strength in the number and quality of his followers, 
see van Wees (1988) 21-22. 
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122).
89
 These are presumably the same men who, at the approach of raiders or 
pirates, came out and fought ‘for the sake of their city and women’ (Od. 11.403, 
24.113). When Hektor wishes to mock Diomedes for retreating he taunts him by 
saying that ‘beyond others the fast-mounted Danaans honoured you with pride of 
place, the choice meats and the filled wine-cups. But now they will disgrace you, 
who are no better than a woman’ (Il. 8.160-163). Hektor claims that Diomedes’ 
unwillingness to stand and fight renders him undeserving of the privileges and status 
he had previously earned in battle.
90
 He links military success with privilege, honour 
and gifts, and cowardice with shame. Hektor himself decides to enter battle despite 
the protests of Andromache, because ‘I would feel deep shame before the Trojans...if 
like a coward I were to shrink aside from the fighting’ (Il. 6.441-443).91 So far, these 
passages suggest that the qualifications for leadership in Homeric society were 
prowess and courage in war. This is demonstrated further by Hektor’s criticism of 
Paris when he shrinks from fighting Menelaos. Hektor believes they will now be 
mocked by the Achaians because Paris has failed to meet the criteria of a war-leader, 
having ‘no strength in your heart, no courage’ (Il. 3.45). Similar criticisms are made 
of Agamemnon by Achilles, who, in his fury, questions Agamemnon’s courage and 
willingness to participate in combat (Il. 1.225-228). In return for participating in 
combat and fighting courageously and skilfully, a Homeric leader received favours, 
honour, gifts and privileges. The epics make this clear through explicit justifications 
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of status, like that of Sarpedon, and the harsh criticism of those who fail to behave in 
accordance with their rank and the expectations of their friends and followers.
92
  
As well as earning prestige and status war also allowed a successful warrior 
to carry off a large amount of plundered wealth. This included livestock, arms and 
armour, precious metals, cloth and slaves. Any of these items, regardless of what 
form they took, could be redistributed to friends and followers.
93
 Some items of 
plunder were given to the leader of the enterprise or to a more powerful basileus. 
Achilles states that the cities captured by the Achaians during the war against Troy 
were immediately plundered (Il. 1.123-129), although he then complains to 
Agamemnon that he is ‘minded no longer to stay here dishonoured and pile up your 
wealth and your luxury’ (Il. 1.170-171). Achilles makes it clear that the pursuit of 
plunder was an immediate concern and that a part of the booty was consistently 
delivered to Agamemnon. A basileus in a paramount position could profit from 
conflict by simply receiving a portion of the spoil from lesser basileis. Achilles 
clearly regards war and looting as inseparable. ‘But I say that I have stormed from 
my ships twelve cities of men, and by land eleven more through the generous Troad. 
From all these we took forth treasures, goodly and numerous…’ (Il. 9.328-330). 
Odysseus, attempting to reconcile Achilles with Agamemnon, promises that Achilles 
may ‘go to your ship and load it as deep as you please with gold and bronze, when 
we Achaians divide the war spoils’ (Il. 9.279-280). A Homeric leader could suddenly 
find himself in possession of an extremely large amount of movable wealth after a 
successful expedition. 
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As well as looting captured settlements stripping the arms and armour from a 
dead enemy is a very common occurrence in the Iliad. Hektor offers half the spoils 
from Patroklos’ body to the man who drags him back to the Trojan lines (Il. 17.229-
231). Diomedes is wounded by Paris when he is distracted stripping the armour from 
Agastrophos (Il. 11.368-378), and when Idomeneus kills Phaistos his followers 
immediately set about removing Phaistos’ armour (Il. 5.48). Many other slain 
enemies are despoiled of their equipment almost instantly after death.
94
 Achilles 
gives a corselet he took from the body of Asteropaios to Eumelos (Il. 23.560-563), 
showing that these items were not necessarily hoarded but could be passed on to 
friends, companions and followers, illustrating the usefulness of plunder in the 
practice of gift-giving. 
Although booty could be obtained as a by-product of war, organising violent 
raids specifically to acquire plunder appears to have been a very common exercise at 
this time.
95
 The need to acquire wealth and the importance of military success is 
reflected in this practice. Odysseus recalls how he and his men sacked the city of the 
Kikonians, for no obvious purpose other than to acquire booty (Od. 9.39-43). He 
later tells the false tale of travelling to Egypt with the explicit intention of raiding 
and seizing goods (Od. 17.428-434). Nestor describes his victory over the Eleians in 
terms of the booty he acquired, ‘fifty herds of oxen, as many sheepflocks, as many 
droves of pigs, and again as many wide-ranging goatflocks, and a hundred and fifty 
brown horses…with foals following underneath’ (Il. 11.677-680). The plunder is 
distributed among the Pylians, although Neleus, father of Nestor, takes the biggest 
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 This is supported by Donlan (1999) 4, who understands the rich man and the successful 
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the presence of this phenomenon in Archaic Attica see Harris (2002) 427-428. 
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share. Odysseus, confronted with the ghost of Agamemnon and ignorant of 
Klytemnestra’s treachery, asks if Agamemnon was killed while plundering livestock 
(Od. 11.401-403).  The deceased Agamemnon also asks the shades of the slain 
suitors how they died. He asks if they drowned at sea, or ‘did men embattled destroy 
you as you tried to cut out cattle and fleecy sheep from their holdings, or fighting 
against them, for the sake of their city and women?’ (Od. 24.106-113). It is worthy 
of note that Odysseus and Agamemnon expected the ghosts they met to have been 
killed on a raid for booty. Both men are depicted considering death on a raid to be 
the most likely fate of recently deceased men. This indicates how widespread and 
frequent the practice must have been, and that men termed as basileis regularly took 
part in it. It is also striking that Agamemnon, the most famed and powerful of all 
basileis, must have personally engaged in raiding and thievery often enough to make 
Odysseus think it most likely that he was killed doing it. Donlan has suggested that 
the rich presents given to Odysseus by Maron at Ismaros were protection money to 
secure his safety while Odysseus’ men looted the nearby city of the Kikonians (Od. 
9.194-204).
96
 If this is the case then extortion under threat of violence could also 
yield valuable profits for a Homeric leader.  
The collecting of spoil as a route to status and power in Homeric society is 
summarised by one of Odysseus’ false tales. Odysseus tells the story of his rise to 
power on Crete through successful raiding and the subsequent accumulation of 
plunder. It is made explicit that military success enabled him, a bastard son with an 
unimpressive inheritance, to arrange a favourable marriage to a woman from a 
wealthy and influential family. ‘But I took for myself a wife from people with many 
possessions, because of my courage, for I was no contemptible man, not one who 
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fled from the fighting’ (Od. 14.211-213).97 The ‘Cretan’ Odysseus soon becomes a 
figure of importance in his community. ‘I was nine times a leader of men and went 
in fast-faring vessels against outland men, and much substance came my way, and 
from this I took out an abundance of things, but much I allotted again, and soon my 
house grew greater, and from that time on I went among the Cretans as one feared 
and respected’ (Od. 14.229-234). Leading and participating in successful raids 
clearly resulted in an increase in wealth and prestige as well as wider recognition of 
a man’s fighting abilities.  
Despite the importance of raiding as a means of attaining wealth it is 
necessary to state that the Homeric poems do not depict property as something that 
merely belongs to the man strong enough to seize it. Ownership of private property, 
and an individual’s rights over his property, is a concept that clearly exists in Homer. 
Several passages in the poems make this quite explicit.
98
 Telemachus, for example, 
is distressed that the suitors are destroying his property, not that they are attempting 
to usurp an abstract office such as that of king. Telemachus makes this clear when he 
declares his intention of summoning an assembly to the suitors. ‘But if you decide it 
is more profitable and better to go on, eating up one man’s livelihood, without 
payment, then spoil my house. I will cry out to the gods everlasting in the hope that 
Zeus might somehow grant a reversal of fortunes’ (Od. 1.376-379). Telemachus then 
firmly states his determination to enjoy his own property. ‘But I will be the anax 
over my own household and my slaves, whom the great Odysseus won by force for 
me’ (Od. 1.397-398). Telemachus appeals to the gods hoping they will punish the 
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suitors’ transgression, which was to seize another man’s property, not usurp his 
position. The gods, as well as mortals, were expected to enforce the accepted norms 
of the communities depicted in the poems. Mentor criticises the community for not 
acting against the suitors’ transgressions, which, he implies, would have been 
expected. Telemachus reinforces this when he addresses the assembly regarding the 
suitors’ transgressions. ‘Even you must be scandalised and ashamed before the 
neighbouring men about us, the people who live around our land; fear also the gods’ 
anger, lest they, astonished by evil actions, turn against you’ (Od. 2.64-67). Should a 
man’s property be seized by another, he expects recompense. Neleus takes a share of 
the booty his son Nestor won from the Epeians because they stole his horses and 
chariot, ‘for indeed a great debt was owing to him in shining Elis. It was four horses, 
race-competitors with their own chariot…but Augeias the anax of men took these, 
and kept them’ (Il. 11.697-700). Agamemnon’s seizure of Achilles’ slave Briseis is 
another notable example, causing Achilles to threaten to kill any man who takes any 
of his other possessions (Il. 1.300-303). Plundering the property of another man 
appears to have been contrary to the accepted norms of the community. While 
transgressing these incurred the indignation of men and aroused the anger of the 
gods, plundering in retaliation or raiding foreign peoples who lived some distance 
away does not seem to have been considered inappropriate.  
Ransoming captives could also bring substantial wealth in the form of craft 
goods and precious metals, items often collectively referred to as keimelion 
(treasure). Chryses offers Agamemnon ‘gifts beyond count’ for the return of his 
daughter (Il. 1.13). Dolon attempts to save his life by offering Odysseus and 
Diomedes a large ransom; ‘in my house there is bronze, and gold, and difficultly 
wrought iron, and my father would make you glad with abundant ransom’ (Il. 
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10.378-381). Priam brings a large ransom to Achilles for Hektor’s body. It includes 
fine cloth, blankets and clothing as well as gold (Il. 24.228-237). Despite the obvious 
material benefits, the basileus depicted in Homer is not obliged, or always inclined, 
to accept the ransom. Agamemnon would rather have Chryses’ daughter as his slave, 
and Odysseus and Diomedes prefer to kill Dolon despite his offer. Some of the items 
from a ransom payment could be passed on as gifts to friends and followers.
99
 A 
silver bowl, originally paid to Patroklos as ransom for Lykaon, is awarded as a prize 
by Achilles at the funeral games of Patroklos, neatly indicating the potential for these 
goods to be redistributed and used to increase the giver’s prestige, and the 
importance of violence as a means of collecting these items (Il. 23.740-748). 
Warfare and raiding also enabled Homeric leaders to seize people as slaves. 
As will be shown, slaves were essential for maintaining the position of a basileus.
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The institution of slavery will be discussed further in the study of social practices 
later in this chapter. Agamemnon intended that Chryseis, a captive taken during the 
war with Troy, would be put to work in his house in Argos (Il. 1.29-31). The plot of 
the Iliad revolves around the anger of Achilles over Agamemnon’s decision to take 
away his slave, Briseis, who had been captured by the army and subsequently 
awarded to Achilles (Il. 1.61-62). In the Achaian camp the army buys wine, for 
which they ‘paid slaves taken in war’ among other things (Il. 7.475). Andromache 
expects that she and Astyanax will be taken as slaves should Troy be sacked (Il. 
24.731-734). Odysseus’ crew seize the Kikonian women when they capture their city 
(Od. 9.41), and Odysseus’ fictitious band of Cretan pirates set about seizing women 
and children almost immediately upon arrival in Egypt (Od. 17.433). We are told 
that Eurymedousa, a slave in the house of Alkinoös, was brought from across the sea 
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before being given as a prize to Alkinoös (Od. 7.7-12). It appears that there was the 
potential for very large numbers of slaves to be taken in war. Some are seized as 
individuals or in small numbers during raids in the epics, although some passages 
imply that all the women and children of a defeated city might be enslaved.
101
 These 
slaves could be given as gifts or prizes, traded for goods or be put to work in the 
household of a basileus. A successful leader could find himself in possession of any 
amount of slaves, from one given as a prize, to a portion of an entire settlement. The 
vital importance of these slaves to maintaining the power of the basileis will be 
discussed later.  
Military success enabled the Homeric warrior to achieve higher status in his 
community and continuing success justified his increasingly privileged status to his 
people and to his peers. Raiding and the profits of war also enabled these men to 
distribute booty and captives to their followers, as well as providing them with a 
crucial source of slave labour.
102
 The evidence so far indicates that power and status 
in Homeric society were not hereditary, but achieved through personal success and 
ability.
103
 
In the context of violence and personal power Hektor’s prayer for his son is 
revealing. Hektor asks that Astyanax be ‘pre-eminent among the Trojans, great in 
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strength...and rule strongly (iphi anassein) over Ilion’ (Il. 6.477-478). Although the 
prayer shows that the poet considers personal strength and leadership in the 
community to be inseparable, the use of iphi is significant. This word appears in two 
contexts in Homer. In the Iliad it is used several times in connection with the rule of 
a god, but when used in connection with the infinitive verb anassein (to rule),
104
 it 
otherwise refers to mortal rulers. The second context where iphi appears is that of 
battle, combat or the physical act of killing or of subduing the enemy. Here it is 
linked with the verbs iphi machesthai,
105
 iphi ktamenoio (Il. 3.375), and iphi 
damenai.
106
 This second context is unmistakably one of physical violence and iphi 
appears far more commonly in this context than in connection with anassein. As 
Hektor is praying for the best possible future for his son, his use of iphi suggests 
that, in this instance, the word cannot be negative in any sense. Yet Hektor is praying 
that his son might rule Ilion ‘by force’ or ‘by might’. Considering the importance of 
the basileus as a leader in war and the close relationship between military success 
and personal power, iphi accurately describes the manner in which a basileus was 
expected to maintain his rule. It has already been shown that basileis led their people 
in war, conducted violent raids and took up conspicuous positions on the battlefield 
at the head of their followers. As these are the practices Hektor desires his son to 
engage in successfully, the use of iphi alongside anassein further suggests that 
personal strength, not inherited status or public appointment, was the primary 
qualification for power. 
The military failure of a leader, as well as behaviour deemed to be offensive 
or irresponsible, could have the opposite effect. Allies might question his leadership, 
                                                          
104
 Il. 1.38, 452, 6.478. Od. 11.284. 
105
 Il. 1.151, 2.270, 4.287, 5.606, 12.367, 18.14, 21.486. 
106
 Il. 19.417, 21.208. Od. 18.57, 156. 
51 
 
abandon his cause and, if they considered themselves sufficiently injured, threaten 
him with violence.
107
 Hektor hints at the social consequences of defeat, ‘since by my 
own recklessness I have ruined my people, I feel shame before the Trojans and the 
Trojan women…that someone who is less of a man than I will say of me: ‘Hektor 
believed in his own strength and ruined his people’ (Il. 22.104-107). Odysseus is 
criticised by Eurylochos, who tries to persuade the crew not to follow him to Circe’s 
house, reminding them of the men they lost to the Cyclops, and that it was ‘by this 
man’s recklessness that these too perished’ (Od. 10.437).108 On his return to Ithaka 
Odysseus is also criticised by Eupeithes at the assembly, who states that ‘he took 
many excellent men away in the vessels with him, and lost the hollow ships, and lost 
all the people’ (Od. 24.427-428). Eupeithes, bent on revenge against Odysseus, 
attempts to use Odysseus’ failure to bring the men home safely to arouse the anger of 
the assembly against him. This incident not only illustrates the importance of 
maintaining popular support, but suggests that the community could shift their 
support and were not necessarily bound to the will of the basileus. Although the first 
example is in a fanciful setting, these instances suggest that the men who followed a 
Homeric leader expected him to have a mind for their safety and not carelessly lead 
them into disaster. A leader who made poor decisions might lose popular support, 
but disgruntled followers, such as Eurylochus, might also be encouraged to use the 
opportunity to attack that leader’s authority.  
Hesitation and cowardly behaviour in battle, as well as outright failure, also 
sapped a Homeric leader’s authority and power.109 Glaukos criticises Hektor for not 
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rescuing the body of Sarpedon. He rebukes him, telling Hektor ‘you come far short 
in your fighting’ (Il. 17.142-153). Glaukos then threatens to lead the Lykians away 
from Troy, judging that if Hektor will not save Sarpedon’s body, he cannot be relied 
upon. It is remarkable that Glaukos felt justified or angered enough to abandon an 
ally who had shown, what Glaukos considered, shortcomings on the battlefield. 
There is no obvious impediment to Glaukos carrying out his threat to depart, 
suggesting that he only considered Hektor an ally while Hektor fulfilled his military 
expectations. Their relationship was clearly not defined by any formal agreement 
consisting of terms and obligations, such as those established between later Greek 
states. Similarly, Odysseus is so disgusted by Agamemnon’s suggestion that they 
flee from Troy at night he exclaims ‘I wish you directed some other unworthy army, 
and were not lord over us’ (Il. 14.84-85). Military failure, recognised in high losses 
of men, acts of cowardice, or simply failing to meet the expectations of allies and 
peers, caused discontent, provoked reproaches, and prompted friends and followers 
to consider abandoning their ally or their leader.  
A Homeric leader, for all his potential power and martial prowess, had to be 
careful not to offend his allies and followers. An obvious example of this would be 
Agamemnon’s decision to take Briseis from Achilles, who considered her to be his 
property. This prompts Achilles to ask Agamemnon ‘how shall any one of the 
Achaians readily obey you either to go on a journey or to fight men strongly in 
battle?’ (Il. 1.150-151). This passage suggests that Agamemnon’s seizure of 
Achilles’ prize (geras) would surely discourage men from following him in the 
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future. Achilles then reminds Agamemnon that the Achaians accompany him ‘for 
your sake’ (Il. 1.157) and ‘to do you favour’ (Il. 1.158). Not only is Achilles so 
outraged by Agamemnon’s behaviour toward him that he withdraws his military 
support, he actually draws his sword from its sheath, seriously considering killing 
Agamemnon in front of the army (Il. 1.188-195). Achilles, in his anger, highlights 
some of the criteria a Homeric leader had to meet to retain the support of his 
followers, and treating them respectfully and allowing them to retain their allotted 
plunder appear to have been particularly significant.
110
 The vital importance of 
maintaining certain standards of conduct toward one’s followers is well illustrated by 
this episode. Agamemnon’s behaviour not only provokes Achilles to insult him 
publicly and withdraw from battle at a critical time, but Achilles is only restrained 
from killing the commander of the entire expedition by the intervention of a goddess. 
Achilles is not alone in resenting and reacting to Agamemnon’s behaviour. For 
following such a man as Agamemnon, who has allegedly hoarded treasure for 
himself and dishonoured the best warrior in the army, Thersites calls the Achaians 
‘fools, poor abuses, you women, not men, of Achaia’ (Il. 2.235).111 Thersites 
criticises the Achaians for being willing to fight for Agamemnon despite the fact he 
has mistreated them. The Achaians themselves, sympathetic to Achilles, begin to 
fight only half-heartedly against the Trojans (Il. 13.105-114). This later causes 
Agamemnon to exclaim in frustration, ‘Oh, shame, for I think that all the…Achaians 
are storing anger against me in their hearts, as Achilles did, and no longer will fight 
for me by the grounded vessels’ (Il. 14.49-51). This is an explicit acknowledgement 
that the resentment of followers and loss of popular support caused the military 
power of a basileus to wane. Disgruntled warriors can also be found on the Trojan 
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side. Aineias is found by Deïphobos at the ‘uttermost edge of the battle’ since ‘he 
was forever angry with brilliant Priam because great as he was he did him no honour 
among his people’ (Il. 13.459-461). We are not told what specific slights Aineias 
feels that he has suffered, but his reaction is the same as that of Achilles. For similar 
reasons to Achilles, Aineias, who considers himself badly treated, withdraws his 
military support. The army of Agamemnon depicted in the Iliad was no feudal host 
of serfs bound by a law or common custom to follow their commanders into battle. 
The Achaian host depicted by the poet was composed of free men who followed 
their respective leaders, as Achilles tells Agamemnon, as a favour. This service 
would ideally be rewarded with opportunities to seize booty, and with gifts and 
prizes that conferred honour on the recipient.
112
 A Homeric war leader also had to 
take care not to lead his followers recklessly into danger or give them cause to feel 
offended if he wished to retain their support. A man who led his followers into 
disaster or whose behaviour made them feel slighted faced disobedience and 
challenges to his authority as well as discontent. The lower ranking men like 
Thersites might grumble and encourage each other to desert him, but his peers and 
powerful allies had the authority and strength to lead their men home and were 
capable of reacting to perceived mistreatment with criticism, insults and even 
violence. 
In the Iliad and the Odyssey the inability of a basileus to defend himself and 
his possessions, as well as his people and followers, could not only result in a loss of 
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status, but loss of property and further threats of violence.
113
 This supports the idea 
that personal achievement and ability were qualifications for high standing in the 
community. Odysseus clearly expects a man of standing to, at some point, be 
compelled to fight in defence of his property, stating ‘there is no grief that comes to 
the heart, nor yet any sorrow, when a man is hit, fighting in battle for the sake of his 
own possessions, either to guard his shining sheep or his cattle’ (Od. 17.470-472). 
Odysseus, then, is familiar with the practice of making predatory attacks on 
another’s property. Achilles’ shade asks after his father ‘whether he still keeps his 
position among the Myrmidon hordes, or whether in Hellas and Phthia they have 
diminished his state, because old age constrains his hands and feet’ (Od. 11.495-
497). If Peleus no longer has the strength to defend himself, Achilles fears for his 
standing and expects Peleus to lose his privileges. Respect for Peleus’ age is clearly 
no impediment to opportunistic and predatory attacks, neither do we hear of any 
defence against attack that might come from occupying a publicly recognised office 
or public position. Similarly Andromache fears for the fate of her son, Astyanax, 
when Hektor is killed, predicting that ‘there will be hard work for him and sorrows, 
for others will take his lands away from him’ (Il. 22.488-489). Achilles and 
Andromache share the same concern. The vulnerability of Peleus and Astyanax, 
stemming from their physical inability to defend themselves and enforce authority, is 
likely to result in the loss of their possessions and status.
114
 The situation of 
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Telemachus is equivalent and is summarised by Peisistratos. ‘For a child endures 
many griefs in his house when his father is gone away, and no others are there to 
help him, as now Telemachus’ father is gone away, and there are no others who can 
defend him against the evil that is in his country’ (Od. 4.164-167). Considering these 
words and the actions of the suitors, the possessions of Odysseus, let alone his 
position in his community, are clearly not protected through occupying a public 
office, by a law, or absolutely guaranteed to pass to Telemachus through inheritance. 
Telemachus himself states ‘there are many other Achaian basileis…in seagirt Ithaka, 
any of whom might hold this position, now that the great Odysseus has perished’ 
(Od. 1.394-396).
115
 Telemachus does not expect to inherit Odysseus’ position as the 
most powerful man in Ithaka, but he does want to inherit his father’s property. ‘But I 
will be the anax over my own household and my servants, whom the great Odysseus 
won by force for me’ (Od. 1.397-398). It is crucial to recognise that Telemachus 
makes a distinction between his relationship to his father’s property and his father’s 
position. Telemachus claims no right over a title or office, although he expresses his 
determination to hold onto his father’s possessions. As van Wees states, ‘it is 
assumed that a weak or absent man’s property is unlikely to be left in peace.’116 Van 
Wees echoes the warnings of Eurykleia to Telemachus. ‘And these men will devise 
evils against you…so you shall die by guile, and they divide all that is yours. No, but 
stay here and guard your possessions’ (Od. 2.367-369). Athene also cautions 
Telemachus. ‘Telemachus, it no longer becomes you to stray off so far from home, 
leaving your possessions behind and men in your palace who are so overbearing. 
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You must not let them divide up and eat up your substance’ (Od. 15.10-13). The lack 
of any obvious deterrent in the Homeric poems, other than force, to those wishing to 
take advantage of a weak neighbour is clear. These examples clearly show that 
personal ability and strength, skill and valour were rewarded with rank, privileges 
and, ultimately, a place at the head of the community. Failing to meet these standards 
caused the status of a basileus to come into question. There is no hint whatsoever in 
Homer that private property was protected by a law enforced by an impartial third 
party, although respecting an individual’s property appears to have been the accepted 
norm. There is also no indication that a man’s status within his community was 
formalised or protected by any public office or that formal institutions existed to 
bestow an inherited title or office. 
Peisistratos’ description of Telemachus’ difficult situation highlights the 
importance of immediate family as military assets (Od. 4.164-167). As well as his 
close relatives, a basileus’ hetairoi would also follow him to war. Hetairoi appear in 
the epics as a man’s close friends and are often depicted in a generally subordinate 
role, although they are by no means treated as servants or bondsmen. The bond 
between a man and his hetairos could be particularly close and is generally depicted 
as a relationship characterised by a very high level of trust and mutual obligation. 
Mentor, for example, being a hetairos of Odysseus, is trusted with the care of 
Odysseus’ house while he is away from Ithaka (Od. 2.225-227). Hetairoi are also 
trusted with carrying precious pieces of loot to the rear during battle (Il. 3.378, 
13.640-641, 16.665), and are given pivotal roles on the battlefield, such as driving 
another man’s chariot (Il. 8.124-125, 316-317). It is Pandaros’ hetairoi who guard 
him with their shields as he prepares to shoot Menelaos with his bow (Il. 4.113-115). 
When Menelaos is wounded by an arrow, it is his hetairoi and his brother, 
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Agamemnon, who immediately gather round him in concern (Il. 4.154) and it is 
Teukros’ hetairoi who carry him to safety when he is wounded (Il. 8.332-334). 
Sarpedon’s corpse is also carried from the battlefield and tended by his hetairoi (Il. 
5.692-695). A man’s hetairoi often appear in close physical proximity; those of 
Diomedes sleep around his hut (Il. 10.151-153), those of Achilles sleep around his 
(Il. 1.349), and a speech of Andromache suggests that a man will be expected to 
attend feasts with his hetairoi (Il. 22.491-498).
117
 
 A high-ranking individual could also be a hetairos. Agamemnon clearly 
believes that Idomeneus is obliged to fight for him as he has treated Idomeneus well 
and often invited him to feasts. Idomeneus responds by promising to be an erieros 
hetairos to Agamemnon (Il. 4.257-264). Mentor and Halitherses had been Odysseus’ 
hetairoi and are expected by the assembly to offer aid to Odysseus’ son (Od. 2.254). 
Obligations towards one’s hetairoi do not seem to disappear at the moment of death. 
Glaukos describes Sarpedon as being xeinon kai hetairon to Hektor, and is 
subsequently appalled by Hektor’s apparent disinclination to rescue Sarpedon’s body 
from the Achaians (Il. 17.150-151). Zeus predicts that Achilles will take revenge 
against Hektor for the death of his hetairos Patroklos (Il. 17.200-206). Thoas is 
unable to strip the armour from Peiros’ corpse because Peiros’ hetairoi stand in his 
way (Il. 4.532-533). These men were so valued that the death of a hetairos is even 
compared by Alkinoös to the death of a close family member (Od. 8.584-586). 
Andromache’s prediction that Astyanax will be ejected from the feasts of his dead 
father’s hetairoi suggests that, unlike the practice of guest-friendship, the 
relationship would not necessarily be inherited by the dead man’s child (Il. 22.491-
498). 
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 Though the bond between a man and his hetairoi was not merely composed 
of obligations and reciprocal favours, it was also an emotional bond. Hetairoi are 
described on a number of occasions as philos (beloved).
118
 Upon the death of a 
man’s hetairos, the poet describes individuals who are overcome with grief, anger, 
or an almost frenzied desire for vengeance. Achilles is the most famous example of 
this reaction, but there are others. Hektor kills Lykophron, hetairos of Aias, causing 
Aias to ask Teukros to shoot down Trojans in revenge (Il. 15.436-441). Hektor 
himself loses several companions and feels ‘bitter sorrow’ for their deaths (Il. 8.124-
125, 316-317). Odysseus is gripped by ‘terrible anger’ when Leukos, one of his 
hetairoi, is killed (Il. 4.491-495).  
Agamemnon and Telemachus put on lavish feasts for their hetairoi (Il. 4.257-
264, Od. 15.505-507), and Odysseus’ hetairoi expect to share in the wealth he 
collects on his journey (Od. 10.38-45). In return for these favours a man’s hetairoi 
will perform all manner of tasks. They can be found performing mundane services 
such as readying a chariot for a journey (Il. 3.259-260) or rowing a ship, such as that 
of Telemachus or those of Achilles and Odysseus. Hetairoi are also warriors who 
add considerable military strength to a basileus. In the Odyssey they are recruited for 
clandestine actions, such as assassination or ambush (Od. 4.669-672, 13.267). On the 
battlefield hetairoi will defend a basileus and expect to be defended in return. 
Achilles makes this clear as he laments his failure to protect Patroklos. ‘I must die 
soon, then; since I was not to stand by my hetairos when he was killed. And now, far 
away from the land of his fathers, he has perished, and lacked my fighting strength to 
defend him. Now…since I was no light of safety to Patroklos, nor to my other 
hetairoi, who in their numbers went down before glorious Hektor’(Il. 18.99-103). 
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Passages such as this make it clear that hetairoi were not retainers in the sense that 
they were dependents. They were trusted, close friends of varying status who 
expected to be treated with a great deal of respect as well as gifts and invitations to 
feasts. Even allowing for poetic exaggeration, the richest and most powerful basileis 
seem to have been able to afford to maintain their relationships with many hetairoi, 
as Achilles and Odysseus crew multiple ships with their companions. 
Although basileis could maintain their position by distributing booty or 
ensuring their followers were well treated, the use of violence to maintain power and 
dominance over other men is also a feature depicted in the epics. The Iliad and the 
Odyssey depict violence as a method by which Homeric leaders maintained their 
power off the battlefield or in times of relative peace. The following examples 
illustrate the use, and ever-present threat, of violence within Homeric society. 
Thersites, who had spoken in a manner displeasing to Odysseus, is beaten by him 
into silence (Il. 2.265-269).
119
 When the Achaian army flees to the ships, Odysseus 
restores order partly by striking men with a staff (Il. 2.198-199). Odysseus, on his 
return home, is angered by the criticism of one of his followers and ponders whether 
he should behead the man on the spot ‘even though he was nearly related to me by 
marriage’ (Od. 10.438-44). Odysseus seriously considered killing a man because he 
had criticised him and challenged his authority. The poet also describes men who are 
fearful of provoking such a violent response from a more powerful man. Kalchas the 
seer will not reveal Apollo’s anger over Agamemnon’s treatment of Chryses to the 
Achaians until he has extracted an oath from Achilles that he will protect him (Il. 
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1.75-91). This is because Kalchas expects to displease Agamemnon and states that ‘a 
basileus when he is angry with a man beneath him is too strong, and suppose even 
for the day itself he swallow down his anger, he still keeps bitterness that remains 
until its fulfilment deep in his chest’ (Il. 1.80-83). Although Achilles was restrained 
from doing actual violence to Agamemnon by Athene, he threatens Agamemnon 
with death should he attempt to seize any of his other possessions, warning that 
‘instantly your own black blood will stain my spearpoint’ (Il. 1.303). Odysseus 
similarly warns the Achaians not to abandon Agamemnon. ‘May he not in anger do 
some harm to the sons of the Achaians! For the anger of god-supported basileis is a 
big matter’ (Il. 2.195-196).120 Antinoös makes grave threats towards Odysseus, 
disguised as a beggar, ‘for the way you talk, the young men might take you and drag 
you by hand or foot through the house, and tear the skin on your body’ (Od. 17.479-
480). Later, Antinoös is scandalised and angered by a beggar’s request to compete in 
the competition to string Odysseus’ bow, and threatens to force the beggar onto a 
ship and send him to Echetos who will horribly mutilate him (Od. 21.305-311). In 
another example, dire threats are made by the suitors against Athene, who had taken 
the form of Mentor. The suitors threatened what appeared to be Mentor with death 
and the division of his property if he continued to support Odysseus against them 
(Od. 22.213-223). A conversation between Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, and 
Telemachus reveals that the expected reaction towards the aggressive and 
disrespectful suitors would be to drive them from Odysseus’ house by force. 
Odysseus asks Telemachus why he tolerates the suitors. ‘Do you find your brothers 
wanting? A man trusts help from these in the fighting when a great quarrel arises’ 
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(Od. 16-97-98). Unlike Hektor, Telemachus cannot call upon brothers, or brothers-
in-law, to come to his aid, being the only child of Odysseus. Telemachus expresses 
his desire to drive the suitors out by force, threatening ‘I will endeavour to visit evil 
destructions upon you’ (Od. 2.316) and ‘I only wish I were as much stronger, and 
more of a fighter with my hands, than all these suitors who are here in my 
household’ (Od. 21.372-373). He is of course unable to drive away the suitors as he 
lacks the strength. Telemachus has no siblings and he is too young to have formed 
the friendships and marriage alliances through which he could seek allies. Although 
Telemachus tried to encourage public disapproval of the suitors, the Odyssey seems 
to present violence as the only effective means by which the suitors can be expelled 
from Odysseus’ house.121  
In one of his Cretan stories, Odysseus tells how he murdered Orsilochus, the 
son of Idomeneus. Orsilochus had attempted to deprive Odysseus of his share of 
Trojan booty because Odysseus refused to serve Idomeneus, leader of the Cretan 
contingent at Troy, as his therapon. In this situation a warrior of some standing, 
Odysseus, refused to do a favour for a greater man, whose son reacts by making a 
predatory attempt on Odysseus’ wealth (Od. 13.259-271). The informal nature of this 
killing is almost identical to other examples in the poems. In his invented story, 
Odysseus recalls ‘I lay in wait for him with a friend by the road, and struck him with 
the bronze-headed spear as he came back from the fields’ (Od. 13.267-268). The 
suitors plan a similar fate for Telemachus, ‘let us surprise him and kill him, in the 
fields away from the city, or in the road’ (Od. 16.383-384). This design is adopted 
after the suitors’ first attempt at assassinating Telemachus at sea fails (Od. 4.669-
672, 16.341-370). Tydeus, father of Diomedes, is ambushed by a large band of 
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Thebans as he travels from their city after humiliating them in athletic competition. 
‘The Kadmeians…in anger compacted an ambuscade of guile on his way home, 
assembling together fifty fighting men’ (Il. 4.391-393). The king of Lykia ‘spun 
another entangling treachery’ and sent a group of men to assassinate Bellerophon, 
having been asked to kill him by Proitos, his daughter’s husband (Il. 6.167-169,187-
189). Aigisthos is able to murder Agamemnon, despite Agamemnon’s great strength 
and prowess, through treachery. ‘Choosing out the twenty best fighting men in the 
district, he set an ambush…then led him in all unsuspicious of death, and feasted 
him and killed him feasting, as one strikes down an ox at his manger’ (Od. 4.530-
535). These killings and attempted killings were not formal executions, and, with the 
possible exception of the ambush of Tydeus, they lacked the implicit consent of the 
community or of an appointed magistrate. Killings such as these relied on surprise, 
strength and treachery to achieve their aims. They are even distinct from instances of 
popular violence and mob justice as they largely lack the ‘popular’ element. These 
were informal murders carried out by small groups of private individuals organised 
ad hoc to settle private grudges or to further private interests.
122
  
It is worth examining the speech of Amphinomus at Od. 16.400-405 within 
this context of violence and personal power. ‘Dear friends, I for my part would not 
be willing to murder Telemachus; we should first have to ask the gods for their 
counsel. Then, if the ordinances of great Zeus approve of it, I myself would kill him 
and tell all others to do so; but I say we must give it up, if the gods deny us’. This 
speech has attracted claims that Homeric rulers operated under a form of the divine 
right of kings. Despite Nilsson writing as early as 1933 that the Homeric basileus 
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‘was no Pharaoh nor was he a king by right of divine standing’123 some scholars 
have persisted in assuming that, in Homeric society, those that held the  ‘office’ or 
rank of a basileus did so through divine right. This idea has found its way into 
textbooks
124
 and is still entertained in more recent scholarship.
125
 It is not a 
satisfactory interpretation as it is not only unsupported by evidence from the rest of 
the poems, but, as has been shown, the society depicted was dominated by men who 
maintained power through personal prowess. So far, in the context of violence, it has 
been shown that power was a matter of personal strength and ability and the poems 
have indicated the acute vulnerability of those who lacked these. The gods were not 
responsible for appointing the ruling men in the Homeric poems. We are told that the 
gods ‘spin misery’ even for basileis (Od. 20.196). The above evidence has already 
proved that being the son or father of a basileus was itself no defence against 
opportunistic attack. These individuals still required personal prowess, followers, 
wealth and relatives to support their position and defend their possessions. 
Considering these objections, it is necessary to attempt to identify an alternative 
meaning in Amphinomus’ speech, one that can be corroborated by evidence from the 
rest of the epics. A more likely meaning is that Amphinomus does not revere the 
‘office’ of basileus and he does not venerate Telemachus’ pedigree. Amphinomus 
certainly does not regard Telemachus’ person to be sacred. Instead, by accepting 
Amphinomus’ hesitation as a very understandable reluctance to murder the son of a 
wealthy and influential man, famous for his cunning and martial prowess, we can 
begin to create a more coherent and plausible picture of the situation and one that is 
consistent with the norms of Homeric society that have been identified. The more 
likely meaning of Amphinomus is this: that he fears violent reprisals should the 
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suitors make an attempt on Telemachus’ life. It is not difficult to see this fear of 
violent reprisal in operation elsewhere in the epics. Mentor warns the assembly of 
the consequences of disrespecting the house of Odysseus, stating that the suitors ‘lay 
their heads on the line when violently they eat up the house of Odysseus, who, they 
say to themselves, will not come back’ (Od. 2.237-238). Odysseus himself is aware 
that powerful men will seek revenge if they are able. He points out that the family of 
a murdered man will drive out the killer, and implies that the man who kills the son 
of a basileus should fear even greater reprisals (Od. 23.118-122). It is reasonable to 
assume that a wealthy and influential family would be more effective in carrying out 
acts of vengeance. After Tlepolemos, the son of Herakles, killed his father’s uncle he 
fled straightaway. ‘At once he put ships together and assembled a host of people and 
went fugitive over the sea, since the others threatened, the rest of the sons and the 
grandsons of…Herakles’ (Il. 2.664-666). Odysseus’ false tale of his murder of 
Orsilochus features a speedy flight after a murder. Although he carries out the killing 
stealthily, ‘there was a very dark night spread over all the sky, nor did anyone see 
me, nor did anyone know of it when I stripped the life from him’ (Od. 13.268.271), 
he flees immediately, ‘I went at once to a ship…and asked them to carry me and to 
set me down in Pylos or shining Elis’ (Od. 13.272-275).126 The Old Man of the Sea, 
speaking to Menelaos, expects Aigisthos to be the victim of a revenge-killing for the 
slaughter of Agamemnon. ‘You might find Aigisthos still alive, or perhaps Orestes 
has beaten you to the kill, but you might be there for the burying’ (Od. 4.546-547). 
The relatives of the slain suitors are no exception to this trend and see no other 
alternative to violence in their pursuit of vengeance against Odysseus (Od. 24.426-
532). Although Medon and Halitherses try to stop the assembly from taking up 
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Eupeithes’ course of action, which is to launch an attack on Odysseus (Od. 24.443-
462), they can suggest no other means of seeking redress for the killing of the 
suitors. Eupeithes and the others go so far as to arm themselves and Eupeithes 
himself is killed before order is restored. It is remarkable that in this final instance 
the use of lethal force was the only course of action seriously considered by both 
parties, and the intervention of Athene and Zeus is the only factor that prohibits 
further bloodshed (Od. 24.528-548). Several other killers in the epics resort to exile, 
such is their fear of retaliatory violence.
127
 
When Amphinomus’ speech is placed in its proper context, that is, within a 
society where great men eagerly resorted to violence, Amphinomus’ reluctance 
becomes understandable. The plan of the suitors to murder Telemachus involves 
potentially fatal consequences for the assassins. A fear of sudden, violent reprisals is 
consistent with the norms and practices depicted in the rest of the poems. In this 
instance the body of evidence that exists in the poems makes it unnecessary and 
misleading to assume the presence of divine right or any form of abstract reverence 
for Telemachus’ person or position.  
Men clearly fear the power of basileis in the epics. Consequently, even 
powerful individuals like Odysseus are depicted warning their comrades against 
provoking a more powerful man (Il. 2.195-196). Homeric leaders had few qualms 
about using violence to maintain their dominance over weaker individuals. In the 
epics they beat those who displease them and are prepared to use deadly force in 
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response to perceived slights or signs of dissent as well as against actual physical 
attack. Opportunistic, unprovoked, killings were also carried out in the quest for 
profit and more power. Even fellow basileis, religious figures such as Chryses (Il. 
1.26-32), and relatives were threatened with violence. Consequently, individuals in 
the Homeric poems are understandably wary of incurring the anger of a basileus. 
The examples above suggest that although men might have followed a basileus 
because of his reputation, for an opportunity to gather plunder or the promise of 
gifts, they would also conform to the will of a powerful man through fear. The 
heavy-handed and widespread use of violence maintained a Homeric leader’s 
dominance alongside success in war, personal wealth and the social practices to be 
discussed in Part III. 
Much of the evidence presented above has given the impression that 
opportunistic and predatory killings were a socially accepted or ‘normative’ part of 
life in Homeric Greece. This was not the case. The poet does not depict the killing of 
another individual, even by a wealthy, powerful man, as an act which went 
unpunished or uncensored by the community. The high number of fugitive killers 
noted above attests to this. When Odysseus shoots down Antinoös in his house, the 
suitors state clearly that Odysseus, still not fully realising his identity, must die for 
the killing (Od. 22.27-30). In this instance the suitors even thought that Antinoös had 
been killed by accident yet still demanded death as the penalty (Od. 22.31-33). 
Eupeithes is able to convince more than half of the assembly to follow him and 
attempt to kill Odysseus and Telemachus in revenge for killing the suitors, their 
relatives (Od. 24.463-468). Eupeithes even encourages the assembly to act quickly in 
taking revenge as he expects Odysseus’ next action will be to flee from Ithaka (Od. 
24.430-437). The remarkable implication here is that Eupeithes expected Odysseus 
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to flee from his own people, leaving behind his house and property, as a consequence 
of his killing of the suitors. A killer could also be punished by being made to pay 
poine (blood money) (Il. 18.497-499). If the payment was accepted the killer could 
remain in his own country without the threat of vengeance from the victim’s family 
(Il. 9.632-636).
128
 The evidence presented above should encourage the view that 
individuals in Homeric Greece, particularly powerful individuals, were capable of 
opportunistically using their influence and strength to kill others but that they should 
do so was not always approved of by their community. In essence, it is unlikely that 
even basileis could kill with complete impunity. The examples of Telemachus’ 
appeal to the assembly (Od. 2.40-79), Antinoös’ father’s flight to Odysseus (Od. 
16.426-430),
129
 Odysseus’ fear of reprisals from the people (Od. 23.117), and 
Eupeithes appeal to the assembly (Od. 24.426-437), prove that the community was 
capable of coordinated action against one of its own members, even against a 
basileus, should that member act against accepted norms of behaviour or against the 
wishes of the community. 
 
III 
When not at war Homeric leaders ultimately maintained their power through the 
agricultural surplus produced by the labour of their slaves. We will see that this 
surplus could be redistributed as gifts and largesse, and enabled Homeric leaders to 
engage in the various social practices, to be examined in Part III, that were vital to 
maintaining their status. To a modern audience, one of the most remarkable aspects 
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of life in the epics is the widespread ownership of slaves. The wealthiest and most 
powerful men in the epics, such as Agamemnon, Alkinoös, Achilles and Priam, all 
possess slaves. They also seem to possess them in extremely large numbers. We 
encounter fifty female slaves in the fabulously rich house of Alkinoös and a further 
fifty in the house of Odysseus. They are employed grinding corn, weaving, and 
performing menial tasks.
130
 Phoinix relates to Achilles that he had to evade not only 
the watchmen but the female slaves when escaping from the house of his father (Il. 
9.477). Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, claims to have once been rich and therefore 
an owner of dmoes myrioi, ‘countless’, or even ‘ten thousand’ slaves (Od. 17.422). 
Even the poor Laertes owns at least eight slaves (Od. 24.386-390, 497-498). Male 
slaves are found tending the large flocks of cattle, sheep and goats belonging to the 
basileis, ensuring the herds multiply, driving the animals to town and slaughtering 
them (Od. 9.1-29). Male slaves planted and tended vines, fruit trees and other crops, 
and carried out general farm maintenance. Odysseus deliberately ‘mistakes’ his 
father Laertes for a slave while he is busy planting outdoors.
131
 Agamemnon and 
Achilles also give slaves as gifts, prizes, or recompense to other basileis.
132
 Slaves 
appear to have been as much a form of movable wealth as livestock or treasure 
items, and were clearly valued as gifts or prizes. The basileis acquired their slaves 
largely through war and raiding, although some slaves in the epics were born to slave 
parents, becoming the property of their parent’s master (Od. 24.386-388). A small 
number could be received as gifts or purchased. 
The epics clearly portray the leading men as slave owners on a very large 
scale. The poet’s audience must have been familiar with the rich man who owned far 
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more slaves than were required to support his family. For Odysseus’ immediate 
household of three, counting Penelope, Telemachus and himself, a disproportionately 
large number of slaves are owned by Odysseus. Odysseus’ slaves would have 
produced far more agricultural produce and clothing than could possibly have been 
consumed by the family.
133
 Although some of this surplus was stored away (Od. 
2.337-343), we will see that it could also be exchanged. Part III will discuss a 
number of social practices through which Homeric leaders maintained their power 
off the battlefield and the reliance of these practices on the produce of slaves will be 
made apparent.   
Extensive lands were owned by the basileis and worked by their slaves.
134
 
These included pasture for animals, arable land for the planting of wheat and barley 
and even orchards of fruit trees. The types of domesticated animals kept by the 
basileis included sheep and cattle (Od. 1.92), goats (Od. 2.56), and even horses (Od. 
3.263). The produce from these herds included cheese and milk as well as meat (Od. 
4.85-88). Crops were also grown to be used as fodder for these animals (Od. 4.41). A 
speech by Noëmon, in which he asks about the whereabouts of his ship, shows the 
need for broad lands in which to graze animals, ‘now I find that I need her for 
crossing over to spacious Elis, where I have a dozen horses, mares, and suckling 
from them hard-working unbroken mules’ (Od. 4.634-637). Telemachus’ refusal to 
accept horses from Menelaos also suggests that the poet’s audience was able to 
identify good land for pastoral farming. ‘I will not take the horses to Ithaka…since 
you are lord of a spreading plain, there is galingale, and there is wheat and millet 
                                                          
133
 Harris (2006) 364. 
134
 The size and disposition of these farms, estates, and herds, may account for the distortion we 
encounter when attempting to work out the ratio of female to male slaves. Male slaves appear in the 
poems allocated to farm work in the country, and as the Odyssey takes place primarily within various 
households, the workplace of female slaves, the ratio is inevitably distorted. 
71 
 
here and white barley, wide grown’ (Od. 4.602-604). The Odyssey gives the 
impression that large pieces of land were also given over to arable farming. The poet 
describes Ephyre as ‘that rich corn land’ (Od. 2.328-329) and the sun rising over 
‘grain-giving farmland’ (Od. 3.3). Telemachus and his companion drive their chariot 
through a ‘plain full of wheat’ (Od. 3.495). The Iliad also employs the image of the 
reaping of crops as a metaphor during the climax of a battle. ‘And the men, like two 
lines of reapers who, facing each other, drive their course all down the field of wheat 
or of barley for a man blessed in substance, and the cut swathes showering’ (Il. 
11.67-69). Sarpedon describes the lands he and Glaukos owned as ‘good land, 
orchard and vineyard, and ploughland for the planting of wheat’ (Il. 12.314). 
Odysseus recognises the farming potential of unworked land. ‘For it is not a bad 
place at all, it could bear all crops in season, and there are meadow lands…there 
could be grapes grown there endlessly, and there is smooth land for ploughing, men 
could reap a full harvest always in season’ (Od. 9.131-135). One of Odysseus’ false 
tales suggests that a man of property would be expected to spend some time in the 
fields and among his estates (Od. 13.268). All these passages suggest that arable 
farming was extensive, profitable, and a significant source of foodstuffs in Homeric 
Greece.
135
 These crops would have been planted and then gathered in largely by 
slaves (Hes. Op. 571-573), although some hired labourers could have been 
employed, their numbers were small (Hes. Op. 600-603). The overwhelming 
dominance of labour by slaves should be made more obvious by the remarkable 
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absence of labour for wages. Only a handful of references to labour for wages appear 
in the Homeric poems (Il. 21.441-455, Od. 10.85, Od. 18.357-361).
136
  
As well as fields of crops, Penelope keeps an orchard and has a slave to tend 
it (Od. 4.737). Odysseus mentions the varieties of fruit trees he received as a gift 
from his father, ‘you gave me thirteen pear trees, and ten apple trees, and forty fig 
trees; and so also you named the fifty vines you would give’ (Od. 24.340-342). Even 
in his old age and poverty, Laertes still maintains a vineyard on his farm (Od. 1.193). 
Vegetable gardens were also cultivated and maintained (Od. 7.127). These 
descriptions suggest that wealthy individuals in Homeric Greece owned extensive 
lands that produced a wide variety of foodstuffs, and did not rely primarily on herds.  
These lands could come into the possession of a Homeric leader through a 
number of ways. The three most prominent means of gaining land in Homeric 
society appear to have been marriage, feats of arms, and passing property on to one’s 
offspring.
137
 Bellerophon receives land as part of his marriage (Il. 6.191-195) and 
Odysseus is offered a house and property by Alkinoös should he stay in Phaiakia and 
marry Nausikaa (Od. 7.311-315). Considering the large number of herds owned by 
these men, it is likely that land for pasture and grazing was also included in these 
exchanges. Meleagros was promised a large amount of prime land in return for 
fighting in defence of his city (Il. 9.576-580). Land might also be violently seized by 
powerful neighbours (Il. 22.488-489). Sarpedon states that he and Glaukos were 
‘appointed a great piece of land’ that contained ‘orchard and vineyard, and 
ploughland for the planting of wheat’ because of their martial prowess (Il. 12.313-
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314). When Achilles taunts Aeneas he asks him what the Trojans offered him in 
return for his service, ‘Or have the men of Troy promised you a piece of land, 
surpassing all others, fine ploughland and orchard for you to administer if you kill 
me?’ (Il. 20.184-186). It is assumed in Homer that land could be given out in return 
for military assistance. The poet says, in very vague terms, that Laertes ‘won’ his 
farm (Od. 24.207). Menelaos speaks in general terms of the land he would have liked 
to give Odysseus for his service to him. ‘I would have settled a city in Argos for him, 
and made him a home, bringing him from Ithaka with all his possessions, his son, all 
his people. I would have emptied one city for him out of those that are settled round 
about and under my lordship’ (Od. 4.174-177). For service to Menelaos, Odysseus 
might have received a large amount of property. However, it is unclear if the 
exchange of property and a move into lands dominated by Menelaos would compel 
Odysseus to become a therapon like Eteoneus, a ‘retainer’ or ‘henchman’ of 
Menelaos.
138
 Eteoneus also lives in a house near to that of Menelaos and, despite 
being described as kreion (‘lord’ or ‘ruler’), performs domestic tasks within 
Menelaos’ household (Od. 4.22-24, 15.95-98). Privately owned lands are depicted as 
a source of great wealth in Homer and individuals are concerned with gathering land 
through marriage, inheriting from their father or military achievements. The extent 
of these lands and the wide variety of crops grown should further illustrate the 
significance of slave labour as a source of agricultural wealth. 
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IV 
We will now turn to social practices as a means of gaining and maintaining power in 
Homeric society. In times of peace these practices enabled Homeric leaders to 
continue validating their position and gave them opportunities to increase their 
personal power. The practices that will be discussed in this section are feasting, 
religious practices, marriage, xenoi, gift-giving and largesse, the sponsoring of 
athletic competition, and protection payments. 
 
a) Feasting 
The incidents of feasting in the Iliad and Odyssey are many and the frequency of 
these events reflects their importance.
139
 Feasts are prepared by basileis to entertain 
their peers and also for their communities and followers. Nestor, his extended family 
and his entire community are feasting when Telemachus arrives at Pylos (Od. 3.4-
11). Telemachus was invited to ‘equal feasts’ on Ithaka by other basileis (Od. 
11.185). Alkinoös feasts the basileis of Phaiakia, whose wealth and power is not as 
great as his own (Od. 7.98-138). Agamemnon reminds fellow basileis that they have 
eaten at his feasts and enjoyed his generosity and hospitality.
140
 This occurs on the 
battlefield as Agamemnon attempts to encourage various leaders in the Achaian 
army. Phoinix, although an exile, was taken in as a follower by Peleus and attended 
feasts at his home (Il. 9.486-488). Telemachus rewards his crew for their service to 
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him by feasting them on their return to Ithaca, ‘to be my thanks for sharing the 
journey with me’ (Od. 15.505-507). Odysseus, in one of his Cretan stories, provides 
his raiding party with enough to feast them for six days before setting off (Od. 
14.249-252). Nestor also offers regular invitations to feasts as a reward for a 
particular service, in this case spying on the Trojan camp (Il. 10.216-217). 
Agamemnon attempts to increase or re-establish his prestige by feasting the leaders 
of the Achaian army after Nestor suggests that he do so (Il. 9.70-73), and Odysseus 
even suggests that Agamemnon appease Achilles partly by entertaining him with a 
generous meal (Il. 19.179-180). Even allowing for poetic exaggeration, the quantities 
of foodstuffs consumed at these events must have been very large, and the emphasis 
on the generosity of the host, particularly at large-scale events such as feasts for 
departing raiding parties, must have been obvious.  
The guests at the feasts of Menelaos and Alkinoös ate in the conspicuous 
presence of their host’s wealth, surrounded by precious objects, arms and armour. 
Gold and silver are found on display in large quantities and objects made from 
precious metals are used by the guests during the feast.
141
 When Athene, in the form 
of Mentes, visits Telemachus she is washed from gold and silver vessels and given a 
golden goblet to drink from (Od. 1.136-143). The effect of this conspicuous display 
of private wealth can be seen on Telemachus. ‘Son of Nestor…only look at the 
gleaming of the bronze all through these echoing mansions, and the gleaming of gold 
and amber, of silver and of ivory. The court of Zeus on Olympos must be like this on 
the inside, such abundance of everything’ (Od. 4.71-75). The display of precious 
objects in areas of the house open to guests was clearly intended to impress visitors. 
There is such an enormous quantity of weapons and armour exhibited on the walls of 
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Odysseus’ house that the suitors could equip their entire number from what was 
displayed (Od. 19.4-13).
142
 The display of items of treasure and arms within the 
houses of basileis was intended to impress guests, and, as power was attained 
through personal prowess and wealth, this display demonstrated the extent of the 
power of the host. 
Feasting increased the host’s prestige and allowed him to display his wealth 
to guests through the treasures on display in his house and his contributions of 
livestock, wine and other foodstuffs. The feast also placed an obligation on the 
guests to return his hospitality with favours, and gave the basileus an opportunity to 
distribute largesse to his community. In practical terms this ensured that a Homeric 
leader could call upon those of his peers who had enjoyed his hospitality, and were 
under an obligation to him, to perform favours at times of need. This could include 
military assistance. We have seen that Agamemnon reminded certain warriors that 
they had feasted at his expense to try and encourage them to fight on his behalf. 
Feasts were also a form of direct payment in return for services to the leader, as is 
shown by the actions of Telemachus.  
The previous section on slavery showed that the grain and vines cultivated by 
slaves supplied the bread and wine consumed at these events. The meat is from 
slaughtered pigs, oxen and sheep which were tended by slaves. These animals were 
brought in from the countryside to the house of the basileus by his slaves to be 
slaughtered or sacrificed. Free labourers who also worked on the farms were only 
employed at certain times of the year (Hes. Op. 600-604). From the evidence 
presented in Part III it is clear that the basileis absolutely relied on the surplus 
produced by slave labour to engage in the key practice of feasting. 
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b) Religious Practice 
The conspicuous sacrifice of animals prior to the actual eating and drinking is also 
significant. Nestor is able to sacrifice nine victims brought in by the communities he 
rules (Od. 3.4-8), and another he has brought to sacrifice to Athene (Od. 3.418-463). 
Agamemnon sacrifices a bull to Zeus, praying for the success of their expedition, 
then butchers it and the meal is shared between himself, Nestor, Idomeneus, the two 
Aiantes, Diomedes, Odysseus and Menelaos (Il. 2.402-431). Agamemnon makes this 
sacrifice on behalf of the entire enterprise. Similarly the Trojans offer twelve heifers 
to Athene, asking the goddess to protect their city, wives and children (Il. 6.92-95, 
273-278). Alkinoös decides to sacrifice twelve bulls to placate Poseidon, explicitly 
on behalf of the entire polis (Od. 13.181-183). When Odysseus tells a lie about 
organising a raiding party he claims to have given many victims to the crews of his 
ships to sacrifice and then eat (Od. 14.248-252). These animal sacrifices were 
intended to benefit the immediate community by averting the anger of the gods or by 
making it more likely that the gods would grant their requests. The fact that, in these 
examples, the victims were either provided by the basileis or gathered on their 
initiative suggests that the basileis fulfilled an important religious role by using their 
wealth and influence to provide larger sacrifices on behalf of the community.
143
 The 
feasting immediately after the sacrifice of course provided an additional opportunity 
for the basileus to demonstrate his largesse to his followers or the community. 
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If these practices reaffirmed the position of the basileus, so did his interaction 
with individuals known as manteis. These individuals, such as Calchas and 
Theoklymenus, recognised signs sent by the gods or knew the gods’ will through a 
special skill or god-given ability. These specialists could recommend specific 
courses of action at times of indecision or apotropaic rituals to avoid misfortune or 
catastrophe (Il. 1.68-100). The predictions of seers also granted a unique form of 
legitimacy to the basileis. Calchas predicted Agamemnon’s victory over Troy (Il. 
2.300-332). Theoklymenus not only predicts of the suitors (Od. 20.351-370) and the 
return of Odysseus (Od. 17.152-161) but that the family of Telemachus will rule 
Ithaka forever (Od. 15.531-534). It seems that the basileis’ involvement with these 
individuals and wider religious practice contributed to the justification of their 
position.  
 
c) Marriage 
A further practice by which a Homeric leader could find supporters beyond his 
immediate community was marriage.
144
 An analysis of Homeric marriage practice 
will not be attempted here.
145
 The immediate concern will be with understanding 
how Homeric marriage fits into the wider picture of the pursuit of power in Homeric 
society and what the leading men hoped to gain from a favourable marriage. 
Marriage in Homeric society could involve the exchange of different kinds of gifts 
between both parties as well as the promise of further marriage-gifts (hedna). Gifts 
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might be given by the groom to the bride’s father (dora), or a bride might be 
exchanged for some form of service to her family.
146
 A fortunate groom might have 
been so favoured by the bride’s father that he received his bride without paying any 
gifts himself, and even received gifts along with his bride. In some cases wives 
moved into the house of their new husband, in others the groom moved into the 
house of his wife’s father. Two potential grooms, Othryoneus and Achilles, are 
explicitly told that, under certain conditions, they will receive their bride anahednon 
(Othryoneus and Achilles would not be required to give hedna). The examples found 
in the poems vary, and this variation should not be seen as problematic or as 
evidence for a poetic accumulation of marriage practices spanning many centuries.
147
 
Like the general pursuit of wealth and power in Homeric society, the diversity of 
practice suggests that there was no widely recognised ‘system’ regulating marriage 
and certainly no legal code in place. Marriages must have varied in nature along with 
the current needs and desires of the participants and their available resources.
148
 Van 
Wees, writing on Megara at the time of Theognis, has stated that friendship ‘is more 
than an emotional bond for Theognis; it is also, and primarily, an instrumental 
relationship in which benefits are shared and reciprocated.’149 Something similar 
could be said of Homeric marriages. In the epics it is clear that the groom and the 
bride’s family seek to benefit from the arrangement. Marriage alliances certainly 
ensured that a powerful man could call on a wider network of friends and family in 
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times of need.
150
  In the more extreme cases of Nestor and Priam, the result is that 
they can call upon an extended family to perform various tasks and go to war on 
their behalf, as some grooms had moved into the house of the bride’s father. In 
Priam’s case especially his children and sons-in-law are relied upon to fight for the 
city. Sarpedon reminds Hektor that ‘you said once that without companions and 
without people you could hold this city alone, with only your brothers and the lords 
of your sisters’ (Il. 5.472-474).151 This passage indicates the importance of children 
and allies obtained through marriage as future fighters. Odysseus, disguised as a 
beggar, asks Telemachus if his brothers have failed to support him against the 
suitors. Odysseus’ expectation implies that male relatives were regularly called upon 
as fighters. He also states ‘For I myself once promised to be a man of prosperity, but, 
giving way to force and violence, did many reckless things, because I relied on my 
father and brothers’ (Od. 18.138-140). Odysseus clearly believes that a man will be 
encouraged to carry out violent acts by the knowledge that he had the military 
support of his male relatives. The significance of male relatives as warriors is 
reflected in Laertes’ joy at seeing his son and grandson equipped for war and 
boasting of their valour. ‘What day is this for me, dear gods? I am very happy. My 
son and my son’s son are contending over their courage’ (Od. 24.514-515). Marriage 
of course also produced legitimate children (gnesioi) who could inherit their father’s 
property on his death. The use of bastard children (nothoi), in a military capacity, as 
attendants for the legitimate offspring, is a phenomenon that appears on a number of 
occasions in Homer. Although these children do not appear to have inherited 
property in the same manner as their legitimate siblings they were put to use. The 
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chariot of Antiphos, a legitimate son of Priam, is driven by Isos, one of Priam’s 
bastard sons. The chariot of Hektor is also driven by his bastard brother, Kebriones 
(Il. 16.737-738). Demokoön, a bastard son of Priam, comes to Troy from Abydos to 
fight the Achaians (Il. 4.499). Another of Priam’s illegitimate sons, Doryklos, is 
killed by Aias (Il. 11.489-490). Another bastard, Pedaios, son of Antenor, is killed 
fighting for the Trojan cause (Il. 5.69). Some, such as Medon the son of Oïleus, were 
able to lead parties of warriors themselves (Il. 2.727). The example of Medon and of 
other bastards such as Teukros shows that the status of a bastard was no impediment 
to gaining authority on the battlefield or to being treated respectfully. Teukros is 
shown particular favour by Agamemnon who offers him presents for his service (Il. 
8.281-291). Nothoi were also not excluded from favourable marriages. Menelaos 
secures a marriage for Megapenthes, his son by a slave woman, to Alektor’s 
daughter (Od. 4.10-12). Bastard daughters were also of use. Priam’s illegitimate 
daughter Medesikaste was married to Imbrios, who moves into Priam’s household 
and fights for him (Il. 13.170-176). In this final example Priam’s military capacity 
was increased through a marriage. There does not appear to have been any stigma 
attached to using bastard children within the traditional means of gaining power. 
They do, however, appear in a subordinate role to the gnesioi. 
The promise of marriage into a powerful family could provide military allies 
in the form of suitors seeking to impress the bride’s kinsmen. Othryoneus of 
Kabesos agrees to fight on the side of Troy in return for a guarantee of marriage to 
Priam’s daughter Kassandra. We are told that Othryoneus was freed from any 
obligation to pay hedna to the bride’s family (Il. 13.363-369). Able men like 
Othryoneus who might be an asset to the basileus could be encouraged to marry into 
a powerful family and move into the home of the bride’s father, as is the case with 
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Priam’s large household. Alkinoös, impressed by Odysseus, also offers presents and 
a house to Odysseus to encourage him to marry Nausikaaa and remain in Phaiakia 
(Od. 7.311-315). Bellerophon is awarded a piece of land by Proitos’ father-in-law 
along with his daughter in marriage. ‘Then when the king knew him for the powerful 
stock of the god, he detained him there, and offered him the hand of his daughter, 
and gave him half of all the times basileidos (Il. 6.191-195). Achilles, along with a 
marriage to one of Agamemnon’s daughters, is offered a vast amount of treasure, 
slaves and land (Il. 9.141-156). Some of these examples show that a groom could 
receive land, wealth and authority through affiliation with a powerful household 
along with his bride. Men like Achilles, Bellerophon and Othryeoneus are fine 
warriors and obviously of use to their potential bride’s father. In the case of 
Odysseus, he simply impressed a great man and won his favour, causing him to offer 
his daughter along with numerous presents to encourage Odysseus to remain with 
him. ‘O father Zeus…how I wish that, being the man you are and thinking the way I 
do, you could have my daughter and be called my son-in-law, staying here with me 
(Od. 7.311-314). For those suitors who did not receive their bride anahednon, the 
process of securing a favourable marriage is depicted as potentially expensive and 
highly competitive. The suitors delivered gifts (dora) to the bride’s father and 
increased their offers of hedna in what must have been a series of increasingly 
expensive attempts to surpass their rivals.
152
 Eurymachos, who offered dora and 
hedna, appears to have been the most favoured candidate to marry Penelope (Od. 
15.16-18). The Odyssey indicates that Eurymachos’ preeminent position among the 
hopeful suitors is due entirely to his ability to give the most impressive gifts to 
Penelope’s father, and to promise the greatest amount of hedna. 
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The benefits of marriage to both parties were tangible and mutually 
beneficial. The exchange of wealth could greatly increase the property of the groom, 
and the father of the bride might receive many precious gifts from suitors seeking his 
favour. The simple act of exchanging such great quantities of wealth must have been 
impressive in itself. The gifts of the suitor to the bride’s father, as well as his offer of 
hedna, and the presents from the bride’s family to the groom, could be composed of 
livestock, slaves and treasure.
153
 These exchanges could be extensive, involving the 
transmission of entire herds of animals, as well as slaves and metalwork.
154
 To 
secure his marriage, Iphidamas gives one hundred oxen and promises a further 
thousand goats and sheep (Il. 11.244-245).
155
 The produce of slave labour is clearly 
used to feast the bride’s family and provide them with gifts, a practice mentioned by 
Penelope, as well as supplying the bride’s family with the means to pay gifts to the 
successful suitor. The great expense of this practice illustrates its significance to 
those who took part in it. The increase it brought to a basileus’ power and prestige is 
apparent from the evidence above. 
 
d) Xenoi 
Allies could be found through the practice of guest-friendship. Xenoi (guest-friends) 
could be created through exchanging appropriate gifts, as do Odysseus and Iphitos 
when they form their xenosune (Od. 21.13-35). Xenoi could also be inherited. A 
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number of individuals in the Iliad and the Odyssey speak of inheriting older xenos 
relationships.
156
 An individual was obliged to treat a xenos in a certain way. This 
usually manifests in the epics as the provision of portions of food and drink, 
entertainment and lodging, gift-exchange, and general assistance. There is also 
pressure to ensure that a xenos enjoys physical protection. Telemachus laments his 
inability to perform this particular function. ‘For how shall I take and entertain a 
xenos in my house? I myself am young and have no faith in my hand’s strength to 
defend a man, if anyone else picks a quarrel with him’ (Od. 16.69-72). The heroes 
appear to regard the concept of conflict or confrontation with a xenos as deeply 
inappropriate, Diomedes and Glaukus being the most obvious example of this. 
Odysseus challenges the Phaiakians to compete with him, ‘any of the Phaiakians, 
that is, except Laodamas himself, for he is my xenos; who would fight with his 
friend?’ (Od. 8.207-208). Although Odysseus could be speaking sarcastically, as 
Laodamas had insulted him, the point still stands. Menelaos is also careful not to 
detain Telemachus against his will and even criticises the host who entertains a guest 
for too long and prevents him from carrying on with his journey (Od. 15.68-74). The 
harming of a xenos was clearly regarded as contrary to accepted norms as the story 
of Herakles’ murder of Iphitos makes clear. ‘[Iphitos] came to the son of Zeus…the 
man called Herakles…who killed Iphitos while he was a xenos in his household; 
hard man, without shame for the watchful gods’ (Od. 21.25-28). In the Odyssey the 
xenos relationship is clearly depicted as something of inherent value to those that 
practice it. As Peisistratos says to Telemachus, ‘For a xenos remembers all his days 
the man who received him as a xeinodokos receives a guest, and gave him the gifts 
of friendship’ (Od. 15.54-55). Alkinoös states that, to a good man ‘his suppliant and 
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xenos is as good as a brother to him’ (Od. 8.547). Harpalion and Sarpedon are xenoi 
of Paris and Hektor respectively and fight with them against the Achaians (Il. 
13.660-661, Il. 17.150). It is clear that a xenos relationship represented safety, 
sustenance and a potential source of favours. Military assistance may also have been 
implied. As Herman notes, these were essentially private relationships, created 
between private individuals without the consent of the wider community.
157
  
 
e) Gift-giving and Largesse 
The giving of gifts marks some of the most splendid occasions in the epics. They are 
given as prizes, recompense, as compensation for loss or offence, and given or 
promised as rewards for services to a powerful man. They are given as parting-gifts 
to xenoi and are expected to be returned with something of equal value. Gifts could 
take many forms, including unworked gold and silver, bronze, weapons and armour, 
cloth, slaves and livestock.
158
 Hektor laments the loss of all the treasure from Troy, 
as this has been sent away to satisfy their allies. Hektor mentions gold and bronze 
items in particular as having been given away (Il. 18.289-292). When Hektor wishes 
to encourage these allies to fight, he reminds those who have received gifts from him 
of their obligation, ‘with such a purpose I wear out my own people for presents and 
food, wherewith I make strong the spirit within each one of you’ (Il. 17.225-226). 
Odysseus’ crew grumble that he has amassed a fortune while they ‘who have gone 
through everything he has on the same venture, come home with our hands empty’ 
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(Od. 10.41-42). Here, the crew refer to the booty from Troy and the gifts given to 
Odysseus by Aiolos. It seems that gifts given by guest-friends, as well as plunder, 
were liable to be redistributed. The promise of material reward could attract allies to 
fight for another’s cause. These rewards were not necessarily always collected from 
a defeated enemy in the form of battlefield spoil or plunder. Allies could be gathered 
to provide military assistance through the payment of gifts. Agamemnon offers gifts 
to warriors on the Achaian side when he witnesses their prowess in battle. Seeing 
Teukros shooting down Trojans with his bow, Agamemnon states ‘first after myself I 
will put into your hands some great gift of honour; a tripod, or two horses and the 
chariot with them, or else a woman, who will go up into the same bed with you’ (Il. 
8.289-291). Teukros has been seen by Agamemnon to do two things: display his skill 
and to destroy Agamemnon’s enemies. Although Teukros then boasts that he needs 
no such encouragement, it is clear that the purpose of Agamemnon’s promises is to 
encourage his followers to fight hard on his behalf. Achilles criticises Agamemnon 
for taking the treasures, ‘goodly and numerous,’ plundered from the Troad, giving 
them out ‘little by little’ and retaining many for himself (Il. 9.330-333). In the same 
speech Achilles also mentions that ‘all the other prizes of honour he (Agamemnon) 
gave the great men and the princes are held fast by them’ (Il. 9.334-335). 
Agamemnon is clearly expected to distribute gifts to the basileis who followed him 
to Troy and those that followed a leader like Agamemnon clearly expected expensive 
rewards for their services. Although there seems to have been a general practice of 
rewarding followers with gifts or accumulating followers with the prospect of gifts, 
the practice was not indiscriminate constantly.
159
 Agamemnon rewards individual 
warriors, such as Teukros, for fighting with particular skill and success.  
                                                          
159
 For a discussion of the link between distribution of wealth and personal power see Donlan (1982) 
87 
 
To be able to distribute gifts, often treasure, a Homeric leader would have 
required a store of luxury items, as well as other forms of wealth, such as iron, slaves 
and livestock. Such a store is in the house of Odysseus. ‘(Telemachus) went down 
into his father’s high-roofed and wide storeroom, where gold and bronze were lying 
piled up, and abundant clothing in the bins, and fragrant olive oil, and in it jars of 
wine’ (Od. 2.337-340). To accumulate enough wealth to engage in the practice of 
gift-giving, a Homeric leader needed sources of luxury items. Violent forms of 
acquisition were not the only means of collecting these items. The basileis did not 
employ free craftsmen in large numbers or use their slaves to produce high quality 
metalwork or other goods classed as keimelion. Van Wees has pointed out that the 
exception to this is cloth, which is produced by women and slaves within the 
household.
160
 The silver bowls, bronze cauldrons and other precious items are never 
seen to be produced within the oikoi of men like Odysseus, Menelaos or Nestor. 
Metalwork must have been acquired in some other way. This could be achieved 
through plundering or gift-exchange, but it must also have occurred through 
exchanging surplus produce and there is evidence of this form of exchange in the 
epics. We have seen that an agricultural surplus was produced by the slaves owned 
by the basileis. Euneos is able to exchange wine for bronze and iron (Il. 7.473), and 
Phoenician traders exchange their ‘countless pretty things’ for biotos (means of 
living, substance) (Od. 15.456). Odysseus, in disguise, claims that the treasure he has 
stored away ‘would feed (boskoi) a succession of heirs to the tenth generation’ (Od. 
14.325, 19.293-295). In these cases trinkets and items of bronze, iron and gold are 
exchanged for agricultural produce.
161
 Surplus agricultural produce was used to 
acquire luxury items and metalwork, and represents an additional method of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
153. 
160
 van Wees (1992) 227. 
161
 van Wees (1992) 52, 226. See also Donlan (1981) 105. 
88 
 
acquiring these goods. It is very difficult to understand how a Homeric leader could 
possibly come into possession of the necessary quantities of agricultural produce and 
luxury items to successfully perform the social practices expected of him, without 
his slaves.
162
 
 
f) Athletic Competition 
One of the most impressive displays of gift-giving in the Iliad is during the funeral 
games for Patroklos, although athletic competitions organised on a whim for 
pleasure and entertainment, such as those on Phaiakia (Od. 7.100-233) or the 
contests the suitors prepared for themselves (Od. 4.626-627, 17.167-169), do not 
seem to have involved expensive prize-giving. Athletic competition has been seen by 
van Wees as an environment in which ‘aggressive behaviour’ might surface.163 
Although this is probably true, the role of the host as arbitrator of the competition, 
and therefore responsible for appeasing injured honour and pacifying violent 
outbursts, is of greater interest. The other significant areas of interest are the display 
of fairness and generosity by the host, the distribution of wealth at these events, and 
the value of these prizes to the standing of the host and competitors.  
Achilles lists the contests that a wealthy man might be expected to take part 
in as boxing, wrestling, spear-throwing and racing (Il. 23.621-623). There is also a 
chariot race at the funeral games of Patroklos. During these contests Achilles is 
careful to maintain the reputations of certain individuals. Nestor is given a prize by 
Achilles despite being too old to compete (Il. 23.618-623). The need to treat friends 
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and peers respectfully, and to award them gifts that signify honour, extends into 
athletic competition. As much as Agamemnon’s gifts to the basileis that follow him 
at Troy, or the invitations to feasts, games were an opportunity to establish and 
reinforce relationships with valuable friends and allies. Achilles is also seen to act in 
concord with the wishes of the spectators, deciding to give a gift to Eumelos, 
although he finished the race in last place (Il. 23.536-38). The Achaians commend 
Achilles’ decision. ‘So he spoke, and all gave approval to what he was urging, and 
he would have given him the horse, since all the Achaians approved’ (Il. 23.539-
541). During the combat in armour between Diomedes and Aias, the Achaians call 
for the combat to end, fearing for Aais’ safety. Achilles does not oppose this and 
divides the prizes evenly, except for a sword which he gives to Diomedes (Il. 
23.822-825). Achilles, as the host, is also responsible for resolving quarrels and 
disagreements between the participants. He resolves the argument between Aias and 
Idomeneus (Il. 23.492-498), and successfully addresses Antilochus’ staunch refusal 
to give up his prize to Eumelos (Il. 23.543-565). Despite the significance of 
honouring peers and followers, justice and fair-play in athletic competition is clearly 
expected to be upheld. An indignant Menelaos, claiming to have been cheated, asks 
‘O leaders of the Argives…judge between the two of us now; and without favour; so 
that no man of the bronze-armoured Achaians shall say of us: Menelaos using lies 
and force against Antilochos went off with the mare and won, for his horses were far 
slower but he himself was greater in power and degree’ (Il. 23.573-578). Achilles 
also stops the wrestling match between Aias and Odysseus, seeing they are so evenly 
matched, and promises equal prizes to both (Il. 23.735-737). Despite the very 
personal nature of authority at this time, the practice of athletic competition required 
the maintenance of justice by rewarding competitors according to merit.   
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The loss of items of treasure, slaves, metalwork and livestock at these events 
could only be sustained by a man in possession of a significant amount of wealth and 
the spectators must have been aware of this. The simple act of giving so many 
luxurious prizes must have been impressive and, like the practice of feasting, the 
display of the host’s wealth was an important end in itself. Achilles brought ‘prizes 
for games out of his ships, cauldrons and tripods, and horses and mules and the 
powerful high heads of cattle and fair-girdled women and grey iron’ (Il. 23.259-261). 
These prizes are displayed conspicuously before the thousands of spectators in a 
manner reminiscent of Agamemnon’s gifts to Achilles. That Achilles brought these 
things from his ships also suggests that he either carried them off as plunder or was 
awarded them by his friends or followers at Troy. Games were also an ideal 
opportunity for a Homeric leader to demonstrate the extent of his wealth to the 
spectators and presented an opportunity to honour his friends and peers with 
additional gifts, as does Achilles when he gives a prize to Nestor (Il. 23.618). 
Athletic competition provided an opportunity for the sponsor to demonstrate his 
fairness and ability to reward skill and success. Like Agamemnon’s honouring of 
Teukros on the battlefield with the promise of a gift, the host could honour 
individuals who performed well in the competition or for participating in a 
dangerous contest like boxing or wrestling. It is significant that the host was seen to 
do this conspicuously, before a crowd of spectators. For example, each time Achilles 
resolved a dispute, honoured an individual, or conformed to the collective will of the 
assembled Achaians, he did so in full view of his peers and the spectators.  
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g) Protection payments 
The final social practice to be discussed in this section is that of protection payments. 
Harris has identified this practice in the Homeric poems and identified instances of 
its continued existence in sixth-century Attica.
164
 Basileis received payments on the 
understanding that they would protect their people from attack and generally 
maintain order among the communities they ruled. The return that the people ideally 
received for their gifts was twofold: firstly the basileus became their military leader 
and protector, placing himself at the head of his people in battle, and secondly he 
became an arbitrator. The portions of land and food mentioned by Sarpedon are 
representative of this phenomenon. ‘Glaukos, why is it you and I are honoured 
before others with pride of place, the choice meats and the filled wine cups in Lykia, 
and all men look on us as if we were immortals, and we are appointed a great piece 
of land by the banks of Xanthos…Therefore it is our duty in the forefront of the 
Lykians to take our stand, and bear our part of the blazing of battle’ (Il. 12.310-316). 
Sarpedon’s speech revolves around the core of this practice: the basileis fight in the 
forefront of battle, in return for this they possess plenty of land and they are given 
the means to eat and drink. It is in relation to this practice that Agamemnon scolds 
Menestheus and Odysseus. ‘For you two it is becoming to stand among the foremost 
fighters, and endure your share of the blaze of battle; since indeed you two are first 
to hear of the feasting whenever we Achaians make ready a feast of the elders. There 
it is your pleasure to eat the roast flesh, to drink as much as you please the cups of 
wine…’ (Il. 4.341-346). Agamemnon describes a practice identical to that described 
by Sarpedon: the Achaians provide Menestheus and Odysseus with food and drink, 
therefore they should fight hard at the front. In the Iliad Priam abuses his surviving 
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sons and calls them ‘the plunderers of their own people in their land of lambs and 
kids’ (Il. 24.261-262). Priam is not accusing his sons of thievery in the literal sense, 
but is stating that they are undeserving of their privileges because they are poor 
warriors.
165
  
As well as engaging in combat, the basileus would also maintain order 
among their people, pass judgements and uphold themistes; the customary norms of 
the community. This practice is hinted at when Achilles is offered a number of towns 
by Agamemnon. ‘All these lie near the sea, at the bottom of sandy Pylos, and men 
live among them rich in cattle and rich in sheepflocks, who will honour you as if you 
were a god with gifts given and fulfil your prospering themistas underneath your 
sceptre’ (Il. 9.295-298). Achilles will give these people commands and they will pay 
him for keeping order. In Hesiod we also see this practice in action, although Hesiod 
grumbled about the gift-devouring basileis because they were not, in his view, 
fulfilling their part of this arrangement by giving him justice (Op. 38-39). The ability 
of the basileis to collect gifts from their people is mentioned on several other 
occasions in Homer. In Book 17 of the Iliad Hektor states that he does ‘wear down 
my own people for presents and food’ (Il. 17.225-226). Alkinoös suggests that he 
and the other basileis make a collection from the Phaiakians, to make up for the 
expensive gifts they gave to Odysseus (Od. 13.13-15). Odysseus in disguise pretends 
to have once entertained Odysseus in Crete. To do this he states that he collected 
barley, wine and cattle from the people (Od. 19.197-198).
166
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The Homeric poems do not depict formal institutions such as organised 
citizen-militias or publicly appointed generals to counter external aggression, or 
public courts and magistrates to maintain internal order. Instead, an informal 
arrangement of protection payments existed between the basileis and their people 
through which the people would gain military protection and the maintenance of 
good order. Performing their part of the arrangement enabled basileis to collect gifts 
and food from their people, as well as portions of prime agricultural land. This 
practice may be what Telemachus refers to in the Odyssey. ‘It is not bad to be 
basileuemen. Speedily the king’s house grows prosperous, and he himself has rank 
beyond others’ (Od. 1.392-393). Although Telemachus does not specify exactly how 
being a basileus made one rich it is most likely that he is referring to the practice of 
protection payments. As Odysseus’ Cretan tale proves that raiding for wealth was 
not a practice restricted to basileis (Od. 14.229-234), and Telemachus is specifically 
referring to the wealth acquired by simply being a basileus, it is unlikely he is 
referring to wealth violently seized through raiding. As Telemachus is referring to 
the wealth amassed through a practice exclusively undertaken by basileis, he is most 
likely referring to protection payments. 
Laertes is an interesting case regarding this practice. His situation is that of a 
man whose age and lack of militarily effective male relatives has compelled him to 
‘retire’ from ruling and stopped him from pursuing the lifestyle of the basileus. He is 
described as poor and wearing patchy clothes, and Odysseus even compares his 
appearance to that of a slave. It is certain that Laertes no longer leads raids or fights 
at the head of his people as his old shield, rusted and with a broken strap, is retrieved 
from a storeroom by the slave Melanthius (Od. 22.184-185). Laertes explains that he 
had been lord of the Kephallenians in days past and had captured a settlement on the 
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mainland called Nerikos (Od. 24.376-379). Laertes had clearly engaged with the 
kind of military practices expected of a basileus. Although Achilles feared for the 
safety and status of his aged father, Peleus the poet does not speak of Laertes 
suffering any such predatory assaults on his person or property in the absence of 
Odysseus. However, it is obvious that Laertes no longer holds a position of authority 
over his people and his poverty strongly suggests that he no longer receives 
protection payments. He could not, after all, perform his part of the practice by 
offering military leadership because of his age. The practice of protection payments 
has, in the case of Laertes, ceased to function. Laertes’ situation should be contrasted 
with that of Priam. Priam, though old, could maintain his wealth and status and 
continue to collect the payments through his many male relatives. The payments 
made to Priam’s family appear on several occasions in the Iliad and have already 
been discussed (Il. 17.225-226, 24.261-262). Laertes has no such support as 
Odysseus has been absent and Telemachus was too young to take part in the practice. 
As a consequence he lives in relative poverty, takes no active role in ruling the 
people, and does not engage in the practices associated with a basileus, such as gift-
giving, feasting, or hosting games.  
 
Conclusion 
The personal achievements, wealth, strength and prowess of the Homeric leader 
earned, justified and maintained his power and status. We have seen that military 
success could raise a man from relatively humble status to a position of authority and 
power, although he was compelled to maintain that position by fighting for himself 
and on behalf of his community. If, like Priam, he was too old to engage in combat a 
95 
 
basileus needed family and allies to fight on his behalf. When he was unable to 
maintain his position through military success, private wealth and active engagement 
with social practices, his status was no defence against predatory attack and his 
position eventually became unsustainable. War and raiding brought basileis treasure 
and other spoil which they could distribute among their communities and their 
followers to reward their services and encourage future cooperation. It also brought 
the slaves they needed to produce the surplus required to engage in the social 
practices of the elite. The slaves laboured to produce the foodstuffs consumed at the 
feasts or exchanged for the precious luxury objects given as gifts at important events 
or to secure a desirable marriage. The practice of marriage could increase the 
groom’s wealth and status, and could provide the bride’s family with a valuable ally 
as well as an influx of wealth from hopeful suitors. The giving of generous gifts 
placed an obligation on the recipient to perform favours for the basileus. They were 
also given as payment for past services and rewards for particular tasks. These 
encouraged cooperation with the basileus and served to highlight the giver’s wealth 
and generosity. These practices, funded by plunder and the produce of slaves, 
cemented the leader’s position at the head of his people and among his peers by 
increasing and fortifying his personal power. The potentially dangerous situations of 
Peleus, Telemachus and Astyanax, as well as ‘Cretan’ Odysseus’ rise to power, 
clearly show that the position of a Homeric leader was not hereditary,
167
 but based 
on personal success.
168
 The terrible vulnerability of Peleus, Telemachus and 
Astyanax argues forcefully against any kind of formal, hereditary ‘office’ of 
leadership in Homeric society. Although a Homeric leader might wish to pass his 
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possessions to his son (Od. 7.149-150), the maintenance and increase of the son’s 
power and status relied upon his own ability. This is made clear by the condition of 
Telemachus (Od. 1.392-398). There was no ‘office’ of ruler in Homeric society and 
there was certainly no hereditary monarchy that could be automatically passed from 
father to son by hereditary right. Scholars have struggled to define the status of the 
Homeric ‘king’ as a formal, constitutional phenomenon, because no such institution 
ever existed.
169
 Power in Homeric society rested on popular support sustained by 
military prestige and the constant giving of gifts. Despite the wealth and power of 
basileis they were anxious to retain popular support and feared losing it. Athene, 
disguised as Mentor, criticises the Ithakans for not checking the excesses of the 
suitors, implying they had the power to do so (Od. 2.239-241). The father of 
Antinoös fled for his life when the people attempted to lynch him for raiding their 
friends, the Thesprontians (Od. 16.424-429). When Odysseus informs his father he 
has killed the suitors he admits to being deeply troubled by the potential 
consequences. ‘But now I am terribly afraid in my heart that speedily the men of 
Ithaka may come against us here’ (Od. 24.353-354). By distributing plunder, holding 
feasts, defending their people and maintaining order, Homeric leaders could retain 
popular support and their people would have seen a return for their payments of gifts 
to the basileus. 
Within the broad range of methods used to gain power individual Homeric 
leaders built their power and wielded it according to their own means and abilities. 
Agamemnon is depicted as a wealthy and powerful warrior with many friends and 
allies, and ultimately secures his position over the Achaian army by redistributing 
booty and giving precious gifts to the other basileis. Priam is not depicted as a 
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warrior, his age prevents him from fighting, but his wealth and the prowess of his 
many sons and numerous male relatives maintains his position. Odysseus rules over 
a poor and rocky land, but he is intelligent, cunning and a very capable fighter. These 
examples demonstrate that power in Homeric society was personal.  
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Chapter II: Archaic Society 
Archaic tyranny represented a continuation of Homeric practices and the Archaic 
tyrants used the same methods to gain and maintain power as the Homeric basileis. 
This chapter will explain why traditional theories regarding the ‘crises’ of the 
Archaic period are flawed and conclude that the real problems of the age were 
corruption and violence often fuelled by the desire of the powerful to accumulate 
wealth and slaves. The phenomenon that changed the attitude of many Greeks 
towards the old style of leadership practised by the basileis and caused them to label 
these men as ‘tyrants’ was the rule of law. To understand the rise of the rule of law it 
is necessary to identify the problems that it confronted and this chapter will begin by 
identifying and describing these issues. The poetry of the Archaic period, 
particularly that of Theognis and Solon, has often been interpreted as reflecting a 
period of crisis and has been used as evidence for identifying the problems that 
caused this supposed crisis. These problems have frequently been identified as 
overpopulation in the Archaic poleis, the rise of a nouveau riche who challenged the 
traditional landed aristocracy for power and, in the case of Solon’s Attica, 
dissatisfaction with an oppressive and exploitative system of land tenure. The 
supposed rise of a hoplite middle-class, composed of newly propertied soldiers 
whose sudden contribution to warfare prompted them to become politically aware, 
has also been identified as a cause of strife between traditional nobles and the newly 
politically aware middle-classes. The rule of law did not, however, emerge as a 
solution to these specific problems as none of these theories are supported by the 
evidence. Each of these theories has been decisively challenged in recent years by 
new discoveries and approaches to the evidence. This is significant because none of 
these theories could, therefore, be responsible for the rise of tyranny in seventh-
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century Greece. A summary of recent scholarship and a careful examination of the 
evidence will show that none of these theories fits the evidence before passing on to 
identify the actual problems that existed in Archaic Greece. The actual crises faced 
by Solon and his Archaic contemporaries were violence, disorder, greed, and 
corruption within the administration of justice. Nor were these problems new at the 
time of Solon as they can be found in Homer and Hesiod. The society in which these 
poets lived, and the social norms that they practised, incentivised powerful 
individuals to abuse their position and plunder the countryside in order to accumulate 
wealth.
170
 
 
a) Increasing Population 
A barrier to understanding the problems faced by the Archaic Greeks is the 
assumption that they laboured under the burden of excess population, a phenomenon 
frequently used to explain the tensions and disorders of the period. ‘Excess’ 
population has been taken to mean a level of population large enough to cause 
violent competition over land and a surge of popular resentment from a largely 
disenfranchised mass against their traditional rulers. So entrenched has this idea 
become that Scheidel has observed that many scholars begin with the assumption 
that a population explosion occurred rather than an impartial review of the 
evidence.
171
 The idea of a dramatic population explosion often finds support in the 
conclusions of Snodgrass regarding Archaic burial practices. Snodgrass concluded 
that the number of burials in Attica and Argos rose dramatically after about 800 and 
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that this reflected a substantial rise in the general population.
172
 Snodgrass went so 
far as to suggest that the population in one area of Attica ‘may have multiplied itself 
by a factor of approximately seven’ between 780 and 720;173 an absolutely enormous 
increase. A corresponding rise in the number of graves in the Argolid is presented by 
Snodgrass as corroboration for the Attic evidence and as justification for searching 
for the consequences of this supposed population explosion across ‘Greek society’ as 
a whole.
174
 The fact that Greeks began settling overseas from the eighth century has 
also been cited as evidence for a dramatic increase in population, for example by 
Andrewes
175
 and Graham.
176
 Despite the criticisms of Morris the theory of dramatic 
population growth based on burial data has proven very popular. Burial data is, 
however, highly problematic as a gauge for population. As noted by Morris, fully 
excavated cemeteries in the Aegean are few and it is therefore difficult to accept the 
sweeping demographic conclusions, such as an eighth-century population explosion, 
that are drawn from such comparatively sparse evidence.
177
  The use of burial data as 
demographic evidence also raises further questions: are the tiny minority of 
excavated cemeteries representative of the majority of undiscovered or unexcavated 
Archaic cemeteries? How can Snodgrass’ conclusions be reconciled with an Archaic 
literary record that never complains of dramatic increases in population? Morris’ 
suggestion that the increase in archaeologically visible eighth-century burials was 
probably due to changes in burial custom is preferable,
178
 although the important 
point here is that Archaic burial data is not reliable evidence for a population 
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explosion. There are simply too many uncertainties in using burial data as a gauge 
for population. In addition to this, an attractive and logical alternative explanation 
has been put forward by Morris and the date from the graves is corroborated by no 
other form of evidence.  
A study relevant to the theory of Archaic Greek population expansion was 
published by Scheidel in 2003. Scheidel argued against the methodology that 
identified the supposed population explosion, rejecting the idea that an expansion on 
so large a scale occurred.
179
 Using comparative data and statistical analysis Scheidel 
offered models for Greek population growth from the Early Iron Age to the Classical 
period which contradicted the thesis of an Archaic population explosion.
180
 Annual 
growth rates of 1% to 3% are shown to have occurred in situations where growth 
was encouraged by various factors, such as developing countries receiving external 
medical knowledge or resource-rich North America in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries AD.
181
 But as such situations are simply not comparable with Archaic 
Attica and cannot explain how Snodgrass’ incredibly high growth rate of 4% per 
annum could have been possible.
182
 Scheidel also tested the reliability of grave 
evidence as a gauge for population increase and found it to be useless because none 
of the theories that used burial data to discover demographic growth rates could ever 
be substantiated due to the lack of any evidence to complement the graves.
183
 
Although the population may have been increasing in the Archaic period, there is 
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simply no firm archaeological evidence for a sudden and meteoric rise in population 
at this time.  
Although there are justifiable concerns inherent in conclusions based on 
burial data and assumptions about the cause of overseas settlement, recent 
archaeology has provided evidence which directly contradicts the theory of a 
dramatic rise in population during the Archaic period. Several important 
archaeological studies have been published in recent years that have severely 
undermined the idea of an Archaic population explosion.
184
 Bintliff has found 
confirmed examples of Archaic pottery identified in field surveys to be very rare,
185
 
and that the density of hamlets and villages does not begin to increase markedly until 
the late sixth century at the earliest, reaching its peak in the Classical and Hellenistic 
periods.
186
 Snodgrass based his argument on burial data from Attica and Argos, yet 
in compiling the extensive and intensive survey results for these regions Bintliff 
found that neither region displayed explosive growth in the Archaic period. For 
Attica: ‘Peripheral rural districts on intensive field survey and analysis of settlement 
distribution, however, show maximum rural population increase to be late 
Classical.’187 This confirmed Scheidel’s calculations that suggested that settlement 
sites actually reach their greatest peak in the fifth and fourth centuries,
188
 as well as 
Garnsey’s earlier work on land-use and food supply in Attica, which also concluded 
that Attica had a much higher population density after the Archaic period.
189
 For 
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Argos Bintliff notes that ‘Extensive field survey and reviews of excavated and 
published sites indicate a Classical to Early Hellenistic climax, with significant 
anticipation in high Archaic site numbers. Intensive survey in the sw district, 
however, combined with urban excavation, gives stronger emphasis to late Classical 
and early Hellenistic settlement growth and climax. In contrast, limited intensive 
survey in the Argive heartland also suggests precocious rural development in 
Archaic times. We might generalize to suggest a general late Classical to early 
Hellenistic climax, with perhaps significant growth in Archaic times in the Plain of 
Argos and its hinterland, and takeoff seen later in more peripheral areas.’190  The 
study of Jameson, Runnels and van Andel on the archaeology of the southern 
Argolid finds no dramatic increase in the number of settlements nor dramatic 
intensification of farming in the Archaic period. In fact the number of known small 
sites, probably farms, increases from 16 in the Archaic to 22 in the Classical period, 
reaching a far higher 87 in the Late Classical/Early Hellenistic periods.
191
 
Considering the increased size of population in the Classical and Hellenistic periods 
in comparison to the Archaic it is unlikely, if not impossible, for Archaic Greek 
populations to have reached such a level that they could not be supported by their 
territory or suffer internal strife due to competition for farmland. For settlement 
density to have increased so dramatically in the centuries after the Archaic period 
there must have been land available. Furthermore, Frederiksen has noted that walled 
towns increase most dramatically in number from the sixth century to about 479, 
which is far too late to account for a rise in population in the Archaic period, 
particularly the eighth and seventh centuries.
192
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There is no evidence for overpopulation in Archaic poetry or in Herodotus. If 
such a phenomenon was so critical and created such devastating problems for the 
Archaic Greeks it is curious that these writers omitted it entirely. An argument 
against an Archaic population explosion cannot, however, be made from the silence 
of the sources alone. A useful phenomenon to test if overpopulation was a major 
problem at this time is Greek overseas settlement. Snodgrass believed that Greek 
overseas settlements were created due to population growth and ‘land-hunger’.193 
However, the sources simply do not reflect a situation in which Greeks left home due 
to population pressure. Instead they describe a range of other motivating factors. The 
settlement at Cyrene was founded by settlers who were compelled to leave to 
mitigate the effects of a severe drought or at the command of an oracle (Hdt. 4.151). 
The settlement then grew in size when the original settlers offered land to 
immigrants who were encouraged by a further oracle from Delphi (Hdt. 4.159). 
Cyrene then created a settlement elsewhere on the North African coast with political 
malcontents unhappy with the situation at home (Hdt. 4.160). The Spartan Doreius 
attempted to found settlements in Libya and Italy because he was indignant at being 
excluded from the office of king (Hdt. 5.42-43). Miltiades of Athens emigrated to the 
Chersonese because he was unhappy with the rule of the Pisistratids (Hdt. 6.35). A 
community leaving their homeland due to troublesome neighbours or imminent 
danger is a phenomenon that also appears in Homer. The grandson of Herakles 
resettles his entire community in Rhodes because he murdered Herakles’ uncle (Od. 
2.661-670), and the father of Alcinoös resettles his people in Phaiakia to escape the 
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aggression of the Cyclopes (Od. 6.5-10). Herodotus likewise describes the Samians 
leaving their island for Sicily to escape from Persian domination and their tyrant 
Aeaces, an expedition that was joined by those Milesians that escaped the sack of 
their city (Hdt. 6.22-23).  
 A large number of settlements, particularly around the Black Sea and the 
Hellespont, have produced archaeological evidence that confirms these were trading 
centres, suggesting that profit and opportunism was also a driving factor behind 
overseas settlement. Tandy, for example, has suggested this factor as the prime 
motive for Greek settlement overseas.
194
 Tandy presents sites such as Pithekoussai 
and Naxos that appear to have been founded to profit from trade rather than 
agriculture, being located on known trade routes, provided with harbours or without 
(or with only limited access to) fertile land.
195
 Settling fertile plains and 
agriculturally rich regions would surely be more logical if the Greeks were 
struggling to support an oversized population. Instead, as noted by Boardman, they 
settled in places that provided opportunities for trade.
196
 Cook, followed by Graham, 
argued that Pithekoussai was founded for agriculture, ultimately basing this 
conclusion on a comment of Strabo (Strab. 5.247).
197
 Tandy has countered this with 
the claim that ‘the volcanic land is good only for vines’.198 Pithekoussai is also the 
earliest known Greek settlement in the West, and Cook does not explain why the 
settlers passed over the obviously more fertile lands available in southern Italy and 
Sicily that were much closer to Greece. The overseas settlements of the Archaic 
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Greeks were established by political malcontents, refugees, opportunists or those 
fleeing natural disaster, but no firm evidence exists to suggest that they were founded 
due to the problem of surplus population.  
 
b) Rise of a nouveau riche 
A demand for political participation from a newly wealthy or politically aware class 
of Greeks has been suggested as a cause of strife and the poetry of Theognis and 
Solon is often cited as proof of this. Lewis writes that ‘Solon repeatedly separates 
excellence from the possession of wealth, undoubtedly a slap at any nouveau riche 
who was claiming the status associated with aristocratic birth based on wealth.’199 
Donlan went as far as to claim that Theognis’ poetry suggests ‘that the Theognidean 
aristocracy has relinquished political and economic power to a group below them’.200 
In this view he did not depart from that of de Ste. Croix, who viewed Theognis as ‘a 
class-conscious aristocrat if ever there was one.’201 Stanley writes that ‘Theognis, in 
his poems, uses the term agathoi to refer only to the old aristocracy, whereas, kakoi 
refers to anyone who was not a member of the aristocracy, no matter what their 
economic standing was.’202 Regarding Attica Andrewes saw Solon as firmly on the 
side of ‘the poor’ and that Solon ‘certainly thought that the nobles, the existing 
governing class, were guilty of the rapacity he condemns.’203 On examining this 
theory more closely several problems immediately become apparent. Firstly, the 
theory generally assumes the existence of a fixed but poorly defined aristocratic 
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class.
204
 Secondly, it is contradicted by the manner in which the Homeric poems and 
the Archaic poets describe social mobility and the possession of wealth. Thirdly, this 
theory misinterprets the identity of the kakoi in Archaic poetry by ignoring the 
contexts in which this term appears. 
Perhaps the most significant problem with the idea of an Archaic nouveau 
riche is that it operates on the assumption that there existed an established and 
clearly defined aristocracy. Many scholars writing on Archaic Greece state the 
existence of fixed ‘classes’, inevitably including an aristocratic class, in the Archaic 
polis.
205
 This assumption is difficult to reconcile with the evidence of the Homeric 
poems and the Archaic sources. Theognis, as noted by Duplouy, depicts an 
extremely fluid kind of society where upward and downward social mobility could 
be very extreme.
206
 This situation Theognis describes is similar to that depicted in 
the Homeric poems, where the power and status of individuals could rise and fall. As 
discussed in the first chapter, Peleus, Laertes, Astyanax and Telemachus are clear 
examples of actual or potential downward social mobility, while the ‘Cretan’ 
Odysseus offers an example of dramatic upward social mobility. Not only was social 
mobility a feature of life for the Greeks of the eighth century, but the later poets 
never express fears for the downfall of their class, but for their community as a 
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whole. Solon expresses a fear for the city (ἄστυ) and the polis (πάσηι πόλει).207 The 
poetry of Theognis claims that it is the demos that will suffer due to evil actions 
(Theog. 43-45, 47-49, [West]), the polis that will be destroyed (42 [West]), and the 
astoi (23 [West]) or the laoi (52-57 [West]) that are its inhabitants. Alcaeus also 
describes the polis being ‘devoured’ by a bad leader (Alc. 70, 129 [West]) and the 
damos being in a state of distress as a result (129 [West]). Nor were the actions of a 
specific social or political class the greatest threat to the polis. Solon wrote not only 
of restraining the leaders of the demos, the hegemones, but also criticised the greed 
and foolishness of the astoi who were also threatening the safety of the polis (Solon. 
4.5-8 [West]). It is worth noting that both Theognis and Solon were engaging in a 
moralising discourse in which the poets or their personas attempted to convince their 
audiences that their view of politics and society was correct. The kind of behaviour 
they condemned could, after all, be effectively derided by presenting it as a threat to 
the whole community. This does not detract, however, from the usefulness of these 
passages as the concerns they express must have been understandable, and the 
threats credible, for these exhortations to have had any meaning to a contemporary 
audience. The ‘communal’ language of these poets suggests that the Archaic polis 
was not destabilised by a single well-defined social class. It also suggests that 
Archaic poetry does not represent the complaints of the aristocracy against a 
changing social order, but the concerns of free men over violence, disorder and 
excess.  
The theory of an Archaic nouveau riche challenging the rule of the traditional 
aristocracy often turns to Theognis for support, particularly extracts such as 
φορτηγοὶ δ’ ἄρχουσι, κακοὶ δ’ ἀγαθῶν καθύπερθεν (Theog. 678 [West]). It is 
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tempting to assume that the phortegoi are men who have enriched themselves 
through trade who, despite their wealth, were held in contempt by the conventional 
elites. A serious problem with this interpretation is that if there was any prejudice 
against those ‘in trade’ this has probably been over-emphasised by historians, as 
there is no firm evidence for any such prejudice in Homer or the Archaic sources. In 
Homer several individuals engage in trade without any mention of any apparent 
stigma. The Achaian army trades for wine with men from Lemnos who give to 
Agamemnon and Menelaus a special payment of their goods (Il. 7.471-475), Athena 
in disguise claims to be trading a cargo of iron for bronze (Od. 1.184), and the 
basileis appear to be perfectly willing to participate personally in the slave-trade (Il. 
7.471-475; Od. 15.483-4, 20.383). The often quoted passage of the Odyssey in which 
Odysseus is insulted at the Phaiakian games by Euryalos (Od. 8.159-164) has been 
taken as evidence of stigma against those who traded for a living. Before reading too 
much into this passage it must be noted that Odysseus was subjected to several 
insulting remarks and Euryalos never uses a noun to refer to Odysseus personally 
that could be translated simply as ‘trader’. Euryalos describes Odysseus as appearing 
unlike an athlete (Od. 8.159-160) and then tells him flatly that he does not seem to be 
an athlete (Od. 8.164). Between these remarks is the jibe that Odysseus is greedy for 
profit (φόρτου τε μνήμων καὶ ἐπίσκοπος ᾖσιν ὁδαίων κερδέων θ᾽ ἁρπαλέων)208 and 
merely a master of πρηκτῆρες (doers, dealers or traders). The response of Odysseus 
to this verbal attack is to declare himself to be a fine athlete, although wearied by his 
ordeals (Od. 8.166-184). Even if Euryalos has implied that Odysseus is a trader, and 
that this is in some sense bad or shameful, why does the poet not have Odysseus 
address this at all in his response?  
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 A more logical interpretation of Euryalos’ remarks would be that Euryalos 
has simply claimed that Odysseus is a nobody and unfit for athletic competition. 
Furthermore, in Solon’s list of the methods through which men gain riches he lists 
travel over the sea (Solon. 13.43-46 [West]), possibly a reference to trade for profit, 
alongside farming, craft, prophesising and medicine, without any apparent prejudice. 
The poetry of Solon and Theognis both recognised that the pursuit of wealth by men 
was inevitable, and criticised excess and the accumulation of wealth by deception, 
injustice and violence, but never single out trade as particularly loathsome.
209
 If ‘new 
men’ were becoming rich and powerful in the time of Theognis and Solon it was not 
through particularly novel methods. Trade is not derided by Homer or the Archaic 
poets, but Homer, Hesiod and the Archaic poets do criticise those who violently and 
unjustly appropriated the property of others. If the elite of the Archaic polis lost their 
power it was to more successful rivals whose identity need not be defined in terms of 
aristocrats or classes based on occupation.
210
 
 
c) The Kakoi 
It is now necessary to look into the identity of the kakoi of Archaic Greece who are 
variously described by historians as the lower classes, the poor, or anyone not born 
into the aristocracy regardless of their personal wealth. To discover the identity of 
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these individuals it is better to take Theognis and Solon at their word rather than 
impose a social system on Megara or Athens then search for evidence of this system 
in the poems. Approaching the kakoi with the assumption that they must conform to 
a rigid class system leads to confusion regarding their identity.
211
 In lines 832-835 of 
Theognis (οὐδέ τις ἡμῖν αἴτιος ἀθανάτων, Κύρνε, θεῶν μακάρων, ἀλλ’ ἀνδρῶν τε 
βίη καὶ κέρδεα δειλὰ καὶ ὕβρις πολλῶν ἐξ ἀγαθῶν ἐς κακότητ’ ἔβαλεν) the poet 
claims that the gods are not to blame, but that bia (force), kerdos (greed or gain) and 
hybris have thrown men from agatha into wickedness. Here Theognis makes no 
mention of an occupation, but identifies typically wicked behaviour characterised as 
hybris and manifested as violence that has brought the change from good to bad. On 
several occasions the poet explains what he believes a kakos to be and how one 
behaves. The kakon andra does not practice dike (Theog. 279 [West]), whereas all 
arete is in dikaiosune and every agathos is dikaios (Theog. 146-147 [West]). The 
kakon andra is defined by his behaviour, not economic status, and the agathos is 
such because of his ability to practice justice. These lines strongly suggest that the 
agathoi and kakoi have nothing to do with fixed social classes, and that Solon’s 
refusal to exchange arete for wealth in fragment 15 (ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς τούτοις οὐ 
διαμειψόμεθα τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον) is not a refusal to take ‘new money’ but a 
firm stance against taking wealth unjustly, whether through violence, deception or 
corruption. If arete was found in dike and the theft of property was adikos, it makes 
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perfect sense for Solon to state that arete is therefore retained by one who refused to 
steal property.
212
 
  These kakoi who lacked justice could not possibly be ‘the poor’ as Theognis 
is aware that men are capable of acquiring wealth through the very acts that define 
them as kakoi, by being adikos and passing unjust judgements purely for the sake of 
private profit (kerdos) and the increase of their own power (Theog. 43-45 [West]).
213
 
Solon even claims that many agathoi are poor and many kakoi are rich (Solon. 15 
[West]), reflecting the fact that some of his contemporaries were getting rich through 
corruption and violence, a phenomenon also attested by Hesiod and Theognis. 
Theognis even laments that evil-doing men now lead his town with perverse laws 
(Theog. 288-291 [West]), implying that being a kakos and occupying a position of 
power were not mutually exclusive, and again voicing the idea that a kakos was an 
unjust man. It is not necessary to claim, as one scholar does, that the ‘perverse laws’ 
mentioned by Theognis were the creation of the newly powerful lower classes, or 
that they were detrimental specifically to the position of the nobility.
214
 There is no 
evidence for this whatsoever. Those that led with ‘perverse laws’ are criticised by the 
poet because their nomoi were bad (kaka), allowing hybris to conquer dike. The 
‘perverse laws’ mentioned by Theognis were the unjust decrees of men who held 
power but failed to practice dike, not the political attacks of the lower classes against 
the nobility. These men were kakoi because their nomoi transgressed the established 
norms of the community as far as the poet was concerned.  
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 It was not class snobbery that compelled the poet to urge Kyrnos to shun 
kakoi, but the fear that Kyrnos would be corrupted through association. Theognis 
makes this quite clear, declaring that kakoi are not born into the status of kakoi, but 
become so by associating with wicked men and learning to be kakoi.
215
 Theognis 
does not advise Kyrnos to avoid kakoi because they are poor; the poet even asks that 
one avoid censuring another man because of his poverty (Theog. 155 [West]). 
Instead, he urges Kyrnos to avoid kakoi simply because they are wicked and 
dangerous, emphasising their untrustworthiness (Theog. 1168 [West]). Given the 
clear condemnation of the practices of kakoi by the Archaic sources, and the obvious 
resentment of the fact that these practices enriched some kakoi, it is simply 
unnecessary to create a fixed class of ‘new rich’ made wealthy through craft or trade, 
for which the evidence is scanty, and impose them on the kakoi of Archaic Greece. 
Some men were considered kakoi by their contemporaries because their behaviour 
outraged established norms and customs. Given the context in which the kakoi 
appear in Archaic poetry they should be defined by their behaviour rather than social 
status. 
 
d) Hoplite ‘reform’ 
There was no popular movement of middle-class Greek soldiers against their 
aristocratic rulers in Archaic Greece and the evidence for a clash between hoplites 
and an established elite of nobles, apart from an anachronistic extract of Aristotle, is 
non-existent. The theory of the hoplite revolution has been accepted by many despite 
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the fact that no Archaic source ever attributes the problems of the period to resentful 
hoplites
216
 and, as this chapter has already shown, no Archaic source ever depicts 
conflict between a middle-class of hoplites and an aristocratic class of nobles. As 
noted by Krentz, no Archaic source connects hoplites with a fixed economic class 
such as the zeugitai.
217
 Despite this the hoplite revolution or ‘hoplite reform’ is often 
discussed by scholars investigating the economic and social issues of Archaic 
Greece. A detailed account of the hoplite debate can be found in Kagan and 
Viggiano
218
 and this section will summarise some of the most recent scholarship and 
examine a selection of the most relevant evidence.  
A distinction between Homeric ‘heroic’ style combat and Archaic hoplite 
warfare has remained a consistent feature of scholarship on both periods. This has 
resulted in a search for the social and political consequences of the supposed hoplite 
revolution that has profoundly influenced the political history of Archaic Greece. 
These two aspects of the theory were clearly defined by Nilsson in Die 
Hoplitentaktik und das Staatswesen and summarised in a further article in English.
219
 
The ideas defined by Nilsson were subsequently adopted entirely or in part by many 
scholars who generally accepted the essential points as ‘The middle classes 
contributed the hoplite phalanx, and this gave added force to their resentment against 
the aristocratic monopoly of political power and exclusive right to interpret 
justice.’220 Scholars, particularly Andrewes,221 have argued that prior to this 
development the fighting had been carried out exclusively by aristocrats whose 
power base was effectively undermined by the hoplites’ contribution on the 
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battlefield.
222
 This view was based on a flawed reading of epic poetry that interpreted 
the prominence of ‘heroic’ warriors such as Achilles and Hektor as exclusive 
aristocratic domination of warfare. As shown in the first chapter, a picture of 
Homeric warfare dominated almost exclusively by heroes and aristocrats is an 
illusion. Despite the unquestioned poetic focus on the basileis the masses of warriors 
are still perfectly visible in Homeric depictions of warfare.
223
 Yet many modern 
interpretations of pre-hoplite warfare are dominated by preconceptions of Archaic 
classes.
224
 Hanson, for example, states that warfare prior to 800 consisted of ‘the 
private duels of wealthy knights.’225 As shown in Chapter I, recent studies have 
shown that this is not the case and the Homeric poems in fact depict massed combat. 
The prominence of hoplites as a social and political phenomenon in studies 
of the Archaic period can be attributed to several factors. First, the appearance of 
hoplite equipment in the archaeological record of the eighth century. Second, a 
number of seventh-century artefacts that appear to show depictions of hoplite style 
combat. Third, a number of instances in Archaic poetry appear to mention hoplite 
style combat or equipment. These factors have all superficially supported the theory 
that hoplite combat appeared either in the late eighth or seventh centuries. The 
‘hoplite revolution’ also fits well with Aristotle’s fourth-century interpretation of 
events. Aristotle claimed that as the hoplites grew stronger they took more political 
power and more persons began to have a share in the government (Arist. Pol. 
4.1297b.14-29). Aristotle’s interpretation of those with heavy armour as a distinct 
social group was not only anachronistic, as will be shown, but perhaps inaccurate 
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even for his own time.
226
 The theory of an Archaic hoplite revolution, despite its 
basis in a flawed interpretation of the evidence, has dramatically influenced the 
social and political history of the Archaic period.  
Iconography of the seventh century depicts warriors armed with bows in 
among the spear-armed warriors, throwing spears, warriors carrying pairs of spears, 
as well as types of armour and shields found in Homer. In a discussion of the 
surviving iconography van Wees noted the lack of uniformity among many of the 
warriors depicted on Protocorinthian and Protoattic pottery, suggesting a lack of 
economic equivalence among the warriors.
227
 This questions the conclusions of 
scholars who interpret hoplites as being ‘middle class’ or ‘of like circumstance’.228 
Further examples of seventh-century ceramics are presented by van Wees that 
clearly depict warriors carrying two spears, for throwing and thrusting, as well as 
scenes of flight and pursuit that recall the style of Homeric combat.
229
 Hoplite 
combat was too close to allow for an exchange of missiles by the hoplites themselves 
or for a fluid style of combat. Yet the seventh-century poetry of Archilochus 
characterises battle as the sound of the impact of javelins (ἀκόντων δοῦπον) (Archil. 
139.6 [West]). Callinus asks that a dying warrior throw his javelin for the final time 
(1.5 [West]) and describes a fleeing warrior escaping from battle and the sound of 
javelins (δοῦπον ἀκόντων) (1.14-15 [West]). Another seventh-century poet, 
Mimnermus, praises a man for fighting among the promachoi. The lines bear a close 
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resemblance to a typical Homeric exhortation to fight with the promachoi (14 
[West]).
230
 Alcaeus describes bronze helmets with plumes, bronze greaves and 
swords as well as corslets kept in the household. All these items were also stored or 
displayed in the Homeric household and appear in Homeric battle scenes (Od. 19.4-
13). The poetry of Tyrtaeus has been cited as evidence of hoplite combat but 
Tyrtaeus does not present any instances of combat that are distinct from other 
Archaic sources or Homer. The mere fact that the poet literally asks that soldiers 
hold their ground and keep together (11.21-32 [West]) cannot be taken as evidence 
for an entirely new style of hoplite warfare. Not only would a theory based on such 
scanty and vague evidence be precarious at best, but these ambiguous exhortations 
and pieces of advice are found in Homer. In the Iliad warriors stand so closely that 
their arms and armour touches that of their neighbours (Il. 13.131.-133). This is not a 
formal formation but bands of men crowding together for protection or through 
enthusiasm, as occurs when Achilles exhorts the Myrmidons to fight with the 
Trojans (Il. 16.210-217). As discussed in the first chapter, Homeric warriors had no 
fixed position in a battle line or formation. They moved among their comrades at 
will, striking at the enemy or falling back as it suited them. Classical hoplites held 
fixed positions within a formation that they could not leave without disrupting the 
group of warriors. 
Tyrtaeus also describes light-armed warriors operating seemingly at will among 
the more heavily armed, using their shields for cover and harassing the enemy with 
missiles (11.35-38 [West]). There would have been no room for such activity in a 
hoplite phalanx. However, light-armed soldiers or those armed with missile weapons 
do operate in a similar fashion in the Iliad. They use the shields of more heavily 
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armed warriors for cover and take opportunistic shots at the enemy (Il. 4.112-115, 
8.266-272). The evidence from Archaic poetry regarding warfare is sparse and fails 
to provide any clear evidence that hoplite tactics had been adopted in the seventh and 
sixth centuries. What is apparent is that Archaic poetry and iconography appears to 
depict warfare that resembles the style of combat found in Homer. 
 
e) Land tenure in Attica 
Despite the appeals of some historians against using Solon as evidence for economic 
conditions,
231
 several scholars have claimed that systems of land tenure, of varying 
complexity, must have existed in Attica in the sixth century, often basing this on 
Solon’s poetry.232 Andrewes, in his work on Greek tyranny, believed that the Attic 
system of loans, and the harsh law that supposedly governed it, ensured that Attic 
peasants who defaulted on their debts to the elite could be enslaved. They paid their 
debt with a sixth part of their produce and the horoi marked the land from which was 
due their payments to their creditors.
233
 These claims are generally based on 
fragment 36 of Solon which was anachronistically represented as a cancellation of 
debts by The Constitution of the Athenians ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 12.4) and Plutarch 
(Solon. 15).
234
 There are several problems with this view, not least the obvious 
question asked by Bintliff, that if Solon actually released land ‘to the advantage of 
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the oppressed, but without its redistribution – how could this work?’.235 These 
theories have been decisively disproved by Harris who points out that no evidence 
exists for horoi as mortgage markers until the fourth century, and that Solon could 
not have bragged about pulling up the horoi as this was not only a serious crime but 
also sacrilegious. Instead, these lines are simply one of Solon’s several striking 
metaphors, representing the liberation of Attica from stasis and disorder.
236
 The 
hektemeroi that were relieved through Solon’s seisachtheia were likely to be the 
same individuals who paid gifts to the basileis in Homer and Hesiod as discussed in 
the first chapter.
237
 Hesiod mentions the same practice occurring, stating that the 
basileis received gifts for judging cases (Hes. Op. 37-39). Theognis mentions men 
who grow rich and powerful through passing corrupt judgements (Theog. 43-45 
[West]) while he insists on judging cases fairly (Theog. 543-6 [West]). It appears 
that, just as in Homer and Hesiod, some informal system existed where the adherents 
of the local leader, or perhaps those who simply lived under his power, would give 
gifts in return for protection and arbitration despite the fact that the system was 
vulnerable to abuse.
238
 Who were those who had been enslaved and sold if not 
debtors? Those who were enslaved and sold abroad were not hektemeroi that had 
become indebted, but free persons from Attica who had been seized by powerful 
men and sold for profit, as occurs on numerous occasions in Homer.
239
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The problems faced in the Archaic period by men like Solon did not stem 
from overpopulation, land shortage or conflict between fixed classes. As Nagy has 
already observed, Theognis was not a champion of the aristocracy and neither was 
Solon a champion of democracy.
240
 Nor was Theognis unhappy because he was the 
‘aristocratic witness of a demotic revolution.’241 The problems Solon, Theognis and 
their contemporaries actually experienced were excess and greed that encouraged 
hybris, violence, corruption, and extreme social mobility. These phenomena brought 
about death, destruction, slavery (literally and metaphorically), stasis and the 
possibility of tyranny because of the absence of strong legal mechanisms that could 
punish wrongdoers and enforce order. The second part of this chapter will now 
discuss the actual crises of the Archaic period.  
 
II 
a) Land and Labour 
The Homeric poems exhibit a striking absence of war over the possession of land. 
This has been noted by several scholars but rarely explained or investigated.
242
 
Conflict in the Homeric poems is generally carried out in retaliation or for booty. 
When individuals such as Telemachus (Od. 1.376-379, 397-398, 2.367-369, 15.10-
13) or Astyanax (Il. 22.488-489)
243
 are said to be under threat of losing their property 
the threat comes from predatory private individuals seeking to exploit their 
weakness, not from ‘land-hungry’ external communities. Two migrant communities 
have no difficulty resettling themselves in Phaiakia (Od. 6.6-10) and Rhodes (Il. 
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2.661-668). Noëmon can graze animals on the Greek mainland without any apparent 
difficulty (Od. 4.634-637). Land is awarded freely as a gift, recompense or a reward 
to outstanding leaders and warriors.
244
 To describe Laertes’ farm the poet uses the 
participle τετυγμένον, meaning to have been produced or built. The poet explains 
that Laertes had to work hard to build up his farm (ἐπεὶ μάλα πόλλ᾽ ἐμόγησεν) (Od. 
24.206-207). This strongly suggests Laertes merely went out into the hinterland and 
cultivated a portion of unused land, rather than being awarded an existing farm. 
Hesiod mentions many problems faced by a man of his social position, a modest free 
farmer, but lack of farmland is not one of them. There is no shortage of land depicted 
in Homer or Hesiod. In fact there seems to be land available for cultivation. There is, 
however, a high demand for labour.
245
 One of Hesiod’s prime concerns was labour, 
how much of it one needed and how it should be used. He advised on what slaves to 
buy (Hes. Op. 405-407), what kind of work they should undertake and when (Hes. 
Op. 458-461, 469-471, 502-503, 573, 597-598), and when to supplement the slaves 
with hired labourers (Hes. Op. 602). Even a modest farmer like Hesiod relied almost 
totally on slaves, as does Laertes who only works himself because of poverty, 
otherwise relying entirely on his slaves (Od. 24.386-390, 497-498). 
It has been noted in Chapter I that agricultural surplus enabled the basileis to 
engage in the social practices of their communities and maintain their positions as 
the leaders of those communities. As noted by Harris, ‘the elite exploited slave 
labour to maintain their dominance in society.’246 Consequently a surplus of wealth, 
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including agricultural produce, treasure and arms and armour, was absolutely 
essential to maintaining the position of a basileus. Without a surplus he could not 
engage in practices such as xenia, make marriage alliances, or maintain his 
relationships with his hetairoi. Furthermore, without a surplus a basileus could not 
perform the acts that benefited the community and maintained popular support, such 
as sacrificing animals and distributing gifts. Not only the elite but more modest 
landowners like Hesiod aimed at producing a profit, not merely achieving self-
sufficiency.
247
 In the Homeric poems this need for surplus translates into the 
accumulation of lands and other private property. The necessity of producing an 
agricultural surplus also translates into a very high demand for labour to work the 
property of wealthy individuals, essentially a demand for slaves.
248
 Slaves in Homer 
appear to be readily available either through purchase or raiding. Hesiod takes the 
availability of slaves for granted, merely advising on what sort of slave to buy.
249
 
Homeric slaves were property owned by their masters who enjoyed exclusive rights 
to their use.
250
 Slaves could be put to work all year round and their master could feed 
and clothe them as he saw fit, meaning that slavery was a cheap, reliable source of 
labour.
251
 These factors made slavery a more dependable and attractive source of 
labour than transient free workers.  
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The estate of Odysseus provides an indication of how heavily the basileis 
relied on slaves to maintain their position. Odysseus is said to own fifty female 
slaves in his household (Od. 22.421-423).
252
 Outside of the town five slaves 
including Eumaeus care for a herd of pigs (Od. 14.24-28). In a hypothetical exercise 
Harris notes that Odysseus’ forty-eight herds would therefore give a number of 
around two hundred and fifty slaves, allowing four or five slaves for each herd. This 
number is then substantially reduced to twenty five, a mere ten percent of the 
original, by Harris to allow for poetic exaggeration.
253
 Harris’ final number does not 
take into account those slaves who may have been engaged in other agricultural tasks 
mentioned in Homer or Hesiod but are largely ‘invisible’ in the Odyssey. These 
include building shelters, walls or barns, clearing fields, sowing crops, ploughing, 
and tending orchards and vegetable gardens. The final number of slaves owned by 
Odysseus, then, may be even higher. A relatively wealthy man like Odysseus clearly 
relied almost totally on slave labour for his wealth.  
The need for wealth and surplus resulted in raids for slaves. Such was the 
need for slaves that raiding parties would prolong their attack to seize individuals 
rather than merely departing quickly and safely with their loot (Od. 14.245-265). The 
depiction of the enslavement of the entire or a large portion of defeated communities 
must indicate that slaves were highly profitable either as labourers to be put to work 
or sold for profit (Il. 3.301, 4.238-239, 17.224, 24.731-734, Od. 9.41).
254
 The 
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abduction or seizure of higher-ranking individuals suggests their value as property to 
be sold or as labourers could surpass their value in ransom payments. Eumaeus and 
the Phoenician woman who kidnapped him are depicted as the offspring of wealthy 
individuals yet they are bought and sold as slaves rather than ransomed (Od. 15.417-
484). Chryseis’ father offers Agamemnon ransom for his daughter but Agamemnon 
would rather have Chryseis put to work as a slave (Il. 1.29-31). Achilles chose to sell 
a number of Priam’s sons into slavery rather than ransom them despite Priam’s 
ability to pay (Il. 21.77-79, 24.750-753). Raiding and violent seizure of individuals 
was a particularly effective method of accumulating slaves as captives appear to 
have been considered slaves, and therefore property, upon the point of capture. The 
suddenness with which captives made the transition from free to slave is 
demonstrated by the phrases ‘day of freedom’ and ‘day of slavery’.255 Hektor 
expresses his fear that Andromache may be led away by some Achaian, taking away 
her ‘day of freedom’ (ἐλεύθερον ἦμαρ) (Il. 6.455),256 and explains how he defends 
her from the ‘day of slavery’ (δούλιον ἦμαρ) (Il. 6.463). While mocking Patroklos 
Hektor claims that Patroklos had desired to sack Troy and take the ‘day of freedom’ 
(ἐλεύθερον ἦμαρ) from the Trojan women (Il. 16.831). Odysseus also lies about a 
treacherous crew who conspire to seize and enslave him, ‘devising the day of slavery 
for me’ (Od. 14.340). These examples demonstrate the attractiveness of violent 
seizure as a method of acquiring slaves.  
 The frequency of enslavement and the obviously thriving trade in slaves 
depicted in the Homeric poems further supports the theory that a very high demand 
for slave labour existed in eighth-century Greece. Despite the large numbers of 
slaves encountered in the Homeric poems and the obviously widespread practice of 
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slavery, enslaved workers did not always meet the demand for agricultural labour. 
The Homeric poems (Il. 21.441-454, Od. 11.489-491) and Hesiod (Hes. Op. 602-
603) mention the use of free labourers, in small numbers, to supplement slave labour. 
Hesiod mentions the use of these paid labourers unsurprisingly during harvest season 
when work on his farm would have been intense. Slavery, as opposed to free labour, 
was so widespread in Homeric Greece because it was relatively cheap, a master’s 
slaves were available to work throughout the year, and slaves were readily available 
for purchase or through raiding. A master enjoyed limitless power over his slave, 
unlike a thes (wage labourer). A thes had to be paid and was transient. Large 
numbers of waged labourers are entirely absent from the poetry of Homer and 
Hesiod. Finally, the social practices of the time demanded a large agricultural surplus 
from the members of the community who participated in them. This enormous 
demand for labour, particularly from the rich who owned large estates, led to raiding 
for slaves and the kidnapping of individuals because such activities were both 
necessary and highly profitable. Although the social expectation that someone 
should go beyond their community for slaves is visible in Homer, Solon laments the 
condition of those Athenians enslaved and sold both abroad and within Attica. There 
is no reason to conclude that these Athenians were enslaved through debt; they were 
enslaved because powerful neighbours seized and sold them for profit. Solon’s 
poetry criticises those who grew wealthy by practising injustice, noting in particular 
the stealing of sacred property and property belonging to the demos (Solon. 4.11-13 
[West]). The poet claims that this behaviour would lead to ‘evil slavery’ 
(κακὴν…δουλοσύνην), with many of the poor enslaved and sold abroad (Solon. 
4.18-25 [West]), some of whom were brought home by Solon or where freed from 
their masters in Attica (Solon. 36.8-15 [West]). Solon laments unrestrained greed 
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and the theft and violence it encouraged, mentioning the enslavement of persons in 
the context of this behaviour. In a time of violence and disorder it is more logical to 
suggest that those enslaved in Attica were seized during the chaos rather than 
through a complex system of land tenure that is unsupported by the evidence.  
 
b) Hybris 
Theognis wrote that koros (surfeit, greed) had destroyed many foolish men (Πολλούς 
τοι κόρος ἄνδρας ἀπώλεσεν ἀφραίνοντας)257 and that it had killed even more men 
than hunger (Theog. 605-606 [West]), implying that excess and greed were 
themselves a severe and destructive problem.
258
 Perhaps the most dangerous feature 
of koros was that it was often accompanied by, or in turn produced, hybris.
259
 
Hybris, in a social or legal context, appears to have been aggressive behaviour, often 
entailing violence, robbery and acts of injustice that caused misery and pain for its 
victims. Achilles accuses Agamemnon of displaying hybris (Il. 1.203) and of 
inflicting hybris upon him (Il. 9.368-369), because he seized Briseis, his captive and 
his property.
260
 Nestor explains that he led a retaliatory raid because the Epeians had 
treated his people with hybris (Il. 11.694-695). The booty is then distributed among 
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the Pylians, to many of whom the Epeians owed something (Il. 11.686-688). This 
suggests that the Epeians’ hybris had involved stealing from the Pylians or 
plundering them by force. In a false tale Odysseus explains how his men gave in to 
their hybris while on a raid in Egypt, recklessly plundering, kidnapping and killing 
without any regard for their own safety or means of escape (Od. 14.262-265). The 
hybris of Odysseus’ hetairoi is characterised by careless and wanton aggression that 
involved stealing, destroying and killing. Homeric hybris often involves acts of 
violence, theft, aggression and destruction, but also the flouting of accepted norms, 
such as an individual’s right to their property.  
Archaic depictions of hybris contain similar complaints to those of Homer 
against behaviour, often violent, that outraged accepted norms and inflicted pain and 
humiliation. In the poetry of Solon (Solon. 6 [West]) and Theognis (Theog. 153 
[West]), hybris is said to be born from koros, yet in Pindar (Pind. Ol. 13.10) and 
Herodotus (Hdt. 8.77) it is koros that is born from hybris. Precisely which 
phenomenon generates the other is not particularly important here. What is 
significant is that the link between excess, greed and hybris was clearly understood 
as very strong in the Archaic period, and the dangers of hybris were very real to the 
authors of the surviving sources. Theognis feared that hybris would destroy the town 
as it did the wild centaurs (Theog. 541-2 [West]), and reminded his audience that 
hybris had already destroyed several Greek cities (Theog. 1103-4 [West]). Theognis 
even warned that a cycle of greed, violence and hybris would eventually create a 
tyrant (Theog. 39-52 [West]). Hesiod, living in a time before Solon and the rise of 
the rule of law, had already linked hybris with mortals who wronged each other, 
failed to honour the gods (Hes. Op. 134-136), and used violence (Hes. Op. 146). 
Hesiod not only depicted the lowest point of mankind as the dishonour of gods and 
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parents, but the violent rule of the strong with which he again associated hybris (Hes. 
Op. 189, 191-192). In the Archaic sources hybris appears to represent not only an 
abstract idea of injustice and ultimate punishment,
261
 but the actual seizure of wealth 
through violence, deception or corruption. The poetry of Theognis depicts this very 
scenario, where men with hybris practice unjust deeds (ἀδίκοισ’ ἔργμασι)262 and are 
glutted with wealth got through their hybris (ὑβρίζηι πλούτωι κεκορημένος).263 The 
strong links between bia (violence), koros and hybris (Theog. 834 [West]), 
emphasise the destructive consequences of unrestrained hybris and suggest that 
wealth being snatched through violence motivated by greed was a problem of which 
the poet was acutely aware.
264
 In lines 649-652 Theognis claims rapid social 
mobility is occurring, with men gaining or losing all their property in a single night. 
Although this may be hyperbole, it conforms with what is stated elsewhere in the 
corpus regarding the transfer of wealth through violence and corruption. In the Iliad 
and the Odyssey violent raids for plunder are described on a number of occasions, 
and it is violence that enables the ‘Cretan’ Odysseus to achieve such dazzling 
success.
265
 Hesiod’s picture of a dystopian future is one where dike is carried out 
through physical violence (cheirodikai), where men will sack each other’s cities, and 
the man who practices hybris is honoured (Hes. Op. 190-194).
266
 It is also 
noteworthy that both Alcaeus (Alc. 130b [West]) and Theognis (Theog. 341-50 
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[West]) appear to have been driven off their property by violence or the threat of 
violence. 
Hybris was associated not only with violently wresting wealth from others 
but also with accumulating it through corruption, an activity that did not necessarily 
involve any physical acts of violence. In the context of depicting Dike and Hybris in 
direct competition (Hes. Op. 217-218) Hesiod explains how Dike is driven out by the 
δωροφάγοι (gift-devouring men) who issue crooked judgements (σκολιῇς δὲ δίκῃς 
κρίνωσι θέμιστας).267 Following this explanation the poet predicts all the terrible 
punishments for those that practice hybris, cruel deeds (σχέτλια ἔργα) (Hes. Op. 248) 
and give crooked judgements (Hes. Op. 250). Hesiod’s very close association of 
hybris with bribery and other acts of injustice not only reveals the poet’s awareness 
of corruption within the administration of justice, but that hybris could entail the 
outrageous flouting of dike, particularly if such an act was motivated by greed, and 
not just outright violence.  
The issues of injustice and corruption as potential elements in hybris are 
arguably most explicit in Theognis (Theog. 43-45 [West]). The poet complains that 
evil men acting with hybris (ὑβρίζειν) corrupt the demos by giving unjust 
judgements (δίκας τ’ ἀδίκοισι διδοῦσιν) purely for the sake of kerdos (gain, profit) 
and kratos (power). The poet believed that this behaviour was damaging enough to 
cause stasis and bloodshed (Theog. 50-51 [West]). Theognis later advises to be on 
one’s guard against the ‘crooked words’ (σκολιὸν λόγον) of the man who is adikos, 
as his mind is set on taking the property of others by evil deeds (κακοῖσ’ ἔργοις) 
(Theog. 1147-1150 [West]). Solon’s poetry also links hybris with the accumulation 
of wealth by unjust acts (Solon. 13.7-11 [West]), again predicting stasis as the 
                                                          
267
 Hes. Op. 221, 264. 
130 
 
ultimate consequence of hybris. Solon actually names particular perpetrators of 
hybris as the hegemones, the leaders of the demos (Solon. 4.7-8 [West]). Solon 
rebukes them for having an ‘unjust mind’ (ἄδικος νόος) (Solon. 4.6 [West]) and for 
failing to control their koros (Solon. 4.9-10 [West]). Later in the fragment Solon 
offers eunomia, achieved through good laws that were obeyed by all, as a solution to 
Attica’s problems, claiming that it will restrain koros and weaken hybris, again 
associating hybris with acts of injustice driven by greed (Solon. 4.32-34 [West]). In 
the subsequent lines of the fragment Solon mentions the enrichment of certain 
persons through unjust deeds (ἀδίκοις ἔργμασι) and claims that some have  not only 
been stealing from one another, but have also been appropriating sacred and public 
property (Solon. 4.11-13 [West]).
268
 One scholar has claimed that both hybris and 
stasis are ‘in the diction of Solon catchwords for the excesses of an oligarchy’.269 
Solon certainly criticises the hegemones for their hybris, suggesting that the powerful 
were, unsurprisingly, particularly inclined to behave in this manner. Elsewhere, 
however, Solon writes generally that ‘men’ (andres) try to get wealth through hybris 
(Solon. 13.11 [West]) and that Eunomia will combat injustice, koros and hybris 
generally, rather than the crimes of a specific economic or political group (Solon. 
4.32-39 [West]). It is more reasonable to conclude that Solon’s problem was with 
excess in general rather than merely the excesses of the elite.  
 The poetry of Theognis and Solon depicts acts of hybris (generally 
aggressive and destructive acts of violence, robbery and flagrant injustice often 
motivated by intense greed) as a severe problem that threatened the entire 
community. However, the frustrations of these men were not with particularly new 
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phenomena specific to sudden upheavals in their respective poleis. Greek 
communities of the eighth century were already aware that these problems existed. 
The society depicted in the Homeric poems associated hybris with the unfair and 
often violent seizure of property. This behaviour was provoked by the enormous 
demand for disposable wealth generated by the social practices and customs of 
Homeric society. It is therefore unsurprising that a modest farmer like Hesiod should 
state that greed and hybris were serious problems, and his ability to condemn the 
violence and corruption that they encouraged was in no sense revolutionary or 
indicative of an ‘awakening’ class of middling farmers. Solon, who actively 
attempted to find a solution to these problems, was not concerned with 
overpopulation, a land shortage or an overworked and exploited population of serfs, 
but expressed political concerns based on the need for stability and order. 
 
c) Lack of preventative measures 
The problems of greed, hybris and violence were so devastating for Greek 
communities from the eighth century to the sixth because of the lack of strong 
preventative measures and effective legal mechanisms to restrain them. Theognis 
wrote that the hegemones were causing mischief for the polis despite the astoi 
keeping their senses (Theog. 38-41 [West]) and claims that he was aware of 
corruption within the administration of justice (Theog. 43-45 [West]). For Hesiod, 
the corruption of the δωροφάγοι (Hes. Op. 221, 264) and of the basileis (Op. 38-39) 
was of particular concern because their actions drove Dike from the community, 
leading to further injustice and ultimately the terrible retribution of the gods. Hesiod 
wrote that the demos would pay for the wickedness (atasthalia) of the basileis, and 
depicts the injustice of the powerful and of the wicked as a direct cause of harm to 
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the community (Hes. Op. 260-262). The poet even warns that the entire polis would 
suffer because of a kakos aner who plots wicked deeds (ἀτάσθαλα μηχανάαται) 
(Hes. Op. 238-241). It is implied that the community lacked the means to restrain its 
leaders despite their behaviour, and Hesiod and Theognis can suggest no 
preventative measures against those that would pervert justice for profit. When 
explaining the correct way to judge a case (actual or metaphorical), Theognis 
mentions the observance of several religious practices, namely the use of a mantis 
(seer), auguries and sacrifices, to assist him (Theog. 543-546 [West]). No checks, 
balances or penalties for the judge are apparent.  
Theognis expresses his surprise that Zeus, despite his power, allows the man 
that is wicked (alitros), to share the same fate as the man that is dikaios, and for not 
making a distinction between the man that has self-control (sophrosyne) and the man 
that practices hybris and injustice (Theog. 372-379 [West]). The poet goes on to ask 
how it can be dikaios for a man who keeps himself from injustice and oath-breaking 
to receive no justice himself, and for the man who is adikos and atasthalos to live in 
wealth got through hybris, while the just men live in poverty (Theog. 743-752 
[West]). Theognis only laments the situation, offering no solution, while Hesiod can 
only threaten that Zeus will punish hybris and cruel deeds (Hes. Op. 238-239), that 
Dike will ultimately overcome hybris (Hes. Op. 217-218), and that the gods will 
crush the man who, giving in to kerdos, takes property (chremata) by force or 
through his lying tongue  (Hes. Op. 320-326). 
Unlike Homer, Hesiod and Theognis, Solon could offer an effective solution 
to the problems afflicting Archaic society in the form of Eunomia brought about by 
his legislation. Solon boasts of writing thesmoi that were straight (euthus) and just 
(dike) for both the kakoi and the agathoi (Solon. 36.18-20 [West]). The language of 
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the fragment contrasts with the crooked words (σκολιὸν λόγον) and reliance on 
unjust deeds (ἀδίκοις ἔργμασι πειθόμενος) that characterise Archaic descriptions of 
injustice and corruption. By writing laws that were just for both kakoi and agathoi, 
Solon was not necessarily boasting of legislating fairly for every level of society. 
Instead, Solon had ensured that the bad and the good received their just deserts by 
establishing Eunomia through issuing good laws and ensuring that they were obeyed, 
thereby claiming to have addressed the lack of effective judicial procedures. The 
third part of this chapter will investigate the rule of law and show why some Greeks 
viewed it as beneficial to their communities.  
 
III 
The surviving literature of the Archaic period explains why some Greeks thought the 
rule of law was desirable and what benefits they believed it brought to their 
communities. In Solon’s poetry we read that ‘dysnomia brings the city countless ills, 
while eunomia sets all in order as is due…it straightens out distorted judgements, 
pacifies the violent, brings discord to an end, brings to an end ill-tempered 
quarrelling. It makes all men’s affairs correct and rational’ (Solon. 4.32-39 
[West]).
270
 Solon explains that the rule of law not only brings order and peace, but 
has the power to restrain violence and prevent corrupt judgements. There is a strong 
theme in Solon’s poetry that this kind of order and balance within society will 
promote restraint and good order in the polis and that this could be achieved through 
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 This sentiment is echoed in Euripides’ Hecuba by Agamemnon: ‘for this is the interest alike of 
citizen and state, that the wrong-doer be punished and the good man prosper’ (902-904). Also in 
Sophocles: ‘When he (mankind) honours the nomoi of the land and the justice of the gods to which he 
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legislation.
271
 Solon’s poetry describes an attempt to bring order and stability 
through legislation to a fluid society where greed, hybris and violence could quickly 
become uncontrollable.
272
 Solon strongly criticized the greed of those who had 
seized the wealth of others, ‘and they grow wealthy by unrighteousness…and, 
sparing neither sacred property nor public, seize by plunder, each one what he can’ 
(Solon. 4.11-13 [West]). Solon distanced himself from the wealthy whose 
immoderate koros (surfeit) encouraged their avarice and desire for more wealth and 
asked that they moderate themselves (Solon. 4c [West]). This suggests that Solon 
was not working solely in the interests of the elite. It is also not evidence that Solon 
was a ‘man of the people’, as the poet recoiled from what he perceived as their greed 
and self-serving opportunism (Solon. 4.5-6 [West]). For Solon the problems within 
several levels of society would cause violence and death. As van Wees has stated, 
the city was ‘endangered only by private greed and aggression’273 but it was greed 
and aggression that could be found throughout Archaic society.  
Solon’s solution to these problems was to provide fair legislation: ‘These 
things I did when in power, blending bia with dike, I carried out all that I promised. I 
wrote laws for all, for agathoi and kakoi alike, straight and just’ (Solon. 36.18-20 
[West]). What this moderate stance represents is the conviction that an excess of 
wealth and power would lead to hybris, injustice and tyranny. Perhaps the greatest 
contrast between Solon and the basileis was that Solon used his position to distribute 
rights and responsibilities among the population. As Harris notes, ‘Solon does not 
see law and order (Eunomia) as one part of a simple opposition between authority 
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and chaos, but as a mean between the extremes of anarchy and tyranny.’274 Solon did 
not use his position to secure his own power, he never created a special position for 
himself or accumulated wealth or attempted to court favour. Solon even left Attica 
after establishing his laws. These issues and anxieties about excess, violence, 
injustice and tyranny had not only been present in Archaic Greece for some time but 
were probably widespread across the Greek world. Unlike the Medes under Deioces, 
Solon’s poetry never considered monarchy to be the solution to disorder.  
The poetry of Solon and Theognis cautions against greed, an excess of wealth 
(koros), and wealth unjustly taken or through force (bia). Both understood that when 
the powerful seized the property of others it brought harm to the community because 
it created a devastating cycle of violence and obviously needed to be restrained. 
Solon attempted to create this restraint and bring order through his laws rather than 
seizing power for himself. In responding to these problems Solon describes himself 
granting not too little or too much geras to the demos while also protecting the 
wealthy from harm, allowing neither side a victory that was unjust (adikos) (Solon. 5 
[West]). Solon’s concerns were for the entire free community, regardless of status, 
and his aim was to bring order without allowing any element of society a dangerous 
position of dominance.  
The rule of law was a phenomenon that appears to have manifested itself in 
Greece in the seventh century.
275
 The rise of this phenomenon transformed the old 
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 The extent to which one can talk of ‘Greek law’ has been argued by a number of scholars and a 
summary of the debate can be found in Gagarin (2005) 29-32. Finley (1975) argued that ‘Greek law’ 
could not be referred to in any unified sense as each Greek polis retained its own laws. However cf. 
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common Greek identity. Prominent among these values was the ideal of the “rule of law.” Even if one 
cannot speak of early Greek law as a unified legal system, we can still discover several common 
features in the statutes of the Greek poleis, which, taken together, reflect a unified set of principles 
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ways of gaining power practised by the Homeric basileis from socially acceptable 
methods to dangerous and threatening acts that were perceived by many as harmful 
to the polis. This new way of viewing actions that were once tolerated is found in a 
broad range of evidence including poetry, historiography, and legal inscriptions. The 
rule of law also transformed the individuals who employed those methods from 
traditional rulers into tyrannoi; sole rulers who were not subject to the laws of the 
polis and could rule according to their whims. In Athens there appears to have been a 
sincere attempt to ensure that the law was universally applied. Solon wrote of writing 
thesmoi that were just for both good and bad elements of society (Solon. 36.18-20 
[West]). In the fourth century Solon was also credited with creating measures that 
allowed the Areopagus to punish officials ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 8.4). Laws that were 
theoretically accessible to all, and therefore not subject to the private knowledge and 
discretion of a handful of judges, also began to appear in the seventh century. From 
about 650 BC onwards laws began to be inscribed throughout the Greek world and 
set up prominently in public places so anyone could read them.
276
  
The society of the eighth and seventh centuries undoubtedly had a concept of 
justice and fair dealing and, as shown in Chapter I, there was also a clear and well 
defined notion of private property and an individual’s rights over that property. 
However the power to administer justice and enforce norms of behaviour did not lie 
with publicly appointed officials who were held accountable for their actions but 
with the ruling basileis who could, and did, judge according to their whims. As was 
                                                                                                                                                                    
shared by many of these different communities in the period 650-400 BCE.’ This chapter will discuss 
laws from numerous Greek poleis which contain shared principles regarding the division of power. 
276
 As observed by Gagarin, the public display of laws indicates ‘a larger public interest, not the 
interests of a small ruling elite, as the main motivation for the writing and public display of these 
laws.’ (2008) 82. Compare this with the motives for Near Eastern legal inscriptions. ‘Instead, they 
were meant to display to contemporaries the king’s fairness and commitment to justice and to 
preserve for posterity the image of him as a just king.’ Gagarin (2005) 36-37. See also Gagarin (2008) 
76 and Harris (2006) 6-14. 
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shown in Chapter I it was socially acceptable for the basileis to receive gifts in return 
for giving orders and judgements to the community.  
Although the basileis might suffer due to loss of popular support there were 
no formal checks on their power. There were no officials with authority to check 
Odysseus or make him accountable to the community when he acts against their 
wishes by protecting the father of Antoös or slaughtering the suitors. The Ithakans 
had no law or institution to which they could appeal that could bring Odysseus into 
line with their wishes. Several of the laws discussed in this chapter feature rules that 
order officials to act according to the law and threaten penalties for those who failed 
to do so, disrupting the ability of the powerful to act according to their whims. The 
rule of law was the phenomenon that brought about these changes and this chapter 
will show that the development of ideas of eunomia and isonomia was a coherent 
movement that changed the way Greek communities were governed during and after 
the seventh century. This chapter has already identified the problems faced by the 
polis in the Archaic period and showed that these were not isolated or particularly 
recent concerns. It will now argue that for the polis to achieve eunomia power 
needed to be decentralised and divided through the law. It will discuss the various 
strategies for dividing power and bringing about the rule of law found in the literary 
and epigraphic sources. It will also comment on precisely how these strategies 
combatted the concentration of authority found in the Homeric basileis.  
Solon’s poetry praises eunomia as supremely beneficial to the Athenians, 
‘dysnomia brings the city countless ills, while eunomia sets all in order as is due…it 
straightens out distorted judgements, pacifies the violent, brings discord to an end, 
brings to an end ill-tempered quarrelling. It makes all men’s affairs correct and 
rational’ (Solon. 4.31-39 [West]). Solon’s poetry describes legislation as the cure for 
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the problems in Attica and a sure way to bring about eunomia. For Solon, if the polis 
was to achieve eunomia power needed to be shared, divided and distributed among 
the various elements of the populace in a way that was appropriate to their status. 
Solon did not want power to be held among strongmen who plundered the 
countryside at will or concentrated in the hands of a single tyrant. Herodotus also 
wrote that eunomia was brought about through legislation, writing that the Spartans 
were once the worst governed (κακονομώτατοι) of all the Greeks and that the change 
to eunomia was brought about by Lycurgus. According to Herodotus Lycurgus 
changed the laws, took care that they were not broken, and instituted the offices of 
Ephor and Elder (Hdt. 1.65). Despite the fact that the figure of Lycurgus is obscured 
by myth Herodotus’ tale does give an impression of what a fifth-century Greek 
believed an Archaic lawgiver achieved. Herodotus believed Lycurgus’ legislation 
and ability to ensure the laws were obeyed was the cure for Sparta’s poor 
government.
277
 The polis that is free from tyranny and ruled by isonomia appoints 
public officials by lot and ensures they obey the law by holding them accountable for 
their actions (Hdt. 3.80). The fear and distrust of an absolute ruler described by the 
literary sources is reflected in certain laws of the Greeks concerned with regulating 
government, making certain no official could rise above the law, and ensuring no 
individual could accumulate too much power.
278
 The aspects of the laws that 
illustrate this concern have been identified as division of powers and jurisdiction 
among different officials, term-limits for officials and magistrates, penalties for 
officials, adding entrenchment clauses so the laws cannot be overturned, and the 
                                                          
277
 There appears to have existed an abundance of legends regarding Lycurgus in the ancient world, 
although little or no historically useful information is preserved in the surviving sources. Much of the 
material concerning Lycurgus is late (i.e. Plutarch) and obscured by myth and moralising anecdotes. 
For the nature of the Lycurgan ‘reforms’ see Forrest (1995) 40-55, Cartledge (1979) 133-135. 
278Lewis (2007) 13: ‘The Greeks needed to maintain order in their cities, but not at the price of 
tyranny; as time passed, they developed forums in which to argue their cases openly, and (in many 
cases) they wrote laws to guide the decisions of those forums.’  
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granting of powers to boards of officials instead of one man.
279
 What problems, 
exactly, were these safeguards attempting to deal with? These safeguards and the 
specific laws they entail will be directly compared and contrasted with the behaviour 
of Homeric basileis and tyrants. This will illustrate the contrast between Greek 
communities living under the rule of one man and those operating under the rule of 
law and explain why these measures were created.  
The Odyssey describes the community prospering as the result of the just and 
benevolent rule ‘of some basileus who, as a blameless man and god-fearing, and 
ruling as lord over many powerful people, upholds the way of eudikias, and the black 
earth yields him barley and wheat…because of his good leadership, and his people 
prosper under him’ (Od. 19.109-114). The successful basileus who brought about 
this prosperity concentrated in his person a large number of responsibilities and 
powers.
280
 Nestor, for example, is depicted as a leader in war, soldier, religious 
official, ambassador, public figurehead and a kind of taxman. Despite his undisputed 
position as head of the community Nestor retains the power to pursue private feuds 
and arrange marriages that increase the private prestige and power of his own family. 
As shown in Chapter I his sons hold important positions in the community and are 
used for particular tasks by Nestor, some on behalf of the community but also for 
Nestor’s private interests. Nestor even describes a situation in which he led his 
people into a conflict with the Eleians partly to seek redress for his people, but also 
to pursue a private feud over a stolen chariot and horses (Il. 11.669-704). Archaic 
tyrants filled numerous roles just like the Homeric basileis, acting as soldiers, 
arbitrators and rulers. A number of Archaic tyrants were also remembered as 
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 Lewis (2007) 39: ‘Early judges likely rose to prominence because of their reputations for fairness, 
the support they could get from various factions, and their ability to end disputes and return the polis 
to a normal state of affairs.’  
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lawgivers or, in the case of Pisistratus, for ruling as judges and with apparent 
concern for justice and fairness.
281
 The rule of these individuals, like that of the 
successful basileus, is often linked with an increase in the power and prosperity of 
their poleis.
282
 Rather than attribute the success of the community to one man or use 
the law to justify the ruler’s position, Archaic and Classical sources, as shown above, 
point to the law as the source of the community’s prosperity. By contrast, the laws of 
the Near Eastern monarchs such as Lipit-Ishtar and Hammurabi justify the positions 
of these kings as well as list the rules by which the lives of their subjects would be 
regulated.
283
 The prologues of the laws of both kings go so far as to claim divine 
sanction of their rule. They invoke the gods by name who have personally granted 
the king his position. Both kings are lauded for their piety towards the gods, 
presented as the sources of justice in their kingdoms, and their supreme position over 
the land, and the cities and peoples within, is emphasised.
284
 
The Homeric poems and the codes of Lipit-Ishtar and Hammurabi describe 
the very kind of ruler that many Greek laws, as this chapter will show, attempted to 
avoid.
285
 Aristotle believed that tyranny could arise from certain offices which held 
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 Aristotle believed Pittacus was elected as aisymnetes in Mytilene to resolve the civil discord (Arist. 
Pol. 3.1285a), the Athenian Constitution states that Pheidon introduced a system of weights ([Arist.] 
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numerous important powers, giving the example of the office of prytanis at 
Miletus.
286
 Aristotle identified offices that held too much power, or too broad a range 
of powers, as potential causes of tyranny. The idea that powerful offices could lead 
to tyranny had already become a concern by at least the sixth and fifth centuries, and 
Aristotle was by no means the first to voice this concern (Solon. 32-33 [West], Hdt. 
1.96-102). To avoid such a concentration of power the Athenians, even before the 
time of Solon, had assigned certain responsibilities to different officials. For 
example, according to the Athenian Constitution the oldest and highest offices at 
Athens had once been the polemarch, who was head of the army, the basileus and 
the archon ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 3.1-4). These offices clearly separated military, judicial 
and religious responsibilities, representing a radical change from the style of ruler 
depicted in Homer. In the fourth century it was believed that Solon had divided the 
Athenians into four property classes, opening up the offices of state to the first three, 
but restricting the thetes, the lowest class, to the assembly and the law-courts 
([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 7.2-4). Distributing clearly defined rights and duties to different 
sections of the population, and further dividing judicial and executive authority, 
would have decentralised political power and, ideally, made it far more difficult for 
one man to seize control.
287
 In the fifth century Thucydides recognised that there was 
such a separation of powers between the judicial and deliberative elements of 
government in several contemporary Greek poleis (Thuc. 1.73, 3.44). This strategy 
                                                                                                                                                                    
man to be given power to intervene in civil strife or to set up and enforce new laws, and in this way 
the distance between a tyrant and a lawgiver could be very small.’ The suspicions of Solon, Herodotus 
and Aristotle (see above), that the administration of justice and powerful offices could be used to 
establish a tyranny, question this conclusion. It is not unreasonable to suggest that some early tyrants, 
like the Near Eastern kings and Homeric basileis, used the administration of justice and a reputation 
for fairness to justify their position.  
286
 ἐγίγνοντο δὲ τυραννίδες πρότερον μᾶλλον ἢ νῦν καὶ διὰ τὸ μεγάλας ἀρχὰς ἐγχειρίζεσθαί τισιν, 
ὥσπερ ἐν Μιλήτῳ ἐκ τῆς πρυτανείας（πολλῶν γὰρ ἦν καὶ μεγάλων κύριος ὁ πρύτανις). (Arist. Pol. 
5.1305a) 
287
 As noted by Harris (2013) 98, the reforms of Cleisthenes may also have been an attempt to break 
up the local areas of support enjoyed by men like Lycurgus, Megacles and Pisistratus. On 
Cleisthenes’ reforms see Traill (1975) and Whitehead (1986) 16-38. 
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of dividing power within the polis was already well established by the time of 
Thucydides and was a logical step to take considering that Solon and Herodotus had 
already observed that an individual’s reputation for justice was not enough to justify 
them wielding sole power. Herodotus’ story of Deioces the Mede, who seized his 
tyranny by establishing a reputation as a just man (Hdt. 1.96-102), and Solon’s 
awareness that some would criticise him for not using his position to become tyrant 
(Solon. 32-33 [West]), reveal a strong contemporary suspicion that individuals might 
exploit the administration of justice to take power or justify their supreme position. 
The story of Deioces who judged written cases from the seclusion of his palace does 
not necessarily indicate that ‘Herodotus and his contemporaries considered a judicial 
process dependent on writing as characteristic of a monarchy or tyranny.’288 It is 
more likely that writers such as Herodotus and Solon simply considered a judicial or 
executive process dependent on one man as tyrannical. Pisistratus himself was 
remembered as a mild and just ruler who not only observed the laws (a story 
circulated in later centuries that he appeared in court to face prosecution ([Arist.] 
Ath. Pol. 16.8) but administered them himself with great fairness. It has been 
suggested that Pisistratus’ travelling judges existed ‘to give the poor a better chance 
of finding legal redress for injustices suffered at the hands of the elite.’289 Given the 
fact that the administration of justice had already been used by eastern kings and 
Homeric basileis to justify their position or accumulate power, it is more likely that 
Pisistratus’ motives were political rather than philanthropic. Supplying a fair justice 
system would have increased his popularity and even undermined the power of local 
lords, perhaps best represented by figures like his old rivals Megacles and Lycurgus, 
who might otherwise have been approached to resolve disputes. Despite the degree 
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of popular support for and political success of figures like Pisistratus and Deioces, 
both Solon and Herodotus regarded a single man administering the laws with deep 
suspicion.  
Their distrust of this phenomenon was not an isolated view, as is evidenced 
by the nature of many Greek lawgivers. Because a division of powers within the 
polis was necessary to avoid tyranny and monarchy, Herodotus writes that Demonax 
of Mantinea was summoned to reorganise the government of Cyrene. He took certain 
powers from Battus, the basileus, and made them open to the people (Hdt. 4.161-
162). Although Herodotus does not provide details on what these powers were it is 
clear that the changes brought about by Demonax amounted to a decentralisation of 
authority and a redistribution of power among the community. It is also significant 
that Demonax was a foreigner. Lawgivers were often selected from outside the polis 
and were therefore unable to wield political power in the cities to which they gave 
laws. Aristotle’s Archaic lawgivers were external agents deliberately brought in from 
other poleis.
290
 The idea that some Greeks were concerned that the administration of 
justice, or indeed any powerful public office, could be abused or exploited to 
accumulate power is further supported by a number of surviving laws. A late fifth-
century inscription from Athens republishing Drakon’s homicide law corroborates 
the view found in the literature that the power to administer justice needed to be 
decentralised. The law states that the responsibilities of deciding a verdict and giving 
a penalty will be divided between two separate groups of officials, the basileis and 
the ephetai (IG i
3
 104, Lines 11-14; Meiggs and Lewis (1988) 86). Such a measure 
was surely aimed at reducing the kind of corruption mentioned by Hesiod, and 
preventing personal feuds from influencing the outcome of cases, by severing the 
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authority of the judge who delivered the verdict from that of the magistrate who 
issued punishments. The division of power within the judicial system of the polis can 
also be seen in action outside of Athens. A sixth-century law from Chios, although 
badly preserved, lists some duties assigned to certain officials, the basileis and the 
demarchs, and to a δημοσίη βουλή. The δημοσίη βουλή could have been composed 
of fifty members from each phyle (tribe) and probably represents an attempt at 
distributing deliberative and judicial power among the community as this council 
appears to have been authorised to hear appeals separately from the judges (Jeffery 
LSAG 336; Meiggs and Lewis (1988) 8; Nomima 1:62, Lines C.1-9). The entire 
inscription is remarkable for its clear concern with distributing authority among 
separate groups and officials. A seventh-century law from Tiryns states that, 
regarding the unpaid fines of officials, the matter may be handed by the epignomon 
over to the ochlos (SEG 30.380; Nomima 1:78; Koerner (1993), 31). Precisely why 
this might happen, and what powers the epignomon had as opposed to the ochlos, is 
not clear, but it is significant that in this area more than one body or official could 
have authority. A sixth-century law of Elis from Olympia appears to state that the 
consent of a council of five hundred and of the damos are necessary to make changes 
to the law (Nomima 1:109). Each body was therefore unable to act alone in regard to 
altering the law and thus checked the power of the other. A seventh-century law 
from Dreros on Crete regarding term limits on the office of kosmos states that three 
groups of officials, not just the kosmos, but also the demioi and the Twenty, will take 
the oath to abide by that particular law (Jeffery LSAG 311; Meiggs and Lewis (1969) 
2; Koerner (1993) 90.).
291
 This presumably provided a basic check on the power of 
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the kosmos as numerous officials, besides the kosmos himself, were bound by oath to 
ensure the office-holder abided by the term limit. Should the kosmos overstep his 
power several groups of officials were bound to act against him. In order to enforce 
these laws the Greek poleis often gave powers to boards of public officials rather 
than individuals. Many boards of officials are attested for the Archaic period in 
literary and epigraphic sources. The inscription of Drakon’s homicide law names 
four separate boards of officials. Two of these, the Poletai and the Hellanotamiai, 
handled the public money supplied for the inscription. The other two boards, the 
Basileis and the Ephetai, were involved in the process of prosecution in regard to the 
homicide law (IG I
3
 104; Meiggs and Lewis (1988) 86). Other boards of public 
officials are discussed in this chapter, including the Spartan Ephors, the Demioi and 
the Twenty of Dreros, the Basileis and Ephetai at Athens, and the Basileis of 
Olympia. The Constitution of the Athenians also mentions over a dozen boards of 
officials operating in Athens between 600 and 400.
292
 Many Greek poleis adopted a 
policy of distributing powers to boards rather than concentrating it in individuals 
because this prevented the polis from making one man too powerful, a possibility 
identified and feared by Solon (Solon. 9-11 [West]). The distribution of powers to 
boards allowed officials to monitor their colleagues and therefore facilitated 
accountability, one of the crucial aspects of isonomia described by Herodotus (Hdt. 
3.80). In light of this fact there is no reason to conclude that collegiality was solely ‘a 
consequence of the jealousy that accompanied Greek ambition’.293 Considering the 
suspicion of monarchical rule found in Archaic and Classical sources, it is far more 
                                                                                                                                                                    
and transferable functions, but this kind of 'institutionalized' public duties - namely obligations of 
implementation, tasks of control and enforcement - is also regularly an important, if not the central 
element of many early statutes.’  
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likely that collegiality was a sincere attempt at distributing power and providing 
checks on the power of officials by refusing to concentrate their authority. 
Furthermore, the surviving laws that divided powers among boards generally do not 
declare the necessary status or qualifications for the men who would hold the office, 
therefore contradicting the idea that these offices were primarily for restraining elite 
competition.
294
 
The literary and epigraphic evidence listed above suggests that devolving 
power was one method employed by the Greek poleis to ensure that the apparatus for 
administering the laws was carefully divided and kept away from the hands of one 
man.
295
 The poleis from which these laws originate all pursued this particular 
method regardless of substantive or procedural differences in the laws themselves. 
The fact that these measures appeared across the Greek world in the Archaic period 
and were so widely employed suggests a relatively popular move away from the 
arbitrary government of the basileis and a sincere belief in the effectiveness of these 
measures. This is not to claim that the movement towards the rule of law was 
uniform across the Greek world. Macedonia and Cyprus maintained kings well into 
the fourth century, and successful sole rulers were able to thrive in Greek Sicily well 
into the fifth century.  
Once powers and responsibilities were given out by Archaic poleis they were 
no longer held until the holder died or became physically or economically incapable 
of ruling, as was the case with the basileis depicted in Homer. Achilles feared his 
father’s old age would reduce his status and make him vulnerable, not the 
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 Thomas (1996) 30, has observed that written law was ‘fundamental in checking arbitrary 
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termination of his time in any public office (Od. 11.495-497). While Hektor lived he 
prayed that his son Astyanax might rule Troy yet his wife predicted poverty and 
humiliation for him should Hektor be killed. Andromache even goes as far as to 
predict that Astyanax will be physically abused with impunity because of his 
humiliating change in fortune (Il. 22.488-489). In Homeric society a reduction in 
power did not derive from the loss of an office but from loss of ability and status. 
There was no limit to the duration of the rule of the basileis as long as they retained 
the physical, social and economic strength to maintain their dominance. The rise of 
the rule of law brought limits on the duration for which an official held their powers 
or how often a man could hold the same office. Solon was credited with limiting the 
time served as archon to one year ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 8.2) and with limiting the 
number of times an individual could hold certain offices in Athens ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
62.3). Homeric basileis did not give up their powers after a set time.  
From the Archaic period onwards the Greeks devised laws that could 
terminate the power of leaders after a set time or forbid them from returning to 
power. The law from Dreros regarding the office of kosmos prohibits a man who 
held the office to be kosmos again for ten years. ‘When a man has been kosmos, for 
ten years that same man shall not be kosmos. If he should become kosmos, whatever 
judgments he gives, he himself shall owe double, and he shall be useless
296
 as long 
as he lives, and what he does as kosmos shall be as nothing’ (Jeffery LSAG 311; 
Meiggs and Lewis (1969) 2; Koerner (1993), 90.). Similarly a sixth-century law 
from Gortyn forbids the same man from being kosmos within three years, occupying 
the office of gnomon within ten, or from being kosmos for foreigners within five (IC 
IV.14.G-P). A fifth-century inscription from Attica establishes a board of five men to 
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manage the money belonging to Demeter and Kore and states that these officials 
shall hold office for one year only (Fornara (1983) 106). The fact that some of the 
earliest examples of Greek law in existence are concerned with limiting the duration 
of magistrates’ powers suggests that this was an early and very serious concern for 
Archaic Greek legislators. Term limits for high office were necessary to prevent 
individuals from using their positions as a steppingstone to tyranny, a suspicion 
entertained by both Solon and Aristotle.  
In Andocides’ speech Against Alcibiades we read that ‘obedience to the 
magistrates and the laws’ is the best safeguard for the city. At the time of writing 
Andocides was not expressing a particularly novel sentiment in this speech. From the 
Archaic period onwards the Greeks established laws that could enforce obedience 
and punish leaders and magistrates for not laying down their offices or for being 
corrupt or unjust, essentially ensuring that even the most powerful would remain 
obedient to the laws, that no magistrate could be above the law and that all would be 
held accountable for their actions. As Herodotus has the Spartan king Demaratus 
explain to Xerxes. ‘They are free – yes – but not entirely free; for they have a master, 
and that master is Law, which they fear much more than your subjects fear you’ 
(Hdt. 7.104). Before the seventh century there existed no legal means to make rulers 
accountable. Homer and Hesiod both say the gods will ultimately punish injustice. In 
the Iliad, the Odyssey and the Works and Days, there are no set legal penalties for the 
basileis should they not uphold justice and certainly no political authority with the 
power to enforce such penalties.
297
 During and after the seventh century, however, 
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leaders. Homer depicts communities capable of coordinated action against those who harm the 
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the Greeks’ tremendous distrust of those given power is evidenced by the penalties 
they set out for officials who failed to perform their duties.
298
 In a law of c.500 from 
Lyttos in Crete we find that the Kosmos can be tried by judges (SEG 35.991; 
Koerner (1993) 87). A sixth-century law from Eretria declares a fine for officials 
who do not act according to the law (ἀπὸ ῥετõν) regarding what might be the 
payment of fines or debts (Nomima 1.91).
299
 Another sixth-century inscription from 
Eretria lists a fine for the Archos if he himself fails to collect certain fines imposed 
on others (Koerner (1993) 73). A seventh-century law from Tiryns appears to 
contain a similar penalty, threatening the Platiwoinarchoi with a double fine if they 
do not fine the Platiwoinoi should they commit a transgression that has not survived 
in the inscription (SEG 30.380; Koerner (1993) 31).
300
 A sixth or fifth-century law 
from Arcadia lists a punishment for the damiorgos if he does not collect fines 
(Koerner (1993), 35). These laws are significant because they employ a separate 
group of officials as enforcers over other bodies of officials. This facilitated 
accountability and balanced the powers of officials by granting the authority to 
punish them to independent groups. These laws existed to ensure that the behaviour 
of officials conformed to the law rather than private interest and profit, addressing 
the problem of corruption already apparent in Hesiod. These safeguards and 
deterrents are conspicuously absent in Homer. The case depicted on the shield of 
Achilles presents a monetary incentive to encourage the judges to give a just verdict, 
                                                                                                                                                                    
friends, the Thesprontians (Od. 16.424-429). When Odysseus informs his father he has killed the 
suitors he admits to being deeply troubled by the potential consequences: ‘But now I am terribly 
afraid in my heart that speedily the men of Ithaka may come against us here’ (Od. 24.353-354). 
Furthermore both Telemachus (Od. 2.40-79) and Eupeithes (Od. 24.426-437) appeal to the assembly 
to act against those who they claim are harming the community. 
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 Van Effenterre and Ruzé (1994-95) 1:393 
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 See translation and note 49 of Gagarin (2008) 58-59.  
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 The sixth century law from Chios (Jeffery LSAG 336; Meiggs and Lewis (1988) 8; Nomima 1:62, 
Lines C.1-9) may also have contained penalties for officials who accepted bribes, see Jeffery (1956) 
162. The inscription, however, is missing key words and is interpreted by Oliver (1959) 300, as 
describing the levying of a tithe.  
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but no formal checks on the discretion of the judges are apparent (Il. 18.497-508). 
The poet was also aware that men in ‘violent assembly’ might pass crooked 
judgements (σκολιὰς…θέμιστας) and in doing so drive out dike. The only effective 
deterrent against this that the poet presents is the anger of Zeus (Il. 16.386-388) and 
of the gods who examine those men that practice hybris and those that practice 
eunomia (Od. 18.483-487). The penalties listed in the Archaic laws above were there 
to incentivise officials to act according to the law.  
The kosmos at Gortyn could also be tried and fined, probably for the unlawful 
seizure of an individual (IC IV.72: 1.51-5).
301
 This law aimed at preventing the 
unlawful arrest of individuals by threatening the appropriate magistrate with a 
penalty. The laws placed penalties on magistrates for not acting in accordance with 
the interests of the community, thereby discouraging leniency towards enemies and 
traitors. These laws enforced behaviour that was radically different from the 
practices of the leaders of Homeric society. Men like Odysseus used their power to 
protect even those persons whose behaviour could be regarded as deeply harmful to 
the community or even treasonable. Additionally, when Odysseus rescued the father 
of Antinoös from suffering popular justice he acted privately and against the popular 
interest (Od. 16.424-429). 
A penalty is also inscribed against the Locrian demiourgoi in a late sixth-
century inscription. Should they profit in excess of what is prescribed their profit 
will be taken and made sacred to Apollo (Meiggs and Lewis (1988) 13B; Fornara 
(1983) 33). Agamemnon is accused of hoarding treasure which he ought to have 
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 There are several interpretations of this law. See Gagarin (2004) 179, 182 note 30. This particular 
law presents a stark contrast with the behaviour of Homeric basileis and tyrants. As stated in Chapter 
I the basileis of the Iliad and the Odyssey make dire threats against the persons of other free 
individuals, usually because they are perceived enemies or simply men who had offended them. 
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did in the Chersonese (Hdt. 6.39). 
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distributed to his followers. His apparently aggressive and greedy attitude is 
mentioned by Achilles (Il. 1.149-171) and by Thersites (Il. 2.225-241). Achilles, a 
man of considerable status, has a personal grievance with Agamemnon, but 
Thersites’ complaint perhaps represents a more significant problem: that a great man 
might use his position to profit by the community’s labour, regardless of the 
accepted conventions of booty distribution or existing conceptions of fair dealing. A 
law such as the one that regulated the Locrian demiourgoi would ensure that public 
workers or officials could not profit in excess of what the community decreed.  
Athenian citizens could also make complaints to the Council against any 
public official though the matter would be handed over to the courts for prosecution 
([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 45.2). This avenue of redress is completely absent in Homer and 
also under Archaic tyrants as no third party could be approached that held the power 
to check these individuals. These laws addressed problems found in Homer and the 
Archaic period. They penalised men in positions of power, like Odysseus, who acted 
privately and against the interests of the community, regardless of their status. There 
exists in Homer no individual, institution or law like those listed above, with the 
power to punish these men on behalf of the community.  
The Spartan kings, despite their hereditary position and descent from 
Herakles, were also held accountable and subject to the law. Leotychides was tried 
and banished (Hdt. 6.72, 85), Cleomenes was tried on a charge of bribery (Hdt. 
6.82), and Demaratus was deprived of his office as king on the grounds that he had 
no right to the office (Hdt. 6.65-66). Priam accuses his sons of incompetence and of 
taking wealth from their people that they were not entitled to (Il. 24.261-262). 
Despite the obvious problems they have caused Priam’s sons cannot be tried like the 
Spartan kings. Likewise seventh and sixth-century figures like Cypselus and 
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Periander who directly harmed the community by murdering citizens or seizing 
property could not be brought to trial. Although, as stated in Chapter I, the 
community depicted in the Homeric poems was capable of coordinated action 
against an individual, even its ruler, there was no law to regulate this action or to 
ensure that the community permanently held the power to check and punish its 
leaders as the Spartan Ephors did.
302
 The idea that the demos should, and remarkably 
ought, to assert itself against its leaders was certainly not an innovation of Greek 
democracy or even of the Archaic and Classical periods. The Ithakans are 
encouraged to take action against the suitors, despite the fact that the suitors were the 
leaders of the community (Od. 2.46-79, 229-241). Arguably the greatest threat to 
Odysseus and his family comes when Eupeithes leads more than half of the assembly 
to destroy them in revenge for the deaths of the suitors (Od. 24.426-469). Thersites 
encourages the Achaian army to resent Agamemnon because he keeps their plunder 
for himself, regardless of Agamemnon’s considerable status (Il. 2.225-242). The 
Achaians never rise against Agamemnon but they express their anger at his treatment 
of Achilles by fighting only half-heartedly for him (Il. 14.49-51). Hektor calls the 
Trojans cowards for not stoning Paris for all the harm he has caused, suggesting a 
very strong level of resentment against leaders who caused injury to the community 
and a clear idea of how leaders ought to behave (Il. 3.56-57). If the basileis of 
Homer proved incompetent, corrupt or acted against the wishes of the community 
there was no guarantee that they would be held accountable. Several significant 
figures, such as the father of Antinöos and Paris, are threatened with popular justice 
but no formalised procedure to ensure accountability is present in Homer or Hesiod.  
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The poetry of Theognis asks that the demos be yoked and goaded like beasts 
of burden, for they are a demos that loves their masters (φιλοδέσποτον) more than 
any other (Theog. 847-850 [West]). Considering that the poems of Homer encourage 
the demos to act against bad leaders, it is likely that Theognis was expressing his 
frustration with the demos for not asserting itself against bad leaders. Despotes 
means one that owns slaves, therefore Theognis’ lines equate the demos with slaves; 
property with which one can do as one pleases. The poet was voicing his frustration 
with the demos, not actually asking that they be abused.  
Public officials, in contrast to Homeric basileis, were also restricted in their 
capacity to harm or kill citizens during and after the Archaic period. As Hansen 
notes, ‘Several of the orators state with approval the rule that no citizen could be 
executed without due process of law…“no execution without trial” (medena akriton 
apokteinai) was felt to be a right which all citizens enjoyed’.303 That a citizen had an 
inalienable right to be free from the threat of arbitrary physical punishment and 
arbitrary execution that was also recognised by the community and upheld by its 
laws is not found in Homer or Hesiod. In Homer there are a number of instances 
where basileis, on their own initiative, beat, kill, or contemplate killing, members of 
the community without reference to any process that might be regarded as a trial. 
There are however numerous sources from later periods, mainly from Athens, that 
indicate the presence of laws that protected individuals from this kind of arbitrary 
punishment. Beyond Athens, one of the Gortyn laws inscribed in the fifth century 
forbids the unlawful seizure of a free man or a slave before their trial and lists 
several fines as punishment (IC IV.72:1.2-2.2), thereby restraining the power of 
individuals to harm or kill other people. The behaviour of basileis, who are depicted 
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killing on a whim or to secure their position, offers a stark contrast with the law of 
Gortyn which offered protection to the persons of citizens.  
 The Greeks seem to have distrusted attempts to alter the laws as much as they 
distrusted their leaders and public officials. Their reasons for doing so were both 
practical and to reduce the threat of tyrannical rule. During the Persian constitutional 
debate Herodotus has Otanes say that the rule of a single man is the worst form of 
government because a monarchos will surely disturb the ancestral laws, ‘(a 
monarchos) breaks up the structure of ancient tradition and law (nomaia patria), 
forces women to serve his pleasure, and puts men to death without trial’ (Hdt. 3.80). 
It is striking that Herodotus lists the overthrow of the law alongside the murder of 
citizens as one of the most serious consequences of monarchical rule. Thucydides 
associated a lack of regard for the established laws with a breakdown of social norms 
and the proliferation of crime and greed. ‘These parties were not formed to enjoy the 
benefits of the established laws (τῶν κειμένων νόμων), but to acquire power by 
overthrowing the existing regime; and the members of these parties felt confidence 
in each other not because of any fellowship in a religious communion, but because 
they were partners in crime’ (Thuc. 3.82). Aeschines explained that the difference 
between tyranny and democracy is that the subjects of a tyrant are governed by their 
master’s whims, while in a democracy the established laws (τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς 
κείμενοις) govern the people and that the community will benefit by obeying these 
laws (τοῖς νόμοις τοῖς κειμένοις πείθεσθαι) (Aesch. 1.4-6). If the established laws 
were regarded as beneficial to the community then it is understandable that attempts 
to alter them were regarded with suspicion. This explains the origins of a story 
mentioned by Demosthenes; that a man proposing a new law to the Locrians must do 
so with a noose around his neck. He would be strangled if the law did not pass in 
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order to protect the κειμένοις…νόμοις (Dem. 24.139). These passages all suggest 
that it was not blind adherence to tradition that inspired such extraordinary reverence 
for the laws. Antiphon believed that it was the fact that the established laws had 
remained unchanged for so long that was proof of their excellence (5.14-15).  
To prevent attempts to change or overthrow the laws the Greek poleis 
introduced entrenchment clauses. These clauses generally declared attempts to alter a 
particular law illegal and threatened appropriate punishments. An early sixth-century 
inscription from the Heraion at Argos threatens a curse for those who ignore or 
attempt to alter the laws. It is possible that the inscription also threatens exile and 
confiscation of property as the punishment though this is unclear (IG IV.506; 
Nomima 1.100).
304
 A sixth-century Locrian law regarding land threatens the man 
who would propose further division of that land, or create stasis over the issue of 
land, with a curse, confiscation of property, and the destruction of his house (Meiggs 
and Lewis (1988) 13A.7-14, Fornara (1983) 33.A). Land seems to have been a 
particularly sensitive issue in the Archaic period as it could potentially be used to 
buy political support. Menelaus explains that he would have driven the natives from 
a city under his control in order to settle his friend and ally Odysseus there with his 
own people (Od. 4.176-177). This tactic was actually employed by Arcesilaus, the 
basileus of Cyrene. After being driven out in a civil war, Arcesilaus fled to Samos 
where he collected supporters with a promise of land as payment (Hdt. 4.163). The 
Locrian law sought to prevent such political interference in property. A sixth-century 
inscription from Olympia declaring a hundred-year alliance between the Eleans and 
the Heraeans threatens the citizen, official or damos, who harms the inscription with 
a fine (Fornara (1983) 25; Meiggs and Lewis (1988) 17.). This particular clause 
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aimed to ensure the long-lasting alliance ran its course without private or political 
interference. Sole rulers or would-be rulers were not so easily restrained and used 
their positions, or just outright force, to influence or seize control of policy. The 
severity of the above penalties reflects the suspicion of change to the established 
laws found in the literary sources and represents a consistent strategy employed by 
the Greek poleis to preserve the established laws that were regarded as so beneficial 
to the community. Entrenchment also prevented individuals from interfering 
politically with private and public property, or making sudden and dramatic changes 
to the domestic and foreign policies of the state.  
The above examples show that from the seventh century onwards there was a 
movement across the Greek world to divide and limit power through the rule of 
law.
305
 In the centuries before this development the many functions of the various 
public officials found in poleis like Archaic Gortyn and Classical Athens had 
previously been concentrated in the person of the basileus. The basileis found in 
Homer and Hesiod had been military leaders and protectors, judges and arbitrators, 
religious functionaries and ambassadors. As the next chapter will show, the practices 
employed by the basileis and the Archaic tyrants to gain power would remain 
consistent from the eighth century to the fifth. Not only was power originally 
concentrated in the local ruler, but powerful men were encouraged to abuse their 
position to accumulate wealth and slaves. Gaining power in Homeric and Archaic 
Greece required engagement with social practices that in turn demanded the 
expenditure of large amounts of wealth in the form of treasure and agricultural 
produce. Because this society created such a limitless demand for wealth and labour 
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it incentivised the powerful to raid for wealth and slaves and pervert or ignore 
accepted norms of justice to acquire bribes or seize the property of others.  
 
Conclusion 
The evidence does not support a picture of Archaic Greece that was afflicted by 
overpopulation, conflict between clearly defined classes or shaken by a hoplite 
revolution. Both archaeological and literary sources contradict any such theories. 
The archaeological evidence does not corroborate Snodgrass’ burial data or theory 
regarding a dramatic population increase. Instead it demonstrates that population 
growth in the Archaic period was not ‘explosive’ and that overseas settlements were 
often founded with the aim of trade and profit, rather than the sustenance of the 
surplus population. The theory of a challenge to the traditional aristocracy from an 
Archaic nouveau riche rests on precarious interpretations of a handful of passages 
from Homer, Hesiod and Archaic poetry. These are easily disproven by an 
interpretation of these sources that takes their evidence together as part of a broader 
picture of Archaic practices and society. The literary sources depict a society where 
social mobility was fluid and a familiar occurrence, where trade occurred without 
class prejudice, and where an aristocracy simply did not exist. Kakoi were not ‘the 
poor’ or indeed any social class, but are described, particularly by Theognis, as the 
individuals who outraged the accepted norms and customs of society and were 
therefore reviled. The Archaic elite were not usurped by kakoi or by a rising middle-
class of hoplites. Hoplite formations are not depicted in Archaic iconography and 
descriptions of combat in Archaic sources remain consistent with Homeric 
depictions of combat. Like the imposition of classes on Archaic Greece, the 
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discussion regarding Solon and systems of land tenure and ‘economic reform’ in 
Attica is anachronistic. The concerns of Solon’s poetry are with establishing law and 
order and suppressing the violence caused by those who greedily seized the property 
of others. The problems of the Archaic period stemmed from the need of the elite to 
collect wealth and slaves which led to raiding, violence and corruption. This 
behaviour encouraged lawlessness and disorder which threatened the community 
with death, destruction, slavery, stasis and ultimately tyranny. The consequences of 
this behaviour were so severe because of the absence of strong legal mechanisms 
that could punish wrongdoers and impose order.   
The innovation that brought change to the Greek poleis and began in the 
seventh century was the rule of law. This phenomenon caused the concentration of 
power in the hands of one man to become incompatible with ideas of eunomia and 
isonomia. These ideas were lauded by writers like Solon and Herodotus because they 
were ultimately beneficial to the community. The laws that enabled these concepts to 
operate in the Archaic polis combatted the problems of greed, hybris, corruption and 
violence repeatedly attested in eighth-century and Archaic sources. The success of 
these ideas required the application of certain principles such as the divided powers 
and accountability of public officials so carefully prescribed in many of the above 
laws. These principles could not possibly be applied to a Homeric basileus because 
his power inevitably placed him above the law. The power of Homeric basileis also 
rested on very personal methods, such as personal ties, violent raids and gift-giving, 
that were often rendered illegal by the laws listed above, subverting their original 
status as generally normative practices. Archaic and Classical writers depicted the 
sole ruler, often referred to as tyrannos, ruling as the polar opposite to the rule of law 
and to the exclusion of isonomia, eunomia and eleutheria. The fear of a sole ruler is 
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reflected in the various safeguards the Greeks placed in their laws to prevent the 
concentration of power and the abuses of power described by Homer, Hesiod, and 
the Archaic poets. These measures did not have a narrow view to restricting elite 
competition. The clear concern of these early laws was with regulating government, 
making certain no official could be above the law, and ensuring no single individual 
could accumulate too much power. The laws that appeared after 650 tackled specific 
problems, abuses and anxieties that existed under the rule of the Homeric basileis 
and throughout the Archaic period. The next chapter will discuss the Archaic tyrants 
themselves and show that their methods of gaining and maintaining power were the 
same as those of the Homeric basileis.  
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Chapter III: Archaic Tyrants 
As noted in the previous chapters, the early Greek tyrants were the same style of 
leader that had ruled and been accepted by the society depicted in the Homeric 
poems. It was the personal achievements, private wealth, and strength of the 
Homeric leader that earned, justified and maintained his power and status. It is, 
however, necessary to acknowledge the fact that basileis also maintained popular 
support by observing and upholding justice and the customary norms and religious 
rituals of their community. They were not simply strongmen, but used a diverse set 
of methods to take and hold power. Chapter II showed that the traditional ideas of 
tyranny as a new phenomenon are misleading, and there was no linear transition 
from pre-Archaic kings to ‘traditional aristocrats’306 and then tyrants. The adherence 
of scholars to these ideas has resulted in a search for the causes of tyranny and the 
rise of unreliable theories regarding economic and social conditions in the Archaic 
period.
307
 As shown in the previous chapter, there is no firm evidence for fixed social 
classes in Archaic Greece, of an Archaic aristocracy,
308
 of class conflict
309
 or a 
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 Stahl (1987) 104-105, for example, characterises Archaic tyranny as a struggle between aristocrats: 
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 This view is in direct opposition to that held by scholars such as Mossé (1969) 2: ‘En fait, les 
auteurs anciens déjà avaient constaté que partout l’apparition de la tyrannie est liée à un déséquilibre, 
déséquilibre social essentiellement. Le tyran se présente alors le plus souvent comme un chef 
populaire, hostile à l’aristocratie, et qui contribute partout à détruire non seulement le regime 
politique, mais aussi les cadres sociaux imposés par cette aristocratie. Mais à la place, il ne construit 
rien.’ As shown in the previous chapter, no Greek source predating, and including, Herodotus 
represents tyrants as hostile to the aristocracy. Not only is there no evidence for the existence of an 
Archaic ‘aristocracy’ in these sources but any secure references to class conflict of any kind are 
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population explosion. As very little time, perhaps only half a century, separates 
Homeric society from the period popularly recognised as the Archaic period, the 
developments of the seventh and sixth centuries must be seen in the context of the 
practices and customs of Homeric Greece. The poems of Homer and Hesiod were 
created before the advent of the rule of law, and the social expectations of their 
audiences are reflected in the fact that the basileis and their behaviour are portrayed 
as normative. There are naturally complaints against certain actions of the basileis 
that are perceived as unjust, such as violence, theft of property and unfair decisions, 
but the basileis’ rule of the community is not ideologically unacceptable. Their rule 
is taken for granted in the poems and there are no ideological complaints against the 
personal nature of their rule, the extent of their powers or the absence of checks on 
those powers. The spread of the rule-of-law ideology c.650 completely changed the 
attitude of its adherents towards these customs and in particular the style of 
leadership practised by the basileis. The new laws that appeared from the seventh 
century onwards not only tackled the abuses and perceived injustices inherent in the 
rule of the basileis but quickly made rule by one man deeply threatening and 
inappropriate. In the view of its adherents, the rule of law transformed once 
normative and traditional rulers into tyrants. By the fifth and fourth centuries tyrants 
would be viewed as dangerous and deviant to such an extent that their personalities 
were increasingly stereotyped by deeply hostile sources. Their methods of taking 
power, despite not being the primary concern of the authors of our sources, are yet 
perceivable and remain consistent with those of the Homeric basileis.  
The transition of the perception of one-man rule from a socially acceptable 
norm to a threatening and destructive phenomenon was facilitated by the division of 
                                                                                                                                                                    
conspicuously absent. Mossé’s statement is simply not supported by the earliest evidence, but is 
rather a reflection of the later and highly anachronistic sources that postdate Herodotus.  
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powers and the institution of the checks and balances that were an intrinsic part of 
the rule of law.
310
 The term basileus continued to be applied to public office and a 
new word was therefore required to describe the unrestricted rule of one man. The 
origin of the word turannos has not been securely identified due to the very small 
number of surviving sources from the Archaic period. It is not present in Homer or 
Hesiod, and first appears in surviving Greek literature in the poetry of Archilochus. 
It is generally assumed that the word came into the Greek language from the east, 
with Lydia being the most likely place of origin, although other regions have been 
suggested.
311
 The early tyrants represented individuals who persisted in using the 
traditional methods of the basileis to gain and maintain their power despite the 
development of measures to limit and check authority.
312
 In order to prove that the 
Homeric leaders and the early tyrants represent continuity this chapter will assess the 
means the tyrants used to gain and maintain power. Like those of Homeric society 
these constituted a series of personal methods and arrangements. The tyrants of 
Archaic Greece will be discussed as a group in the first part, and Pisistratus and his 
family will be used as a case study in the second part. Chapter IV will investigate 
Classical tyrants as these have generally been separated from their Archaic 
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 Tyranny was therefore not a phenomenon that appeared at a specific moment in Greek history, as 
is believed by most scholars. E.g. Mossé (1969) 2.  
311
 Hippias of Elis believed that the word turannos appeared in Greek in the time of Archilochus, in 
the seventh century (FGrH 6 F 6). The poetry of Archilochus does in fact contain the earliest 
surviving use of the word turannos and the body of poems has been dated to the seventh century. See 
Jacoby (1941) 97-109; Pouilloux (1964) 9. The possibility that turannos is of Lydian origin is 
entertained by Andrewes (1956) 22, and Lewis (2009) 7. Austin (1990) 289, believes the word 
originated in Asia Minor. Parker (1998) 145-149, has identified Hittite and Old Testament terms for 
rulers and judges that are similar to turannos. See also O’Neill (1986) 26-40. 
312
 The individual tyrant, although supported by his friends and family, remained the driving force 
behind his own ascension to power. As noted by Stahl (1987) 61: ‘Alle diesbezüglichen Angaben 
heben nun, erstens, ganz entschieden die Führerpersönlichkeiten als Triebkräfte für die Entstehung 
der jeweiligen Stasis-Gruppierung hervor. Dies ist am besten an der Gruppierung des Peisistratos zu 
beobachten: Ausgangspunkt ist dessen ganz persönliches Streben, Tyrann zu werden (vgl. 1,59,3).’ 
Stahl is absolutely correct to single out Pisistratus as the best example of this. It was Pisistratus’ 
popularity that brought to his side a significant proportion of the Athenian community and his control, 
as head of the family, over territory and private wealth that gave him such substantial military 
support.  
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predecessors by historians on various grounds. This chapter will generally attempt to 
use the oldest sources as far as is possible, as this gives a better understanding of 
Archaic society and avoids the anachronisms and prejudices of the later material.
313
 
Although the first instance of the word turannos is in Archilochus, the first 
articulate descriptions of the tyrant as a sole ruler, as politically deviant and 
fundamentally harmful to the community are found in the poetry of Theognis and 
Solon. In Solon’s poetry the antithesis of tyranny, the rule of law and a state of 
eunomia, are depicted as an attainable goal rather than the accepted and established 
norm. But from Herodotus onwards many Greek sources accepted the rule of law as 
the norm and described personal sole-rule as threatening, destructive and 
abnormal.
314
 Herodotus called this phenomenon monarchy and tyranny.
315
 This 
prejudice against tyrants distorted the view of later writers, particularly fourth-
century philosophers, who applied certain stereotypes to the tyrant’s personality. The 
historical record of Archaic tyrants has suffered in particular from later writers’ 
anachronisms and application of moral stereotypes to the tyrants. The philosophers 
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 Salmon (1984) 189, for example, notes that the account of Nicolaus of Damascus’ account 
regarding Cypselus ‘reeks of two fourth century tendencies: rationalization and assimilation to 
contemporary practice. Many of the details belong to the textbook tyrant of fourth century theorists – 
especially demagoguery and accusations of plots by the tyrant’s enemies.’ The contrast between the 
accounts of Herodotus and The Constitution of the Athenians regarding Archaic Attica is noted by 
Cawkwell (1995) 75: ‘The whole, story, as noted by Herodotus, presents an utterly different picture 
from that of the Constitution of the Athenians, not of an Athens divided by constitutional and social 
interests, but of an Attica divided by local loyalties’. In both ancient examples we can see substantial 
anachronisms and limited understanding of the social realities of Archaic Greece.  
314
 Tyranny is also portrayed as dangerous, destructive and politically deviant in tragedy. Creon’s 
authoritarian position leads him to impiously ignore the laws of the gods and wrongly order the death 
of Antigone. His orders are carried out not because they are just but because his subjects fear him as is 
implied by the chorus (Soph. Ant. 211-220), and by Haemon (Soph. Ant. 689-700). See Harris (2006) 
61-80. 
315
 A theory had been developed that tyranny was, at some stage in the Archaic period, acceptable or 
popular in the Greek poleis.  This theory is closely related to the idea of the tyrant as the leader of the 
demos against the Archaic ‘aristocracy’. The ultimate flaw in this theory has been pointed out by 
Luraghi (2014) 68: ‘For a start, one point must be made explicit. If we look at the handful of passages 
from Archaic poets that supposedly display a positive attitude to tyranny, we immediately notice that 
they all have a point in common. No Archaic poet ever says that he – or she, for that matter – lusts 
after tyranny. Without exception, the desirability of tyranny is evoked only in order to be immediately 
rejected, or transferred to some hypothetical other.’  
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attribute to the Archaic period the social, political and legal concerns of their own 
times, such as a tension between rich and poor and the call for a redistribution of 
land. The moral stereotypes of tyranny generally revolve around forms of excess 
including sexual deviancy, greed, bloodthirstiness, paranoia and arbitrary decisions. 
Andrewes, for example, writing on the tyrant Periander discussed the problems 
inherent in Aristotle’s account of the tyranny. ‘But the conventional view finds 
sinister motives everywhere and repeats the same charges monotonously against 
each tyrant, so that it is hard to be sure what we may believe of Periander, or how to 
interpret what we do believe.’316 This insightful comment highlights the potential 
oral deformation of the surviving source material. The anecdotes and accounts of 
early tyrants may well have undergone changes as they conformed to new audience 
expectations or were subjected to improvisation by tellers.
317
 For example, the rather 
positive tales that predicted a tyrant’s future success through oracles could easily be 
interpreted as an originally positive folk-tale or piece of ancient propaganda that 
experienced changes as Greek society grew to fear and hate tyranny. Another 
example would be the possible desire of some Athenian families to distance 
themselves from charges of collaboration with the Pisistratid tyranny, noted later in 
this chapter, which has long been suspected to have influenced the accounts of 
Herodotus and Thucydides. A further problem is posed by the fact that the study of 
the Archaic period means using dozens of separate anecdotes, tales and oracular 
predictions rather than drawing on one or two larger sources, such as the Homeric 
poems. This renders the method of identifying formulas or patterns in a text to assure 
oneself of a sole author or time period for its composition much less useful.  
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 Andrewes (1956) 51. 
317
 Finnegan (1977)54-55. 
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These problems can, to some extent, be mitigated by adhering to the 
evidence-based methodology of this thesis. This chapter will therefore gather 
evidence from a number of different sources that surely represent a myriad of 
traditions yet, as we shall see, present a very consistent picture of how Archaic 
tyrants took power. As stated by Drews, when approaching the Archaic tyrants it is 
far more profitable to ask ‘how’ they came to power rather than ‘why’.318 
Consequently this chapter will generally focus on Archaic tyranny as a phenomenon 
grounded in the social practices of the time, rather than attempt to follow 
chronologically the careers of individual tyrants or the strains of the narratives of 
specific authors regarding certain tyrants.
319
 This will be done in order to better 
identify broad patterns of evidence and to avoid the need to fill in gaps in the earliest 
sources with unreliable later material or speculation.
320
 This chapter will also point 
out the links between the practices of the Archaic period and those that are depicted 
in Homer and Hesiod to show the level of continuity that existed between these 
periods. The methods of gaining and maintaining power to be discussed are warfare, 
religious practice, marriage, friends and family, wealth, and the administration of 
justice.
321
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 Drews (1972) 132.  
319
 The benefits of this methodology are pointed out by Mitchell (2013) 48: ‘By looking at Greek 
rulership in the long view, and as a single phenomenon, rather than as imposing the traditional 
opposition between basileis and tyrannoi, it is possible to see that there are significant trends in the 
ways that rule was understood and expressed across the seven hundred years or so from the Early Iron 
Age to the dawn of the Hellenistic period’. Although Mitchell refers ambiguously to ‘rulership’ rather 
than tyranny, the need to discuss the phenomenon as a whole, and search for wide patterns of 
evidence, remains pertinent.  
320
 Lavelle (1993b) 9, regarding the Pisistratids, points out the most severe problems when trying to 
use the source material to construct a ‘continuous or comprehensive narrative’. Lavelle singles out the 
fragmentary evidence, large chronological gaps between Pisistratid rule and the dates of the written 
sources and the hostility of the sources to Pisistratus and his family. Although Lavelle is writing 
specifically on the Pisistratids, all of these problems could be applied to the sources on any other 
Archaic tyrant.  
321
 Mitchell (2013) 57, though broadly speaking correct, does not quite acknowledge the great breadth 
of methods used by Homeric basileis and tyrants to gain and maintain power: ‘The ruler must either 
rule through some kind of coercion (whether with the support of a co-opted elite or through military), 
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I 
a) Warfare 
One of the earliest surviving uses of the word turannia is found in a metaphor of 
Archilochus in which the poet states that a city has been taken by force and is now 
ruled as a tyranny (Archil. 23.19-21 [West]). A fragment of Theognis asks Zeus to 
destroy the family of Cypselus after lamenting the destruction of Cerinthus, the 
general destruction of vineyards and the flight of the agathoi (Theog. 891-894 
[West]), the implication being that Cypselus was responsible for the violence and 
destruction. This association of tyranny with violence, military force and military 
leadership would persist from the Archaic period to the Roman conquest, and we 
shall see that Archaic tyrants are often closely linked with military leadership. Harris 
has noted that military commands were a popular stepping-stone for those aiming at 
tyranny in Archaic and Classical Greece.
322
 Harris cites the examples of Pisistratus, 
who led the Athenians successfully against Megara, Solon, who captured Salamis 
and later wrote that he could have made himself tyrant, and the Spartan Pausanias, 
who held extensive military powers and was suspected of intending to make himself 
a tyrant.
323
 In addition to these there are further Archaic examples. Gelon had been a 
cavalry officer under the tyrant Hippocrates and subsequently played a leading role 
in crushing a revolt against Hippocrates’ sons before betraying them and becoming 
                                                                                                                                                                    
or through a process of legitimization…’ . A crucial step in understanding Greek tyranny is to 
recognise the diverse and sometimes subtle and nuanced methods through which they took power. It 
is however an oversimplification to state that: ‘In the context of archaic and classical Greece, 
legitimacy – that is, willing obedience – was achieved through proof that the ruler had an excess of 
aretē, excellence.’ This acknowledges neither the diversity of methods available nor their practical 
benefits and implications.  
322
 Harris (2010) 406.  
323
 This is overlooked by Rhodes (1981) 200, in his commentary on The Constitution of the Athenians. 
Rhodes focuses instead on the methods of deception and the securing of a bodyguard as a favoured 
route to tyranny.  
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tyrant himself.
324
 In both capacities Gelon must have wielded considerable military 
power. Other tyrants appear to have exercised personal control over the military once 
they were secure in power. For example, Herodotus states that Thrasybulus directed 
the war against the Lydians and organised the peace treaty and subsequent alliance 
with Alyattes (Hdt. 1.22). Thucydides also believed that the Pisistratids successfully 
prosecuted several wars on behalf of Athens (Thuc. 6.54). All of these tyrants 
occupied important military positions before or during their rule and appear to have 
lead soldiers into battle personally. As shown in Chapter I, the military power and 
success of the Homeric basileus were crucial to establishing and maintaining his 
position at the head of the community. Homeric basileis secured armed support 
through the distribution of wealth, through their reputation or through relationships 
based on practices such as marriage and guest-friendship. We shall see that Archaic 
tyrants continued to use these traditional methods, and military prestige, military 
success, the use of violence and armed supporters all continued to be used by tyrants 
or prospective tyrants in their pursuit of power.  
 Many Archaic tyrants are recorded leading military expeditions or were noted 
for the military prowess in the sources. Gyges is one of the earliest individuals to be 
called a tyrant by a surviving Greek source. According to Herodotus his descendants 
Ardys, Sadyattes and Alyattes led military expeditions of varying success (Hdt. 1.15-
17). In the sixth century Croesus,
325
 the son of Alyattes, continued this practice with 
greater success, subduing many of the Asiatic Greeks and compelling them to pay 
him tribute (Hdt. 1.26-27). Gelon won prestige through victory in many battles and 
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 Nicolaus of Damascus wrote that Cypselus held the position of polemarch before he became tyrant 
(FGrH 90 F 57). Although this fits with the practice of using a powerful office to take power the 
source is very late and Hornblower (2013) 253, noting the presence of post-Archaic prejudices and 
assumptions, has dismissed it as ‘unusable’.   
325
 Herodotus calls Croesus turannos of all the people living west of the Halys river (Hdt. 1.6).  
168 
 
as a military leader (Hdt. 7.154), receiving considerable acclamations for his 
victories over the Carthaginians (Diod. Sic. 11.21, 25). Gelon was also recorded 
fighting against Callipolis, Naxos, Zancle, Leontini and Syracuse on behalf of the 
tyrant Hippocrates. Hippocrates himself gained the town of Camarina by fighting 
against the Syracusans and forcing them to hand over the settlement to him (Hdt. 
7.154). Hippocrates was eventually killed fighting against the native Sicels (Hdt. 
7.155). Hippocrates and Gelon therefore provide examples of conquest by force of 
arms and a style of leadership characterised by personal participation in combat and 
leadership by example. By offering his military leadership to a beleaguered Thracian 
tribe, Miltiades son of Cypselus became a tyrant in the Chersonese (Hdt. 6.34-35), 
achieving his position entirely through military leadership. In the sixth century 
Polycrates
326
 was well known for his military successes that brought him fame, 
slaves, wealth and territory (Hdt. 2.39, Thuc. 1.13). Thucydides also names the 
island of Rhenea as a particular conquest of Polycrates (Thuc. 3.104).
327
 Archaic 
tyrants were clearly militarily active, often led their forces personally and used their 
military power to secure additional wealth and territory. This could be achieved 
through intimidation, raiding and piracy, and outright conquest. As noted in Chapter 
I, the Homeric basileis also made a point of conspicuously leading their men into 
battle, and profited from the plunder and slaves accumulated in successful 
expeditions.  
Some Archaic tyrants were quick to resort to force to impose their will. 
Herodotus states that Cyprus was ruled by tyrants (Hdt. 5.109) and that one ruler, 
Onesilus, seized Salamis from his own brother with the support of his own faction 
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 For the duration of the tyranny at Samos see White (1954) 36-43. Mossé (1969) 17, also suggests 
several theories on the date of the accession of Polycrates to the tyranny.  
327
 On the naval power of Polycrates see Carty (2015) 128-148. 
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(Hdt. 5.104). Pheretima carried out brutal reprisals against the inhabitants of Barca 
for the murder of Arcesilaus (Hdt. 4.202-203). A number of Archaic tyrants removed 
their rivals through arrest, exile or deception. Miltiades son of Cimon, shortly after 
arriving in the territory, tricked, seized and imprisoned the most influential men in 
the Chersonese to consolidate his position (Hdt. 6.39).
328
 Maeandrius of Samos 
supposedly did the same, luring the leading men of the island into his presence and 
imprisoning them (Hdt. 3.142). When Maeandrius became ill, his brother Lycaretus, 
expecting to become tyrant, had all the prisoners put to death, presumably to 
facilitate the transmission of power (Hdt. 3.143). Like Lycaretus, several Archaic 
tyrants simply chose to exterminate any potential rivals. Herodotus records a 
tradition that Gyges murdered Candaules, the previous ruler of Lydia, in order to 
become tyrant (Hdt. 1.11-12).
329
 Upon becoming tyrant of Corinth Cypselus 
proceeded to exile or murder a significant number of Corinthians, almost certainly 
his opponents or potential rivals, implying that he possessed the necessary force to 
overpower his enemies (Hdt. 5.92b). It is implied through an anecdote in which 
Periander asks Thrasybulus for advice that Periander and Thrasybulus murdered all 
their rivals or any individuals they considered to be threats (Hdt. 5.92g). Aristotle 
tells the story in reverse, having Periander advise Thrasybulus to cut down the tallest 
ears of corn (presumably meaning the most outstanding men) (Arist. Pol. 3.1284a). 
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 The sources regularly associate Archaic and Classical tyrants with deception and often depict them 
exercising a certain degree of cunning. It is not immediately clear why tyranny and deceitfulness 
should have been so closely associated. Yet tyrants such as Pisistratus (Hdt. 1.59, 60; [Arist.] Ath. 
Pol. 15.4-5 ), Polycrates (Hdt. 3.59), Miltiades son of Cimon (Hdt. 6.39), and Thrasybulus of Miletus 
(Hdt. 1.21-22) for example, all employ deception at critical moments. Darius, who Herodotus 
considers to be a monarchos, has no qualms about employing the clever plan of his groom in order to 
become king of Persia (Hdt. 3.85-86). On the subject of the cunning tyrant see Luraghi (2014) 67-92. 
Goušchin (1999) 15-16, argues, with reference to Hdt. 1.59, for deception in the early stages of 
Pisistratus career: ‘I believe, however, that what Pisistratus could be ‘in word’ was the people’s 
champion only, not a leader. In saying this, Herodotus is trying to convince his readers that Pisistratus 
was a deceiver. Firstly, he was a false demos-protector. Pisistratus deceived the demos and pretended 
to be the people’s champion, while covertly he aimed at personal power. Herodotus was sure that the 
establishment of the tyranny went against the demos’ interest. Pisistratus further deceived the 
Athenians when he wounded himself in order to have a bodyguard granted to him.’  
329
 Gyges is associated with wealth and tyranny by Archilochus (Archil. 19 [West]). 
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Theron of Akragas was said to have exterminated his rivals, although by a much 
later source (Diod. Sic. 11.48). When discussing tyranny and polticial violence it is 
worth bearing in mind that, as we have seen, as early as the sixth century an 
association between tyranny and violence had already crystallized. By the late fifth 
century, Herodotus was able to articulate a more complex caricature of tyranny that 
went beyond a mere association with violence. Herodotus’ imagery of repression and 
the deliberate targeting of prominent citizens appear in several anecdotes, including 
that of Periander and Thrasybulus, and were repeated in the fourth century. These 
anecdotes may represent an oral tradition or folk story, but the consistency with 
which they were repeated suggests that they also represent a series of Archaic and 
Classical Greek preconceptions of how tyrants behaved in their pursuit of power.   
Pisistratus’ attempt at seizing control of Athens by using armed men was not 
the first. Cylon had used the same tactic in the seventh century, gathering his hetairoi 
to assist him in taking the Acropolis, although unsuccessfully (Hdt. 5.72).
330
 
Fortunately the evidence of the Homeric poems provides an abundance of 
information on the nature of hetairoi. As noted in the Chapter I, hetairoi were close 
friends of an individual who fought alongside him on the battlefield and received 
from him presents of food, valuables and booty. Hetairoi in the Homeric poems are 
often employed as soldiers, following their leader on raids for example, and for 
clandestine purposes such as murder. For Cylon to have enjoyed their support he 
must have had access to enough wealth to maintain his relationship with this band 
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 Hornblower (1991) 204, attributes the failure of Cylon’s coup to the supposed lack of economic 
and social crises nullifying any desire for tyranny: ‘It also makes good sense in terms of Athenian 
history: the Athenians in c.630 were not yet ready for a tyrant. During the next generation their 
economic and social difficulties worsened, and Solon legislated as reformer, but still not as tyrant, in 
594. But Solon’s solutions failed, and in the course of the sixth century a real tyrant, Pisistratus, took 
power.’ The presence of social and economic crises in sixth century Attica that could have led to 
tyranny have been effectively disproven by Harris (1997; 2006, 10-14), and by the results of field 
survey that contradict the theory of an Attic population explosion. See Chapter II. 
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and the personal prowess to attract a group of loyal warriors. Cylon’s use of hetairoi 
as his immediate source of military muscle during his coup fits perfectly with the 
Homeric uses of these individuals.
331
  
The bands of armed followers that seem to have accompanied many tyrants 
are often called ‘bodyguards’ by translators of the sources, and are generally 
depicted as a feature of the tyrant’s oppressive rule and a stereotypical feature of 
tyranny. Aristotle claimed that Theagenes of Megara asked for a bodyguard in the 
same manner as Pisistratus (Arist. Rhet. 1.2.19) and recorded a tradition that 
Cypselus had no bodyguard as an exception to the rule (Arist. Pol. 5.9.22). It is an 
entirely correct observation that many Archaic tyrants are recorded using bands of 
personal retainers, or close friends and allies as armed support. The precise identity 
of these soldiers is usually extremely difficult to discover, although modern 
scholarship often defines them as ‘mercenaries’. There is no single Archaic term 
consistently used to describe these armed supporters and their origins and motives 
are often not specified by sources which are simply not interested in them. When 
these supporters are discussed the vocabulary applied to them is diverse. The 
Archaic, Classical and post-Classical sources refer to the warriors who supported 
Archaic tyrants as hetairoi, epikouroi, misthophoroi, misthotoi, or a number of other 
terms. Some of these terms are specific and merely descriptive, such as toxotoi 
(archers), or perhaps more ambiguous like several of the terms above. The Classical 
and post-Classical sources are generally extremely problematic when attempting to 
employ them as evidence for the tyrants’ armed supporters. Many of the later sources 
were written at a time when the contracting of mercenaries was a formalised process 
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 On the followers and hetairoi of Homeric basileis van Wees (2004) 95, writes: ‘Leading men 
competed among themselves for followers, and those who agreed to serve under them did so on the 
basis of kinship or friendship, or as a favour, or because they were afraid to say no.’ These comments 
would be equally relevant if applied to Archaic tyrants.  
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sometimes carried out by the state and when it had crystallised into a standard trope 
of tyranny. No Archaic source attributes bodyguards to tyrants, although the tyrants’ 
links with military leadership are very strong. It is therefore worth investigating 
precisely how Archaic tyrants collected military support and what were the identities 
of these supporters.  
Tyrants could find military allies through well-established social practices 
found in the Homeric poems, such as the practice of guest-friendship.
332 Aristagoras, 
a relation of Histiaeus, tyrant of Miletus, was offered the rule of Naxos by certain 
citizens who had been driven off the island, on the understanding that he would help 
them return. Their request implies that they hoped for military assistance from 
Aristagoras. Herodotus explains that the Naxians had gone to Miletus to request aid 
because Histiaeus was their xenos (Hdt. 5.30). The exiles must have initially 
expected some form of support from Histiaeus based on their xenia relationship. 
Isagoras too would have been established as tyrant of Athens through armed force, 
namely that of the Spartans and their allies, had the campaign succeeded. The 
Spartan king in command of the expedition, Cleomenes, was Isagoras’ xenos (Hdt. 
5.70, 74). For these individuals the practice of guest-friendship produced 
considerable military support which could play a critical role in bringing them to 
power. The same process of course occurs in Homer, where xenoi bring significant 
military aid to the Trojan side.  
Greek tyrants are often said to have made use of mercenaries, but the exact 
nature and status of their armed supporters is often ambiguous. ‘Mercenary’ is a 
problematic term to apply to the soldiers of early Greek tyrants as it entails modern 
prejudices and assumptions and it also ignores the nuanced and variable ways tyrants 
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 Xenoi appear as military allies in the Iliad, e.g.: Il. 13.660-661; 17.150. 
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and eighth-century rulers gathered military support. ‘Mercenary’ also implies that 
the tyrants were doing something militarily innovative, as there is no proof that 
mercenaries are found in Homer. In the Iliad the allies of the Trojans are referred to 
as epikouroi and the soldiers and allies of early tyrants are also sometimes referred to 
as epikouroi.
333
 Interestingly, Hector explains in very clear terms how these 
epikouroi are given gifts and food despite their leaders’ existing links to the ruling 
family of Troy through marriage or guest-friendship.
334
 The epikouroi of the Iliad 
are not mercenaries fighting purely for pay, but neither are they depicted serving 
Troy through a formal alliance or simple goodwill. Sarpedon for example, while 
calling himself an epikouros of Troy, was also a xenos and a hetairos of Hector.
335
 
The Trojan epikouroi were not allies operating without any other connection with the 
rulers of Troy, but were linked to the ruling family of Troy through various social 
practices. Likewise, we are told that Tydeus travelled to Mycenae in his capacity as a 
xenos to ask for epikouroi to fight with him against Thebes (Il. 376-379).
336
 Homeric 
epikouroi therefore chose to fight in another’s conflict, and were not warriors driven 
into foreign military service by desperation or penury, or even through political 
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 van Wees (2004) 71, on epikouroi: ‘The word epikouroi was used from Homer to the fifth century 
for various kinds of foreign soldiers brought in to help fight a war. It included both allies 
(symmachoi), i.e. troops sent publicly by another state, and private forces which did not represent a 
state and were called volunteers (ethelontai) or, if they served for an agreed wage, mercenaries 
(misthophoroi).’  Cf. Lavelle (1989) 36: ‘Invariably in Homer’s Iliad, the word ἐπικουρος means 
‘ally’, never ‘mercenary’, and that, or more precisely, ‘fight(er) alongside (or ‘on behalf of’) must be 
the original sense of the root. Ἐπικουρ- came also to denote ‘fight(er) for pay’ from the time when 
Carian and Ionian epikouroi accepted Psammetichos’ promises of rewards for service with him in 
Egypt. The original sense of epikour- was nevertheless retained through the fifth century. See also 
Carty (2015) 149, who believes Archaic epikouroi to have broadly been ‘soldiers in foreign military 
service.’  
334
 τὰ φρονέων δώροισι κατατρύχω καὶ ἐδωδῇ λαούς, ὑμέτερον δὲ ἑκάστου θυμὸν ἀέξω (Il. 17.225-
226). Hektor begins the speech by calling the Trojan allies epikouroi (Il. 17.220). 
335
 Trundle (2004) 4, unequivocally and correctly states that there are no mercenaries in Homer, and 
that the Homeric term epikouros does not mean ‘mercenary’. 
336
 This particular instance may support the comments of van Wees (2013) 23: ‘Whether the wage 
was paid in kind, bullion or coin, the transaction was contractual and differed fundamentally from a 
‘reciprocal’ transaction in which a service was performed voluntarily or as a favour for a beneficiary 
who might or might not reciprocate with a gift or counter-favour at his own discretion. In Homer and 
Hesiod, contractual service for a ‘wage’ was the norm for hired labour but exceptional in the public 
domain, where reciprocal relations prevailed, as we have seen.’ 
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exile. Individuals of great wealth and status, such as Priam, speak freely of having 
once fought as an epikouros (Il. 3.188). 
An epikouros in the Iliad appears to have been a warrior who fought beside 
or on behalf of another,
337
 who probably had an existing relationship with his ‘ally’ 
characterised by a significant social practice such as guest-friendship. This epikouros 
might very well expect to be given valuable gifts and be maintained at his ally’s 
expense.
338
 The eighth or seventh-century poet Archilochus writes of being called an 
epikouros ‘like a Carian’ (Archil. 216 [West]). Kaplan believes that this fragment is 
the earliest example of the word epikouros being used to mean ‘mercenary’.339 In a 
separate fragment the poet also writes of earning his wine and bread by his spear 
(Archil. 2 [West]). The poet does not clarify this metaphor but, as he calls himself an 
epikouros elsewhere, it is not unreasonable to suggest Archilochus is referring to 
receiving sustenance through the same practice as the Trojan epikouroi. It is difficult 
to accept Kaplan’s conclusion as accurate. First because Archilochus’ comments are 
quite vague and therefore difficult to interpret in isolation, and second because they 
bear a closer resemblance, if taken literally, to the Homeric practice of service in 
exchange for food and drink, than any other.  
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 Archilochus makes clear the point that an epikouros was a warrior in a short but revealing 
fragment. ‘Glaucus, an epikouros is a philos for just so long as he’s prepared to fight.’ (Archilochus. 
15 [West, adapted]. A man’s friend might be called a philos, but when the philos fought for or with 
his friend he might be termed an epikouros.  
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 The origins of epikouroi, as indicated by Homer, are not particularly complex. They were 
encouraged to fight for their ally by the social practices that had established a relationship between 
them and the material rewards of plunder and gifts. Luraghi (2006) 22, is therefore correct to point out 
that the origin of Archaic Greek ‘mercenaries’, as Luraghi calls the epikouroi, was certainly not to be 
found in a ‘socio-economic crisis’. Luraghi is also correct to point out that Archaic Greek 
‘mercenaries’ were not an ‘elite phenomenon’ (e.g. Niemeier (2001) 24) as there is no evidence to 
support the view that Homeric warriors were drawn exclusively from the elite. However, Luraghi 
(2006) 23, also argues that epikouroi had to disguise the ‘mercenary’ nature of their service by using 
terms such as epikouros and xenos. This is doubtful because there is no indication in Homer that 
epikouroi were shamed or socially inferior because of their service to another, and because the 
Homeric epikouroi and the poet Archilochus received gifts, not a wage like a hired labourer. The 
Trojan epikouroi are also hetairoi, xenoi, or linked to Priam’s family by marriage, grounding their 
alliance with him in socially acceptable and highly respected practices.  
339
 Kaplan (2002) 233. 
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The epikouroi of the Archaic tyrants appear to have been a continuation of 
the Homeric practice.
340
 We are told that Polycrates maintained a large force of hired 
soldiers and archers. Herodotus made a distinction between the various elements of 
this force, naming them as epikouroi misthotoi and archers (ἐπίκουροί τε μισθωτοὶ 
καὶ τοξόται) (Hdt. 3.45). A misthotos was a hired man who earned wages, implying 
that these soldiers were perhaps deserving of the name ‘mercenary’. Before 
assuming that Herodotus presents evidence for Archaic mercenaries we must 
acknowledge that the distinction between epikouroi and misthotoi in Herodotus is 
not a clear one.
341
 When Pactyes assembled soldiers Herodotus states that he, among 
other things, ‘hired’ epikouroi, using the verb related to the noun misthotos (Hdt. 
1.154). This is problematic because no Homeric epikouros receives a steady, agreed-
upon wage of money. Furthermore, when Herodotus writes that Miltiades assembled 
five hundred epikouroi immediately upon arrival in the Chersonese (Hdt. 6.39), 
Herodotus uses the participle βόσκων, meaning literally to feed or nourish, when 
referring to Miltiades relationship with these soldiers. That Miltiades maintained 
these men at his own expense is therefore apparent and mirrors exactly Hector’s 
delivery of gifts and food to the Trojan epikouroi and Archilochus’ statement that he 
received bread and wine through his spear. However the exact status and background 
of Miltiades’ soldiers remains unclear in Herodotus. The Ionians and Carians in the 
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 Trundle (2004) 5, states that: ‘The tyrants were the first Greek employers of mercenaries. They 
used hired men to gain power, as bodyguards and as instruments to maintain their regimes. As we 
shall see, the mercenary and the tyrant often went hand-in-hand in the Greek world.’ This view of the 
early Greek tyrant’s military power as purely ‘mercenary’ oversimplifies their methods of gaining 
military support. It also gives a false impression of their supporters as fighting purely for pay, rather 
than on the basis of connections founded on traditional social practices, as this chapter shows. Most 
importantly, this view does not address the continuity of these practices from Homeric to Archaic 
Greece. The sources that do refer to Archaic tyrant’s soldiers as mercenaries, as hired men, are late-
fifth century or later.  
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 Carty (2015) 147, 155-165, has a more radical view of Polycrates’ epikouroi, positing that they 
may have been slaves taken in raids and compelled to fight or exported to Egypt to serve essentially 
as slave-soldiers. Carty’s argument is ingenious but relies heavily on certain interpretations of the 
sources rather than explicit evidence. Carty also does not take into account the evidence of the Trojan 
epikouroi from the Iliad, where the leaders of these warriors are explicitly linked to the ruling family 
through socials practices such as marriage and guest-friendship.  
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service of Psammetticus of Egypt were epikouroi, but Psammetticus was said to have 
brought them into his service by making them great promises, implying that he 
offered them something substantial but Herodotus is not specific (Hdt. 2.152). 
Herodotus’ picture of epikouroi is further confused by the fact that the term is often 
absent on occasions when our assumptions about civil war and factional strife might 
lead us to expect to encounter hired, or at least allied, military support. Arcesilaus 
was able to collect soldiers for his cause in Samos by offering the recruits land, 
effectively ‘buying’ their support. This tactic was successful and Arcesilaus was able 
to gather a large stratos (army) (Hdt. 4.163). Onesilus seized Salamis from his 
brother with the support of his stasiotes (Hdt. 5.104). It is extremely difficult to 
prove the existence of any transition between the recruiting methods of the basileis 
and those of the Archaic tyrants in Herodotus.  
Herodotus, writing in the late fifth century, lived in a time when foreign 
soldiers could be paid monetary wages to fight in another’s war, such as the 
misthophoroi who were hired by the Athenians for the campaign in Sicily and who 
Thucydides believed came for the sake of profit (kerdos) (Thuc. 7.57). Herodotus’ 
ambiguous use of epikouros and misthotos is most likely caused by Herodotus 
confusing the older practice of receiving one’s guest-friends and relatives as 
epikouroi, giving them appropriate gifts and feeding them, with the later fifth-
century practice of hiring foreign soldiers for a wage as was certainly practised at 
this time. As Homeric and Archaic epikouroi received gifts and food from their ally, 
it would be not be unreasonable to suggest that later writers, such as Herodotus, 
might have mistaken the Homeric and Archaic practice of gift-giving and providing 
sustenance for the payment of a mercenary wage. Schaps has argued that Herodotus 
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had very limited knowledge of forms of exchange before the invention of coinage,
342
 
supporting the idea that Herodotus may have misunderstood the earlier practice.  
Several scholars have attempted to link the appearance of coinage in Greece 
with the appearance of the first tyrants, particularly to their use of military force.
343
 
Kraay, for example, claims that Pisistratus would have needed coins in order to pay 
his ‘mercenaries’ from Argos and Thessaly,344 although Kraay also argues for a 
broad date of c.575-525 for the appearance of the so-called ‘Wappenmünzen’ in 
Athens, a date that reaches back several decades before the rise of Pisistratus.
345
 
Subsequently Kroll and Waggoner argued against the ‘high’ dates for the earliest 
coins of Athens, Aegina and Corinth that were originally based on the testimony of 
Plutarch’s Solon and The Constitution of the Athenians.346 Basing their conclusions 
on the archaeological evidence rather than post-Classical testimonies Kroll and 
Waggoner arrived at a date of c.550 for the earliest coinage of Athens.
347
 Drews has 
also claimed that Archaic tyrants were rulers brought to power by hoplite epikouroi 
paid in the newly invented coins, but this idea cannot be correct. The previous 
chapter showed that the phalanx formation, where warriors held fixed positions, was 
unknown in the seventh century. Drews’ speculative remark that the hoplite 
epikouroi could now be hired with the newly invented coinage does not consider the 
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 Schaps (2003) 111: ‘As we have seen in his story of Rhodopis, Herodotus was unaware that iron 
spits had ever been used as a medium of exchange. By the mid-fifth century and probably well before 
that, market trade implied coins.’ 
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 Cook (1958) 261, suggested that the reason behind the creation of coinage in Lydia may have been 
to pay the Lydian king’s mercenaries who received the coins as bullion but then circulated them as 
money. 
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 Kraay (1976) 59. It is unlikely that the Argives or Thessalians who supported the Pisistratids were 
‘mercenaries’. Pleket (1969) 26, also calls the Argive supporters of Pisistratus ‘mercenaries’. We are 
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 Kraay (1962) 417. Wallace (1962) 417, argued for a later date ‘soon after the middle of the sixth 
century’. 
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fact that the Trojan epikouroi were already being given gifts of valuables and food, 
and seem to have been well satisfied.
348
 Seaford has noted that there is no coinage in 
the Homeric poems, but in his seven characteristics of early Greek money there is no 
substantial discussion of the use of other forms of wealth to pay for military support 
in the Homeric period.
349
 As with the Homeric period, there is no firm evidence that 
in Archaic Greece tyranny, military support and coined money went hand in hand. In 
fact the evidence from Homeric poetry suggests that the accumulation and 
sustenance of military support functioned perfectly well without coined money. The 
revolutionary nature of coinage is vulnerable to being overstated, particularly in 
regard to payment for military service. Kinzl, for example, suggested that the newly 
minted coins enabled sixth-century farmers to save a little money to buy food during 
bad agricultural years and that this had a stabilising effect on the society.
350
 This 
kind of exchange, involving surplus precious metals, valuables or craft goods for 
foodstuffs, is already well attested in Homer. The Phoenicians in the Odyssey 
exchange trinkets for a large amount of biotos (Od. 15.456) and a woman is 
described earning a misthos for her children by working at the loom (Il. 12.433-435), 
presumably exchanging her products for the means of living. Odysseus, in disguise, 
claimed that he collected enough ktemata (goods or possessions) to feed his 
successors for ten generations, so large was the amount of keimelia collected (Od. 
19.293-295). Again we see that other forms of wealth, including treasure items 
(keimelia), could be exchanged for the essentials of life. Giving the phenomenon of 
early Greek coinage any substantial role in the rise of seventh and sixth-century 
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 Kinzl (1979) 313: ‘Ferner darf wohl angenommen werden, daß die nun beginnende Verbreitung 
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Greek tyrants is simply unnecessary and stretches the available evidence beyond any 
tolerable limits.     
In a more recent work Schaps is sceptical that coinage was created in Greece 
to pay hired soldiers, but still speculates that the force assembled by Pisistratus for 
his third coup may have included many ‘mercenaries’.351 As we have seen, it is 
unlikely that the bands of warriors who supported basileis and tyrants were true 
mercenaries. Furthermore, we should not begin with the assumption that Archaic 
warriors were necessarily paid in coined money. The terms misthotoi and 
misthophoroi have often been taken to mean that these men received a wage of 
coined money. However, in the Iliad, where no coins are present whatsoever, a 
woman labours at her weaving to provide a misthos for her children (Il. 12.433-435), 
and Apollo and Poseidon work for Laomedon for a misthos (Il. 21.441-457). 
Interestingly Hector offers the chariots and horses of Achilles to the man who 
reconnoitres the Achaian camp. Hector calls this a ‘great gift’ and a misthos (Il. 
10.303-312). Hector offers the misthos in return for a favour, in this case the 
collecting of intelligence, and the misthos takes the form of a very expensive and 
highly prestigious gift. There is no hint whatsoever that Hector is doing anything 
other than honouring a useful friend with a gift according to the norms of reciprocity 
and largesse. Dolon merely asks that Hector swear to Zeus that he will stand by his 
promise to give him the horses and chariot, never implying that he is in any way a 
‘mercenary’ or that he is upset at being associated with the term misthos.  
The evidence above suggests that it is unnecessary to create a sudden and 
absolute transition from the Homeric practice of supplying soldiers in return for gifts 
and favours to the later practice of contracting mercenaries for a wage, particularly a 
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wage of coins, at least not in the Archaic period. The support of Homeric epikouroi 
was not secured through an agreed-upon wage of coins. Instead the relationship 
between epikouroi and their allies was based on the ties created by various social 
practices. The epikouroi of Homer simply did not need to be paid a wage of coins as 
gifts of food and valuables, often including a share of the booty, appear to have been 
perfectly acceptable recompense for their services. In Homeric and Archaic Greece 
coinage was not necessary to secure military support although in Classical and post-
Classical times it may, as with any transaction, have helped to facilitate it. 
 Although many of the epikouroi cited above were rewarded with something, 
referring to them simply as mercenaries ignores the contexts in which the term 
epikouros appears and the many social practices already binding the various parties 
together.
352
 Considering that the epikouroi of the eighth-century were allies partially 
secured through standard practices like guest friendship and marriage, yet still 
received gifts of valuables and could be maintained at their host’s expense, it is 
probably unnecessary to create a sharp definition between ‘ally’ and ‘mercenary’ 
when investigating the Archaic epikouroi in the service of tyrants. In fact the 
evidence actively discourages it. As noted by Singor, ‘As for the epikouroi, its 
meaning is ambiguous, for even “allies” must often be fed and maintained by those 
in whose service they appear.’353 The use of armed supporters continued to be a 
significant tool for tyrants or those aiming at tyranny, with military support largely 
found through traditional practices and personal relationships. There is little or no 
evidence in the Archaic sources for purely mercenary support, nor is there evidence 
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for hoplite or other class-based forms of military support for tyrants. By 
accumulating followers and allies, military prestige, and killing rivals and opponents 
the Archaic tyrants did not depart from the practices of the previous centuries 
presented in the Homeric poems. 
 
b) Religious practice 
Many Archaic tyrants were remembered for actively engaging with religious 
practices,
354
 with Delphi and Olympia being particular recipients of luxurious 
offerings. Micythus, left as ruler of Rhegium by the tyrant Anaxilaus, dedicated 
statues at Delphi (Hdt. 7.170-171).
355
 Polykrates dedicated the entire island of 
Rhenea to Apollo (Hdt. 1.13) and built temples (Arist. Pol. 5.1313b). Gyges was 
remembered for the gold and silver offerings he sent to Delphi (Hdt. 1.14). Cypselus 
built a treasury at Delphi, later rededicated as the treasury of the Corinthians (Hdt. 
1.14, Plut. De Pyth. 13). One of the members of the powerful Orthagorid family,
356
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 Descent from gods and heroes has been claimed, in very general terms, to be a method of 
legitimising the rule of tyrants. For example Mitchell (2013) 58: ‘Proof of heroism was possible by 
proving descent from gods or heroes.’ Mitchell states that proving one’s heroism showed that one 
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benefits of claiming descent from a god or hero? If this phenomenon is to be cited as a method by 
which basileis and tyrants took power then explicit examples of leaders gaining armed supporters, 
collecting wealth and encouraging popular support specifically through heroic or divine descent are 
necessary.  
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(1995) works on sanctuaries and Greek religion contain no chapters or subsections on tyrants. This is 
partly because the links between tyrants and religious legitimacy are generally interpreted cynically as 
pure propaganda rather than as sincere participation with contemporary religious customs. This is the 
view adopted by Morgan (1990) 5: ‘At least for the purposes of assessing sanctuary investment, 
however, tyrants are better regarded as representatives  of a particular experiment in state ordering 
rather than as leading individuals, since their actions in promoting civic building schemes reveal a 
close practical identification with the poleis they ruled, whatever their underlying personal motives.’ 
The problem with this interpretation is that it overlooks the practical need of tyrants, and of Homeric 
basileis, to ensure the safety and prosperity of their community through giving appropriate gifts to the 
gods.  
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 The precise dating and genealogy of the Orthagorid family is almost impossible to discern due to 
incomplete and contradictory sources. Attempts to make sense of them and apply some form of 
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whose most famous representative is Cleisthenes the tyrant of Sicyon, may have 
built a treasury at Olympia. The dedicator is named Myron and called a tyrant by 
Pausanias although it is unclear if this was a seventh-century individual or a later 
member of the family (Paus. 6.19.1-2).
357
 The expensive dedications of Cypselus at 
Delphi and Olympia are also mentioned by the philosophers (Arist. Pol. 5.1313b; Pl. 
Phdr. 236.b) and by a number of later writers (Plut. De Pyth. 13; Agaklytos FGrH 
411F1; Strab. 8.20; Paus. 5.2.3). Aristotle wrote that Cypselus imposed a tithe on the 
property of the Corinthians amounting to a tenth part taken on an annual basis. He 
then dedicated this wealth to Zeus to fulfil an oath he had made ([Arist.] Oec. 1346a-
1346b). Although the anecdote told by Aristotle about Cypselus’ tithe is bizarre and 
almost certainly apocryphal, a community-wide collection of goods initiated by the 
ruler for the purposes of sacrifice is attested in Homer (Od. 3.4-8) and also in 
Herodotus (Hdt. 1.50).   
Pausanias claims to have seen a horn dedicated by Miltiades son of Cimon, 
the first of his family to be tyrant in the Chersonese (Paus. 6.19). Theagenes of 
Megara was, in later times, believed to have built the altar to Achelous in the city 
(Paus. 1.41). Alyattes, a descendent of Gyges and ruler of Lydia, built temples to 
Athena (Hdt. 1.22) and made a gift of a silver bowl to the sanctuary at Delphi (Hdt. 
1.25).
358
 Herodotus wrote that Croesus made huge sacrifices of animals and objects 
to the gods, as well as compelling every Lydian to offer sacrifice (Hdt. 1.50). 
Croesus’ dedications at Delphi included gold and silver, women’s ornaments and 
clothing, and weapons (Hdt. 1.51-2, 54, 92). Herodotus writes that Maeandrius, who 
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became tyrant of Samos after the murder of Polycrates, dedicated Polycrates’ 
furniture in the temple of Hera (Hdt. 3.123). As well as advertising the giver’s piety 
to the community and visitors to the temple or sanctuary, the dedicating of objects 
was done to elicit a reciprocal response from the god, as well as to give thanks or 
fulfil an oath.
359
 Although these dedications won praise and helped establish 
legitimacy within the tyrant’s own polis, the fact that so many were prominently 
displayed at Olympia and Delphi suggests that the tyrants were also interested in 
winning praise and establishing legitimacy abroad.  
In addition to being enthusiastic patrons of sanctuaries tyrants actively 
engaged with religious ritual. Pheidon of Argos may have seized control of the 
contests at Olympia, overseeing them in place of the Eleans (Hdt. 6.127).
360
 Grinnus, 
the basileus of Thera, travelled to Delphi to sacrifice victims on behalf of his polis 
(Hdt. 4.150). Like the Homeric basileis Grinnus is seen conspicuously sacrificing for 
his community. Although he is not called a tyrant by Herodotus he is clearly the 
ruler of the community, taking charge of religious affairs and possessing the 
authority to organise and command an expedition of settlers. By building temples 
and other dedications to the gods tyrants continued the practices of the Homeric 
basileis. By using their wealth and power to ensure that the community enjoyed the 
favour of the gods through their offerings they offered a unique service to their 
people. Several rulers, Grinnus of Thera and the Pisistratids (see below) are also 
mentioned offering sacrifice specifically on behalf of their community, giving these 
rulers an opportunity to distribute wealth and honour the gods. Shapiro has stated 
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 Pheidon is called a tyrant by Herodotus but, as noted by Kinzl (1979) 299: ‘Herodots 
Bemerkungen sollten auch nicht dahingehend ausgedeutet werden, daß Pheidon wegen des 
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Herodotus calling him a tyrant. Interference in the traditional rites is not listed in Herodotus’ clearest 
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that ‘The reason why temples were the medium through which tyrants advertised 
their wealth and power is obvious and has nothing to do with piety.’361 While 
Shapiro is probably correct to point out that religious practice, particularly temple 
building, certainly showed a tyrant’s wealth and power, this view presents a picture 
of Archaic Greece where rulers cynically exploit the piety of their apparently docile 
people entirely for quick political profit and expediency. This view does not fit at all 
with Homeric and Hesiodic concerns over maintaining the favour of the gods (Il. 
16.386-388, Od. 18.483-487; Hes. Op. 130-139). These poems clearly present the 
importance of propitiating the gods with gifts and observing customary rituals. This 
is done in order that the community would be safe and prosperous through receiving 
the gods’ favour. Conversely denying the gods their gifts and failing to practice and 
uphold accepted religious norms brought down the anger of the gods upon the entire 
community. The god’s punishment could take the form, among other things, of 
failing crops, disease or barren women. Temples were therefore as necessary for the 
community as the houses and walls of the city, as shown by Nausithoos who built 
the temples on Phaiakia as a matter of course upon founding the settlement (Od. 
7.10). By using their wealth and influence to build temples the tyrants performed an 
important and lasting service to the community by encouraging its prosperity and 
averting the anger of the gods. Herodotus describes the Lydian Alyattes, a member 
of the Mermnadae who had usurped the tyranny from the Heraclids, building two 
temples to Athena at Assesus. He did this because his health was failing after 
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accidentally burning down the original temple of Athena. It is implied that by 
building two new temples Alyattes appeased the anger of the goddess (Hdt. 1.19-22). 
This instance recalls the crew of Odysseus offering a temple to Helios to make 
amends for offending him by slaughtering his cattle (Od. 12.345). For rulers so 
obviously concerned with maintaining popular support, the observance of religious 
custom would have played a key role in maintaining the popularity of a tyrant and in 
justifying the tyrant’s position at the head of the community. If the tyrant could 
provide the largest and most impressive sacrifices in a highly conspicuous manner 
this could only have increased his legitimacy by linking his rule with the continued 
prosperity of his subjects.
362
    
 It is remarkable how many Archaic rulers received oracular predictions of 
their rule or at least attracted traditions of (often favourable or at least ambiguous) 
prophecies during or after their lifetimes. One scholar has commented that ‘We 
should not see in the oracles or portents recorded by Herodotus…anything more than 
the reflection of popular interest in oracles and superstition.’363 Despite the high 
probability that many of the oracles recorded by Herodotus represent an oral 
tradition they should not be ignored when studying early tyranny. It is, of course, not 
possible to prove that the oracles represent a historical record, as opposed to an oral 
tradition formed over time. Some bear the hallmarks of folk-stories, containing 
moral warnings, coincidental meetings and predetermined outcomes. It is, however, 
worth noting that the oracles in the Homeric poems perform specific functions, often 
giving direction to the community, legitimacy to rulers and boosting communal 
morale. Divinely inspired predictions appear in the Homeric poems and contributed 
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directly to the legitimacy of certain basileis. Telemachus, for example, is told 
explicitly that his family will rule Ithaka forever by Theoclymenus (Od. 15.531-534). 
Agamemnon is also told in a dream that the gods have granted that he will conquer 
Troy. Although Zeus is deceiving him Agamemnon does not doubt the divine 
message (Il. 2.1-34). Both prophecies confirm the actions of their subjects and, 
explicitly in the case of Agamemnon, legitimise violence against their enemies. If 
such practices occurred and had meaning in the late eighth century, there is no 
reason to believe they were not practised or lacked meaning in the seventh or the 
sixth century for the same reasons. While the accounts of oracles may not represent 
an accurate historical record of rituals or events, it is probable that they represent a 
long-standing tradition of oracular pronouncements, given the societal function 
performed by the oracles in the Homeric poems, and the political function of the 
oracles for the later tyrants. Marking the oracles of Herodotus, or other sources, as 
totally fictional and historically useless also ignores the obviously positive 
relationship between many tyrants and sanctuaries such as Delphi. This relationship 
is best evidenced by the literary and archaeological record of the tyrants’ many 
offerings. Finally, when we investigate the relationship of tyrants to oracles a broad 
pattern of evidence emerges which is difficult to dismiss. Far too many tyrants are 
associated with oracles for these prophecies to be an elaborate fabrication. If the 
surviving accounts of oracles from Homer to the fourth century were mere poetic or 
literary tropes, this would have required a faithful reproduction of these tropes over a 
period of at least four hundred years in order to produce the body of oracles which 
have survived. Furthermore, the use of oracles to secure divine sanction and 
guidance for state actions has been well established by several scholars, particularly 
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Neer.
364
 This is not to say that the personages and events contained in stories of 
oracles should always be accepted as historical. As with oral poetry, folklore rarely 
records events accurately, but still acts as a repository of practises understood by 
contemporary audiences. Dismissing tyrannical associations with oracles as folklore 
also requires us to assume that tyrants did not wish to make use of this obviously 
effective tool that not only provided legitimacy but genuinely assisted the 
community by revealing the gods’ will.  
Cylon attempted his coup after receiving an oracle promising him the tyranny 
of Athens provided he performed the correct actions at the correct time. Cylon, 
however, misinterpreted the oracle, instigated his coup at the wrong time and the 
attempt failed (Hdt. 5.71; Thuc. 1.126; Plut. Solon. 12).
365
 The Heraclid tyrants of 
Lydia had their power confirmed by an oracle (Hdt. 1.7),
366
 as did Gyges when he 
came to power (Hdt. 1.13). One of the most interesting examples is that of Cypselus 
of Corinth. His rule of Corinth was prophesied by the oracle at Delphi and has 
attracted a great deal of scholarly debate (Hdt. 5.92b, 92e).
367
 There are three 
oracular pronouncements in Herodotus concerning Cypselus and although there is no 
general agreement about the date or historicity of the Cypselid oracles they do fit 
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into the broader association of Homeric and Archaic rulers with oracles.
368
 
Furthermore they confirmed Cypselus in his position and predicted the destruction of 
his enemies just like the oracles given to Agamemnon and Telemachus in the 
Homeric poems. Battus of Cyrene also received the approval of the oracle at Delphi 
that confirmed him and his family in their power (Hdt. 4.155). His descendant 
Arcesilaus also had his power reaffirmed by the oracle at Delphi (Hdt. 4.163). 
Miltiades received oracular support for his leadership of the Dolonci while still 
living under the rule of the Pisistratids (Hdt. 6.34). With so many Archaic tyrants 
receiving favourable oracles it is clear that the approval of the gods was actively 
sought by these men and for a significant reason.  
 For an explanation of this phenomenon we must turn to the society that 
predates the tyrants. Much of the scholarship that discusses the Cypselid oracles, for 
example, does not discuss the Homeric use of manteis and of prophecy to lend 
religious legitimacy to the ruler’s position and behaviour. The prophecies given to 
Homeric basileis confirmed their families in positions of power and legitimised 
violence against their enemies. The oracles, manteis or messages contained in 
dreams or in other mundane circumstances revealed the gods’ will or gave warnings 
to avoid impending disasters. Possessing this knowledge confirmed the actions and 
statuses of rulers (Il. 2.300-332) or future rulers such as Telemachus (Od. 15.531-
534). As we have seen, many of the prophetic statements made regarding Archaic 
tyrants do precisely the same. The fact that Homeric poetry depicts tangible benefits 
in engaging with oracles and prophecies for Homeric rulers should help question a 
move to dismiss the Archaic oracles regarding tyrants as pure propaganda or pure 
fiction. When the significance of oracles as a means to gain popular support for 
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tyrants has been acknowledged by scholars they have generally viewed it as an 
attempt by a usurper and illegal ruler to excuse his dominant position in the polis. 
One scholar has taken this view in acknowledging the practical value of oracles to 
tyrants, stating that ‘Tyrannical power was, by definition, extra-legal, yet tyrants 
commonly attempted to enhance their popularity by presenting their rule as a 
desirable departure from the previous order; if they did consult Delphi, they may 
therefore have sought deliberately to present the responses as different and special 
also.’369 This view perhaps misses the key issue of continuity between the practices 
of the Homeric basileis and the Archaic tyrants. The rule of an Archaic tyrant was 
neither innovative, as it’s form was several centuries old, nor a departure from 
another form of rule but that of the rule of law.  
 
c) Wealth 
There are no census records for Archaic Greece, no tax receipts or assessments that 
can reveal precisely how wealthy tyrants and their families were or from what 
sources they created wealth. However, archaeological and literary evidence suggests 
many Archaic tyrants or potential tyrants were very wealthy individuals. Personal 
wealth was after all required to employ many of the methods required to gain and 
maintain power, such as collecting soldiers, establishing friendships with other 
powerful men and arranging marriage alliances.
370
 It was also needed for less 
obvious methods of constructing power such as hosting games, distributing largesse, 
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building temples, offering sacrifice and providing expensive offerings for 
sanctuaries. Many tyrants also attracted striking anecdotes that revolved around the 
extent of their personal wealth or their avarice, suggesting a popular association of 
tyranny with riches.  
 Gyges and Croesus were proverbially wealthy tyrants, giving away expensive 
gifts and generating anecdotes focused on their fantastic wealth (Hdt. 1.14, 6.125). 
Cylon and Miltiades the son of Cypselus were both Olympic victors (Hdt. 5.71, 6.35, 
39), suggesting they were wealthy individuals with the means to patronise the 
games. Cleisthenes of Sicyon is associated with extensive consumption of wealth in 
the form of food and drink consumed at feasts and items of treasure given away as 
gifts (Hdt. 6.129-130). Cleisthenes of Sicyon was also believed to have won a 
chariot race by several later sources (Pausanias. 7.6-7; Diod. Sic. 8.19). Miltiades 
was able to afford to maintain five hundred men once he had established himself 
securely in the Chersonese (Hdt. 6.39).  Herodotus wrote that Cypselus had seized 
the property of his enemies upon coming to power (Hdt. 5.92e). Cypselus of Corinth 
may have also levied a tithe on the populace ([Arist.] Oec. 22.1). Archilochus 
famously associated great wealth with tyranny (Archil. 19 [West]), as does the 
poetry of Solon (Solon. 33 [West]). Tyrants could also gain large amounts of booty 
through their position as military leaders, often investing the profits in acts of 
generosity or sacred dedications.
371
 In order to become a tyrant private wealth was 
clearly necessary to engage in the various practices and methods that increased the 
individual’s power. Being a tyrant also seems to have led to an increase in private 
wealth, with Polycrates, Maeandrius and Gelon all becoming very wealthy, or 
                                                          
371
 As noted by Burkert (1996) 25: ‘Gods legitimate war, with its rapid changes of wealth, and the 
outcome is temple-building. Successful wars would most easily bring the necessary amount of riches 
at a stroke, the surplus to be transformed into a lasting monument.’   
191 
 
notably wealthier, after becoming tyrant, suggesting a correlation between one’s 
position as tyrant and one’s ability to accumulate wealth. As the interests of ancient 
authors lay elsewhere, precisely how this happened is generally not clear, although a 
theory will be suggested in the section about the administration of justice below.  
 
d) Friends and family 
Hornblower has called Thucydides’ statement that Minos appointed his sons to 
govern the islands of the Cyclades an anachronism, stating that it is ‘borrowed from 
the age of tyrants’.372 While there is no single ‘age of tyrants’ the comparison 
between the legendary Minos’ use of his sons as rules and the behaviour of the 
Greek tyrants is apt. Archaic tyrants were certainly quick to call upon the services of 
friends and family in time of need. They employed them as councillors, supporters, 
soldiers, public figures and political agents. If they had the power they could also set 
them up as rulers in their own right, extending this favour to friends and allies as 
well as relatives. Using friends and family in the context of gaining and maintaining 
power was not an innovative action in the Archaic period. The basileis depicted in 
Homer had already been making extensive use of relations and guest friends as a 
matter of course, turning to their relations for assistance, even as military muscle or 
assassins, sometimes employing them in perilous circumstances. Polycrates initially 
divided the rule of Samos between himself and his two brothers (Hdt. 3.39), but also 
attempted to build useful relationships with individuals beyond his immediate 
family, exchanging presents with Amasis of Egypt (Hdt. 2.182).
373
 A positive 
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relationship between Periander and the kingdom of Lydia may also have existed.
374
 
Periander supposedly sent three hundred boys, presumably enslaved individuals, to 
Alyattes to be castrated (Hdt. 3.48), and at least some of the dedications of the 
Lydian kings at Delphi were placed in the treasury of Cypselus, later the treasury of 
the Corinthians (Hdt. 1.14). Histiaeus of Miletus had also maintained guest-
friendships with an unspecified number of the leading men of Naxos (Hdt. 5.30). 
Herodotus explicitly states that Terillus of Himera received armed support from the 
Carthaginians because of his guest-friendship with their king (Hdt. 7.165). After 
resolving their war, Thrasybulus and Alyattes made a point of becoming xenoi (Hdt. 
1.22). In Herodotus’ tale of the rise of Deioces at the meeting of the Medes 
Herodotus suggests that it was the ‘friends’ (philoi) of Deioces who dominated the 
meeting, and by extension had a hand in the suggestion that the Medes create a 
monarch. Herodotus clearly expected that a man’s philoi would have a role in 
elevating him to power (Hdt. 1.97-98). This is seen most clearly when Cylon’s 
hetairoi assist him in his coup. Although we hear next to nothing of support from 
Cylon’s immediate family, Thucydides implies that Cylon was supported in person 
by his brother who later escaped with him from the Acropolis (Thuc. 1.126). As well 
as using friends and supporters as allies, a number of Archaic tyrants were placed in 
their positions by a more powerful friend or relative. Some Ionian tyrants were 
supported by the Persian king or his satraps (Hdt. 4.137-138; 5.11, 23; 5.94; 7.156), 
while others, such as Lygdamis of Naxos, were given places to rule by another 
friendly tyrant (Hdt. 1.64). Herodotus writes that Theomestor was rewarded with the 
tyranny of Samos for his military service to the king of Persia (Hdt. 8.85). Before he 
was murdered, Lycophron was given the rule of Corinth by his father Periander, who 
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would in turn have transferred himself to and ruled Corcyra (Hdt. 3.53). The careful 
use of friends, family and established contacts as agents and subordinates helped 
protect the ruler’s position by granting authority or important tasks to individuals 
whose loyalty was fairly secure. 
 
e) Marriage 
Many significant marriages are mentioned by the sources in relation to Archaic 
tyranny. As Dreher notes, regarding tyrants’ wives and female relatives the sources 
only mention some of the women immediately associated with significant tyrants, 
saying little or nothing about the rest.
375
 Despite the scarcity of evidence there are 
important social and political factors involved in tyrant marriages. Before c.650 a 
favourable marriage in Homeric Greece could lead to upward social mobility, large 
transfers of wealth, military support and an increase in personal prestige and status. 
We will see that these marriages continued to bring all of these benefits, including 
significant military assistance at times of peril, for the tyrants concerned.
376
 
Although Herodotus was uncertain as to the truth of the story, he noted that 
Pausanias of Sparta was betrothed to the daughter of Megabates, a cousin of Darius, 
because Pausanias had a desire to become tyrant of Greece (Hdt. 5.32). Herodotus 
might have doubted the story, but marriage as a stepping stone to power and 
eventually tyranny was not, as shall be shown, an unusual occurrence. A number of 
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marriages between tyrant families and other powerful families or rulers are 
mentioned in passing by the sources. An Egyptian Pharaoh might have married one 
of the daughters of the Battiad family of Cyrene (Hdt. 2.181). Cleisthenes of Sicyon 
married his daughter to Megacles son of Alcmaeon (Hdt. 6.130). This must have 
been a useful marriage for Cleisthenes as the Alcmaeonids were a large and wealthy 
family with many followers and adherents. In the sixth century they had the strength 
to drive out the rival Pisistratid family. Miltiades son of Cimon secured his rule of 
the Chersonese partly by marrying Hegesipyle, the daughter of a neighbouring 
Thracian king (Hdt. 6.39). Herodotus mentions this event in the context of steps 
taken by Miltiades to secure his rule, implying that this marriage was a conscious 
decision taken by Miltiades to cement that position.
377
 Periander married the 
daughter of Procles the tyrant of Epidaurus (Hdt. 3.50). Anaxilaus, tyrant of 
Rhegium, secured aid for Terillus, tyrant of Himera, because he had married 
Terillus’ daughter (Hdt. 7.165). The Athenian Cylon had married the daughter of 
Theagenes, tyrant of Megara, and had received some military aid from Theagenes 
during his attempt to seize control of Athens (Thuc. 1.126). The extent of military 
aid given to relations by marriage suggests that there was strong political or social 
pressure for rulers to support their relations. This translated into effective and 
substantial military support, as seen in the Iliad where relations by marriage assist 
each other on the battlefield and where promises of a favourable marriage are used to 
secure military support. 
 
f) Justice 
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The concept of tyrants as lawgivers and political and legal innovators has been 
argued by several scholars. This view of Archaic tyranny is attractive because it 
appears to support the theory that presents tyrants as social revolutionaries, creating 
a neat evolution of Greek government from kings and aristocracies through to 
tyrannies, oligarchies and the ultimate goal of democracy.
378
 It can also be easily 
married to theories of economic and social crises in the Archaic polis, with the tyrant 
depicted as either a product of or the solution to these crises. In reality the evidence 
for tyrants and the administration of justice suggests, as we shall see, a further 
continuation of Homeric practices.  
Many anecdotes preserving sayings or stories that exhibit the tyrant’s fairness 
or wisdom have been preserved alongside traditions that named tyrants as great 
legislators. However, these stories must be approached with an element of caution. 
The traditions of justice and fairness that are attributed to many Archaic tyrants of 
the seventh and sixth centuries have caused the tyrants to be described as reformers 
and lawgivers by several generations of scholars. These historians emphasise the 
novelty of the tyrant’s position and claim that the tyrant represented a force for 
reform or revolution. This, however, is an incorrect interpretation. As has been 
shown tyrants were not brought to power by social or economic crises. On the 
contrary, tyrants appear to have engaged with the features of the rule of law as long 
as these features served their interests. Even Dionysius, often depicted as the most 
sordid of tyrants, maintained the assembly at Syracuse, putting critical decisions 
regarding war and peace to the vote (Diod. Sic. 14.45). What the evidence suggests 
is that the traditions of justice and lawgiving that surround some early tyrants 
actually reflect continuity, not revolution. There are recognisable and sophisticated 
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concepts of justice and fairness operating in Greece from the eighth century 
onwards. Archaic tyrants were not the first individuals to offer Greek communities 
justice and order in return for wealth and authority. The Homeric basileis were doing 
this well before 650. We also know that the basileis were able to accumulate wealth, 
popularity and power through the administration of justice. The tyrants did not 
depart from this. What really seems to have occurred is that from the seventh century 
the tyrants kept maintaining order and conspicuously administering justice in the 
same manner as the Homeric basileis.
379
  
A number of traditions of justice have survived regarding Archaic tyrants.
380
 
Aristotle believed Pittacus was elected as aisymnetes in Mytilene to combat civil 
discord (Arist. Pol. 3.1285a) and the Athenian Constitution states that Pheidon of 
Argos introduced a system of weights ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 10.2). Herodotus reported 
that Cleisthenes personally altered the tribal system of Sicyon (Hdt. 5.67). In later 
times Pittacus, Periander and Pisistratus were named among the Seven Sages of 
Greece (Plat. Prot. 342a; Diog. Laert. 1.13). Carty has argued that Polycrates’ father, 
and perhaps Polycrates himself, held key magistracies before Polycrates became 
tyrant.
381
 In the fourth century Cleisthenes of Sicyon was remembered by some as 
having cared for the interests of his people and of being moderate and for 
scrupulously observing the laws (Arist. Pol. 5.1315b). Herodotus links the popularity 
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of the Egyptian king Mycerinus’ rule with his conspicuous fairness. Mycerinus was 
known to him for reintroducing the Egyptians’ ancestral religious customs and for 
resolving disputes in a remarkably fair manner (Hdt. 2.129). Cadmus of Cos, despite 
receiving an apparently secure tyranny from his father, gave up the tyranny there 
from his own sense of dikaiosune, writes Herodotus, although he seems to have gone 
on to rule the town of Zancle (Hdt. 7.164). Such was Cadmus’ reputation for justice 
and reliability that he was trusted with a great deal of gold by the tyrant Gelon to 
hand over to Delphi or to Xerxes as he thought appropriate (Hdt. 7.163-164). One of 
the oracles associated with Cypselus predicts that he will δικαιώσει Corinth (Hdt. 
5.92b). δικαιώσει has been translated by scholars in various ways, such as ‘chastise’, 
‘punish’ and ‘bring justice to’.382 The verb appears in other contexts in Herodotus to 
mean ‘punish’ or to think something to be ‘just’ or ‘right’. For example, 
Psammeticus was not ‘punished’ with death by his former allies (Hdt. 2.151) and 
Deioces has offenders ‘punished’ (Hdt. 1.100). The word is also used by Herodotus 
in religious contexts regarding the proper ways to behave towards the gods (Hdt. 
2.47, 4.186, 6.182). The word is therefore closely connected to punishment and also 
to the perception of what is considered ‘proper’ or ‘right’. So in the context of the 
Cypselid prophecy the verb most likely means to ‘chastise’ or ‘punish’ Corinth. 
Given that the oracle talks of the monarchoi of Corinth and from Theognis, Solon 
and Herodotus we know that monarchoi are tyrannical and lawless, ‘punish’ would 
fit the context. The poetry of Theognis and Solon also blames the citizens for setting 
up tyrants, expecting them to suffer for it in the long term in an environment of 
violence and lawlessness. Solon implies the citizens deserve the inevitable 
oppression for their greed and stupidity (Solon. 4, 11 [West]). Theognis is quite 
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explicit about this too, expecting to be among those chastised (Theog. 39-52 [West]). 
A reasonable interpretation of dikaiosei would be that Cypselus will ‘punish’ 
Corinth. This may very well mean the tyrannical monarchoi, the foolish citizens or 
both parties. Despite the doubts of several scholars regarding the historicity of the 
Cypselus oracles there are reasonable grounds for suggesting that Cypselus was 
associated with the administration of justice at least after his lifetime. First because 
oracular pronouncements were not uncommonly associated with Archaic rulers. and 
second because of the strong links between Homer and Archaic rulers and the 
administration of justice. Parker points out the similarities between the oracle that 
claims that Cypselus will ‘bring justice to’ Corinth and the fragment of Theognis in 
which the poet fears the arrival of an andra euthuntēra who will correct the hybris of 
the city (Theog. 39-40 [West]).
383
  A euthuntēr is one who corrects, straightens or 
chastises. Theognis links this man and the chaos in his city with the arrival of 
monarchoi, and this is no contradiction. Deioces of course set out to become tyrant 
by behaving in a just way, and Herodotus nowhere asserts that Deioces was not a 
just man. We shall see that being a tyrant was no barrier to using the administration 
of justice to secure one’s power.  
 The administration of justice was another method through which Archaic 
tyrants could, like the Homeric basileis, construct and justify their power. The 
Homeric basileis even accumulated wealth in return for maintaining order and 
dispensing justice. Hesiod made predictable complaints against this system, liable as 
it was to abuse and corruption. As noted in the previous chapter, Near Eastern kings 
administered their own laws and used them to create an image of themselves as just 
and deserving rulers, and their inscriptions focus on justifying the ruler’s position 
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rather than explaining the procedural details of his laws. Although one might 
speculate that the anecdotes and traditions showing the justice of early tyrants imply 
they employed this method, this would remain speculation had not several Greek 
writers been aware that this practice was sinister in nature. Solon and Herodotus 
observed that a reputation for justice was not enough to justify wielding sole power. 
Herodotus’ story of Deioces the Mede, who seized his tyranny by establishing a 
reputation as a just man (Hdt. 1.96-102), and Solon’s awareness that some would 
criticise him for not using his position to become tyrant (Solon. 32-3 [West]), reveal 
a sixth and fifth-century suspicion that individuals might exploit the administration 
of justice to take power. A ruler who conspicuously displayed his fairness and 
justice, receiving the community’s approval was not novel. Yet Solon and Herodotus 
not only regarded a single man administering the laws with deep suspicion, but 
interpreted such a powerful position as tyranny. This suspicion is repeated by 
Herodotus during the Persian constitutional debate in Book 3. Darius, himself 
wanting to become king, of course suggests monarchy as the future government of 
the Persians. Darius explains that the monarch will inevitably be the man who puts 
down disorder and the associations of evil men who harm the public good (Hdt. 
3.80). This particularly cynical episode represents a movement away from the Greek 
acceptance of just sole-rulers, as depicted in Homer, towards a suspicious and fearful 
attitude towards unrestrained monarchy, regardless of the monarch’s personal 
attitude to justice. It should not be particularly surprising that Aristotle, writing in the 
fourth century, should have associated the office of aisymnetes so closely with 
tyranny and monarchy (Arist. Pol. 3.1285a).
384
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g) Cultivating popular support 
The methods and practices discussed above were often deployed to cultivate popular 
support for the ruler among the community. This explains the importance of hosting 
and participation in games.
385
 Cylon was said to have been an Olympic victor (Hdt. 
5.71; Thuc. 1.126). Pantares, the father of the tyrants Cleandrus and Hippocrates, 
may have won an Olympic victory in the late sixth century (Hdt. 7.154; cf. IvO 142). 
Cimon won victories in the chariot races on several occasions before being 
murdered, possibly by the sons of Pisistratus. Miltiades, son of Cimon, had also won 
an Olympic victory before he became a tyrant in the Chersonese (Hdt. 6.36).  
Victory in the games not only displayed the skill of the victor, it showed the 
victor’s wealth (and his willingness to be generous and pious with that wealth), his 
positive relationship with the gods and a clutch of impressive virtues. Thucydides 
has Alcibiades assure the Athenians of his public spirit and trustworthiness by 
claiming that his victories at the Olympic games showed the glory and power of 
Athens to the rest of the Greeks (Thuc. 6.16.1-2). Victory in the games brought 
praise and admiration to the victor at home. The view that games were an 
opportunity to illustrate the pious use of wealth is supported by the fact that the 
games were a part of the honours due to the gods and heroes, and victors 
traditionally made expensive dedications to the gods. The poetry of Pindar and 
Bacchylides also supports the view that victory helped prove that the victor held the 
gods’ favour. The pious use of wealth and the ability to prove that one was a 
recipient of the gods’ favour were both important phenomena in the rule of the 
Homeric basileis. As Chapter I showed, the basileis gained popularity and prestige 
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from hosting and administering games and secured prosperity and security for 
themselves and their communities by honouring the gods with gifts. A problem 
emerges when it is ambiguously claimed that victory in the games immediately 
translated into political power. This is the view maintained by Mitchell; that a ruler 
or potential ruler needed to display suitably heroic characteristics to justify their rule 
and therefore the games were an ideal opportunity to give a ‘repeated expression of 
their aretē.’386 While this may be correct, broadly speaking, Mitchell does not 
explain what tangible benefits arose for the victor.
387
 Mitchell states that 
‘Panhellenic victories also obviously had an on-going importance for rulers in 
maintaining the ideological basis of their rule…’.388 This misinterprets the 
motivation for taking part in games as no Archaic source unequivocally portrays 
tyranny as a positive phenomenon or attributes to it a socially acceptable ideology of 
rulership.
389
 Furthermore the rule-of-law ideology that emerged throughout Greece 
from around 650 was uncompromising in its hostility to sole rulers. There was 
simply no ‘ideological basis’ for Archaic tyrants to maintain. Instead the benefits of 
victory in the games must have been, to a wealthy Greek ruler, specific and tangible.  
The Archaic demos, like the Homeric community of the late eighth century, 
was not a silent body incapable of coordinated action or of defending itself.
390
 A 
number of scholars have described the Archaic populace as such or largely ignored 
them in their studies. Singor, for example, depicts large numbers of Archaic 
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 Mitchell (2013) 71.  
387
 Mitchell (2013) 69-73.  
388
 Mitchell (2013) 71.  
389
 With the possible exception of the epinician poetry of Pindar and Bacchylides, but even these 
sources are somewhat ambiguous toward tyranny, never praising the phenomenon itself as a form of 
rule.  
390
 This has been noted by van Wees (2008) 38: ‘it is a mistake to picture early Greek assemblies as 
wholly powerless, no more than a token audience for elite decision-making.’  
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Athenians as militarily incompetent and poorly armed, if armed at all.
391
 Yet Athens 
alone provides a number of instances where the community actively and successfully 
defended itself against tyranny. When Cylon seized the Acropolis of Athens during 
the later half of the seventh century Herodotus describes the opposition that thwarted 
his attempt as the public officials that represented the community.
392
 Herodotus even 
names the specific officials that he believed handled the situation as the prytaneis of 
the naukraroi (Hdt. 5.71).
393
 Cylon was not opposed and defeated by another rival 
family or by a specific social class. Thucydides also writes that ‘the Athenians’ came 
together to oppose Cylon and that the siege of the Acropolis was managed by public 
officials, in this case he writes that it was the archons who lead the resistance (Thuc. 
1.126). Pisistratus’ third attempt to become tyrant was opposed by those of ‘the 
Athenians’ who did not join with him (Hdt. 1.62). After being appointed archon in 
508 Isagoras was set up as tyrant by Cleomenes of Sparta (Hdt. 5.74). After seizing 
the Acropolis with his supporters and allies, Isagoras was besieged by ‘the 
Athenians’ who had united behind the boule to resist him (Hdt. 5.72). This kind of 
popular opposition implies the need for strong popular support for existing and 
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 Singor (2000) 110, claims: ‘ What role the lower classes could play in a serious war is not 
immediately clear, but one can presume that in times of emergency they could be called up to fight 
with what weapons were at hand: stones and sticks.’ The idea of a docile and militarily inept Archaic 
populace has proven tenacious. A number of scholars believe that the Archaic population, particularly 
the ‘lower classes’ or ‘the poor’ had no part to play in the politics of the Archaic polis. This is the 
view adopted, for example, by Anderson (2005) 178: ‘Early poleis were…oligarchies, and politics 
would remain essentially an elite preserve down to the late archaic era.’  This view persists in the 
most recent scholarship. Mitchell (2013) 61, writes: ‘While previous scholarship had thought that the 
politics of the archaic tyrannoi was based on popular support, it has become increasingly clear that the 
object of elite politics was not the rest of the community but other members of the elite.’ This is not 
the view of this thesis, and there is no need to presume that the majority of the Archaic population 
played no part in war and therefore could not play a decisive role in resisting tyranny. The free 
population was already playing a central role in combat in the late eighth century. The majority of the 
Ithakan assembly, composed of the free men of the community, seizes their arms when they are 
encouraged to kill Odysseus, for example. 
392
 For some discussion on the dating of Cylon’s coup see Hornblower (1991) 204.  
393
 Thucydides describes the officials who dealt with Cylon as the nine archons (Thuc. 1.126). The 
two accounts therefore differ in the exact identity of the public officials who lead the resistance to 
Cylon. See Hornblower (1991) 209.  
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potential tyrants.
394
 The Athenian community of the seventh and sixth centuries had 
both the inclination and the means to defend itself against individuals attempting to 
seize power, supporting the evidence of Theognis and Solon that suggests the 
existence of an Archaic prejudice against the rule of one man and undermining the 
theory that battling over the question of tyranny was the preserve of the elite. The 
Athenians were even led by their public officials who, in each case, appear to have 
responded to the threat of tyranny with alacrity. Tyrants were resisted by the Archaic 
and Classical Greek communities because, as discussed in the previous chapter, they 
were inevitably placed above the law and consequently the property and persons of 
the citizens of the polis were not safe under their rule. A sole ruler also contradicted 
almost every single aspect of the rule-of-law ideology which had spread throughout 
the Greek world from the seventh century and which was staunchly advocated by 
Solon’s poetry and praised by Herodotus.395  
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 The attempts by the populace, or at least by a significant proportion of the populace, to resist 
tyranny at Athens clearly contradict the theory advocated by some scholars that tyranny was the 
product of Greek ‘aristocrats’ struggling against each other for supremacy, with no, or only token, 
participation from the general populace. The example of Athens, and the ultimate fate of several 
tyrants, also contradicts the theory that tyranny was, in a general sense, morally or politically 
ambiguous to the Greeks, attracting praise and blame in equal measure. Both of these theories are 
suggested by de Libero (1996) 32, commenting on Solon. 33[West]: ‘Die Ambivalenz des Tyrannis-
Begriffes in Athen wird an diesem Fragment besonders deutlich: Während sich τυραννίς bei Solon in 
ihrem negativen Sinn offenbart al seine egozentrische, dem Gemeinwesen schädliche Herrschaft, wird 
sie bei einigen athenischen Aristokraten zu einer erstrebenswerten, von den Göttern gewärten 
Vorrangstellung, die unermeßlichen Reichtum verheißt. Unklar bleibt aber hier, auf welchem Weg 
sich die neuen Tyrannen ihre ersehnten Schätze zu beschaffen gedachten.’ 
 Der Tyrannis-Begriff, der auch bei Solon in der Monarchia sein Synonym besitzt, ist im 
Athen des frühen 6.Jahrhunderts v.Chr. weder einseitig positive noch negative ausgeprägt. Gegner 
wie Befürworter der Tyrannis verwenden gleichermaßen den Terminus in Verbindung mit den ihnen 
genehmen Assoziationen.’ There are several problems with de Libero’s view. Firstly, Solon never 
implies that tyranny was being sought after exclusively by ‘aristocrats’. Solon’s poetry associates 
tyranny with greed, as in Solon. fr. 33 [West], and violence (Solon 9, 32 [West]) but never includes 
class based connotations. Secondly, while de Libero is correct to state that the term turannis could be 
used by individuals in certain situations and with associations they found suitable, Solon’s warnings 
against greed and violence, found also in Theognis and more generally in Hesiod, prevent us from 
concluding that tyranny, as described by Solon’s poetry, was an ambiguous term. Solon’s poetry 
uncompromisingly describes tyranny as devastatingly harmful to the community.  
395
 Some scholars have overlooked the essential threat posed by the tyrant to the free community of 
the polis and the simple fact that the tyrant simply circumvented the careful system of political checks 
and balances introduced to Greece c.650 as key reasons for conflict between communities and tyrants. 
Instead, resistance to tyranny is too often attributed to a nebulous ‘elite’ or a largely anonymous 
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 Other tyrants found themselves in difficulty when they lost popular support 
or incurred the anger and resentment of their people, one had the gates of his city 
shut in his face by his former subjects before being wounded and driven away (Hdt. 
6.5). Consequently Archaic tyrants were concerned with encouraging and 
maintaining popular support. Chapter I discussed that the Homeric basileis not only 
feared losing the support of their people but feared their anger and resentment.
396
 
Their conspicuous involvement in religious ritual and the administration of justice 
was partly encouraged by the desire to maintain the support of their community. 
Therefore attempts by Archaic tyrants to create and maintain popular support were 
neither novel nor necessarily about soliciting the aid of the mob, but were necessary 
to secure their position at the head of the community.  
 
 
II 
 By looking at a broad picture of Archaic tyranny it has been shown that certain 
methods were used by tyrants and prospective tyrants to gain power during the 
Archaic period. These methods have thus far not departed from those employed by 
the Homeric basileis, suggesting continuity between the behaviour of Homeric and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
clique of ‘aristocrats’ whose supposedly ferociously competitive nature compelled them into violent 
conflict with tyrants. For example Mitchell (2013) 15, writes: ‘It was certainly the case that, across 
the Greek world, rule by one man, or rule by one man and his family , did not sit easily in a political 
culture that was competitive and which also had a strong egalitarian ethos, particularly among the 
political elite.’ The problem with this view it that is does not consider the conflict between tyranny 
and the rule-of-law ideology or acknowledge the fact that no Archaic source ever characterises 
resistance to tyranny as class based.  
396
 White (1955) 1, claims: ‘The earliest tyrants were not demagogues for the simple reason that there 
was as yet no demos upon whose shoulders they could rise.’ While White is correct to state that early 
tyrants were not demagogues, the above claim does not consider the evidence of Homer or Archaic 
poetry, which not only suggests the presence of an Archaic demos, but one that was capable of action. 
This view does not see the connections between tyrants and the need to cultivate popular support.  
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Archaic rulers. Essentially, the Archaic tyrants retained the substance of Homeric 
practices but many, as we shall see, adopted some of the outward trappings of the 
rule-of-law ideology. We will now turn to the Pisistratids of Athens as a case study. 
Pisistratus and his family will be examined because the historical record for their 
rule is more complete than that of any other Archaic tyrant, and in this record 
Pisistratus and his family can be seen making use of all the methods described 
above. Furthermore, the Pisistratids are regularly discussed by scholars attempting to 
summarise the broader phenomenon of tyranny and have been continuously 
associated with the flawed theories of Archaic economic and social crises.  
There is also little scholarly consensus regarding the means and methods by 
which Pisistratus took power and attempts to move towards this have been hampered 
by widespread and firmly entrenched misconceptions regarding Archaic society.
397
 
This problem has been compounded by the fact that scholarship has preferred to 
study the supposed periods of reform immediately before and after the period of 
Pisistratid rule rather than the tyranny itself.
398
 When the Pisistratids themselves 
have been studied, a large amount of scholarship has focused on attempting to link 
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 E.g. Andrewes (1956) 106: ‘The two older parties [of Pisistratus] had probably a similar local and 
personal structure: they may have been divided by principle also, the one claiming and the other 
resisting the benefit of Solon’s reform, but this view of them should be supported not so much by the 
names of the parties as by the character of the Alcmeonidae and the actions of Megacles, and the 
probability that Lycurgus belonged to the older nobility.’ Andrewes’ approach to the nature of the 
supporters of Pisistratus and his rivals is hampered by his failure to recognise the tyrant’s acute need 
for popular support and for allies who had to be acquired through marriage or some other social 
practice. It is a view which also subscribes to the false idea of an Archaic ‘noble’ or ‘aristocratic’ 
class battling against the legal and social changes of the seventh and sixth centuries. Some of these 
ideas were also adopted by Mossé (1969) 61, who characterised the parties of Megacles and Lycurgus 
as aristocratic factions and links the party of Pisistratus with the demos: ‘Ainsi en face des deuz 
factions aristocratiques dont les assises sociales, sinon géographiques, étaient identiques, le parti de 
Pisistrate s’identifait avec le demos.’ The problem with this approach to Pisistratus is that it directs 
attention away from the tangible and quite traditional methods he and his family used to gain power, 
for which there is evidence that can be contextualised with further Homeric and Archaic examples, 
and instead directs scholarly attention towards social and economic phenomena for which there is no 
firm evidence.  
398
 As noted by Frost (1985) 57: ‘The Peisistratid period on the other hand is often viewed as a 
betrayal of the promising development of democracy. The causes of tyranny have been declared more 
significant than anything that went on during that tyranny and the regime in general was seen through 
Aristotelian eyes as a mere phase occurring between aristocratic and democratic polities.’  
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the family to specific territories within and outside Attica, instead of the methods 
they used to gain power or their behaviour when in power. This section will show 
that their methods of gaining and maintaining power did not depart from those of the 
eighth-century basileis or their Archaic contemporaries.
399
  
Discerning the relationship between the Pisistratids and the Athenians is 
absolutely critical in order to discover the methods by which they took and held 
power. Following this approach, as Kinzl astutely observes, will only have historical 
significance if we can divide the Archaic realities and useful information from the 
anachronisms of the surviving sources.
400
 The various problems with the sources on 
Archaic tyranny are just as acute regarding the Pisistratids of Athens.
401
 Pisistratus 
and his family ruled Athens for a long period of time, although the exact chronology 
of the three periods of Pisistratid rule is confused and still uncertain. The main 
accounts of Pisistratid rule, found in Herodotus, Thucydides and The Constitution of 
the Athenians, do not agree chronologically.
402
 Regarding the dates of Pisistratus’ 
three coups and the periods of exile they give different periods of time, suggesting 
either ignorance or differing sources. Furthermore, almost a century separates the 
earliest accounts of Pisistratid rule, Herodotus and Thucydides, from the expulsion 
of Hippias in 511/0, leading to the problems that historical distance entails and the 
kind of confusion regarding the facts that Thucydides describes and attempts to 
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 See Andrewes (1956) 107-113, for an outdated but still useful account of how Pisistratus 
maintained his power. 
400
 Kinzl (1979) 310: ‘Ein solcher Versuch kann jedoch nur dann sinnvoll erscheinen, wenn es uns 
irgendwie gelingt, das Historisch-Faktsiche aus seiner anachronistisch überlagerten Umgebung 
herauszuschälen.’ 
401
 The problems particular to Herodotus’ account (Hdt. 1.59-64), for example, have been noted by the 
commentators: ‘What should have been essentially a chapter on the economic, social, and 
constitutional history of Athens c.560-46BC is reduced in this digression to a series of anecdotes, 
portents, rumours, and strategems bearing upon tyranny.’ Asheri, Lloyd & Corcella (2007) 119. 
402
 Herodotus has generally been considered to contain the most reliable account of the family. E.g. 
Barceló (1993) 161. 
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clarify.
403
 An additional problem is represented by the hostility of the Athenians after 
the expulsion of Hippias to the Pisistratids and tyranny in general. It is possible to 
interpret later Athenian sources on the Pisistratids as apologies for collaboration with 
the tyrants and attempts to distance the Athenians from the Pisistratids. This has 
made a number of historians sceptical regarding the validity of the sources on the 
Pisistratid tyranny. This should not, however, influence the records of the methods 
they used to take power as these, as we shall see, continue to conform entirely to the 
behaviour of their contemporaries and Homeric predecessors.  
 The Pisistratid family and their supporters were associated with several 
regions of Attica
404
 and the Pisistratids probably owned property abroad in northern 
Greece
405
 and possibly in Sigaeum. At the centre of the family were Pisistratus and 
his legitimate sons Hippias and Hipparchus. Two other sons of Pisistratus are 
attested in the sources. These are Hegesistratus, called a nothos by Herodotus (Hdt. 
5.94), and Thessalus. These were believed to be the younger brothers by Thucydides 
(Thuc. 1.20). The author of The Constitution of the Athenians wrote that 
Hegesistratus and Thessalus were in fact the same person, one name being merely a 
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 See Flament (2010) 6-20, for a discussion of the chronology of the Pisistratid tyranny presented in 
The Constitution of the Athenians.  
404
 French (1959) 57, concluded that Pisistratus had a local area of support. French also cited the now 
outdated theories of economic crisis and reform as a source of support for Pisistratus within the city of 
Athens itself. A more recent article by Goušchin (1999) 18, regarding Pisistratus’ leadership of the 
‘hillmen’, illustrates the persistence of the idea that the factions struggling for supremacy in Attica at 
this time must have been class-based: ‘It does not matter that Herodotus keeps silence of Pisistratus’ 
appointment. Herodotus (and A.P. as well) labels Pisistratus as prostas. It was enough for him and for 
his readers to understand that the Diakrioi (Hyperakrioi in Herodotus’ work) were not an aristocratic 
faction. They were a political group which appeared as a result of the mutual agreement of Pisistratus 
and the demos. Pisistratus had to promulgate his democratic (or demagogic) programme in order to 
become the people’s leader. Although we hear nothing of it, Pisistratus must have had such a 
programme. Herodotus hints at its existence when he says that Pisistratus was prostas in word only: 
he considers Pisistratus’ programme to be a trick.’ Goušchin’s comments reveal the underlying 
weakness of this position. By relying on the anachronistic Athenaion Politeia, ignoring the 
conspicuous absence of class-based support for tyranny in Solon and Herodotus and assuming that 
Pisistratus at least claimed to be ideologically motivated, a misleading picture of Athenian tyranny 
has been created. This view ignores the oldest evidence for Athenian tyranny and imposes fourth 
century political assumptions on an Archaic world where they simply did not exist.  
405
 For a discussion of some of Pisistratus’ activity in northern Greece see Cole (1975) 42-44.   
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nickname, and names a further son of Pisistratus as Iophon ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 17). 
Thessalus is named by Thucydides among the gnesioi of Pisistratus (Thuc. 6.55). 
Beyond Hippias and Hipparchus the record of Pisistratus’ sons is clearly confused. 
Pisistratus was probably married at least three times and it is unclear whether he 
remarried after his previous wife’s death or practised polygamy. The family enjoyed 
friendly relations with other Greek poleis and powerful families, most notably with 
Argos, Thessaly, and Eretria. Pisistratus was supported by Lygdamis of Naxos and 
the Pisistratid family, headed now by Hippias, are called the xenoi of the 
Lacedaemonians on no fewer than three occasions by Herodotus (Hdt. 5.63, 90, 91). 
The Pisistratids also had friends and supporters within Attica and the city of Athens 
itself. The level of support for Pisistratus within Attica is particularly hard to discern 
due to the hostility of the Athenians to tyranny after the exile of Hippias; however, 
some information can be gleaned from Herodotus and Thucydides. Pisistratus 
himself appears to have been a man of wealth and had led Athenian soldiers against 
Megara with great success. He must have made himself very popular in Athens and 
Attica as large numbers of Athenians had not only acquiesced to his rule on three 
separate occasions but actually assisted him in his three bids for the tyranny. The 
sources mention geographically defined areas of support for Pisistratus
406
 and 
sympathetic Athenians leaving the city to join Pisistratus’ army before the battle of 
Pallene. This fact becomes more significant when we consider that, in the seventh 
century, the population of Athens had come together to resist and defeat Cylon, who 
was himself an Olympic victor.  
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 Sealey (1960) 164, interprets Pisistratus’ geographically defined supporters as his ‘local retainers’. 
Lewis (1963) 36, sees the reforms of Cleisthenes as a deliberate attempt to break up some of these 
areas of local loyalty. 
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a) Warfare 
Despite the fact that we hear of very little violence during the periods of Pisistratid 
rule,
407
 military prestige, military success, the use of violence and armed supporters 
all continued to be used by the family in their pursuit of power. Before any of his 
three attempts to become tyrant Pisistratus already enjoyed the fame and prestige 
won through his military success against Megara (Hdt. 1.59; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
14.1),
408
 although he later added to his reputation by conquering Naxos (Hdt. 1.64) 
and Sigaeum (Hdt. 5.94). When in power Pisistratus and his family successfully 
pursued conflicts on behalf of Athens (Thuc. 6.54). The group of supporters 
mentioned by Herodotus and The Constitution of the Athenians that supposedly 
formed Pisistratus’ third faction against Megacles and Lycurgus is curiously inactive 
in these accounts (Hdt. 1.59; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 13.4).
409
 That Pisistratus held a 
geographically defined area of support is not at all unlikely, but a better gauge of his 
popularity at Athens would be Herodotus’ statement that many Athenians joined 
Pisistratus to fight for him after he invaded Attica via Marathon (Hdt. 1.62). If 
Athenians made up Pisistratus’ band of club-bearers and fought for him at Pallene it 
follows that many could have fought for him and his family in the later wars 
mentioned by Thucydides (Thuc. 6.54). This provides some of the grounds for 
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 The Pisistratid attitude towards the Athenians while in power appears to have generally been one 
of restraint. A notable exception would be the murder of Cimon by Pisistratus’ sons during the reign 
of Hippias (Hdt. 6.103). Unfortunately Herodotus does not specify exactly why Cimon was killed, 
merely stating that it happened. However Cimon’s repeated victories in the four-horse chariot race at 
Olympia suggest that he was wealthy and, considering that Cylon and Pisistratus were Olympic 
victors themselves, viewed as a potential rival by Hippias.  
408
 Kinzl (1979) 308, believes Pisistratus participated in the war with Megara in the official capacity 
of archon polemarchos.  
409
 Attempts to identify Pisistratus’ supporters during his first coup, Herodotus’ hyperakrioi, have 
been severely hampered by the superimposing of classes, particularly a hoplite class, on Archaic 
Athens: E.g. Holladay (1977) 52.  
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dispelling the myth that early tyrants were brought to power and secured their 
position over an unwilling populace with the help of foreign mercenaries.
410
  
The Pisistratids were particularly careful to amass armed support from 
various sources at critical moments. Pisistratus’ particularly consistent success in this 
area not only speaks to his accomplishments as a soldier and his personal popularity 
but also reveals the remarkably diverse practices through which a tyrant could gather 
military support. Pisistratus acquired a band of men armed with clubs 
(korunephoroi)
411
 through a ruse that he used to seize control of Athens for the first 
time in c.561/0
412
 (Hdt. 1.59). Pisistratus was assisted in his third and final coup 
(c.546) by Argive soldiers assembled through his marriage to the Argive woman 
Timonassa (Hdt. 1.61; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 17.4).
413
 These are generally called 
mercenaries by historians. However their status as mercenary troops is debatable. 
The picture is confused by the conflicting nature of the sources. For example, 
Herodotus calls the Argive troops who supported Pisistratus misthotoi (Hdt. 1.61), 
yet the later source on Pisistratus, The Constitution of the Athenians states that these 
Argives came because of friendship (philia) created through Pisistratus’ marriage to 
an Argive woman ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 17.4). The Argives were led by Pisistratus’ son, 
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 E.g. Frost (1984) 291, has written that Pisistratus’ third coup was supported by a mercenary force, 
listing the Eretrians, Naxians and Argives as mercenaries. Cf. Lavelle (2005) 159, regarding the final 
tyranny of Pisistratus: ‘It certainly did not depend on a permanent foreign mercenary force, which 
oppressed the Athenians. This would have been ineffective, and there is no sign whatsoever of its 
existence in any case.’ 
411
 Lavelle (2005) 95-96, doubts the reliability of Herodotus’ account of these men, questioning if 
these were even ‘club-bearers’ at all, given the uselessness of such weapons against conventionally 
armed soldiers. Lavelle does not, however, doubt that Pisistratus had armed supporters at this time.     
412
 The dates for Pisistratus used here are those of Rhodes. For a valuable summary of the source 
material for Pisistratid chronology see Rhodes (1976) 219-233; (1981) 191-199. A similar chronology 
is adopted by Asheri, Lloyd and Corcella. Asheri places the continuous period of Pisistratid rule, from 
the third coup to the expulsion of Hippias, from c.547/6 to 511/10. (2007) 119. Hind (1974) 7-8, 
compiles a number of the chronologies for Pisistratus’ coups and periods of exile that were published 
prior to that of Rhodes. For a summary of the problems inherent in establishing a Pisistratid 
chronology see Ruebel (1973) 125-136. For cunning and trickery as a particular hallmark of tyranny 
see Luraghi (2014) 67-92.  
413
 Note Cawkwell (1995) 73-86, for some of the serious problems with the Athenian Constitution as a 
source for the Pisistratids.  
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Hegisistratus. Hegesistratus was the son of Pisistratus and Timonassa, suggesting 
that these were indeed allies secured through the ties established by marriage and 
friendship. The Constitution of the Athenians also mentions armed support from 
Eretria and Thebes and claims that Pisistratus hired (μισθωσάμενος) soldiers from 
around Pangaeum for his final coup ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.2). Pisistratus was able to 
return to power for the third and final time by defeating the Athenian army at Pallene 
(Hdt. 1.63). Once installed in power Pisistratus continued to cultivate armed support, 
collecting more epikouroi (Hdt. 1.64).
414
 The Pisistratids were later able to call in 
support from the Thessalians against their enemies, also called epikouroi by 
Herodotus (Hdt. 5.63). The sources say nothing more about precisely how the 
Pisistratids built a relationship with the Thessalians, although the point that 
Pisistratus possibly had a son named Thessalus has created some speculation on the 
relationship (Thuc. 1.20; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 18.2; Diod. Sic. 10.17). The attitude of the 
later sources towards Pisistratus’ soldiers was to view them as mercenaries in the 
fourth-century sense: warriors contracted and paid a wage by the government. 
However, a social practice, marriage, lies behind Pisistratus’ ability to recruit the 
substantial body of Argive soldiers for his final coup and in Homer the Trojans give 
their epikouroi food and gifts despite the existing ties of friendship, kinship and 
marriage with their leaders. This makes it unlikely that Pisistratus ever truly relied on 
mercenaries.
415
  
 The Pisistratids also maintained guest-friendships with powerful individuals 
from other poleis including at least one Spartan king. After regretting their ousting of 
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 Thucydides also believed that Hippias appeared in public with doruphoroi (Thuc. 6.57). For an 
informative discussion of the nature of Pisistratus’ epikouroi see Singor (2000) 112-119, and 110-111 
for a useful summary of Pisistratid military activity.  
415
 This is supported by Lavelle (1993a) 10: ‘The men are not mercenaries but allies: allies from 
Thebes, from Naxos, and very probably from Eretria (cf. [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 15.2); partisans from the 
Attic countryside; and the city fighters who answered Pisistratus’ call to arms.’ 
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the Pisistratids the Spartans even attempted to reinstall their xenos, Hippias, to his 
position of tyrant of Athens (Hdt. 5.91). Herman has contextualised such 
relationships within the concept of ritualised friendship. Herman logically concludes 
that the large gifts of wealth and manpower made to Pisistratus and his family by 
their friends only made long-term sense if they expected some form of 
reciprocation.
416
 This is particularly significant for figures like Lygdamis of Naxos 
or the men who led contingents allied with the Pisistratids, such as the Thessalians or 
even the Spartan king.
417
 These relationships were crucial to the Pisistratid cause 
because these individuals headed large numbers of followers and had access to 
substantial resources. Pisistratus’ private property and his ability to collect more 
wealth through his friends and personal connections enabled him to secure military 
support by giving him the ability to maintain epikouroi who had to be fed and 
rewarded with wealth in one form or another. Pisistratus certainly collected military 
support through conventional methods such as marriage, personal connections and 
distributing private wealth. It is not unreasonable to suggest that the later sources 
may be confusing these practices with the purchasing of mercenary troops.
418
   
 
b)   Wealth 
Many Archaic tyrants or potential tyrants were wealthy individuals. Personal wealth 
was required to use many of the methods required to take power, such as maintaining 
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 Herman (1987) 92: ‘Ritualised friends heading entire social units bestowed favours on each other 
relying on the probability that when the need arose the favours would be repaid.’  
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 Lavelle (1993b) 109-110, is one of the few scholars to argue that Pisistratus’ epikouroi were not 
‘mercenaries’. Lavelle (1993b) 110-111, also cites four separate sources which imply that the tyrant’s 
doryphoroi were Athenians, not foreign mercenaries. These include Aristophanes’ Knights (11. 448-
449), in which Paphlagon’s grandfather is said to have been one of the doryphoroi, and Herodotus, in 
which Pisistratus is given a guard of club-bearers from the Athenian assembly (Hdt. 1.59). Cf. Lavelle 
(2005) 95-96. 
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soldiers, establishing friendships with other powerful men, and arranging marriage 
alliances with influential families. Wealth was also needed for less overt methods of 
constructing power such as distributing largesse, building temples, offering sacrifice 
and providing expensive offerings for sanctuaries.
419
 The careful use of wealth was 
absolutely crucial to Pisistratus’ rise to power. As pointed out by Lavelle, Herodotus 
seems to be at pains to emphasise the significance of wealth to Pisistratus’ cause, 
repeatedly mentioning wealth, particularly chremata or variations of the word (Hdt. 
1.61-62).
420
 The Pisistratids were able to maintain varying numbers of armed men 
and construct temples and buy dedications for the gods.
421
 To afford any of these 
Pisistratus and his family must have had access to large amounts of wealth. This 
wealth came from a number of sources. Pisistratus almost certainly owned estates in 
Attica itself as his property (chremata) was substantial enough to be noted by 
Herodotus as being put up for sale during his exile (Hdt. 6.121).
422
 The 
geographically defined area of support for Pisistratus also suggests that he possessed 
land in that specific region. The Pisistratids probably owned property around the 
river Strymon in northern Greece as they were able to gather revenue (chremata) 
from there during their exile (Hdt. 1.64).
423
 Their rule over other regions beyond 
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 Lavelle (2005) 143, has claimed that Pisistratus may have employed his chremata to bribe some 
Athenians to join him before Pallene or at least refuse to fight him. Unfortunately there is no evidence 
for this in the sources and it remains speculation.  
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 Lavelle (2005) 159, makes the claim that Pisistratus simply enriched the Athenians from his own 
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Pisistratus distributing wealth to the Athenians generally or of Hippias doing the same.  
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 Pisistratid power derived from land and agricultural wealth is noted by de Libero (1996) 50: ‘Die 
Familie wird einen durch Einkünfte aus den ländlichen Gütern finanzierten, ihrem ihrem Sozialstatus 
angemessenen Lebensstil gepflegt haben, der sie auch im politischen Bereich aktiv werden ließ.’  
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 It seems unlikely that Pisistratus was harvesting silver and gold from the area around Pangaion. 
The wealth from the northern territories probably came from elsewhere. As stated by Lavelle (1993a) 
6: ‘If appreciable amounts of Thracian gold or silver were continually flowing down to the tyrants at 
Athens from 546, we should expect some commensurate signs of prosperity, especially in the coinage 
of the times. But the signs we have are rather to the contrary: the Wappenmünzen, the so-called 
‘heraldic’ coins of Pisistratus’ final tyranny are relatively few in number, small in denomination, and 
apparently designed for local use and circulation only; they do not bespeak abundance or prosperity, 
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Athens, such as Sigaeum,
424
 may also have provided income through tithes or private 
property, although this must remain speculation. The Pisistratids may have levied 
some form of tithe on the Athenians.
425
 The tithe, as reported by Thucydides and the 
Athenaion Politeia, is a curious phenomenon which is obviously out of place in 
Archaic Greece (Thuc. 6.54; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 16.4). It is, however, a practice firmly 
grounded in the customs of the Homeric world. It appears to have been based on the 
tyrant’s ability to resolve disputes and bring order to the community and will 
therefore be discussed further in the section below on justice. It is important to note 
that one of the reasons that the nature of the Pisistratid tithe has vexed scholars is the 
fact that it blends the public and the private.
426
 Much like the basileis the Pisistratus 
led and brought order to the community and in return collected wealth from the 
public. Consequently the tithe is a problematic phenomenon for a scholarly view that 
sees the severing of the public and private spheres as a crucial development of the 
Archaic period. 
 The Pisistratids also received wealth from friends and supporters. During his 
second exile Pisistratus received gifts (δωτίνας) from poleis that owed him 
something (Hdt. 1.61). Unfortunately Herodotus does not specify precisely why these 
poleis owed Pisistratus, but given the ability of Homeric basileis to collect gifts 
                                                                                                                                                                    
but rather a limited economy and restricted resources of silver even compared with the tyranny after 
Pisistratus.’ 
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 Sigaeum was secure enough for Hippias to flee there when he was driven from Athens in 511/10. 
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 Lavelle (2005) 96-97, is sceptical about the historicity of a such a tithe, citing the political and 
practical implications of collecting such a tax. Lavelle does not, however, draw the comparison 
between this sixth century tithe and the ability of the Homeric basileis to collect valuables and 
agricultural produce from the populace. This overlap in practice, between the Pisistratids and Homeric 
basileis, has already been pointed out by Harris (1997) 103, 107-111. The continuation of this practice 
into the Archaic period would also answer the queries of scholars regarding Solon. fr. 33 and 
precisely how one became wealthy through simply being a tyrant. E.g. de Libero (1996) 32: ‘Unklar 
bleibt aber hier, auf welchem Weg sich die neuen Tyrannen ihre ersehnten Schätze zu beschaffen 
gedachten.’ 
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 As noted by Smith (1989) 63: ‘Herodotus also mentions (Hdt. 1.64) Peisistratos’ revenue from 
property on the Strymon, and it is probable that there was little distinction between taxes officially 
raised and the tyrant’s personal income from various sources.’  
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through various social practices, we should not see anything particularly radical here. 
These contributions were probably the fruit of personal and informal connections as 
Herodotus uses the noun δωτίνη, meaning a gift or present, to describe them and 
Pisistratus was able to acquire them at his own discretion. Unfortunately Herodotus 
only names one of the contributors, Lygdamis, who provided men and chremata. 
The relationship between Pisistratus and Lygdamis appears to have been reciprocal, 
as Pisistratus would later give him the island of Naxos to rule (Hdt. 1.64), further 
supporting the theory that Pisistratus collected gifts through personal connections 
and an element of reciprocity.  
 
c) Religious practice  
Although the evidence for Pisistratid interaction with religion is sparse, the surviving 
sources are telling and indicate that the Pisistratids engaged with religious practices, 
customs and dedicatory sacrifices in the same manner as their Archaic 
contemporaries and Homeric predecessors. Some of the most well-known anecdotes 
about Pisistratus contain elements of religious custom and ritual. Pisistratus 
supposedly paraded into Athens accompanied by an impersonation of the goddess 
Athena (Hdt. 1.60; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 14.4)
427
 and on his final attempt at seizing 
power enjoyed the support of a favourable prophetic utterance from an 
accompanying mantis (Hdt. 1.62-63). This use of a mantis at a moment of crisis is 
already an established practice in the poems of Homer, where they are employed to 
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lend legitimacy to an individual or a cause. Herodotus also recorded a story in which 
he states that a chresmologue named Onomakritos had been a close friend of 
Hipparchus (Hdt. 7.6). Pisistratus later followed the command of an oracle by 
ritually purifying the island of Delos (Hdt. 1.64), showing conspicuous piety and 
presumably going to great personal expense.
428
 These oracles are highly favourable 
towards Pisistratus and scholars have questioned their historicity and original 
purpose. It is impossible to arrive at a definite conclusion for either question 
although the Pisistratid oracles are certainly representative of a much broader 
phenomenon that connected Homeric and Archaic rulers with oracles. Consequently 
it is difficult to accept the theory that the Pisistratid oracles were fabricated as an 
excuse or apology for Athenian collaboration under the tyrants. While it is true that 
Athens was deeply hostile to tyranny after the expulsion of Hippias and, as 
Thucydides noted, collectively confused as to certain details of the tyranny, any 
theory that claims the oracles were revisionist propaganda ignores the long and 
complex tradition of Greek rulers seeking oracular support.
429
 The more positive 
oracles concerning Pisistratus, namely the prophecy made before the battle of 
Pallene and the command to purify Delos, ultimately fulfil the same goals as the 
oracles given to Homeric basileis. The first predicted Pisistratus’ victory, to some 
extent legitimising violence against his enemies, the second provided an opportunity 
to demonstrate piety by obeying the commands of the god concerning one of the 
most important sanctuaries in the Greek world. Pisistratus’ son and successor 
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 Lavelle (1993b) 92: ‘Consequently, the rationale would proceed, the Athenians did not fail at 
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Hippias may have maintained a similar attitude towards the use of oracles as 
Herodotus not only claimed that the Spartans removed written oracles collected on 
the Acropolis by the Pisistratids after they ousted Hippias (Hdt. 5.90), but that 
Hippias himself possessed a ‘precise knowledge’ of certain oracles (Hdt. 5.93).   
 During their rule the Pisistratids took control of all the proper state sacrifices 
(Thuc. 6.54) and placed themselves conspicuously in control of the Panathenaea, 
directing and perhaps appearing in the procession (Thuc. 5.56-57; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
18.3). Diodorus wrote that the daughter of Pisistratus also took part in the procession 
(Diod. Sic. 9.37). As well as engaging in ritual the Pisistratids gave physical 
offerings to the gods. Hippias, grandson of Pisistratus, dedicated the altar of the 
twelve gods in the market place and the altar of Apollo in the Pythium (Thuc. 6.54; 
IG I² 761).
430
 The Pisistratids also worked on the temple of Olympian Zeus ([Arist.] 
Pol. 5.1313b).
431
 Pisistratus and his family carefully observed religious tradition and 
ensured that religious norms continued to be practised of behalf of the community 
when they were in power. They also took a conspicuous part in religious rites, 
visibly connecting themselves with the favour of the gods and consequently the 
safety and prosperity of the polis. 
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 For the Altar of the Twelve Gods see Shapiro (1989) 133-141. Arnush (1995) 135, has suggested 
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d) Marriage 
The practice of marriage was instrumental in securing the power of Pisistratus and 
his family. Pisistratus was able to return to power in 557/6 or 556/5 on the strength 
of an alliance with his former rival Megacles through a marriage to Megacles’ 
daughter (Hdt. 1.60-61). Reconciliation through marriage is a practice already 
attested in Homer, where Agamemnon attempted to secure Achilles’ support and 
resolve their quarrel partly through an offer of marriage. The mother of Hegesistratus 
was probably Timonassa of Argos, although the identity of Pisistratus’ other wives is 
unclear. The identity of the mother of Hippias and Hipparchus is uncertain, although 
Dreher concludes that she was most likely a member of an important Attic family.
432
 
In preparation for his third coup in 546/5 Pisistratus recruited Argive warriors 
through a friendship with the Argives established by marriage to an Argive woman, 
Timonassa (Hdt. 1.61; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 17). For Pisistratus an influential marriage 
carried as much military potential as the marriage alliances of the Homeric basileis. 
Marriage of course produced offspring and relatives whose loyalty was relatively 
secure. Pisistratus and his family made extensive use of their relations in times of 
need. Like the basileis they employed them as councillors, soldiers, public figures 
and political agents. Several of Pisistratus’ descendants may have held the 
archonship at Athens (Thuc. 6.54; SEG 10:352) and Herodotus also tells us that 
Pisistratus set up his son Hegesistratus as tyrant of Sigaeum (Hdt. 5.94).
433
 In both 
instances the tyrant’s children were deliberately placed in positions of power inside 
and outside Athens. Pisistratus’ son Hippias continued to use marriage as a political 
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Spartans in 511/0, the town may have remained under the rule of Hegesistratus at that time.  
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tool, marrying his daughter to Aeantides, the son of Hippocles tyrant of Lampsacus. 
Thucydides attributes the marriage to Hippias’ desire to secure an overseas refuge 
and tap into Hippocles’ influence with the Persian king (Thuc. 6.59). The legitimate 
(gnesioi) sons of Pisistratus inherited his power, while the nothoi and other relatives 
were still put to good use leading soldiers or occupying important positions. 
Hegesistratus, for example, led the Argive soldiers who fought on behalf of 
Pisistratus at the battle of Pallene. Marriage and the relatives it produced were a 
crucial aspect of Pisistratus’ pursuit of power.  
 
 
 
 
e) Justice 
Herodotus mentions that, once in power for the final time, Pisistratus raised revenue 
in Attica (Hdt. 1.64). Thucydides and the Athenian Constitution state that this was a 
percentage tithe on produce (Thuc. 6.54; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 16.4), and the Athenian 
Constitution states that Pisistratus visited the countryside administering justice 
([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 16.5).
434
 It is likely that there was a link between the collection of 
wealth and the ordering of justice in Attica. Pisistratus was concerned with 
conspicuously maintaining order and administering justice, or at the very least in 
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appearing to uphold justice.
435
 This appears to have created for him a reputation for 
justice and moderation that endured after his death. Pisistratus not only observed the 
laws but apparently administered them himself with great fairness (Hdt. 1.59; Thuc. 
6.54; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 16.1,5). A story was circulated in later times that he granted 
tax exemption to a farmer who grumbled about his tithe ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 16.6) and 
appeared in court to face prosecution ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 16.8). Although the 
authenticity of these later tales is doubtful they fit well with the other sources’ 
descriptions of Pisistratus as conspicuously just and moderate. In behaving in this 
manner Pisistratus was not doing anything radical. Basileis were expected to uphold 
themistes (Il. 9.295-298) and dike (Od. 19.107-115; Hes. Op. 38-39), and maintained 
popular support by doing so. It would also explain how Pisistratus justified exacting 
tribute from the Athenians (Hdt. 1.64; Thuc. 6.54; [Arist.] Ath. Pol. 16.4). Pisistratus 
was behaving in a traditional manner by keeping order and bringing justice to Attica 
and collecting wealth as recompense. It is possible that the later sources may be 
misunderstanding Pisistratus’ collection of gifts as direct taxation, which is generally 
unheard of in the Archaic sources, or perhaps Pisistratus merely formalised the old 
informal practice of giving the local basileus gifts. 
A conspicuous display of generosity and fairness could lead to a great deal of 
popular support and acclamation, as happens to Achilles during the funeral games 
for Patroklos. This kind of behaviour is also attested in Herodotus’ tale of Deioces’ 
rise to power over the Medes. Deioces abused his reputation as a just man, gaining 
leverage over the populace who granted him tyrannical power in return for 
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maintaining order. Herodotus even writes that Deioces behaved justly in order to 
become tyrant (Hdt. 1.96-100).
436
 Pisistratus conformed to this practice either by 
dispensing justice himself or providing his own travelling judges ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 
16.5). Not only would this have brought order and stability to Attica but would have 
disrupted the need for Athenians to approach other powerful men to settle disputes, 
such as Pisistratus’ old rivals Megacles and Lycurgus. It would also have cultivated 
a great deal of popular support for Pisistratus himself.  
Pisistratus may also have attempted to conceal the nature of his rule over 
Athens by disguising it with some of the features of the rule of law. Herodotus 
makes a point of stating that Pisistratus, after installing himself in power, did not 
disturb the magistracies or meddle with the existing laws (Hdt. 1.59). Thucydides 
also notes that Pisistratus and his family did not overthrow the ancestral laws 
(keimenois nomois), particularly the annual archonship, which Thucydides states the 
Pisistratids filled with one of their family members (Thuc. 6.54). However Rhodes 
notes that the names that survive on the fragment of the inscribed archon list do not 
appear to be exclusively drawn from the Pisistratid family. Names like Cleisthenes, 
Miltiades and Calliades are not attested elsewhere as relatives of Pisistratus, leading 
Rhodes to conclude that ‘clearly the tyrants did not rely solely on their own family 
but secured the cooperation of the leading families of Athens’.437 If this was the case 
then the maintenance of the archonship still supports the theory that Pisistratus and 
his family attempted to disguise the nature of their rule. The poetry of Solon and 
Theognis predates the rule of Pisistratus and both explicitly name tyranny and 
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monarchy as deeply harmful to the polis. Indeed Solon’s poetry expresses the wish 
to prevent tyranny. Furthermore Herodotus’ features of monarchy, as expressed by 
Otanes, include the overthrow of ancestral laws and the lack of open debate and 
accountability. Pisistratus could have combated these complaints by preserving the 
traditional offices and observing the laws, as well as allowing courts and other 
deliberative bodies to continue functioning.
438
 
In order to take power we have seen Pisistratus use private wealth, military 
prestige, personal connections, marriage alliances, religious practice and the 
administration of justice. The Pisistratids were particularly concerned with securing 
popular support and must have been fairly successful in this endeavour as there was 
no serious resistance or substantial opposition to their rule between the third coup of 
Pisistratus c.546/5 and the expulsion of Hippias in 511/0. This leaves a period of 
well over three decades in which the family of Pisistratus ruled Athens securely.
439
 
During this time, Pisistratus and his family did not depart from the established 
practices of the Homeric basileis. Even when the family took control of activities 
otherwise performed by public officials, such as making war and offering sacrifice 
on behalf of the city, they were not behaving in a particularly novel manner, but 
simply using the opportunity to pursue traditional practices themselves.
440
 Although 
the careers of other Archaic tyrants are not as well documented in the sources as that 
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of Pisistratus, they overwhelmingly conform to the same template by employing 
traditional practices to take power.  
 
Conclusion 
The key to understanding Archaic tyranny is to recognise the level of continuity 
between the tyrants and the Homeric basileis.
441
 As with the Homeric basileis, the 
personal wealth, strength and prowess of the tyrant enabled him to secure his 
position as ruler and justified and maintained his power. This chapter has shown this 
by investigating the methods by which tyrants gained and maintained power. These 
methods were the same as those employed by the Homeric basileis and therefore the 
Archaic tyrants represented a continuation of Homeric practices and not a political or 
social innovation. The legal and social landscape had changed, but the substance of 
the methods tyrants used to gain power remained consistent with those employed by 
their Homeric predecessors.  
Military success underpinned much of the tyrant’s authority although he was 
obliged to protect and justify this position by fighting against rivals and on behalf of 
his community. War and raiding also brought tyrants plunder, slaves and territory 
that they could distribute at will, often to family and loyal supporters. If a tyrant was 
not able to protect and enlarge his power alone then family and allies were secured to 
fight on his behalf. Xenoi, hetairoi and epikouroi could be secured through personal 
relationships and the distribution of wealth. Relationships created through 
                                                          
441
 This link is a preferable point of focus rather than the flawed theories of social and economic 
change and upheaval. E.g. Mossé (1969) 3: ‘Si l’on essaie de déterminer les facteurs qui ont contribué 
au développement de la tyrannie, il semble qu’on puisse distinguer deux séries de faits qui dérivent 
d’ailleurs d’une commune origine : les progrès techniques réalisés dans le monde grec entre IXe et le 
VIIe siècle et qui ont eu d’importantes repercussions, d’une part dans le domaine de la production et 
de la vie économique, d’autre part dans le domaine militaire.’ 
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established social practices appear to have underpinned much of the tyrants’ military 
support and they supplemented this by liberally distributing gifts and favours. As we 
have seen the practice of marriage could not only enhance the groom’s personal 
wealth and status, but could provide the participating families with significant 
assistance in the form of money and soldiers. The Archaic tyrant’s military support 
did not come from soldiers that we can unequivocally call mercenaries, but from the 
same methods and personal connections used by the Homeric basileis to collect 
warriors. Archaic tyrants spent their resources to secure armed support because force 
was the only meaningful method of removing a tyrant.  
The particularly sinister nature of the tyrant’s control over justice in the polis, 
despite being noted by Solon and Herodotus, is generally overlooked by historians 
focused on investigating the tyrant’s role as a reformer, legislator or political 
revolutionary. The anecdotes of fairness and wisdom associated with tyrants like 
Pisistratus indicate the existence of a desire to conspicuously display the tyrant’s 
fairness and justice, as had been practised by the Homeric basileis to gain popular 
support. By upholding justice and maintaining the customs and religious rites of the 
community, the tyrant not only contributed to the prosperity of the community but, 
as was the case with Pisistratus, removed the need for the populace to approach other 
powerful men and potential rivals to resolve disputes. This level of control over the 
community’s system of justice was regarded as dangerous by both Solon and 
Herodotus because of this.  
All of these practices were funded by the tyrant’s personal wealth and 
property, the loot from successful conquests and the contributions and gifts of their 
friends, relatives and supporters. Despite the tyrants’ unique access to wealth and 
power they were anxious to retain the support of their community. The power of 
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tyrants rested on maintaining a degree of popular support sustained by military 
prestige, the conspicuous administration of justice, proper observance of religious 
practice and the distribution of wealth. When tyrants or potential tyrants failed to 
maintain popular support they could be resisted and driven from their polis as 
happened to Cylon.  
Just like the Homeric basileis there was a broad range of methods which 
Archaic tyrants used to construct their power and they wielded it according to their 
own means and abilities. Lygdamis of Naxos along with several Ionian tyrants 
received their tyrannies from other powerful rulers in return for their services, often 
taking the form of military assistance. Tyrants such as Polycrates and Gelon were 
remembered primarily as warriors who accumulated booty, territory and slaves 
through their conquests. Miltiades initiated the tyranny in the Chersonese by giving 
military leadership to a tribe of Thracians. Other tyrants, such as Miltiades son of 
Cimon and Terillus appear to have consolidated or defended their tyrannies through 
significant marriages and subsequently exploiting the resources of their relatives and 
friends. Pisistratus and his family have been used as a kind of case study because the 
sources for their rule are the most extant and because they show them engaging with 
all the various practices used to gain power. The Pisistratids led their supporters in 
war, exploited their personal connections to accumulate wealth and military power, 
arranged favourable marriages, and conspicuously administered justice and 
participated in religious ritual. What the Archaic tyrants share is their consistent 
adherence to methods of gaining and maintaining power that were not only 
widespread throughout the Archaic period but firmly entrenched and accepted by the 
society depicted in the Homeric poems. The tyrants discussed above did not use 
novel or innovative methods to gain and maintain power, instead they relied on very 
226 
 
old and traditional practices. Neither did they exploit social or economic crises such 
as an explosion in population or class conflict as there is simply no evidence for 
these phenomena in the Archaic period. Consequently it is unnecessary to assume 
that the tyrants were a new phenomenon when their methods remain identical with 
the basileis of the eighth century, despite the rise of the rule-of-law ideology in the 
seventh century.    
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Chapter IV: Classical Tyrants 
 
The first chapter of this thesis investigated the methods employed by the Homeric 
basileis to gain and maintain power. A pattern of evidence emerged from the 
investigation which showed the basileis founding their power on military success, 
personal connections and engagement with a broad range of social practices. The 
third chapter investigated the practices used by the Archaic tyrants to gain and 
maintain power. The Archaic tyrants were examined as a phenomenon, with the 
Pisistratids discussed as a single case study to illustrate the continuity with which 
these methods were employed. These practices and methods were discussed rather 
than the careers of individual tyrants in order to present and discuss a broad pattern 
of evidence without having to rely on less trustworthy later sources. This approach 
removed the need to create an unbroken narrative history of any individual tyrant, 
consequently eliminating the need to fill in the considerable gaps in our knowledge 
of the careers of early tyrants with speculation. The third chapter concluded that the 
Archaic tyrants used the same methods to take power as the Homeric basileis, 
relying on their personal prowess, popularity, wealth and a number of significant 
social practices to take and hold power. Chapter IV will be organised in a similar 
fashion to the first and third chapters and will show that the methods used by 
Classical tyrants to gain and maintain their power remained consistent with their 
Homeric and Archaic predecessors.  
 
A number of scholars have made a clear chronological or character 
distinction between Archaic and Classical tyrants, treating them as two 
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fundamentally different species of ruler.
442
 As pointed out by Lewis, ‘They were not, 
it is suggested, the grand and wealthy figures that Cleisthenes and Polycrates had 
been, but adventurers and opportunists, given a route to power by the social changes 
which followed the Peloponnesian War.’443 A further distinction is generally drawn 
between the tyrants of the wider Greek world, particularly those of the Greek 
mainland, and the Sicilian tyrants. This distinction was made by Berve who pointed 
out the issues identified in antiquity: the disturbed and mixed population of Sicilian 
Greek cities and their supposedly luxurious lifestyles, citing Alcibiades’ speech in 
Thucydides and the, perhaps rather dubious, evidence of Plato’s seventh letter (Thuc. 
6.17; Plato. L.7.326b-326d).
444
 Berve claimed that the low intensity of ‘polis spirit’ 
in Greek overseas settlements also contributed to the rise of tyranny in Greek 
Sicily.
445
 This idea has also been voiced in more recent scholarship.
446
 Berve 
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 Mossé (1969) 98, referred to the ‘awakening’ (réveil) of fourth century tyranny. Recent textbooks 
have also made a distinction between Archaic, mainland Greek tyranny and Sicilian Greek tyranny. 
E.g. Dillon and Garland (2013) 283.  
443
 Lewis (2009) 59. By necessity this chapter will discuss a number of fourth century tyrannies 
located in what may be considered to be geographically peripheral areas, such as Sicily and Cyprus. 
Note the comments of Lewis (2000) 97: ‘The prevalence of tyranny in the fourth century, in places 
across the Greek world, from Sicyon and Pherai to Heracleia and Halicarnassos, is often presented 
either as a peripheral phenomenon, unrelated to the development of the ‘major’ poleis, or as a sign of 
decline from the political sophistication of the fifth century.’ Lewis is correct to indicate these views 
as problematic regarding Classical tyranny.  
444
 Mossé (1969) 101, also stated that conditions were different in Greek Sicily, citing unstable 
populations, frequent recourse to mercenaries and, consequently, chronic revolutions. 
445
 A similar observation has been made against fifth century Syracuse by Ober (2015) 253, who 
described the government as: ‘fragile in the face of the pressure of the ongoing war with Carthage and 
Carthage’s Sicilian allies.’ This is an unfair evaluation of the Greeks of Syracuse, and probably of the 
Sicilian Greek communities in general. Although we lack detailed evidence of the fifth century 
‘constitution’ of Syracuse, there is enough evidence to show that the Syracusans were just as 
concerned about the possibility of tyranny as their fellow Greeks and took practical steps to guard 
against it. Syracuse may have had specific laws against tyranny as early as the 450s. Diodorus wrote 
that a certain Tyndarides who aimed at tyranny and dynasteia was tried and condemned to death at 
this time. Unfortunately Diodorus does not record what the specific charges were against Tyndarides, 
but also notes that after this incident the Syracusans established a practice similar to the Athenian 
method of ostracism (Diod. Sic. 11.86.4-5). The author of The Constitution of the Athenians wrote 
that ostracism was introduced in Athens to prevent tyranny as well as to remove the remaining friends 
of the Pisistratids ([Arist.] Ath. Pol. 22.3). Thucydides has Hermocrates complain that the Syracusans 
had established no fewer than fifteen generals to fend off the Athenian expedition (Thuc. 6.72.4-73.1). 
This was clearly done in order to avoid the concentration of power in the hands of one man. Although 
the Syracusans acted on Hermocrates’ advice and reduced the number of generals they still refused to 
place one man in sole command of the army. The tension between military efficiency and aversion to 
tyranny in Greek poleis is pointed out be Harris (2015) 84: ‘On the one hand, there was a need to 
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ultimately settled on the military threat posed by Carthage and a subsequent need for 
efficient, monarchical rule, as the greatest factor in encouraging tyranny in Sicily.
447
 
Berve notes, for example, that the apparently tyrant-free period in the middle of the 
fifth century corresponds with a period of relative peace between the Sicilian Greeks 
and Carthage.
448
 These views have partly come about because of the apparent 
scarcity of tyrants in the fifth century and their sudden resurgence in the fourth 
century.
449
 This chronological gap has created an arbitrary barrier between the two 
periods of tyranny, provoking some scholars to search for new causes to explain the 
rise of tyrants in the Classical period. This is linked to a strong belief in modern 
scholarship that the Classical tyrants took power through foreign mercenaries and 
demagoguery. These factors, as argued by Berve, supposedly became particularly 
extreme in Sicily thanks to the presence of a great deal of wealth in certain Sicilian 
poleis and the ever-present military threat from the proximity of Carthage to the 
island. As we shall see, this view of Classical and Sicilian tyranny as a second and 
                                                                                                                                                                    
centralize military command in one person and to avoid fragmentation, which would inhibit the 
creation and implementation of a coherent strategy and the execution of orders. On the other hand, the 
Greek city-state wished to avoid tyranny, which placed one man above the law and posed a threat to 
the public good and to the rights of individuals.’ Syracuse was no different in this respect from 
mainland poleis.  
446
 Lomas (2006) 115.  
447
 Berve (1967) 221: ‘Diese versteht sich erst im Hinblick auf die Gefahr, welche den Hellenen jenes 
Bereiches von den Karthagern und anderen nichtgriechischen Völkern drohte und eine strafe 
Zusammenfassung der partikularen Kräfte unter monarchischer Führung notwendig machte.’ Parke 
(1933) 21, had attributed Dionysius I’s rise to ‘his ability to check Carthage’ some thirty years before 
Berve. For examples of Greeks recognising the efficiency of monarchy or sole-command during war 
see Harris (2015) 84-85. 
448
 Berve (1967) 222. There are grounds for arguing against Berve’s conclusion. The last Deinomenid 
tyrant of Syracuse, Thrasybulus, was not driven out until 466/5. Diodorus also records an incident in 
the 450s where an individual named Tyndarides attempted to make himself tyrant of Syracuse. 
Syracuse defeated the attempt and executed Tyndaries when Syracuse was at peace with Carthage 
(Diod. Sic. 11.86.4-5). Hermocrates, probably in 407, was also resisted by force and ultimately killed 
due to the Syracusans’ fear that he would become a tyrant (Diod. Sic. 13.75.5). Although Syracuse 
was hostile to Carthage at this time the city still opposed the return of a proven commander with an 
international reputation because of the fear of tyranny. There are therefore two points which argue 
against Berve’s theory regarding lack of tyranny corresponding with periods of peace with Carthage. 
First, the last Deinomenid was not expelled until comparatively late and a further attempt at tyranny 
was made shortly after. The attempt of Tyndarides also had no connection whatsoever to conflict with 
Carthage. Second, the Syracusans, in the midst of a bloody war with Carthage in 407, chose to guard 
against tyranny rather than allow the return of Hermocrates, a man regarded by contemporaries as a 
very fine soldier and logically a good candidate to lead the resistance to Carthage.  
449
 E.g. Mossé (1969) 93.  
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distinct wave of monarchical rulers is not supported by the evidence of the 
sources.
450
 
 
This chapter will illustrate the continuity between the methods used by the 
Archaic and Classical tyrants to take and hold power. It will do so by adopting the 
same structure as Chapter IV, discussing each of the methods and practices used by 
the Classical tyrants in turn and showing the level of continuity between the 
Classical tyrants and their Archaic and Homeric predecessors.  
 
If there were differences between the Archaic and Classical tyrants they were 
limited to the following four points. 1) There were more sophisticated checks and 
balances in the Classical poleis for the potential tyrant to overcome, including laws 
specifically designed to prevent tyranny and which stipulated harsh penalties.
451
 
Several instances will be discussed in this chapter where successful, popular Greeks 
were penalised for overstepping the set limits of their offices, even if they had no 
aspirations to tyranny, or on the mere suspicion that the individual had tyrannical 
ambitions. 2) Partly as a consequence of the first point, the Classical tyrants were 
compelled to work hard to not appear to be tyrants. The Classical tyrants existed in 
an age where the rule of law was the norm and was already several centuries old. 
The tyrants therefore came into more extensive contact with the institutions and 
mechanisms of the rule of law and with citizen bodies who were generally watchful 
                                                          
450
 Other scholars have gone further and not only viewed Classical tyranny as distinct from Archaic, 
but viewed it as being of little consequence to Classical Greek history. De Ste. Croix’s well-known 
and extensive work on class in Classical Greece (1981) passes over Classical Greek tyranny almost 
entirely, only briefly discussing Clearchus of Heraclea and Euphron of Sicyon.  
451
 For example, the decree of Demophantus at Athens (Dem. 20.159; Lyc. Leocr. 125-126). The 
decree preserved in Andocides 1 has been proven to be a forgery, see Harris (2013/2014) 121-153. 
The process of eisangelia at Athens also guarded specifically against the overthrow of the democracy, 
acts of treason, and by extension tyranny (Hyp. 4.7). For the problems caused by the checks and 
balances imposed on the Greek military see Harris (2009) 407-412; and for the Spartan solution to 
this tension: Harris (2015) 86-90.  
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against tyranny and corruption.
452
 Consequently many of the Classical tyrants made 
increasingly strenuous attempts to cloak the nature of their power in some of the 
features of the rule of law. Some of the tyrants discussed in this chapter will be 
shown to have engaged with the features of the rule-of-law ideology. Some began 
their tyrannies in perfectly legitimate positions of authority, carrying legally 
bestowed civil and military powers, a dangerous combination of authority 
assiduously and strictly avoided by many modern, representative forms of 
government. In this respect Classical tyrants perhaps employed this method of 
disguise more intensively than their Archaic counterparts although even this was not 
entirely innovative. As noted in the third chapter, Pisistratus attempted to disguise 
the tyrannical nature of his rule with certain features of the rule of law. His 
maintenance of pre-existing magistracies, preservation of the laws and deference to 
the courts combined with the conspicuous display of his own personal sense of 
justice combined to not only obscure the power he held but contributed greatly to his 
popularity. This method was ultimately not innovative. The Classical tyrants did not 
deviate from their Archaic predessors in this way, but merely intensified a method 
already in existence. 3) There were mercenary forces available in the Classical 
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 Thucydides wrote that when Athenagoras attempted to dissuade the Syracusans from believing 
Hermocrates’ warnings over the Athenian expedition. He did this partly by encouraging the fear that 
the warnings were part of an attempt to subvert the government and by implying that Hermocrates 
wanted to use the situation to gain control of Syracuse (Thuc. 6.36-40). Thucydides believed 
Hermocrates was a good officer and a man of exceptional courage (Thuc. 6.72) Xenophon also 
praised Hermocrates as a man of exceptional abilities (Xen.  Hell. 1.127-31). Diodorus specifically 
noted that Hermocrates was very popular in Syracuse and was, for a time, the most influential man in 
the city (Diod. Sic. 13.63.1). Hermocrates’ personal prowess and popularity may have made him an 
object of suspicion in Syracuse as well as praise. Considering his prominence it is unsurprising that 
Hermocrates was opposed by a significant number of Syracusans. On this subject Caven (1990) 41-
42, notes: ‘But in the famous debate ‘recorded’ by Herodotus (which formulated basic constitutional 
theory for Antiquity), it was noted that the popular leader who put down faction and restored national 
unity before very long assumed the monarchy. If, therefore, Hermocrates returned and united the 
nation, he could not help becoming a tyrant.’ The level of distrust towards Hermocrates in Syracuse 
was high enough for the Syracusans to refuse to recall him even after he had piously collected and 
returned the bones of the Syracusan dead killed in a recent action against the Carthaginians (Diod. 
Sic. 75.2-5). Diodorus explains that the reason for this was that the Syracusans were afraid that 
Hermocrates might become a tyrant if allowed to return (Diod. Sic. 13.75.5).   
232 
 
period. Jason, Dionysius I and Dionysius II were well known in antiquity for 
employing unusually large numbers of mercenaries. By the Classical period the 
epikouroi of the Homeric and Archaic periods, soldiers connected to the tyrant 
through various social practices and rewarded for their assistance with food and 
plunder, appear to have been eclipsed or at least marginalised by the use of 
mercenaries who fought for pay and profit. However, the uses to which these troops 
were put, such as conquest, raiding and intimidation, did not deviate from the uses of 
the Archaic epikouroi. The armies of Classical tyrants certainly increased in scale 
from their Archaic predecessors but, as we shall see, the manner in which they 
employed these troops did not change. 4) A new set of challenges arises regarding 
the source material. Unlike many of the sources for Archaic tyranny, some of the 
material pertinent to Classical tyranny is contemporary.
453
 The problems lie not so 
much in anachronisms and chronological distance or even in the hostility of the 
sources to tyranny, this last point being generally universal in Greek sources. Rather, 
the issue with the sources on Classical tyranny, whether they are Classical or post-
Classical, is their insistence on forcing tyrants and their actions into predesigned 
moulds that suit the intentions of the authors of each particular text. This will 
become apparent when dealing with several of Xenophon’s works and the 
philosophical texts, for example, where this habit is particularly acute. The nature of 
these texts remains one of the greatest barriers to understanding the Classical tyrants, 
but they do not describe a change in the methods employed by tyrants to take power.   
  
The sources on the Classical tyrants suffer from the, often extreme, prejudice 
of their authors towards tyrants and tyranny in general. Many stereotype the tyrant’s 
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 Lewis (2009) 60.  
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personality and record numerous lurid stories of the tyrant’s excesses, violence, and 
sexual deviancy.
454
 Xenophon’s Hieron explains that the tyrant partakes in too much 
eating, sex and luxury (Xen. Hieron. 1.21-23, 29-38, 2.1-2). Likewise Aristotle made 
the claim that the goal of tyranny was to pursue pleasure rather than virtue (Arist. 
Pol. 1311a). One of the best articulated descriptions of the features of tyranny was 
written by Herodotus. In his Persian constitutional debate Otanes complains that 
monarchical rulers overthrow the laws, force themselves on women and kill men 
without trial (Hdt. 3.80). Herodotus repeats the last feature when he describes how 
Periander killed many Corinthians without trial (Hdt. 5.92g). Diodorus, making use 
of a source more hostile to Clearchus than Xenophon, describes Clearchus the 
Lacedaemonian as a tyrant and notes that he put wealthy Byzantines to death without 
trial in order to steal their property (Diod. Sic. 14.12.9). The expectation that a tyrant 
would be violent and abusive towards his subjects was voiced by Solon more than a 
century earlier (Solon. 32.1-4 [West]). While remaining staunchly hostile to tyranny 
as a phenomenon, not one of these sources were concerned with recording the daily 
workings of the tyrant’s rule and few were concerned with recording the events 
surrounding a tyrant’s rise to power in any great detail. The sources on the tyrant’s 
accession and life paradoxically tend to take the form of frustratingly general 
statements or of curious anecdotes, some of which read like mere slander. This 
leaves enormous gaps in our knowledge of Classical tyrannical rule, particularly in 
mundane but significant areas such as day-to-day administration, finances and the 
administration of justice. The sources focus heavily on the moral degradation of the 
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 Luraghi (1994) 33-34, suggests, regarding Phalaris, that the image of the tyrant constructed by the 
sources may not represent reality. Luraghi correctly points out the problems inherent in the historical 
tradition regarding tyrants, particularly the tendency of the sources to exaggerate or belittle features of 
the tyrant’s rule.  
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tyrant, forcing the tyrant’s personality and actions into a predesigned mould to better 
illustrate the moral lesson the author wished to impart.  
 
A further problem is presented by the fact that, by the Classical period, the 
word ‘tyrant’ had become a label and an accusation to be used against one’s political 
enemies and against rulers that the writers of the sources disapproved of.
455
 It is quite 
possible that several individuals that are listed among the tyrants by modern scholars 
did not consider themselves, and were not considered by their supporters, to be 
tyrants. Jason’s assumption of the office of tagos was done by the laws of the 
Thessalians, and it is through the account of Xenophon that we know Jason of 
Pherae as a ‘tyrant’, although Xenophon never calls Jason ‘tyrant of Pherae’. It is 
therefore necessary to be cautious when approaching certain texts, on the 
understanding that the tyrant in question might not in reality be a sole ruler, but an 
object of disapproval and derision for the author of that particular text.
456
 
 
a) Warfare 
The strong links between Classical tyrants such as Dionysius I and Jason of 
Pherae
457
 with soldiering and military success have led one scholar to refer to some 
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 Thucydides records that Alcibiades’ lifestyle offended some Athenians to the extent that they 
expressed the concern he might have been aiming at a tyranny. While this may have been Alcibiades’ 
political opponents using the fear of tyranny to discredit him, Thucydides states that the Athenians put 
their public affairs into the hands of others as a consequence (Thuc. 6.15).  Thucydides has Alcibiades 
himself claim that his family were hostile to tyranny, using this political stance as a method of 
ingratiating himself with the Spartans (Thuc. 6.89).  
456
 Note, for example, Xenophon’s apparently ambivalent attitude towards Jason of Pherae. This is 
summarised by Sprawski (1999) 10: ‘Xenophon endows him , to be sure, with certain characteristics 
of the ideal leader, and even calls him the greatest man of his times, but he clearly emphasizes that 
Jason’s goal was not to bring peace, but rather to win glory for himself. Jason thus constitutes a great 
threat, since he is gifted with many virtues, but his fundamental stance is immoral.’  
457
 Jason is called tyrant by Xenophon, Diodorus (Diod. Sic. 15.57.2, 15.60.1), and Polyaenus 
(Polyaenus. Strategemata. 3.9.40). Note the comments of Sprawski (1999) 60, regarding the 
ambiguities and difficulties in establishing Jason’s position in Thessaly: ‘Given the assumption that 
Jason was tyrant of Pherae and that it was from this position that he attempted to impose his authority 
over all of Thessaly, the term “tyranny” cannot in fact be used of his power in Thessaly. It is accepted 
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Classical tyrannies as effectively ‘military monarchy’.458 Another scholar referred to 
Classical tyrants as ‘military adventurers’.459 These links take the form of successful 
military leadership, hiring of mercenaries, military support from friends and family, 
conquest, personal participation in combat and the presence of military themed 
anecdotes in the sources. These instances vary in scope, from Dionysius I controlling 
large fleets and leading tens of thousands of soldiers,
460
 to Evagoras setting out to 
become a tyrant and storming Salamis in a surprise night attack with a handful of 
followers (Isoc. 9.28-32). Military command remained a method by which Greek 
officers could attempt to seize tyrannical power.
461
 The murderers of Jason of Pherae 
were honoured in several Greek cities because, as Xenophon records, there was a 
belief at the time that Jason, who had recently been made tagos, would soon become 
a tyrant (Xen. Hell. 6.4.32).
462
 One of the speeches of Demosthenes makes the bold 
but generally correct claim that all basileis and dynastai are strong when they 
                                                                                                                                                                    
that he succeeded, after the country had been united, in arranging his election to the office of tagos, 
the head of the Thessalian koinon, in a manner consistent with tradition.’ Sprawski (2004) 438, notes 
that only one source, Diodorus, calls Jason the ‘tyrant of Pherae’, and Xenophon writes that Jason was 
from Pherae, but does not call him tyrant of Pherae (Xen. Hell. 2.3.4). There was clearly some 
ambiguity regarding Jason’s status and position, official or otherwise, in ancient times and even his 
contemporary Xenophon was not particularly decisive in his description of him. This ambiguity, 
between tyranny and legitimate but powerful office, is also found in the much earlier example of 
Pittakos. Pittakos, called a tyrant by Archilochus (Archil. 348 [West]), was categorised as an 
aisymnetes by Aristotle (Arist. Pol. 1285a29).  
458
 Andrewes (1956) 128. 
459
 Westlake (1952) 12-13. The appearance of some Classical tyrants as mere warlords at the head of 
mercenary armies may be a product of the scarcity of source material  and the focus of what material 
does survive, rather than the reality. While it is true that the poorly documented and less well known 
tyrants such as Hicetas and Mamercus generally feature in the surviving sources as soldiers and 
leaders of mercenaries (e.g, Diod. Sic. 16.68.1-3, 9; Nep. Timoleon. 2), better documented tyrants 
such as Dionysius I, Evagoras of Salamis and Jason of Pherae appear as far more complex rulers, who 
constructed their power on a diverse set of methods and practices. It is difficult to accept this as a 
coincidence. It is more likely that, because the lesser known tyrants acted as foils and contrasts in the 
literary sources for heroic figures such as Timoleon, or as players in wider historical events, they 
naturally appear at the head of armies or in military situations. On Hicetas and Mamercus see Talbert 
(1974) 87-97, 110-113.  
460
 Plutarch claimed that Dionysius’ son and successor, Dionysius II, had at his disposal ten thousand 
bodyguards, four hundred triremes and ten thousand cavalry (Plutarch uses the word myrios, which 
could mean ‘countless’ or ‘ten thousand’), as well as ‘many’ hoplites (Plut. Dion. 14). While Plutarch 
is possibly exaggerating to magnify Dion’s, and subsequently Timoleon’s, achievements in 
overthrowing the tyranny, the resources of Syracuse and her subjects were probably extensive.  
461
 Harris (2015) 85-86.  
462
 Xenophon’s comment is also interesting because it implies that Jason was not considered, at least 
by some contemporaries, to have actually been a tyrant at the point of his death.  
236 
 
succeed militarily (Dem. 11.14).
463
 This was certainly true for the Homeric basileis 
who enjoyed large windfalls of movable wealth and upward social mobility through 
successful raids and through military success in general. In Xenophon’s Hieron the 
author has Hieron explain that while private citizens desire mundane, easily acquired 
things, the tyrant desires ‘poleis, much land, harbours or strong acropolises’ (Xen. 
Hieron. 4.7). While Xenophon is constructing a moral image of the tyrant as jaded 
and driven by insatiable desires, the objects of the tyrant’s desire have, in this 
passage, a general military theme. Xenophon, like Demosthenes, recognised a link 
between tyrants and military ambition. The positions of Classical tyrants were 
strengthened by military success and were undermined by defeat. Warfare was a 
means by which Classical tyrants could maintain their power by enlarging their 
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 Some of the most obvious examples of sources associating Classical tyrants with military activity 
are found in Demosthenes’ speeches concerning Philip and his son Alexander. For the purposes of 
this thesis the Macedonian rulers, including Philip and Alexander the Great, are considered to be 
tyrants. They are not discussed in the body of the thesis because of constraints of space but also 
because they were an ostensibly Greek family ruling over barbarians. Furthermore, the manner in 
which Macedonian rulers came to power differs from that of Greek tyrants. A paper by Errington 
(1978) made a convincing argument against the notion of a Macedonian assembly with defined legal 
rights ‘acclaiming’ the king. Instead, Errington suggested dynastic succession approved by a formal 
or informal council of nobles. The issue is further complicated by Errington’s contention that the 
conspicuous assumption of the royal title basileus only occurred after Alexander’s death as the 
Successors fought among themselves. On the succession in Macedonia cf. Hatzopoulos (1996) 303-
312. These issues make the Macedonian rulers a unique phenomenon which would require a separate 
study. However, examples of their behaviour relevant to the argument will be mentioned in the 
footnotes.  
Regarding the identification of the Macedonian rulers as tyrants, they and their predecessors 
are called tyrants by several Greek sources and their behaviour matches exactly with the pattern of 
tyrannical behaviour established in the previous chapters. On several occasions Herodotus calls the 
kings of Macedon tyrants. He records a tale which explains how a certain Alexander took the turannis 
of Macedon (Hdt. 8.137). This Alexander is later called a tyrant by the Spartan envoys (Hdt. 8.142). 
Although Demosthenes calls Philip and other kings of Macedon basileus (Dem. 6.20, 25; 7.11), the 
speeches of Demosthenes are particularly firm in their accusation that Philip and Alexander were 
tyrants. They characterise the behaviour of the Macedonian kings as typically tyrannical, citing the 
same characteristics of violence and injustice already attributed to tyrants by Theognis and Solon 
(Dem. 10.10). Demosthenes readily accused Alexander of using force to work his will on the Greek 
states (Dem. 17.16).  Demosthenes also called Philip a tyrant or implied he was a tyrant on a number 
of occasions. Speaking on Philip’s relations with the Olynthians, Demosthenes states that close 
intercourse with tyrants undermines even good constitutions (Dem. 6.21). In the same speech 
Demosthenes explains that Philip’s appellations, basileus and turannos, are incompatible with 
freedom (Dem. 6.25). Demosthenes also claimed that the Thessalians viewed Philip as a despotes 
(Dem. 11.4). Elsewhere Demosthenes explicitly associates the establishment of tyrannies and 
‘dynasties’ with the rise of Philip in Greece (Dem. 10.4, 8). Another speech claims Alexander 
restored tyrants to Messene, stating that this behaviour was obviously turannikos (Dem. 17.4).  
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territory by conquest, distributing booty and enabling them to justify their pre-
eminent position to the community through victory. We shall see that there was no 
difference between the military activities of the Classical tyrants and those of their 
Archaic predecessors. 
 
The popularity to be gained from personal success in war remained an 
important feature of tyranny after the end of the Archaic period.
464
 Gelon, before he 
died in 478, was said to have brought eunomia (good order) and euporia (plenty or 
abundance) to Sicily by defeating the Carthaginians (Diod. Sic. 11.38.1). Despite the 
fact that Diodorus’ claim that Gelon was hailed as ‘saviour, benefactor and basileus’ 
(εὐεργέτην καὶ σωτῆρα καὶ βασιλέα) by the Syracusan assembly sounds suspiciously 
like the titles given to Hellenistic kings (Diod. Sic. 11.26.5-6), it should be 
remembered that tyrants carefully cultivated popular support and an appearance 
before the assembled citizens finds precedent in the behaviour of Pisistratus and his 
family. Plutarch also records the existence of a strong favourable tradition in Sicily 
regarding Gelon (Plut. Dion. 5). The positive tradition surrounding Gelon appears to 
have been born from his military successes against Carthage. One of Isocrates’ 
speeches praises Dionysius I for delivering Syracuse from danger and making it one 
of the greatest of the Greek cities through his leadership in war (Isoc. 3.23).
465
 Pindar 
celebrated Hieron’s victories over the Etruscans and Carthaginians (Pyth. 1.71-73). 
Pindar also praised Hieron for protecting Locris from war with his power (dynamis) 
(Pyth. 2.20). Xenophon wrote in terms approaching admiration for the military 
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 This was true not only for tyrants but also for other individuals and groups who wished to bring 
about a change of government. After the battle of Mantinea a faction which Aristotle calls the 
gnōrimoi, having gained repute during the battle, subsequently rose against the democracy (Arist. Pol. 
1304a).  
465
 De Angelis (2016) 215, notes that Dionysius I not only secured resources through territorial 
conquest but reaffirmed his status as the ruler of Syracuse.  
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activities and lifestyle of Jason of Pherae, such as his meritocratic approach to 
awards for soldiers, personal bravery and practice of leading by example (Xen. Hell. 
6.1.5-6).
466
 Isocrates also used a theme of military ambition and conquest to praise 
Evagoras of Salamis, who ruled from c.411-374.
467
 Isocrates describes how 
Evagoras had acquired territory and built triremes and walls (Isoc. 9.47).
468
 Isocrates 
claimed that Evagoras not only conquered Cyprus but plundered Phoenicia and 
captured the city of Tyre (Isoc. 9.62).
469
 Evagoras’ conquests were probably 
substantial, as Diodorus also recorded that Evagoras subdued some of the cities of 
Cyprus by force (bia) (Diod. Sic. 14.98.2), and succeeded in conquering almost the 
entire island (Diod. Sic. 14.110.5). Alexander of Pherae also successfully fended off 
at least one major expedition sent against him by Thebes at the height of her power. 
Diodorus even describes Alexander personally leading an aggressive pursuit of the 
defeated Theban army (Diod. Sic. 15.71.4-6; Plut. Pel. 29.1), also noting that 
Alexander was militarily successful against the Thessalian communities that opposed 
him (Diod. Sic. 15.80.1).  
 
Although Hermocrates of Syracuse never became a tyrant, and it is debatable 
whether he ever intended to,
470
 Diodorus records that the Syracusans were at least 
                                                          
466
 On the sources for Jason see Sprawski (1999) 9-14. 
467
 Costa (1974) 42, puts a terminus ante quem for Evagoras’ seizure of power at 410.  
468
 Isocrates’ speeches, despite being highly favourable to Evagoras, explicitly states that Evagoras 
was a tyrant. Isocrates compared Evagoras to others who had been exiled from a tyranny (οἱ μὲν γὰρ 
ἄλλοι, κἂν ἐκ τυραννίδος ἐκπέσωσι) (Isoc. 9.27). The same speech describes Evagoras returning from 
exile to be a tyrant (τυραννεῖν) (Isoc. 9.28), and upon succeeding actually becoming tyrant (Isoc. 
9.32). Isocrates even praises Evagoras from rising from the status of a private citizen to the position of 
tyrant (Isoc. 9.66). Diodorus refers to Evagoras as basileus (Diod. Sic. 14.39.1; 14.98.1).  
469
 After conquering Tyre, Evagoras may have compelled his new Phoenician subjects to provide him 
with warships as Diodorus mentions twenty Tyrian triremes serving in Evagoras’ fleet (Diod. 15.2.4). 
470
 Parke (1933) 63, considered Hermocrates’ attempt to return to Syracuse in 407 to be an attempt at 
tyranny.  
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afraid that he might make the attempt (Diod. Sic. 13.75.5).
471
 In this context, 
Hermocrates’ actions upon returning to Sicily after being exiled show the 
significance of military success for one’s popularity, and therefore remain relevant 
when discussing tyranny. Rather than pursue a war against the opposing party in 
Syracuse, Hermocrates used his mercenaries to wage a private war against the 
Carthaginian territories in Sicily. In this he was very successful. Just as Gelon had 
done about seventy years before, Hermocrates collected large amounts of booty and 
earned for himself the praise of the Sicilian Greeks. His successes against Carthage 
were impressive enough to convince the majority of the Syracusans to regret his 
exile and seriously consider recalling him (Diod. Sic. 13.63.2-6). Despite the fact 
that Hermocrates was not a tyrant Diodorus’ account very neatly illustrates the 
effectiveness of military success in securing popular support in the polis for 
influential individuals, particularly when discussed in relation to Gelon’s example.   
 
The instances where tyrants were defeated illustrate the importance of 
military success by highlighting the consequences of its absence. Thrasydaeus, tyrant 
of Acragas and Himera, was defeated in battle by Hieron, and consequently fled to 
Nisaean Megara where he was put to death (Diod. Sic. 11.53.4-5). Dionysius’ failure 
to defeat the Carthaginians outside Gela in 405 created an immediate threat to his 
rule. Dionysius’ defeat resulted in not only resentment against him from the 
Syracusans, but also a determined, if poorly organised, revolt against him by the 
Syracusan cavalry. The horsemen ransacked Dionysius’ house and abused his wife to 
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 As leader of the allied Greeks against Persia, Pausanias had also been accused of tyrannical 
ambitions in 478, and was subsequently tried and replaced with another Spartan officer (Thuc. 1.95). 
Westlake (1958-59) 240, takes the view that: ‘They [the Sicilian Greeks] produced few great leaders 
who were not tyrants because they were seldom willing to accept unpalatable advice.’ The Syracusans 
experienced a number of tyrannies and attempts at creating tyranny in the fifth century. Westlake’s 
view does not take into account this context, and unfairly brands the Sicilian Greeks as incompetent, 
when the evidence suggests that they were justifiably wary of powerful and successful men.  
240 
 
such an extent that she committed suicide (Diod. Sic. 13.112). Arriving shortly after 
the cavalry, Dionysius was compelled to retake the city by force, killing or driving 
out those who had revolted against him (Diod. Sic. 13.113). Xenophon also mentions 
the revolt, although he records that it was the people of Leontini who, in the 
aftermath of Dionysius’ defeat, took the opportunity to revolt from Dionysius and 
left Syracuse to return to their own territory (Xen. Hell. 2.3.5). Military defeat shook 
Dionysius’ grip on power and caused serious insurrections against his rule.  
 
By providing military assistance to other communities tyrants also enhanced 
their popularity abroad. Diodorus records an incident in which the Sybarites 
requested Hieron’s aid against Croton (Diod. Sic. 11.48.4). Diodorus also records a 
second incident in which the Himerans approached Hieron, offering him their city to 
rule if he would assist them in attacking their overbearing and unpopular tyrant, 
Thrasydaeus (Diod. Sic. 11.48.7). In 474 Hieron was also approached by 
ambassadors from Cumae who requested his aid against the Etruscans, against whom 
he subsequently won his famous victory (Diod. Sic. 11.51). Gelon, by virtue of his 
military power, was also approached by the mainland Greeks for aid against Persia 
(Hdt. 7.145). Clearchus the Lacedaemonian, called a tyrant by Diodorus (Diod. Sic. 
14.12.9), received gifts of money to support his solders from the Greeks of the 
Hellespont, as he was making war on the neighbouring Thracians (Xen. Anab. 1.1.9). 
Alexander of Pherae may have received certain honours at Athens, including a 
bronze statue (Plut. Pel. 31).
472
 A speech of Demosthenes notes that Alexander of 
Pherae had received armed support from Athens because of his bitter opposition to 
Thebes which at the time coincided with the interests of Athens (Dem. 23.120). 
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 Plutarch belittles the award of the bronze statue by implying that the Athenians only put it up 
because they were taking Alexander’s money.  
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According to Isocrates and Pausanias, Evagoras of Salamis received a statue at 
Athens in gratitude for the arms with which he had supplied the Athenian fleet 
shortly before the battle of Cnidus (Isoc. 9.56-57; Paus. 1.3.2). Evagoras also 
received citizenship at Athens. Isocrates states this was ‘because of many and great 
benefactions’ (Isoc. 9.54) to Athens.473 A very badly damaged inscription from 410/9 
also honours Evagoras for services to Athens (IG I³ 113), although this may have 
been in gratitude for mediation on behalf of the Athenians rather than for Evagoras’ 
military aid.
474
 The Geloans regarded Dionysius, at least for a time, as a liberator and 
when they were threatened by Carthage turned to him for military aid. By presenting 
himself as their military protector Dionysius not only won the goodwill of the polis 
of Gela but returned to Syracuse with an excuse to be placed in command of an even 
larger body of troops (Diod. Sic. 13.93.5). Dionysius I also provided military 
assistance to the Spartans in mainland Greece (Xen. Hell. 7.1.20-22, 28), 
subsequently receiving honours from the Athenians, discussed below, who attempted 
to detach him from the Spartan alliance.  
 
Jason had access to the military resources of Thessaly through his occupation 
of the office of tagos. Sprawski points out that Xenophon only really uses the word 
tagos in a military context which gives very little indication of the extent of its civil 
or judicial powers,
475
 although Jason was able to set and collect tribute from 
neighbouring or subject peoples (Xen. Hell. 1.12, 19). It does however give a good 
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 It is unclear whether the Evagoras mentioned in Dem. 12.10 is the same individual who ruled 
Salamis from c.411-374. The Evagoras described by Demosthenes was expelled from the city, 
whereas the elder Evagoras was probably murdered (Arist. Pol. 1311b; Diod. Sic. 15.47.8).  
474
 Costa (1974) 46.  
475
 Larsen (1968) 15, suggested that the office of tagos was in fact an appointment for life. On the 
word tagos itself see Sprawski (1999) 16-17. There seems to have been some uncertainty in (or 
merely lack of interest in accurately defining) the exact nature of the ruler of Thessaly. Pindar uses the 
verb βασιλεύω to describe the men who ruled Thessaly (Pindar. Pyth. 10), and both Herodotus and 
Thucydides refer to the leader of the Thessalians as basileus (Hdt. 5.63; Thuc. 1.111).  
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view of the extent of Jason’s military power. This gave Jason the power to assemble 
the various contingents provided by the cities of Thessaly, to lead them on campaign 
(Xen. Hell. 6.4.30), and possibly to use common funds to supplement the 
considerable manpower of Thessaly with large numbers of mercenaries (Xen. Hell. 
6.4.28).  
 
 Using military office as a stepping-stone to tyranny was a tactic employed by 
a number of Greeks in the Classical period. Dionysius I used his position as 
strategos autokrator to become tyrant of Syracuse through his control of military 
resources (Diod. Sic. 13.95.1).
476
 Dionysius would use the army to violently 
suppress the revolt of the cavalry after being defeated by the Carthaginians outside 
Gela in 405 (Diod. Sic. 13.112.4-13.113.4). Despite the defeat at Gela, it is worth 
noting that, with the exception of some of the cavalry, Dionysius maintained control 
over the army at an extremely traumatic time; extricating it from the battlefield, 
returning it to Syracuse and using elements of it to crush the revolt. This suggests 
that either the office of strategos autokrator gave Dionysius enough control over the 
army to keep it firmly in hand or that Dionysius was popular enough with the army 
to maintain their loyalty during a civil war. The Phocian tyrants based their power on 
their occupation of the elected office of strategos autokrator. The Phocians 
nominated Philomelos for the office (Diod. Sic. 16.24.1), and after his death 
Onomarchus was elected to the same office (Diod. Sic. 16.32.4). Upon the death of 
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 It is unlikely that Diodorus’ statement that Dionysius declared himself tyrant is true. See Caven 
(1990) 58: ‘but I doubt if he put it quite as crudely as that. He may very well have issued a 
proclamation (like that of Peisistratus, after his final seizure of power) that he took upon himself in 
the present crisis the direction of all public business; but if he did, his position was still constitutional, 
even though it must have become clear to everyone that, if he called upon his bodyguard and the 
mercenaries to support him, it would take a civil war to depose him.’ Given the universal Greek 
hostility to outright tyranny Caven is surely right to criticise Diodorus’ account. In this he is also 
supported by Mitchell (2013) 131.  
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Onomarchus his brother Phayllus, called a dynastes by Demosthenes (Dem. 23.124), 
also became strategos autokrator. In Thessaly the office of tagos was used by 
several individuals who may already have been recognised as tyrants, such as Jason 
and Alexander of Pherae, before they took the office.
477
 Sprawski points out that 
Xenophon only uses the word tagos in a military context which gives very little 
indication of the extent of its civil or judicial powers.
478
 It does however give a good 
view of the extent of Jason’s military power. This gave Jason the power to assemble 
the various contingents provided by the cities of Thessaly, to lead them on campaign 
(Xen. Hell. 6.4.30), and possibly to use common funds to supplement the 
considerable manpower of Thessaly with large numbers of mercenaries (Xen. Hell. 
6.4.28). If this is accurate, then legitimate or traditional offices may have been a way 
for existing tyrants to extend their powers over wider territories and gain access to 
their resources without the need for outright military conquest. Euphron of Sicyon 
had himself elected strategos with a number of others to form a board of generals in 
Sicyon and had his own son appointed to lead Sicyon’s mercenary soldiers (Xen. 
Hell. 7.1.45).
479
 It is remarkable that, given Euphron’s obvious popularity in Sicyon 
and the unsettling presence of his Arcadian and Argive allies in the very agora, the 
Sicyonians still avoided giving Euphron the sole command. Instead they appointed a 
board of generals within which Euphron was merely one member. It is clear that, 
whatever Euphron’s intentions regarding Sicyon, the citizens were unprepared to 
create a tyrant, regardless of Euphron’s popularity. Xenophon, a source deeply 
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 Demosthenes explained that Philip had been profiting from the collection of taxes from Thessalian 
ports and markets (Dem. 1.22). Demosthenes, who elsewhere depicts Philip as a tyrant, claimed that 
this money was going to pay Philip’s mercenaries. This is an interesting passage because, if accurate, 
it suggests that Philip deliberately rejected the opportunity to demand direct tribute from a subdued 
people in favour of the adoption of the established methods of revenue collection. 
478
 On the word tagos see Sprawski (1999) 16-17.  
479
 Griffin (1982) 70, believes Euphron to have originally been a member of the pro-Spartan 
‘oligarchy’. If this is accurate then Euphron’s motives become more opportunistic than ideologically 
or class motivated. 
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hostile to Euphron, states that Euphron had his colleagues in the government 
murdered (Xen. Hell. 7.1.46). Unfortunately he is not clear as to who exactly was 
killed, although the position of this comment suggests that it was Euphron’s 
colleagues on the board of generals who were removed. Timophanes of Corinth may 
have used his command of the city’s mercenaries as the foundation for his attempt at 
tyranny (Arist. Pol. 5.1306a; Plut. Timol. 4). Plutarch also noted that Timophanes 
was an experienced soldier and highly regarded in Corinth as an army officer (Plut. 
Timol. 4). All of these individuals used their offices and control over the military to 
extend their power and remove their rivals and opponents. It is for this reason that 
the Greeks of the Classical period were so careful to place legal constraints on army 
officers. The possibility of tyranny arising out of military authority was a very real 
threat and the severe penalties for overstepping one’s legal authority or illegally 
extending the duration of one’s command reflect this.480  
 
 Personal military leadership also remained important to Classical tyrants. 
Personal participation in combat and conspicuous leadership played a key role in 
establishing the power of their Homeric and Archaic predecessors. Dionysius almost 
certainly had some experience of combat and military life before becoming strategos 
autokrator, possibly while he was a supporter of Hermocrates. Diodorus writes that 
Dionysius had actually been with Hermocrates when he and his supporters were all 
but wiped out in a violent civil conflict that culminated in a battle in the heart of the 
city of Syracuse. Dionysius himself somehow managed to escape the ensuing 
                                                          
480
 The trial of Epaminondas and Pelopidas, who had illegally extended the duration of their 
commands in the Peloponnese, was well known in antiquity (Plut. Pel. 24-25; Paus. 9.14.5-7; Nep. 
Epaminondas. 7-8).  
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massacre (Diod. Sic. 13.75.8-9).
481
 Jason of Pherae led his troops in person and 
inspired them by his example (Xen. Hell. 6.1.6) Xenophon also wrote that Euphron’s 
allies, presumably the Arcadians and Argives, acquiesced in Euphron’s murderous 
behaviour partly because he readily led the Sicyonian mercenaries on expeditions on 
behalf of his allies. Xenophon states that Euphron led these troops in person, and that 
he earned the trust of his allies by eagerly (πρόθυμος) leading these mercenaries to 
aid them (Xen. Hell. 7.1.46). Euphron’s personal leadership and obviously close 
relationship with these troops enabled him to operate in Sicyon without the 
immediate interference of his allies and, as Xenophon states, to gain the support of 
the mercenaries in the city’s employ.482   
 
 As well as exercising control over the soldiers and military institutions of the 
polis the tyrants also employed violence against dissidents and potential rivals. 
Dionysius I suppressed several revolts violently (Diod. Sic. 13.113; 14.9.5), although 
in the early years of his rule he used the assembly to put his enemies to death with at 
least a semblance of legality (Diod. Sic. 13.96.3). Xenophon describes how 
Lycophron established his supremacy in Thessaly by defeating his enemies in battle. 
‘It was about this time…that Lycophron of Pherae, who was ambitious to gain 
control over the whole of Thessaly, defeated in battle those Thessalians (the people 
of Larissa and others) who opposed him and killed large numbers of them.’ (Xen. 
Hell. 2.3.4).
483
 Plutarch claimed that Timophanes put a number of Corinth’s leading 
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 Sanders (1991) 282, believes that Dionysius had served under Hermocrates during the Decelean 
War, although his evidence from Diodorus is not explicit about this connection.  
482
 The Macedonian kings appeared before the assembled Macedonians (Diod. Sic. 17.2.2; Justin. 
11.1.7-10) and led the army, linking the kingship closely with military leadership. Lock (1977) 91-98, 
argued convincingly against the notion of the Macedonian kingship as a ‘constitutional’ monarchy, 
characterising it as a personal form of rule without established legal rights and obligations, not 
dissimilar to the form of rule practised by the Homeric basileis and the Greek tyrants.  
483
 Lycophron is called a tyrant by Diodorus (Diod. Sic. 14.82.5).  
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citizens to death when he became tyrant (Plut. Timol. 4).
484
 After the murder of Jason 
his brother Polydorus and Polyphron succeeded to the office of tagos. Xenophon 
records a popularly held belief at the time that Polyphron murdered Polydorus in his 
sleep. Xenophon goes on to state that Polyphron made the office of tagos like a 
tyranny by murdering the best citizens in Pharsalus and exiled more from Larisa 
(Xen. Hell. 6.34).
485
 Philomelos, called a tyrant by Polyaenus (Polyaenus. 
Strategemata. 5.45),
486
 destroyed the pro-Amphictyonic family of the Thracidae after 
he seized Delphi (Diod. Sic. 16.24.3). When Onomarchus succeeded him as 
strategos autokrator he had the Phocians who opposed him executed and their 
property confiscated (Diod. Sic. 16.33.3) 
  
 Military success continued to be a route to securing large amounts of 
moveable wealth in the form of slaves, treasure items, goods and other property.
487
 
Diodorus records that Dionysius I attempted to stop the massacre of the Motyans 
after the capture of their city because he wanted to sell the inhabitants for money 
                                                          
484
 This is, however, contradicted by Diodorus, who wrote that Timophanes, although he was 
practising some of the behaviour of tyrants, was pre-emptively killed before he could make himself 
tyrant of Corinth (Diod. Sic. 16.65.3-4).  
485
 The early days of Alexander’s accession provide some stark examples of the need for force in the 
vulnerable, early moments of a tyrant’s rule. Alexander’s friends rallied to him and took control of his 
father’s palace (Arr. Anab. 1.25.2). There were a number of rivals or merely troublesome or 
untrustworthy neighbours that were dealt with harshly during Alexander’s accession. These included 
the relatives of Attalus and the members of the house of Lyncestis. Alexander’s destruction of his 
rivals was steady and effective. The son of Perdiccas, Amyntas, was killed. Alexander intended to 
arrest or kill Attalus, a more difficult task as Attalus was based in Asia Minor at the time. Alexander 
also exterminated Attalus’ relatives. There is also mention of another half-brother of Alexander in 
Justin who was also murdered, but this cannot be checked against any other source, being mentioned 
solely by Justin. 
486
 Aeschines also refers to the leaders of the Phocians as tyrants (Aesch. 2.131). Pausanias calls them 
dynastai (Paus. 4.5.4).  
487
 Harris (2015) 87: ‘Another measure to prevent tyranny was to forbid the king or other commander 
from distributing booty to his troops after a victory. This generosity might boost morale and reward 
good service, but it threatened to create a personal bond between the king and his troops, who might 
become more loyal to him than to the community. As a result, all booty was handed over to special 
officials, who were responsible for selling it and making sure that the proceeds were paid into the 
public treasury (Xen. Hell. IV, 1, 26-28).’ 
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(Diod. Sic. 14.53.2). After the capture of Motya Dionysius’ army looted the city and 
collected large amounts of silver, gold and clothing. Diodorus wrote that Dionysius 
allowed his men to loot the city in order to encourage them to future conquests 
(Diod. Sic. 14.53.3). After defeating the Carthaginian mercenaries outside Syracuse 
Dionysius gave their baggage over to his soldiers to plunder for themselves (Diod. 
Sic. 14.75.9). Other tyrants such as Jason completely destroyed poleis that opposed 
them or pre-emptively destroyed cities that might in future cause them problems, as 
Jason did to the Hyampolitans and to the city of Heracleia (Xen. Hell. 6.4.27). It is 
often unclear in the sources as to what happened to the moveable wealth of these 
cities, but it is hard to believe that it was not carried off by the conqueror. The 
treacherous destruction of Scotoussa by Alexander of Pherae is mentioned by several 
sources. While Plutarch only notes that the city was destroyed and Diodorus claimed 
that Alexander looted the city, Pausanias wrote that Alexander sold the women and 
children specifically to pay his mercenaries.
488
 Probably in 361/360, Alexander 
raided some of the islands of the Cyclades, including Tenos. A speech of 
Demosthenes states that Alexander landed on Tenos and enslaved the inhabitants 
(Dem. 50.4). Diodorus states that Alexander sent ‘pirate ships’ on this expedition, 
implying that it was a raid for booty rather than a manoeuvre of any strategic 
significance.
489
 Polyaenus wrote that Alexander actually raided the Piraeus itself 
(Polyaenus. Strategemata. 6.2). Although we should not overestimate the value of 
plunder to Classical tyrants, it appears to have been a short-term method of paying 
their soldiers and encouraged them to continue fighting in the hope of further 
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 Diod. Sic. 15.75.1; Plut. Pel. 29; Paus. 6.5.2. Westlake (1969) 145, points out that Alexander 
needed funds to pay the garrisons he maintained over the Achaeans of Phthiotis and in Magnesia. See 
Plut. Pel. 31.  
489
 ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων Ἀλέξανδρος μὲν ὁ Φερῶν τύραννος λῃστρίδας ναῦς ἐκπέμψας ἐπὶ τὰς Κυκλάδας 
νήσους (Diod. Sic. 15.95.1-2).  
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opportunities to acquire loot. Gathering booty and redistributing also increased the 
popularity of military leaders within the army and in the polis itself.  
 
b) Mercenaries 
The tyrants’ use of soldiers recognisably mercenary in nature seems to be well 
attested in this period.
490
 While this thesis has shown that significant numbers of 
mercenaries did not play any major role in Archaic tyranny, by the late fifth century 
recognisably mercenary forces were available for hire by poleis or tyrants.
491
 By this 
time Thucydides was able to write of the auxiliary forces accompanying the Sicilian 
expedition that the Argives would fight against other Dorians because of the ophelia 
(self-interest, benefit) of each Argive; that the Mantineans and other Arcadian 
misthophoroi would fight other Arcadians through their kerdos (greed, desire for 
profit); and that Cretans and Aetolians served for a misthos, with the Cretans 
ultimately fighting against their own colonists at Gela in return for that misthos 
(Thuc. 7.57.9). These troops were clearly mercenaries; soldiers fighting in another’s 
war in return for pay. While Thucydides seems to have had an interest in 
documenting the decline of social norms and general degradation caused by 
extended periods of warfare, there is no reason to disbelieve Thucydides’ description 
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 Mossé (1969) 96-98, cites the rise of mercenary armies as a major development of the fourth 
century, although the practice probably began in the fifth. As noted in the third chapter, there are 
references to Archaic and early Classical tyrants making use of mercenaries, but these are only found 
in Classical or post-Classical sources and are almost certainly anachronistic. These sources have, 
however, led to a number of scholars assuming that the tyrants of the late sixth and early fifth 
centuries used mercenaries in the same manner and quantity as their fourth century counterparts. 
Dunbabin (1948) 410, for example, assumes that Gelon was supported by Hippocrates’ mercenaries 
against the citizen-soldiers of free poleis. There is absolutely no contemporary or near-contemporary 
evidence for this.  
491
 The quality of the mercenaries employed by tyrants is debatable. Westlake (1969) 147, for 
example, stated that by 364, the Thessalian League ‘was still no match for the trained mercenaries of 
Alexander’. While it is tempting to view these soldiers, who were arguably semi-professional, as 
superior to citizen militias, and therefore a military advantage to tyrants, this view should not be 
accepted out of hand. An answer to the question would require a survey of the nature of tyrant-led 
forces and their levels of military success. Polybius is one of the few ancient sources that addresses 
this issue directly, claiming that the tyrant’s mercenaries were more efficient than citizen militias 
(Polyb. 11.13). 
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of the mercenary contingents in 416/415. Thucydides also states, in a rare but 
valuable mention of a late fifth-century tyrant, how the exiled tyrant Evarchus of 
Astacus returned to power in 431 through the help of the Corinthians, and by hiring 
mercenaries himself (καὶ αὐτὸς ἐπικούρους τινὰς προσεμισθώσατο) (Thuc. 2.30, 
33).
492
 In the fourth century Aristotle claimed that states relied on citizens for their 
defence, while the tyrant relied on mercenaries to defend him from the citizens 
(Arist. Pol. 1285a, 1311a). This view was tied to Aristotle’s contention that the 
tyrant’s rule was inherently oppressive and consequently unpopular with the citizens. 
Before accepting Aristotle’s assessment, one should note the perceptive comments of 
Lewis regarding Euphron of Sicyon. ‘What Xenophon does not say is that Euphron 
used the mercenaries against his own citizens, to enforce an unpopular rule nor that 
he brought the force into being: he clearly took it over from the previous regime.’493 
Aristotle took a similar view with oligarchies, claiming that, as they could not rely 
on the demos, they employed mercenaries whose commander inevitably became a 
tyrant, citing the example of Timophanes of Corinth (Arist. Pol. 5.1306a).
494
 
Plutarch records the same incident, writing that Timophanes was appointed by the 
Corinthians to command the city’s four hundred mercenaries (xenoi) and 
subsequently made an attempt at becoming tyrant, probably in the mid 360s (Plut. 
Timol. 4). Diodorus claims that Hieron hired mercenaries when he succeeded Gelon 
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 Thucydides’ short reference to Evarchus may be one of the earliest and most reliable pieces of 
evidence relating to the tyrants’ use of mercenaries. Here Thucydides was referring to a contemporary 
figure and, as we know from his comments regarding the mercenaries hired for the Sicilian 
expedition, Thucydides lived at a time when the enlisting of foreign soldiers for pay by the state was a 
known practice.  It is likely that this instance is the first secure reference to a tyrant hiring mercenary 
soldiers. While oppressing citizens with foreign mercenaries was a standard accusation against 
tyrants, and such instances should therefore be examined with caution, the evidence of Thucydides, 
and the conspicuous absence of evidence for Archaic mercenaries, suggests that employment of 
mercenaries by tyrants became a widespread phenomenon during the later half of the fifth century.  
493
 Lewis (2004) 70.  
494
 Timophanes’ attempt at tyranny in Corinth is also mentioned by Diodorus, who makes no mention 
of mercenary troops but claims Timophanes was collecting panoplies to distribute to his followers 
who were from the poorer elements of the polis (Diod. Sic. 16.65.3).  
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as tyrant of Syracuse in 476, although this may be an anachronism (Diod. Sic. 
11.48.3). Similarly Diodorus has Thrasybulus, another Deinomenid, enlist foreign 
soldiers, who served for pay, in 466 to oppose the citizens who were becoming 
restless under his rule (Diod. Sic. 11.67.5). The lack of contemporary evidence for 
the Deinomenids, particularly Thrasybulus, makes it difficult to discern whether 
these early fifth-century tyrants were employing mercenaries, as Thrasybulus’ rule is 
a mere three decades from the relatively secure evidence of Thucydides, or whether 
their armed supporters conformed with the Archaic practices. Dionysius I and his 
son Dionysius II hired large and diverse numbers of mercenaries, including Celts and 
Iberians (Xen. Hell. 7.1.20; Diod. Sic. 14.44.2).
495
 Dionysius I went so far as to 
double the pay of his soldiers after becoming strategos autokrator (Diod. Sic. 
13.93.2). The timely arrival of twelve-hundred Campanians and a further three 
hundred mercenaries saved Dionysius’ tyranny during the second major threat to his 
rule (Diod. Sic. 14.9.1-4). Dionysius II may have returned to power in Syracuse in 
347 by invading the city at the head of a mercenary force (Plut. Timol. 1).
496
 Jason of 
Pherae collected large numbers of mercenaries, Xenophon has Polydamas claim that 
there were as many as six thousand (Xen. Hell. 6.1.5).
497
 His relative Alexander of 
Pherae also employed mercenary soldiers (misthophoroi) (Diod. Sic. 15.75.1). 
Euphron took care to ingratiate himself with the foreign mercenaries in the service of 
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 Diodorus’ account of Dionysius I’s extensive preparations for war with Carthage (Diod. Sic. 
14.41-43) is difficult to reconcile with the military realities and limitations of the Classical Greek 
polis. In these passages Diodorus describes Dionysius ordering the construction of hundreds of 
warships and enormous quantities of arms and armour. Diodorus also implies that Dionysius himself 
mobilised large amounts of manpower by offering high wages and bounties to productive workers. 
This mass mobilisation of resources and manpower reads suspiciously like the act of a Hellenistic 
king or of republican Rome than of a Classical Greek polis.  
496
 Demosthenes accused Philip of using mercenaries (xenoi) to overthrow the Eretrian democracy and 
to set up the tyranny of Philistides (Dem. 9.33). 
497
 Berve (1967) 287: ‘Gestützt auf diese Soldnermacht, gesichert durch eine Leibwache, herrschte er 
über Pherai kaum anders als einstige Tyrannen in Griechenland.’ Berve’s view somewhat 
oversimplifies the diverse range of methods tyrants employed to gain power. Although we know little 
of Jason from the sources, Xenophon notes Jason engagement with religious ritual and custom, and 
the continued prominence of his children after his death suggests Jason’s family was prominent and 
influential within Thessaly.  
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Sicyon. Xenophon claimed that Euphron distributed chremata to them and increased 
their numbers, serving the double purpose of increasing Sicyonian military power 
and his own influence as his son was in command of the mercenaries (Xen. Hell. 
7.1.45-46). Euphron returned to power in Sicyon after a civil war with the support of 
a mercenary force provided by Athens (Xen. Hell. 7.3.4). According to Diodorus 
(15.2.3), Evagoras of Salamis was given chremata by Hecatomnus of Caria to 
support the xenikoi that fought for him. Diodorus (15.2.4) notes that Evagoras had an 
abundance of wealth with which to hire misthophoroi. Unlike the Homeric basileis 
and Archaic tyrants, Classical tyranny does seem to have made use of plainly 
mercenary soldiers. The Classical tyrants continued to use friends and family as well 
as allies secured through traditional social practices in a military capacity, but hired 
soldiers were also employed by tyrants from the fifth century onwards. Mercenary 
forces do not seem to have pushed out the older method of securing armed 
supporters through traditional relationships entirely. As we shall see, friends, family 
and marriage alliances continued to have significance for Classical tyrants.  
 
The regularity in the sources of Classical tyrants’ use of mercenaries 
encourages the view that such forces were abundantly available and that tyrants had 
little financial difficulty employing them. In reality the use of mercenaries was 
limited by the simple fact that they had to be paid.
498
 Xenophon’s Hieron claims that 
the largest and most necessary expenditure of the tyrant goes to maintaining his 
phulakes (Xen. Hieron. 4.9). Xenophon explains that the tyrant’s phulakes are his 
most necessary expenditure because without them he will surely be destroyed.
499
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 On the financial costs of ancient Greek mercenaries see Trundle (2004) 81, 92-98.  
499
 Dion is described by Plutarch entering Syracuse surrounded by a hundred of his mercenaries 
(xenoi) who made up his phulakēs (Plut. Dion. 28), yet the sources never depict him as a tyrant or 
claim that he had tyrannical ambitions.  
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While Xenophon’s Hieron attempts to create a very negative image of tyranny as 
repressive and hysterically paranoid, Xenophon himself had an abundance of 
military experience including service in foreign wars, and clearly had a grasp of the 
practical implications of paying and supplying large numbers of soldiers (e.g. Xen. 
An. 7.3.10; 3.3.18). Furthermore, Diodorus’ revealing statement regarding Dionysius 
I’s method of hiring mercenaries as late as possible to save money (Diod. Sic. 
14.43.4), shows that even very wealthy tyrants probably had limited resources with 
which to acquire mercenaries. It also raises the question of whether or not tyrants 
hired mercenaries as permanently established units or to meet the needs of the 
current crisis.  
 
Figures who were not tyrants but were closely associated with military 
leadership and employed mercenaries, such as Hermocrates (Diod. Sic. 13.75.5) and 
Dion of Syracuse (Plut. Dion. 34, 48), were suspected of tyrannical ambitions.
500
 
Plutarch has Dion’s enemies try to sever his links with the military while they 
malign him as a potential tyrant. Plutarch, overwhelmingly favourable to Dion, 
claims that these opponents were envious troublemakers and demagogues but in the 
context of the Classical Greek distrust of military office-holders and their severe 
censure of those who overstepped their powers, the distrust of Dion’s influence over 
the mercenaries is understandable and certainly not without parallel. Mercenary 
forces were available to tyrants from the fifth century onwards, and these rulers 
understandably made use of this new form of military support.  
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 Evans (2016) 168, has suggested that, up until the birth of Dionysius II, Dion was in fact the ‘heir 
presumptive’ to the tyranny. If this is accurate then it could help explain why a number of Syracusans 
suspected Dion of tyrannical ambitions.  
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c) Religious practice 
The interaction of the Classical tyrants with religious custom remained consistent 
with the behaviour of their Archaic predecessors. Gelon set up impressive thank-
offerings at Delphi (Tod 17; Meiggs and Lewis 28). Bacchylides wrote that no man 
had sent more gold to Apollo at Delphi than Hieron (Bacchylides. 3.63-66). Physical 
examples of Hieron’s dedications have also been found. An inscribed helmet from 
Olympia bears an inscription dedicating the object to Zeus from Hieron and the 
Syracusans (Tod 22; Meiggs and Lewis 29). Pindar describes Hieron ‘caring’ for, or 
‘protecting’ (ἀμφιέπω), Demeter and Zeus of Aetna (Olympian 6.95).501 The family 
of Gelon had traditionally held the office of priest of the earth goddess at Gela (Hdt. 
7.153). Harrell has argued that the sanctuary of the Syracusans at Olympia was 
originally built by Gelon to commemorate his victory at Himera. Harrell bases this 
on the name given to the sanctuary by Pausanias, ‘the treasury of the Carthaginians’, 
referring to the Phoenician trophies kept there, and Pausanias’ description of 
Phoenician spoils contained within the treasury that were dedicated by Gelon and the 
Syracusans (Paus. 6.19.7).
502
 Gelon was also remembered for dedicating large 
amounts of booty to the gods (Diod. Sic. 11.25). Athenaeus also mentions the 
offerings of Gelon and Hieron at Delphi (Ath. 6.20). The practice of giving booty 
taken in war as well as other precious items to temples and sanctuaries was already 
well established by the time of Homer and was carried on by the Classical tyrants.
503
 
Polyzalos of Gela, a Deinomenid and brother of no less than three tyrants, dedicated 
the Delphi Charioteer in the first half of the fifth century. The inscription on the 
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 On the archaeology of Sicilian tyrants’ temple-building see Morgan (2015) 46-51.  
502
 Harrell (2006) 128-129.  
503
 There is no need to regard Greek displays of piety and displays of power, wealth and success as 
mutually exclusive. See Jim (2014) 176-202, particularly 190: ‘Display and competition, however, 
were not necessarily separated from or incompatible with piety. Doubtless an important reason for 
offering military tithes was to render the gods their due and to acknowledge their role in successful 
undertakings.’  
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monument also asks that Apollo favour Polyzalos (Jeffery LSAG.9). The children of 
Deinomenes appear to have dedicated a number of offerings at important sanctuaries 
such as Delphi. Diodorus recorded that Gelon also built temples to Demeter and 
Kore and sent a golden tripod to Delphi as a thank-offering to Apollo (Diod. Sic. 
11.26.7), and records that Dionysius I built temples in Syracuse (Diod. Sic. 15.13.5). 
 
Much as Pisistratus was believed to have maintained the traditional sacrifices 
carried out in Athens during the sixth century, Aristotle describes Dionysius I 
organising the community-wide dedication of offerings to Demeter and states that 
Dionysius I made sacrifice to Demeter himself ([Arist.] Oec. 1349a). This was not an 
unusual practice: as noted above the family of Gelon had traditionally held the office 
of priest of the earth goddess at Gela. Plutarch also mentions Dionysius II
504
 offering 
sacrifice upon the arrival of Plato in Syracuse and mentions his presence at the 
‘customary sacrifices’ (Plut. Dion. 13). Isocrates praised Nicocles for his piety in 
providing offerings for his dead father, Evagoras, and for holding games and contests 
in his honour (Isoc. 9.1). While Plutarch is a late source, it was certainly not unusual 
for Greek rulers, legitimate office-holders or otherwise, to be present at state 
sacrifices or to organise spontaneous sacrifices in thanksgiving or to avert some 
perceived disaster.
505
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 Sanders (1991) 275-287, has argued that Dionysius I and his son and successor could have 
received honours commonly associated with the ‘ruler cult’ of the Hellenistic period. This is in an 
interesting theory but unfortunately Sanders’ evidence is either very late or very vague. The evidence, 
such as literary records of certain statues of the tyrants supposedly bearing features resembling the 
gods Dionysus and Apollo, requires a very optimistic reading of the evidence to be of any 
significance.  
505
 Gelon was described by a later source as being awarded posthumous heroic honours in Syracuse 
(Diod. Sic. 11.38.5) and so was another Sicilian tyrant, Theron of Acragas (Diod. Sic. 11.53.2). This 
does not prove that these men received heroic honours during their lifetimes, but probably reflects the 
well-established tradition of posthumously worshipping extraordinary men who did remarkable things 
in life as heroes.     
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 Games in honour of the gods, as noted in the third chapter, provided an 
extraordinary opportunity to display and spend wealth, to display skills, virtues and 
in victory show one’s favourable relationship with the gods. Victory in the games 
also brought praise and honour for the victor in their home polis as their victory 
showed the Greek world the wealth and power of their city. Thucydides has 
Alcibiades try to convince the Athenians of his reliability by explaining that his 
victories in the chariot races at the Olympic games advertised the power and glory of 
Athens to the Greek world (Thuc. 6.16.1-2). If victory in the games brought praise 
and admiration to the victor at home, this partly explains why some tyrants 
enthusiastically invested their wealth in participating. Homeric basileis and tyrants 
worked to maintain popular support in their communities and games provided an 
excellent opportunity to encourage popular support.
506
 Hieron and Theron of 
Acragas were both victors in panhellenic games and were celebrated in Pindar’s 
victory odes. At Olympia Pausanias saw a statue group of a chariot flanked by 
jockeys and their horses, commissioned by Deinomenes the son of Hieron, to 
commemorate his father’s victories (Paus. 6.12; 8.42). The close relatives of these 
tyrants also achieved victories. Polyzalos, a Deinomenid, and Xenocrates (Pind. 
Isthm. 2), brother of Theron, both won victories at the Pythian games.
507
 Pausanias 
wrote that some believed Gelon had won a victory at Olympia in 488 (Paus. 6.9.4-5), 
and a reconstructed inscription from Olympia appears to support this (IvO 143).
508
 
Dionysius I sent several four-horse chariots and pavilions made of expensive cloth to 
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 Morgan (2015) 70, on tyrants and games: ‘Clearly such triumph could function as either a 
precondition or an endorsement of the acquisition of autocratic power.’ A more accurate interpretation 
would be that success in the games appears to have encouraged the popular support which was one of 
the various preconditions for a successful monarch.  
507
 Morgan (2015) 71, provides a table of Deinomenid and Emmenid victories in panhellenic games as 
well as those of their associates and Anaxilaus of Rhegion.  
508
 Pausanias himself believed that the Gelon son of Deinomenes mentioned in the inscription could 
not be the same Gelon who was tyrant of Syracuse. Pausanias gives reasons for this but they are not 
particularly compelling (Paus. 6.9.4-5). 
256 
 
the Olympic games (Diod. Sic. 14.109.1-2; cf. Lys. 33.3-5). Although the particular 
incident mentioned by Diodorus did not result in victories for Dionysius, the fact that 
his representatives attended the games, and that Dionysius invested his wealth in this 
way, proves his interest in the practice. Some of the best information on this 
phenomenon is found in praise poetry and victory odes, such as those of Pindar. 
Pindar’s poetry claims the favour of the gods for his patrons who had won contests at 
the major sanctuaries. Pindar wrote that the gods must have assisted Hieron (Ol. 
1.106), and that Artemis and Hermes personally assisted his chariot in the race (Pyth. 
2.8, 10). The instances above are particularly interesting as they claim that the tyrant 
Hieron was a direct beneficiary of the gods’ good will. A similar claim is made by 
Isocrates, admittedly outside the context of games, regarding Evagoras of Salamis. 
Isocrates stated that Evagoras was more favoured by the gods than other men 
(θεοφιλέστερον) (Isoc. 9.70).509 In a victory ode Bacchylides claimed that Hieron 
had received from Zeus himself the geras of ruling over so many Greeks (Bacch. 
3.11-12). It is significant that these sources claimed a personal, favourable 
connection between these tyrants and the gods.  
 
 In a very interesting and understudied passage Xenophon explains Jason of 
Pherae’s relationship with Delphi and the Pythian games. Xenophon describes how, 
with the approach of the games, Jason ordered the poleis under his control to provide 
animals for sacrifice and offered a gold crown to the city who gave the finest bull. 
Not only were his demands of the cities modest, but he still assembled, according to 
Xenophon, many thousands of victims for sacrifice. Xenophon also claims that Jason 
mustered the Thessalian forces at this time because he wanted to manage the festival 
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 Markou (2011) 60, considers the rulers of Cyprus to be ‘royal dynasties’ whose power was 
hereditary and protected by the gods. However, what we see in Isocrates is more like the claims of the 
Homeric poems and of Pindar, that the basileus enjoyed the favour of the gods.  
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and the games himself, implying that this force would have enabled him to do so 
(Xen. Hell. 6.4.29-32).
510
 Even Jason’s community-wide collection of animals for 
sacrifice is not without precedent. Jason’s use of his position and influence to 
accumulate the most and the best quality sacrifices recalls the two scenes of sacrifice 
encountered in the Odyssey and discussed in Chapter I. In the first instance Nestor 
oversees the sacrifice of nine bulls by the nine groups of people that he rules (Od. 
3.5-8), in the second Nestor personally organises the sacrifice of a heifer, one that 
meets certain conditions of quality, and has its horns plated with his own gold (Od. 
3.418-429). A similar incident is also reported in Herodotus who records a tale in 
which Croesus sacrifices animals by the thousand and orders every Lydian to offer 
sacrifice (Hdt. 1.50). Jason follows the regular pattern of Greek rulers regarding their 
relationship with the gods, which was to ensure their favour by conspicuously 
offering the most impressive sacrifices and dedications. He uses his unique level of 
influence and access to wealth to arrange lavish sacrifices, displaying generosity and 
piety. Xenophon also records a general belief of the time that Jason might have 
desired to seize the treasures at Delphi, claiming that the Delphians were so worried 
about the possibility that they even asked the oracle what they should do if Jason 
tried to take any of the god’s wealth (Xen. Hell. 6.4.30). The desire to loot the 
sanctuaries is an unsubstantiated accusation levelled at several tyrants. It would not 
make sense for Jason to collect and ultimately destroy so much of his own wealth by 
sacrificing or dedicating it to the god only to rob Apollo’s sacred treasuries. 
Xenophon also states quite clearly that Jason’s aim was to take control of the Pythian 
games and administer them himself. It is far more likely that Jason merely intended 
to administer the games, perhaps even by force, and enjoy the ensuing increase in 
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 Berve (1967) 289, writes that Jason may have done this in order to demonstrate his military power 
as a potential hegemon in a war against Persia. Unfortunately there is no contemporary evidence that 
Jason ever seriously considered attacking Persia at the head of a united Greece.  
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prestige, as Philip II would do later in the fourth century.
511
 The importance of 
appearing as the protector of Apollo’s shrine may also have been recognised by the 
Phocian tyrant Philomelos. While the violence of the Phocian tyrants is noted by 
several sources, Buckler notes that Philomelos’ decision to have his Locrian 
prisoners thrown from the cliffs conformed to the standard punishment for those that 
committed sacrilege, and may have been an attempt to present Philomelos as the 
defender of Delphi’s holy places.512  
  
 Association with oracles continued to be significant for Classical tyrants. 
Plutarch preserves a tale in which Deinomenes is told by the oracle at Delphi that 
three of his sons, Gelon, Hieron and Thrasybulus, will all be tyrants (Plut. De Pyth. 
19). Diodorus mentions a dream of Gelon in which he was struck by lightning and a 
tale in which Gelon as a child chased a wolf from his schoolroom. The school then 
collapsed and killed all the other boys (Diod. Sic. 10.29). Cicero reports two tales 
regarding Dionysius I which he claimed were taken directly from the contemporary 
account of Philistus. The first is the tale, supposedly put about by Dionysius’ mother, 
that, while pregnant with Dionysius, she dreamt she gave birth to a satyr. The 
interpreters declared that her child would become famous and enjoy a long period of 
good fortune.
513
 The second portent recorded by Cicero, again quoting Philistus, 
describes how a swarm of bees settled in the mane of Dionysius’ horse, and that this 
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 Demosthenes claimed that Philip had taken control of the Pythian games, conspicuously presenting 
himself to the Greek world as the organiser of the sacred event (Dem. 9.32). Philip also managed to 
establish himself as a member of the Amphictyonic council (Dem. 11.4). 
512
 ‘Traditionally, those guilty of sacrilege against Apollo’s sanctuary were punished by being hurled 
from the steep and lofty Phaidriadai. By subjecting the captured Lokrians to this fate, Philomelos 
emphasized the Phokian claim to the presidency of the sanctuary. Those who opposed him and his 
countrymen opposed the god, and would be punished accordingly.’ Buckler (1989) 24.  
513
 Huic interpretes portentorum, qui Galeotae tum in Sicilia nomimabantur, responderunt, ut ait 
Philistus, eum, quem illa peperisset, clarissimum Graeciae diuturna cum fortuna fore (Cic. De Div. 
1.39).   
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was taken as an indication of future success (Cic. De Div. 1.73).
514
 Isocrates also 
claimed that portents and oracles had surrounded the birth of Evagoras, predicting 
his future success and affirming his descent from Zeus (Isoc. 9.21). Diodorus 
recorded two anecdotes containing prophecies regarding Philomelos the Phocian. In 
the first, Philomelos forced Apollo’s priestess at Delphi to climb upon the tripod to 
make a prophecy and the priestess exclaimed that Philomelos was able to do as he 
pleased, as he was resorting to violence and clearly stronger than her. Philomelos 
took this exclamation to be an oracle and had it published to show that Apollo 
approved of his actions (Diod. Sic. 16.27.1). Even though it is likely that Diodorus 
was using a source that was hostile to Philomelos, showing him as violent and 
sacrilegious, Philomelos was still attempting to secure an oracle that would approve 
of his actions and by extension confirm his position. In the second tale an eagle 
appears and snatches up a number of pigeons from the temple of Apollo. Those who 
knew about such things interpreted the sign to mean that Philomelos and the 
Phocians would control the affairs of Delphi (Diod. Sic. 16.27.2). These instances 
recall the oracles that attended the Archaic tyrants as they clearly serve the same 
function: foretelling the rule of the tyrant and predicting his future success.  
 
d) Wealth 
Greed and a desire for wealth form a strong stereotype of Classical tyranny. 
Ingenious tricks to collect money, confiscations, appropriation of public funds, the 
theft of sacred treasure, plundering, enslaving and outright seizures of property are 
common occurrences in the accounts of Classical tyrants. In an article on Dionysius I 
Bullock reminds the reader that Dionysius was known to the Greek world, and to 
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 In ancient times Philistus was generally well regarded as a historian but also widely acknowledged 
as a supporter of tyranny. Plutarch wrote that he was philotyrannótatos (Plut. Dion. 36). Cf. Diod. Sic. 
16.16.3; C. Nep. Dion.3.  
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Greek historians, as ‘a money-getter and money-spender.’515 While this statement 
might seem obvious to those familiar with the accounts of Dionysius I it is important 
to remember the fact that Greek tyrants, like their Archaic predecessors, were in 
constant need of money to maintain their position. As shown in the previous chapters 
Greek rulers, basileis or tyrants, were obliged to spend large amounts of wealth to 
engage in the very practices that made them rulers in the first place. The payment of 
soldiers, construction of temples, sacrifices and dedications, gifts to friends and 
public displays of generosity required the constant spending of wealth in many 
different forms, all of which had to be collected from a number of different sources. 
Any discussion of Classical tyranny and wealth, however, has to acknowledge the 
fact that the authors of the sources were simply not concerned with the daily 
functions of the polis under tyrannical rule, let alone the extent of their property or 
exact financial circumstances. Aristotle’s collection of anecdotes that list the 
schemes Dionysius I supposedly used to collect money are a good example of this. 
While most of these stories are surely apocryphal, the schemes being impractical and 
obviously unenforceable, they may well be founded on a grain of truth. Dionysius 
collected wealth from the community to dedicate to the goddess Demeter, sold 
captured populations as slaves, plundered captured settlements and raided Tyrrhenia 
for booty ([Arist.] Oec. 1349a-b). These stories probably represent a number of 
realistic methods by which tyrants like Dionysius could gather wealth. In part due to 
hostile sources such as Aristotle, it is very difficult to determine the extent to which 
tyrants merely co-opted the existing mechanisms for tax or tribute gathering or used 
their own wealth to fund their ambitions. To what extent their private wealth was 
mingled with what might be considered public funds is also unclear. Demosthenes, 
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 Bullock (1930) 263.  
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for example, claimed that Philip had appropriated the public funds of the Thessalians 
for himself (Dem. 6.22), and Jason of Pherae was empowered as tagos to collect 
large amounts of wealth from the Thessalian cities (Xen. Hell. 6.4.29). Aristotle 
wrote that Dionysius I of Syracuse collected taxes (eisphora) from the population 
(Arist. Pol. 1313b16). Money was certainly necessary for Jason to pay the six 
thousand mercenaries he had enrolled, as well as to perform the impressive sacrifices 
that Xenophon describes Jason organising.
516
 Euphron is accused by Xenophon of 
confiscating the property of the better citizens in order to use the money to pay his 
mercenaries (Xen. Hell. 7.1.46). Such statements by the sources are problematic 
because, in this example, the source is so overtly hostile and the accusation that 
tyrants oppressed their fellow citizens with foreign mercenaries was a standard 
criticism of tyranny. In Euphron’s case, it is difficult to discern whether Xenophon 
was throwing a clichéd accusation of tyrannical behaviour at a man he despised, or 
accurately recording the actions of a man whose behaviour happened to fit the 
profile of a tyrant.  
 
Diodorus claimed that Dionysius gave out the land of Syracuse in equal 
portions to citizens and aliens, except for the best land which he gave to his philoi 
(Diod. Sic. 14.7.4-5). Diodorus places this event after the revolt of the cavalry (Diod. 
Sic. 13.112.2-6), and therefore the property of the exiles could have been that which 
was given over to Dionysius’ philoi. However to accomplish the kind of distribution 
that Diodorus describes would have required Dionysius to control very large tracts of 
land, or to have held the power to redistribute nothing less than the entire territory of 
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 Regarding the strange anecdotes about Jason’s ploys to gain money, Sprawski (1999) 52, 
perceptively notes: ‘Interestingly enough, however, all these anecdotes are in agreement that Jason 
covered the costs of maintaining his huge army of 6,000 mercenaries from the estate of his own 
family.’ Berve (1967) 287, also believed that Jason sources much of his wealth from the inherited 
estate of his family. 
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Syracuse. While there is no good reason to doubt that Dionysius I gave lands and 
other property to his philoi, especially as Isocrates, a contemporary of Dionysius I, 
recommended generosity towards a ruler’s philoi in a passage concerned with the 
management and use of wealth (Isoc. 2.19), it is difficult to accept Diodorus’ claim 
that such a huge redistribution occurred. It is more likely that Dionysius merely gave 
the property of his enemies to his friends and allies, and while this may have been 
substantial, accusations of large-scale land redistribution should be approached 
cautiously.  
 
A number of Classical tyrants seem to have been wealthy men from rich 
families. Polyaenus’ collection of tricks and schemes used by Jason of Pherae to 
collect money generally describe Jason deceiving his rich mother or one of his rich 
brothers into giving him their wealth (Polyaenus Strat. 6.1.2-5, 6-7). The private 
wealth of the tyrants Hieron and Theron was openly celebrated by Pindar. While the 
form of this wealth is generally not specified, it is difficult to believe that Hieron’s 
family did not own lands around Syracuse and Gela, although there is no evidence 
for this except the comment of Diodorus that Gelon’s body was buried on land 
owned by his widow (Diod. Sic. 11.38). Hieron’s hearth is called ‘rich’ by Pindar 
(Ol. 1.10), and Hieron himself is said to have collected an unparalleled crown of 
wealth (Pyth. 1.49-50). Hieron, Pindar claims, has been given wealth along with 
wisdom by tyche (Pyth. 2.56-57). Hieron’s wealth is celebrated and described in the 
most dramatic style by Bacchylides, who speaks of Hieron’s ‘towering piles of 
wealth’ (Bacchylides. 3.13 [West]). Xenophon’s Hieron also implies a popular 
contemporary belief that tyrants were extraordinarily wealthy and therefore occupied 
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an enviable position (Xen. Hieron. 2.1-2).
517
 Timophanes of Corinth was believed by 
Diodorus to have been particularly wealthy (Diod. Sic. 16.65.3). According to 
Diodorus, the house of Dionysius I contained a large amount of silver and gold as 
well as other precious items (Diod. Sic. 13.112.4). The wealth of Dionysius I was 
described by Diodorus as prominently displayed during the sumptuous celebrations 
held for his weddings, with one wife brought in a trireme fitted with silver and gold, 
and the other carried to his house in a four-horse chariot (Diod. Sic. 14.44.7-8). 
Isocrates advised Nicocles to remain frugal in his habits, but to be luxurious in his 
dress and personal appearance as befitted a ruler (Isoc. 2.32).  
 
The wealth possessed by Classical tyrants did not just take the form of cash, 
treasure items or goods but also of land and estates. The extent of the Dionysii’s 
private property, particularly land, is hinted at by sources whose authorial interests 
unfortunately lay elsewhere. Diodorus explains that Dionysius I, aiming to secure at 
least the neutrality of the Messenians in the coming war with Carthage, made a 
present of land to them which secured their goodwill (Diod. Sic. 14.44.3-4). It is not 
clear if this was land Dionysius I owned himself or if it was territory that he 
controlled as the man who, as strategos autokrator, directed the public business of 
Syracuse and her subjects. Either way, Dionysius I exercised enough power to 
dispose of large pieces of land as he saw fit. Dionysius also gave gifts of money to 
soldiers who had performed particularly well in battle (Diod. Sic. 14.53.4). When 
Dionysius was faced with large numbers of mercenaries demanding their pay, he 
bought them off by giving to them the city and territory of Leontini in lieu of their 
pay (Diod. Sic. 14.78.2-3). Dionysius’ military power appears to have been closely 
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 Isocrates’ letter to the children of Jason makes a very similar argument against the belief that 
tyranny led to wealth, pleasure and happiness (Isoc. L.6.11-13).  
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connected to his ability to distribute wealth in the form of pay, booty and land to his 
soldiers. Dionysius II exiled Dion and took his property, coming to distrust him and 
to regard him as a threat. Dion was a very wealthy man. Dion’s wealth, even during 
the straitened circumstances of his exile, was marvelled at by his fellow Greeks 
(Plut. Dion. 15). Dionysius II profited from Dion’s considerable estates by 
confiscating and selling them (Plut. Dion. 18, 19). We may speculate that the wealth 
of the younger Dionysius must have been truly extraordinary,
518
 perhaps even 
making him one of the wealthiest men in the Greek world. Dionysius’ collection of 
wealth through conquest and the confiscation of his enemies’ property appears to 
have provoked accusations, ancient and modern, of demagoguery and of inciting 
class conflict. Aristotle, for example, accused Dionysius of stirring up the masses 
against the rich in Syracuse (Arist. Pol. 1306a).
519
 After the revolt of the cavalry 
Dionysius certainly killed or exiled the rebels, seizing their property and land and 
distributing it to his friends, as well as to Syracusan citizens and resident aliens 
(Diod. Sic. 14.7.4-5). The view that this was a class-based action, rather than simply 
a case of rewarding one’s friends with the property of one’s enemies, is rightly 
criticised by Caven.
520
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 Plutarch calls the tyranny of the Dionysii the ‘greatest tyranny ever’ (Plut. Dion. 50; Timol. 1).  
519
 Lintott (1982) 185, has stated that: ‘Among Aristotle’s lists of demagogue tyrants…only Dionysius 
overthrows a truly democratic constitution by rabble-rousing and attacks on the rich.’ It is, however, 
unlikely that Dionysius truly incited the citizens against the rich as two distinct factions. As noted by 
Andrewes (1956) 140: ‘But it was not class feeling of this simple kind that got him the backing of 
men like Philistus, or the rich and influential Hipparinus whose daughter he later married. It must be 
remembered too that he had followed Hermocrates himself, and thought it worth his while to get the 
Hermocrateans recalled, and married Hermocrates’ daughter at the moment when he gained his 
bodyguard and his tyranny.’ It does not make sense that Dionysius, originally a supporter of the rich 
and influential Hermocrates, would have incited the Syracusans against the rich when his supporters, 
such as Philistus, Hipparinus and Dion, were themselves some of the richest men in Syracuse.  
520
 Regarding this incident, note the comments of Caven (1990) 78-79: ‘Diodorus’ statement would 
imply that Dionysius put through a full-scale redistribution of land (gēs anadasmos), the terror of 
Greek landowning societies; but I believe that we may safely say that this was not the case. Even if 
Dionysius had had the force at his disposal to evict thousands of small landowners, all of them in 
possession of their arms, from the soil, he had no reason to wish to do so. He was a war-lord in the 
making, not a social reformer or revolutionary. He had not been put in power as the result of a rising 
of the landless against the landowners, and although he had not scrupled to exploit class suspicion, it 
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 Dionysius I’s apparent desire for wealth was translated by Diodorus into a 
plot to seize Delphi and plunder the treasures of the gods (Diod. Sic. 15.13.1). As 
with the accusation levelled at Jason, this simply does not fit with the tyrants’ 
conspicuous and well evidenced desire to engage in religious custom. Why would 
Dionysius I spend so much wealth honouring the gods at Olympia (Diod. Sic. 
14.109.1-2) only to commit the most appalling sacrilege at Delphi? On a political 
level such an act would have alienated Dionysius I from the entire Greek world, as 
pointed out by Lewis.
521
 While Aristotle accuses Dionysius I of looting the temple of 
Leucothea, this temple was in Tyrrhenia and Aristotle is a deeply hostile source 
([Arist.] Oec. 1349b). This isolated incident, assuming that it did occur, is hardly 
evidence of Dionysius I’s intention to loot the most important sacred sites in the 
Greek world. Dionysius I was also an extraordinarily capable politician and a shrewd 
enough ruler to tempt both Sparta and Athens with his immense resources and 
manpower while alienating neither. It is unlikely that a ruler of his political acumen 
would have been willing to provoke international outrage by stealing from Delphi or 
Olympia. The religious behaviour and the political ability of the elder Dionysius 
does not support this piece of ancient slander.
522
 A successful tyrant like Dionysius I 
would hardly go to the effort and great expense of depositing treasures at a sanctuary 
                                                                                                                                                                    
had been that of the hoplite class against the governing class.’ Although Caven’s comments regarding 
conflict between the ‘hoplite class’ and landowners are a generalisation, his rejection of the idea that 
Dionysius was in any sense a reformer or social revolutionary is correct and well founded in 
Diodorus’ account. Dionysius merely rewarded his supporters with the confiscated property, and 
demonstrated his generosity by distributing the remainder to the citizens and aliens. Neither policy 
was innovative or revolutionary, being practised by Homeric basileis and Archaic tyrants.  
521
 Lewis (2009) 62.  
522
 Berve (1967) 249, rightly rejects the accusation that Dionysius I intended to plunder Delphi: ‘Die 
Behauptung einer gehässigen Tradition, er habe das delphische Heiligtum plündern wollen, das er im 
Gegenteil durch Sendung von Weihgeschenken und Förderung des Tempelneubaus zu fördern 
gedachte, verdient keinen Glauben.’ Woodhead (1970) 504, also rejects the accusation that Dionysius 
I intended to plunder the sacred treasures at Delphi.  
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merely to violently and criminally rob them back, destroying his international 
reputation and domestic credibility in the process.   
  
 Similar accusations were brought against Euphron by Xenophon, a very 
hostile critic of Euphron. Xenophon claims, in a phrase reminiscent of the 
complaints in Solon’s poetry (Solon. 4.11-12 [West]),523 that Euphron spared neither 
public property nor sacred property in paying the mercenaries (Xen. Hell. 7.1.46). 
That Euphron took sacred treasures is not substantiated elsewhere, and such an act 
would have surely disgusted the people of Sicyon, who later honoured Euphron with 
heroic status. Euphron was very popular with a significant faction within the city and 
it is unlikely such monstrous impiety would have contributed to such enthusiastic 
support. While Euphron was clearly in need of money, the mercenaries being one of 
the pillars of his authority, it is very difficult to unquestioningly accept Xenophon’s 
statement. First, because of the moral, and by extension political, revulsion with 
which Greeks regarded temple robbers it is unlikely that an able politician like 
Euphron ever seriously contemplated stealing from temples; second, because the 
accusation is not corroborated elsewhere; third, because Xenophon was so overtly 
hostile to Euphron; fourth, because Xenophon used the accusation of temple robbing 
in his Hieron as a criticism of tyranny in general (Xen. Hieron. 4.11).  
 
 While several tyrants appear to have been maligned in antiquity with 
accusations of sacrilege, the Phocian tyrants do appear to have taken the treasures at 
Delphi for themselves during the Third Sacred War. While Diodorus states twice that 
Philomelos did not take the sacred treasures (Diod. Sic. 16.28.2, 56.5-6), he directly 
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contradicts himself elsewhere (Diod. Sic. 16.30.1), while stating that Onomarchus 
and Phayllus did melt down the dedications to be coined. Plutarch wrote that both 
Philomelos and Onomarchus stole the sacred treasures (Plut. Tim. 30.4), and 
Pausanias noted that the Phocians did take money from the sanctuary (Paus. 3.10.4). 
This act of sacrilege appears to have been motivated by necessity, rather than the 
cliché of tyrannical lust for wealth. The Phocians had entered into the Third Sacred 
War ill prepared,
524
 the war itself was costly in manpower and money,
525
 and they 
faced several powerful opponents which they were unlikely to overcome on the 
strength of their own resources. Furthermore, the ultimate destination of the 
plundered treasures was the Phocians’ mercenaries. The sources, despite their 
hostility to the Phocian tyrants, overwhelmingly depict Delphi’s wealth going to pay 
the army (Diod. Sic. 16.56.5-6; Plut. Tim. 30.4), rather than into the pockets of the 
tyrants themselves. Diodorus specifically states that Philomelos was compelled to 
plunder the treasures to meet the costs of the war (Diod. Sic. 16.30.1). Anecdotes of 
the Phocian tyrants using the god’s treasures for personal gratification are curiously 
few (e.g. Ath. 13.83).  
 
 Dionysius I used his wealth to encourage the support of individuals or 
communities for his tyranny. Dionysius quelled an incipient revolt against his rule 
partly through the verbal support of his Spartan ally Pharacidas and by subsequently 
distributing gifts and laying on public banquets for the Syracusans (Diod. Sic. 
14.70.3). These gifts, and those of land and other property mentioned above, appear 
to have had some effect on the populace. Aside from the obvious example quoted 
above, where an incipient revolt was quelled by gifts, the consistent failure of the 
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Syracusans to unite and form an effective opposition to Dionysius suggests that he 
was popular enough to make at least a portion of the populace hesitant to fight 
against him. Most of the citizens chose not to assist the cavalry during the very 
serious revolt of 405 and on several occasions the Syracusans appear to have either 
had misgivings about revolting against Dionysius or suffered from crippling internal 
dissent and indecision when they actually took up arms against him.
526
   
 
 As well as collecting wealth from their own property, taking it from their 
enemies and directing the use of public funds,
527
 tyrants may also have received gifts 
from those who wanted to cultivate their favour. In an interesting passage of 
Isocrates’ To Nicocles the writer warns Nicocles against men who bring him gifts of 
gold, bronze and clothing (Isoc. 2.1), and Isocrates implies later in the text that he 
expects men to bring gifts to the tyrant (Isoc. 2.22).
528
 If Isocrates’ description is 
accurate then the practice of soliciting the favour of the local basileus with gifts had 
apparently not changed since the time of Polykrates (Hdt. 3.42), or of the Homeric 
basileis (Od. 15.84-85). Isocrates’ mention of this practice is supported by Diodorus 
who records the Geloans giving gifts to Dionysius I (Diod. Sic. 13.93.4). While we 
should not overestimate the amount of wealth collected in this manner it is worth 
noting that both Homer and Hesiod considered the receiving of gifts a significant 
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 The tyrant’s use of wealth is a phenomenon which appears in the demosthenic speeches. 
Demosthenes claimed that Philip had spread his influence partly by force and partly by distributing 
chremata to those who desired wealth (Dem. 10.5). In another speech the Athenians who were 
sympathetic to Philip are accused of doing so out of a desire for Philip’s ‘gifts’ (Dem. 11.18). In a 
later speech the pro-Macedonian Athenians are accused of taking money from Alexander (Dem. 
17.11). The theme of these accusations is quite clear, that the distribution of private wealth translated 
into political influence. Even if these claims were pure invention by Demosthenes to incite hostility 
towards Philip and Alexander and their sympathisers, enough Athenians must have found such an 
idea credible to encourage Demosthenes to make the claim in the first place. 
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 Xenophon wrote that the tagos could collect tribute from subject or neighbouring communities 
(Xen. Hell. 1.12, 19). 
528
 Isocrates implies that Nicocles was himself a tyrant. He gives Nicocles advice, explaining that 
tyrants too often live free of admonition, while using turannos, dunasteia and monarchia 
interchangeably (Isoc. 2.4-5).  
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source of wealth for basileis, although Hesiod criticised the practice as it was liable 
to abuse (Od. 1.392-393; Hes. Op. 221, 264). 
 
e) Friends and family 
The Archaic tyrants made considerable use of friends and family members as allies, 
agents, councillors and subordinates. The loyalty of such individuals was generally 
secure and they contributed their own followers and resources to the tyrant’s cause. 
Most of the identities and backgrounds of the individuals who served Classical 
tyrants as army officers or agents in diplomatic or civil capacities have been lost. 
Others, such as Doricus, who was loyal enough to Dionysius I that he attempted to 
quell a revolt in the army and was subsequently killed by the mutineers (Diod. Sic. 
14.7.6-7), are no more than names. Enough examples, however, are preserved in the 
sources to show that the Classical tyrants surrounded themselves with relations and 
close friends on and off the battlefield.  
 
In the fourth century Isocrates recommended that, for a tyrant, magnificence 
in generosity was particularly appropriate when giving benefits to the ruler’s philoi 
(Isoc. 2.19). In the following passage Isocrates even advised Nicocles to give offices 
to those of his philoi who were the most closely related to him (Isoc. 2.20).
529
 This 
chapter will show that Isocrates was not advocating a particularly novel method of 
securing one’s power. A fragment of a stele recording an alliance between Erythrae 
and the tyrant Hermias of Atarneus, dated to c.350-c.342, details the terms that not 
only existed between Erythrae and Hermias, but also between Erythrae and Hermias’ 
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 In the following passage Isocrates is quite explicit that he is advising Nicocles on how to maintain 
a tyranny (Isoc. 2.21). 
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hetairoi (SIG³ 229).
530
 The Classical tyrants were just as quick to place friends and 
relatives in positions of power as their Archaic and Homeric predecessors.   
 
Dionysius I had some considerable support from several wealthy and 
influential individuals who assisted him into the tyranny. Aristotle accuses a man 
named Hipparinus of supporting Dionysius during his seizure of power in 406/5 
because Hipparinus expected to profit financially from the change in regime (Ar. 
Pol. 1306a1). Dionysius also had the support of a certain Heloris, who may have 
been his adopted father (Diod. Sic. 14.8.5). Not the least of Dionysius’ supporters 
was the wealthy admiral, soldier and historian Philistus (Diod. Sic. 13.91.4). There 
was also Dion, a hugely wealthy individual whose sister Dionysius I married (Diod. 
Sic. 14.44.8). Dionysius I appointed his brothers Thearidas and Leptines and his 
relatives by marriage as military and political leaders and ambassadors. We 
encounter all of these men at various points in the accounts regarding Dionysius’ 
reign, taking leading roles in his regime. Leptines, for example, is mentioned 
frequently in the account of Diodorus. What is most striking about Dionysius’ use of 
relatives is their employment as commanders of the army either subordinate to 
Dionysius himself or in independent commands. In the account of Diodorus 
Dionysius’ forces are rarely commanded by anyone other than Dionysius himself or 
a member of his family. Leptines was given important military commands on land 
and sea, putting him in control of thousands of troops and large fleets of warships. 
We are also told of another brother of Dionysius, Thearides, who received similar 
responsibilities.
531
 The prominence of Dionysius’ brothers is reflected in their 
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 A speech of Aeschines also mentions Phillip of Macedon’s hetairoi (Aeschin. 2.157).  
531
 After the sack of Motya Dionysius gave Leptines a fleet of one hundred and twenty ships and 
entrusted him with the sieges of Aegesta and Entella (Diod. Sic. 14.53.5-54.4). Leptines was regularly 
used as a senior naval commander by Dionysius (Diod. Sic. 14.55.2-3; 14.59.7; 14.60.2-4; 14.72.1; 
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presence in an Athenian inscription of 394/3 in which Leptines, Thearidas and 
Polyxenos are named immediately after Dionysius himself (IG II² 18). Similarly 
Isocrates implies that Evagoras used his son Pyntagoras as a senior commander 
during his war with Persia (Isoc. 9.62). Diodorus is more explicit, stating that 
Evagoras left Pyntagoras in Cyprus as hegemon while he travelled to Egypt to meet 
with his allies (Diod. Sic. 15.4.3). Plutarch makes a similar statement about 
Dionysius II, writing that the younger Dionysius left his son, Apollocrates, in 
command of the citadel of Syracuse (Plut. Dion. 37). Euphron of Sicyon further 
secured his position by placing his son in command of Sicyon’s foreign mercenary 
contingent (Xen. Hell. 7.1.45).  
 
 Xenophon quotes a speech by Polydamas of Pharsalus who declared himself 
to be the proxenos and euergetes of the Spartans, and implies that he had inherited 
these positions from his ancestors (Xen. Hell. 6.1.4). He had been sent as an envoy 
by Jason who, according to Xenophon, was relying on this relationship to ensure a 
favourable response from the Spartans, a response that would enable him to pursue 
his conquests unmolested by Spartan military power.   
 
Classical tyrants were not by nature inclined to support other tyrants 
autonmatically. They did so only when it was in their interests and the other tyrants 
remained on friendly terms with them. Dionysius I persuaded a certain Aeimnestus 
to make himself tyrant of Enna but when Aeimnestus would not allow Dionysius 
into the city, Dionysius turned on him, supported the citizens and ultimately handed 
                                                                                                                                                                    
14.102.2-3). Leptines was ultimately killed leading a wing of Dionysius’ army against the 
Carthaginians (Diod. Sic. 15.17.1-2). Dionysius appears to have been committed to the policy of 
using relatives by blood or marriage to control his powerful military. After making a decision contrary 
to Dionysius’ interests Leptines was removed from his command by Dionysius and replaced by his 
brother Thearides (Diod. Sic. 14.102.3).  
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Aeimnestus over to them for punishment (Diod. Sic. 14.14.6-8). Nor was Dionysius 
particularly concerned with setting up other tyrants in other poleis when the 
destruction or transferral of their populations better suited his interests. After 
securing Catane and Naxos through treachery Dionysius chose to enslave the 
populations rather than install the traitorous generals as tyrants (Diod. Sic. 14.15.1-
3).
532
 
 
A significant number of Classical tyrants appear to have inherited their power 
from their fathers or close relatives, following in the tradition of the great tyrant 
families of the Archaic period such as the Cypselids and the Pisistratids. Thrasybulus 
inherited the tyranny of Syracuse from his brother Hieron (Diod. Sic. 11.66.4), who 
had inherited the tyranny from his brother Gelon. Thrasydaeus, who had been ruling 
Himera, also inherited the tyranny of Acragas after Theron’s death in 476 (Diod. Sic. 
11.53.1). Diodorus implies that Thrasydaeus was subordinate to his father during his 
lifetime, explaining that the idea of appealing to Theron about his son’s government 
was mooted by the Himerans as they expected Theron to favour his son (Diod. Sic. 
11.48.6-7). Diodorus also wrote that Anaxilas, tyrant of Rhegium and Zancle, died in 
the same year and that a certain Micythus held power on the understanding that the 
tyranny would be given to the sons of Anaxilas when they came of age (Diod. Sic. 
11.48.2). This phenomenon was noted by Isocrates, who commented on the fact that 
some rulers inherited their basileia from their fathers (Isoc. 9.35). Nicocles had of 
course succeeded his father Evagoras as the ruler of Salamis. After Clearchus of 
Heraclea was murdered, his son Timotheus inherited the tyranny (Diod. Sic. 
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 Philip, Demosthenes claimed, had set up a friendly tyranny in Euboea to directly threaten Athens 
(Dem. 10.8, cf. 10.68). Demosthenes makes mention of Philip’s hetairoi and the hegemones of his 
xenoi (Dem. 11.10). Demosthenes accuses Alexander of setting up a wrestler named Chaeron as 
tyrant of Pellene (Dem. 17.10).  
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16.36.3). Upon the death of Timotheus his brother Dionysius became the tyrant of 
Heraclea (Diod. Sic. 16.88.5). The inheritance of tyranny from a father or close 
relative appears to have been a very common practice for Classical tyrants. This 
makes sense as the nearest male relative would have inherited the tyrant’s property 
and a number of his relationships.  
 
f) Marriage 
Marriage brought the same benefits to Classical tyrants as it did to Archaic rulers. 
While one scholar has noted that marriage could have been a method to ‘pass 
legitimate rule’ from one tyrant to another,533 there is no evidence of inherited 
kingship  recognised by law in Archaic and Classical Greece except for the 
descendents of Herakles at Sparta. Furthermore, the fact that tyranny was popularly 
viewed as incompatible with the rule of law by Archaic and Classical Greeks, and 
the fact that Classical tyrants faced a constant struggle to maintain popular support 
both argue against the view of tyrant marriages as a means of legitimisation. Tyrants 
participated in marriage for the tangible benefits that it brought them, not because of 
abstract ideas of royal descent. These benefits took the form of political support, 
increased influence, wealth and the opportunity to produce male children who would 
be employed as military leaders, supporters and rulers in their own right. Diodorus 
even states that Dionysius remarried after the death of his first wife as he was eager 
to beget children, ‘comprehending that the goodwill of his offspring would be the 
surest guard over his power’ (Diod. Sic. 14.44.5). Given the evidence of the previous 
section on the tyrants’ use of family and close friends, there is no reason to view 
Diodorus’ statement regarding Dionysius’ desire to remarry as inaccurate.  
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In an interesting passage Diodorus records that Dionysius, almost 
immediately after becoming tyrant of Syracuse, married the daughter of Hermocrates 
and simultaneously married his own sister Theste to Polyxenus, who was 
Hermocrates’ brother-in-law.534  The purpose of these unions was clearly to bind 
Dionysius to the old supporters of Hermocrates, particular the more prominent and 
wealthy members of the faction, and Diodorus helpfully comments that Dionysius 
married into the house of Hermocrates in order to make his tyranny secure (bebaios) 
(Diod. Sic. 13.96.3; Cf. Plut. Dion.3). After his first wife’s death during the revolt of 
405 Dionysius married twice more. Diodorus attributes the initial impetus for one of 
these marriages to Dionysius’ desire to gain the neutrality of certain poleis for the 
approaching war with Carthage. Dionysius married Doris the Locrian who Diodorus 
states was the daughter of Xenetus, the citizen most esteemed by the Locrians (Diod. 
Sic. 14.44.6). Dionysius also married a Syracusan wife, Aristomache, who appears to 
have been the daughter of Hipparinus, the man noted by Aristotle for being an early 
supporter of Dionysius (Ar. Pol. 1306a1).
535
 Despite Aristotle’s accusation that 
Hipparinus was merely attempting to make money from the association, Diodorus 
calls Hipparinus ‘the most renowned of the Syracusans’ (Diod. Sic. 16.6.2). 
Hipparinus was clearly an influential figure in Syracuse, suggesting a deliberate 
decision on the part of Dionysius to secure his support through the marriage with his 
daughter. In order to reconcile himself with his brother Leptines after his return from 
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 Berve (1967) 249, attributes the marriage with Hermocrates’ daughter to Dionysius’ desire to enter 
the circle of Syracusan nobility. Berger (1992) 42, has also written that Dionysius married 
Hermocrates’ daughter: ‘in order to connect himself with aristocratic circles.’ There is however no 
indication in the sources that the fifth century Syracusans were in any way overawed by men of 
particular rank or ancestry. The ultimate fate of Hermocrates himself attests to this. It is more likely 
that Dionysius wanted the support of the old supporters of Hermocrates who had survived their 
leader’s defeat and death, and the support of Hermocrates’ surviving relations.  
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 Diodorus claims Dionysius’ Syracusan wife was the daughter of Hipparinus (Diod. Sic. 16.6.2). C. 
Nepos also wrote that Aristomache was the daughter of Hipparinus (Nep. Dion. 1) 
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exile, Dionysius married his daughter to Leptines (Diod. Sic. 15.7.4).
536
 Dionysius II 
may have married off his sister Arete to one of his supporters named Timocrates 
(Plut. Dion. 21, 26). Arete was originally married to Dion by Dionysius I, but 
Plutarch mentions her being remarried to Timocrates by Dionysius II after Dion’s 
exile in 366. Diodorus’ account portrays Dionysius I and Dionysius II using 
marriage in much the same way as their Archaic and Homeric predecessors; as a 
method of securing allies, resolving conflict and to gather supporters.
537
 
 
A speech of Lysias claims that Athenian ambassadors had been sent to 
Dionysius I in an attempt to encourage a marriage alliance between Dionysius I and 
Evagoras of Salamis, who was a steady ally of Athens (Lys. 19.20). The passage 
explains that this would have encouraged Dionysius I to detach himself from the 
Lacedaemonians and become friendly with Athens. This corresponds with Diodorus’ 
political explanation for the marriages of Dionysius I (Diod. Sic. 14.44.4). The use 
of marriage to create good relations between states finds precedent in Herodotus. In 
the early fifth century Gygaea, sister of Alexander son of Amyntas, was married to a 
Persian named Bubares. This is of some significance because Herodotus partly 
attributes the good relations between Macedon and Persia at this time to the 
                                                          
536
 Curiously Plutarch criticises Philistus, the historian and supporter of Dionysius I, for, among other 
things, admiring the marriages of tyrants (Plut. Dion. 36). Unfortunately Plutarch fails to explain his 
position and the historian is left to speculate whether Plutarch was criticising the political implications 
of tyrant marriages, such the strengthening of the tyrants position and the spread of his influence at 
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 This view is in opposition to that of Berve (1967) 250, who stated that the purpose of these 
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most powerful men in Syracuse to him through marriage for the sake of security and to spread his 
influence.  
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marriage, also claiming that the son of Gygaea and Bubares, also called Amyntas, 
received the city of Alabanda from the Persian king (Hdt. 8.136).  Marriage clearly 
continued to be an important practice for Classical tyrants and continued to be a 
method through which they could accumulate political capital.  
  
g) Disguising tyranny and appearing just  
Hesiod recorded a practice whereby the basileus received the approval of the 
community by giving just judgements (Hes. Th. 84-86). This section will show that 
displays of justice and benevolence towards the community remained an important 
method by which classical tyrants cultivated popular support and justified their 
elevated position.
538
 One scholar has written that ‘For ancient autocrats it was 
essential to control the military resources of the state, often by bringing men in from 
outside the state in order to control the citizen population.’539 While it is true that 
military power and military success were vital for the maintenance of the tyrant’s 
rule, the extent to which mercenaries and brute force enabled control over an 
unwilling population is debateable. Furthermore, this view overlooks the fact that 
tyrants tried to gain the support of native citizens through other means, rather than 
simply repressing them with foreign mercenaries. The Classical tyrants existed at a 
time when the rule of law had been the norm in Greece for several centuries, and 
when sole-rulers were denounced as threats to the persons and property of private 
citizens. To counter this hostility some Classical tyrants behaved conspicuously 
justly and upheld and adhered to the customary norms of their community. They also 
cloaked themselves in legitimate offices
540
 and used the features of the rule-of-law 
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 Harrell (2002) 449-450, has noted the importance of praise poetry for the public image of tyrants.  
539
 Trundle (2006) 67.  This view was also held by Parke (1933) 63. 
540
 Sprawski (2006) 138, makes the point the Jason may have become tagos, a traditional office, to 
specifically avoid appearing tyrannical.  
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ideology, such as assemblies and courts, to dispose of their enemies. In the late fifth 
century Herodotus was aware that these methods might be employed and of the 
possibility that a man might use the administration of justice to take power. 
Herodotus described the rise of Deioces the Mede, an influential man who 
intentionally appeared just to the community in order to justify his accession to a 
tyranny (Hdt. 1.96). Herodotus’ tale has Deioces amass enough popular support 
through his conspicuously just behaviour until the local communities were prepared 
to give him sole power.  
 
Pindar praised Hieron for founding Aetna with eleutheria through the nomoi 
of Hyllus (Pind. Pyth. 1.62-63), and that he managed or ordered (διέπω) Ortygia 
‘with a pure sceptre’ (Pind. Ol. 6.93). Pindar praises Hieron for having a 
themisteion…skapton, a sceptre of themis (Pind. Ol. 1.12).541 The Iliad describes 
Zeus giving to the basileus his sceptre and the ability to administer themis (Il. 2.206) 
and the community prospering under the sceptre of a just ruler (Il. 9.295-298). 
Maeandrius, who succeeded Polycrates and desired to be the most just of men but 
became a tyrant, was said by Herodotus to have taken up Polycrates’ sceptre (Hdt. 
3.142).
542
 Pindar’s praise of Hieron seems to have drawn on an established 
association of rulers with justice, symbolised by their sceptres. Hieron’s power is 
couched by the poet in terms of justice and protection of customary norms. Hieron’s 
victory over the Carthaginians and Etruscans was also described by Pindar in terms 
of just punishment. Hieron, wrote Pindar, punished the hybris of these people (Pind. 
Pyth. 1.71-73). Nestor led his cattle raid to avenge the hybris of a neighbouring 
                                                          
541
 Morrison (2007) 59, does not make the connection between the Homeric sceptre and that of 
Hieron, but does note that lines 12-13 of Olympian 1 imply that Hieron rules over all Sicily. 
542
 Agamemnon inherited his sceptre from his father (Il. 2.46), and it was originally a gift from the 
gods (Il. 2.102-105). 
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people who had plundered his community and stolen from his father. When Pindar 
actually calls Hieron turannos he qualifies this with the word lagetas (Pind. Pyth. 
3.85), a rare word meaning ‘leader of the people’.543 Hieron’s behaviour towards 
other men is also used by Pindar to characterise his just rule. Hieron is kindly to the 
astoi, not envious of the agathoi, and a ‘wonderful father’ to xenoi. Hieron is 
depicted carefully observing the correct and just norms of behaviour (Pind. Pyth. 
3.71).  
 
 During his brief account of the murder of Jason of Pherae, Xenophon implies 
that Jason sat in judgement over some of the disputes which arose among the people 
he ruled. We are told by Xenophon that during a review of his cavalry Jason allowed 
anyone to approach him with a request. Xenophon uses the participle deomenos, 
meaning to be in want of something or to beg a favour, in reference to these 
petitioners. Furthermore the seven assassins who killed Jason approached him as if 
they were in disagreement and wished him to resolve their argument (Xen. Hell. 
6.31). Xenophon uses the word diaphero to describe these men which, in the context 
of litigation, means to struggle or quarrel. Xenophon appears to have considered 
Jason, his contemporary, as empowered, either legally or informally by virtue of his 
status, to judge and resolve disputes brought to him by private individuals. Isocrates 
praised Evagoras for punishing wrongdoers according to the law (Isoc. 9.43). Other 
tyrants made displays of piety and magnanimous behaviour. Diodorus noted that 
Gelon enjoyed the favour of the Sicilian Greeks because of his gentleness towards 
them and his mild rule (Diod. Sic. 11.67). In 404, during the most serious revolt 
against Dionysius I’s rule, Dionysius buried the bones of the Syracusans who died 
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 Hornblower (2004) 64, is probably correct to see Pindar’s λαγέτας τύραννος as drawing from 
Homer; particularly from Agamemnon’s appellation of ‘shepherd of the people’.  
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fighting against him and swore to have no enmity for those who had revolted against 
him (Diod. Sic. 14.9.6-7). Diodorus states that the rebels who did return to Syracuse 
were treated benevolently by Dionysius (Diod. Sic. 14.9.9). The picture of Classical 
tyrants that emerges from the available evidence is one of a semi-formal judge 
conspicuously resolving individual cases or of an apparently benevolent ruler, 
respectful of the laws, who protected the community from external aggression.
544
 
  
No Classical tyrant seems to have referred to himself as turannos
545
 and the 
word itself does not appear to have become a more acceptable term in the Classical 
period.
546
 The inscriptions on Deinomenid dedications are valuable evidence for the 
attitudes of tyrants towards the presentation of their own positions as these items 
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 The Macedonian kings served as supreme judges in certain cases. Alexander’s justice when 
hearing cases had become proverbial by the time of Plutarch (Plut. Alex. 42).  
545
 Oost (1976) 224-225, has argued that the tyrants of Sicily, including the Dionysii, took the title of 
‘king’: ‘If ancient Greek politicians who occupied a monarchical position thought that they could 
profitably arrogate the ancient and prestigious name of king, it is a priori likely that they would do so. 
Men are ruled by words and symbols, as modern studies of political mystique and charisma have 
amply shown.’ Oost’s view rests on two fundamental misunderstandings. First, of the connotations of 
the word basileus. As shown in the first chapter, the Homeric basileis were not kings, hereditary 
monarchs or despots who held power by divine right or through an aura of mysticism. The basileis 
were local rulers who held power by virtue of their personal strength and their ability to enforce order 
and the customary norms of their people, yet remained answerable to the free community they ruled. 
Second, Oost assumes that a sole ruler could be made politically acceptable to the Archaic or 
Classical Greek polis if he adopted a certain title. There is simply no evidence to suggest that tyranny, 
an unaccountable sole ruler, was acceptable to the Archaic Greeks or their Classical descendents. 
Instead, as this chapter shows, the tyrants used a plethora of methods to increase their power, maintain 
their position and cultivate popular support while distancing themselves from the label ‘tyrant’. 
546
 Teegarden (2014) 1-11, views anti-tyranny legislation as a tool of the ‘pro-democrats’ within a 
polis. This view is unconvincing because, as the second chapter showed, articulate complaints against 
tyranny existed in the time of Solon and Theognis, long before the existence of a democracy in the 
style of fourth century Athens. A further problem with this view is that a number of contemporary 
Classical sources imply a widespread and popular condemnation of outright tyranny without ever 
linking that condemnation to any ‘democratic’ element within the polis. Aristotle noted that special 
honours were given to tyrant-killers (Arist.  Pol. 1267a). Xenophon’s Hieron claims that the assassins 
of tyrants not only avoided the penalties given to murderers, but received honours including statues in 
the sanctuaries (Xen. Hieron. 4.5). Xenophon also recorded two specific instances where tyrants were 
murdered. The killers of Jason where honoured in some cities because it was feared that Jason would 
become a tyrant (Xen. Hell. 6.4.32), and Xenophon has one of the murderers of Euphron of Sicyon 
imply that a tyrant-killer would receive praise (Xen. Hell. 7.3.10). Isocrates also noted that tyrant-
killers received the highest honours (Isoc. 8.143). For further discussion of this point, and 
Teegarden’s use of the forged documents in Andocides 1, see Harris (2013/2014) 121-153; (2015a) 
224-226.  
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effectively advertised them to the Greek world. The surviving dedications never use 
the terms basileus or turannos, although the original inscription on Polyzelus’ 
charioteer at Delphi may have referred to the dedicator as Gelas anasson. The 
inscription on the base of one of Gelon’s thank-offerings at Delphi declares that it 
was set up by ‘Gelon the son of Deinomenes’ (Tod 17; Meiggs and Lewis 28). The 
inscription on a bronze helmet from Olympia, dedicated as part of an offering of 
arms by Hieron after his victory at Cyme in 474, reads hιάρον ὁ Δεινομένεος καὶ τοὶ 
Συρακόσιοι τõι Δὶ Τυράνʼ ἀπὸ Κύμας (Tod 22; Meiggs and Lewis 29). Hieron is 
simply defined in the inscription as ‘son of Deinomenes’ and identified with ‘the 
Syracusans’. The inscriptions on these dedications suggest that the Deinomenids had 
no desire to present themselves to the international Greek community as kings, let 
alone as tyrants. Almost a century later Dionysius I also avoided portraying himself 
as a tyrant. Dionysius I is referred to as ‘archon of Sicily’ in an Athenian inscription 
of 394/3 (IG II² 18; Rhodes and Osborne 10). A second Athenian inscription of 
369/8, badly damaged but detailing negotiations with and honours for Dionysius I, 
contains a line, partially restored by Rhodes and Osborne, that again calls Dionysius 
I ‘archon of Sicily’ (IG II² 103; Rhodes and Osborne 33). A third inscription, dated 
to 368/7, may have referred to Dionysius as archon, although much of the word 
‘archon’ is a restoration (IG II² 105; Rhodes and Osborne 34). It is unclear whether 
the presence of the word archon in these inscriptions is the consequence of an 
Athenian desire to reconcile Dionysius’ tyranny with their own form of government 
and traditional hostility to tyranny or due to Dionysius’ personal desire to refer to 
himself as a magistrate rather than a monarch or tyrant. However, given the 
unwillingness of the vast majority of Dionysius’ fellow tyrants to refer to themselves 
as turannoi or basileis, it is probably the latter. Dionysius I did assume his tyranny 
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after being elected to a legitimate position by the citizens of Syracuse and Hieron 
was also called archos of the Syracusans (Pind. Pyth. 1.73), although Pindar does 
call him turannos elsewhere (Pind. Pyth. 3.85). It is also telling that Dionysius I is 
not ever referred to in these documents by a military office or by the office of 
strategos autokrator to which he was legally elected by the Syracusans. Leucon, the 
ruler of the Cimmerian Bosporus, was not given any title by Demosthenes (Dem. 
20.30), although the rulers of the region are called tyrants by Aeschines (Aesch. 
3.171). Leucon was also given no title in the Athenian inscription that honoured his 
sons Spartocus, Paerisades and Apollonius, who were also not identified with any 
title (Rhodes and Osborne 64).
547
 
 
Tyrants could make use of some of the features of the rule of law as well as 
appearing conspicuously generous or just. They even employed legal methods, such 
as the assemblies and the courts, to dispose of their political enemies rather than 
simply murdering them or driving them into exile, as Xenophon believed Euphron 
had done in Sicyon. Dionysius, aiming at the sole command, brought charges of 
corruption against his fellow generals in the assembly of Syracuse as well as some of 
the most prominent citizens. Dionysius succeeded in securing the dismissal of a 
number of officers in this manner (Diod. Sic. 13.91.4-92.2). Dionysius continued this 
method by encouraging the assembly to recall the citizens who had been exiled, 
almost certainly the old supporters of Hermocrates (Diod. Sic. 13.92.4-7). 
Unfortunately Diodorus only concludes that these exiles were persons who would 
look favourably on the creation of a tyranny in Syracuse, expecting to not only return 
to their own property but willing to let their enemies be killed and their property 
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confiscated. By achieving their return legally Dionysius avoided the need to use 
force to restore them to the city and avoided the suspicious accusations of tyranny 
aimed at Hermocrates and Dion (Plut. Dion. 48, 49). Dionysius I pursued this policy 
to the extent of using the assembly to condemn two of his most prominent 
opponents, Daphnaeus and Demarchus, to death (Diod. Sic. 13.96.3).
548
 Dionysius 
may also have employed this method outside of Syracuse. At Gela Dionysius found 
the majority of the people in conflict with the wealthiest citizens. After using the 
Geloan assembly to have them executed, Dionysius took charge of the confiscated 
property, paying the Geloan mercenaries their arrears and doubling the pay of his 
own men. Diodorus notes that it was through this act that Dionysius secured the 
loyalty of his troops, Gela’s mercenaries and the citizens of Gela (Diod. Sic. 13.93.1-
4). The remaining citizens of Gela consequently regarded Dionysius as a liberator, 
publicly honouring him with a number of gifts (Diod. Sic. 13.93.4).
549
  Dionysius 
continued to use the assembly in matters regarding war and peace. In 397 Dionysius 
brought the Syracusans together in assembly and convinced them to declare war on 
Carthage (Diod. Sic. 14.45.2-46.3). Despite the fact that Diodorus attributed a desire 
to take up arms and make an attempt against the tyranny to explain the Syracusan 
enthusiasm for war, Diodorus also states that there was genuine desire to subdue 
Carthage in Greek Sicily at this time.  By clothing his power in these institutions 
Dionysius avoided an old charge against tyranny; that he was overthrowing the 
ancestral laws (Hdt. 3.80), and could appear closer to an acceptable archon. When 
Philomelos seized Delphi, he let it be known that he intended no harm to the 
sanctuary but was merely trying to overturn the unjust decrees of the Amphictyons 
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 Cf. Ar.Pol. 1305a. 
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 The idea that Dionysius deliberately attempted to avoid an appearance of tyranny has been put 
forward by Sanders (1987) 92: ‘Thirdly, we observe that Dionysius’ avoidance of the title τύραννος 
and use of the appellation ἄρχων Σικελίας for international purposes indicates a very real desire on the 
tyrant’s part to mask his tyrannical position and emphasise the constitutionality of his regime.’ 
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and to defend the ‘ancestral laws’ of the Phocians (βοηθεῖν τοῖς πατρίοις νόμοις τῶν 
Φωκέων) (Diod. Sic. 16.24.5). 
 
There is little reason to think that Classical tyrants ever referred to 
themselves, or were referred to by their supporters, as turannoi. It is more likely that 
each tyrant aimed to present himself as a war-leader, a hegemon, or an archon. The 
Classical tyrants continued to appear conspicuously just and benevolent in public 
and attempted to present themselves as pious towards the gods and public-spirited 
towards the community. They cloaked their power and their actions in established 
offices and claimed to be upholding the community’s laws by their actions. This 
behaviour not only encouraged popular support and distanced the tyrant from the 
stereotypical features of tyranny, but made the tyrant’s elevated and fundamentally 
dangerous position as sole ruler more palatable to the community.  
 
Conclusion 
The previous chapter showed that the key to understanding Archaic tyranny is to 
acknowledge the continuity between the rulers of Homeric society and the practices 
of Archaic tyrants. The key to understanding Classical tyranny is to recognise the 
continuity between Archaic and Classical tyranny. Creating arbitrary divisions 
between Archaic and Classical, or Sicilian and mainland tyranny, does not result in a 
better understanding of the phenomenon. The chronological gaps between periods 
where tyranny appears more frequent may also be illusory. It has been noted 
elsewhere that the fifth century was a period in which the Greek world was largely 
free from tyrannical rule. The situation, however, is unlikely to be so 
straightforward. The fifth century saw the death of Hippias and the rise of one of the 
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most powerful Greek tyrants, Dionysius I. Furthermore, the last Deinomenid was not 
overthrown until 466 and Thucydides mentions a tyrant called Evarchus ruling 
Astacus on the Greek mainland in 431. It is simply not correct to regard the fifth 
century as an interval between Archaic and Classical tyranny. If there was any break 
between periods of tyranny in Greece it was certainly narrower than is generally 
accepted. In addition, there is a scarcity of contemporary source material to cover 
much of the fifth century. The interests of a prose writer like Herodotus often lay 
beyond the poleis of mainland Greece and Thucydides was primarily concerned with 
those individuals and states involved in the Peloponnesian War. These factors 
frustrate attempts to discover how many fifth-century tyrants may have been 
completely lost to history. It is also worth noting that the number of Archaic tyrants 
may have been inflated by Classical and later writers applying the label of ‘tyrant’ to 
rulers who may have been considered by their contemporaries as basileis. While 
exploring these two points further is beyond the scope of this thesis,  
 
Andrewes referred to Classical tyranny in Sicily as ‘military monarchy’.550 
While military leadership, military success and force remained crucial to the security 
of the tyrant’s position, the view of Sicilian tyranny as highly militarised ignores the 
broad range of methods the Sicilian tyrants shared with Archaic and Classical 
tyranny. Sicilian tyranny, and Classical tyranny in general, does not require any new 
terminology to define it as there was no significant difference between the behaviour 
of the Archaic and Classical tyrants. Military success and military power continued 
to be crucial for the Greek tyrants, they assembled powerful forces and often led 
them in person. The tyrants also ingratiated themselves with their soldiers by the 
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distribution of booty and pay. The tyrants, and some potential tyrants, often used 
legitimate military offices to gain control of the polis’ military power before using it 
to impose their will on the city. This occurred not only in Sicily, where the 
ubiquitous and frightening presence of the Carthaginians arguably caused a more 
militarised environment, but on the Greek mainland too. The military reputation and 
popularity gained through successive victories and conquest enabled some tyrants to 
gain offices or authority on the strength of favourable public opinion. This is, for 
example, the manner in which Dionysius first came to power in Syracuse. Dionysius 
used his popularity, and the not inconsiderable help of some wealthy friends, to rise 
to the position of strategos autocrator. Control over military forces also enabled 
tyrants to secure the booty from captured settlements, sell populations into slavery, 
and to plunder territory for movable wealth. While the extent to which Classical 
tyrants relied on mercenaries to carry out campaigns or maintain their rule over 
unwilling subjects is debatable, they did make extensive use of these soldiers as they 
became more available over the course of the fifth century.   
 
 The interaction of Classical tyrants with religious custom remained 
remarkably consistent with their Archaic predecessors. Classical tyrants continued to 
place a tithe from their war-booty in the sanctuaries and to spend their wealth 
constructing temples, commissioning expensive dedications, and competing in the 
panhellenic festivals in honour of the gods. They organised state sacrifices and 
personally offered sacrifices to the gods. Some continued to be associated with 
oracles that generally confirmed them in their position and provided some legitimacy 
for the extent of their powers. The general impression given by the evidence is that 
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tyrants attempted to appear pious and assiduously conformed to the established 
practices regarding the worship of the gods.  
 
 While most of the accusations that certain tyrants aimed to plunder the 
panhellenic sanctuaries were demonstrably false, with the notable exception of the 
Phokian tyrants, they most likely grew out of the very real fact that, by necessity, 
tyrants were acutely concerned with gathering wealth. Classical tyrants were in 
constant need of money in order to engage in the practices discussed above, and 
large amounts of wealth were absolutely necessary to maintain the tyrant’s position. 
Tyrants were compelled to spend sums of money on religious dedications, gifts and 
acts of public generosity. They also spent large sums on acquiring and rewarding 
mercenary support. The methods which tyrants used to gain wealth were varied. 
Tyrants sourced wealth from their own property, including land, from tithes, tribute 
from subject communities, plunder, the property of defeated or exiled enemies and 
the sale of war captives as slaves. This behaviour resulted in the tyrants acquiring a 
reputation for avarice and the circulation of stories describing their deceptive 
characters, money-grabbing and ostentation.   
 
 While Classical tyrants could theoretically use their wealth to acquire a 
mercenary force, or abuse a legally bestowed military office to seize power, they still 
required the active assistance of supporters to gain and maintain their position. 
Classical tyrants continued to practice the very old method of placing close friends 
and relatives by blood or marriage in positions of power, as subordinate rulers or 
using them as sources of wealth and military assistance. The sons of tyrants inherited 
their father’s wealth, resources and a number of his relationships with friends and 
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allies, somewhat inevitably becoming tyrants themselves. Furthermore, tyrants used 
marriage to acquire political capital and the allegiance of the supporters of prominent 
families.  
 
 The link between the prosperity of the community and the justice of its rulers 
is apparent in the poems of Homer and Hesiod, and the conspicuous administration 
of justice was also an important practice for the Archaic tyrants. Several Classical 
tyrants appear to have dispensed justice and most made coordinated attempts to 
appear benevolent towards their community, presenting themselves as pious towards 
the gods and public-spirited. Many Classical tyrants clothed their power in legal 
offices and several claimed to be the protectors of the community’s ancestral laws. 
Maintaining the established offices and practising just behaviour and public 
generosity encouraged popular support, distanced the tyrant from the stereotypical 
features of tyranny, and made the tyrant’s power more tolerable to a Greek world 
that had had the capacity to recognise and guard against tyranny since the seventh 
century.  
 
 Isocrates wrote that governments of all kinds, presumably including 
monarchies, lasted longest when they cultivated and served the interests of the mass 
of citizens (to plēthos) (Isoc. 2.16). Consequently, most of the practices discussed 
above were, like those of their Archaic and Homeric predecessors, ultimately aimed 
at encouraging popular support for the Classical tyrant. This was especially true of 
rulers like Dionysius I, whose position and power would have been easily recognised 
by many Greeks as legally questionable if not outright tyrannical.
551
 The Classical 
                                                          
551
 Stroheker (1958) 147.  
288 
 
Greeks did not become more amenable to tyrants, as Caven has rightly argued 
regarding fifth-century Syracuse. ‘The fate of Hermocrates had shown that the 
Syracusan Demos was not going to surrender tamely to any hetaireia or small 
private army.’552 Tyrants were successful in the Classical period when they 
cultivated popular support and made some attempt to distance themselves from the 
features associated with tyranny. They conspicuously appeared to act justly, 
sometimes occupied legitimate offices and tried to be seen to uphold the norms of 
their communities. Even this tactic was anticipated by Pisistratus who was shown in 
the previous chapter to assiduously observe the norms of justice and religion, as well 
as maintaining the laws and offices of Athens intact and undisturbed, while 
effectively remaining the ruler of Athens. 
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Conclusion 
 
Earlier attempts to define and discuss Greek tyranny have struggled to explain the 
phenomenon largely due to a flawed approach. This thesis has shown that the first 
step in studying tyranny should be to dispense with the unsupported assumption that 
it was a new phenomenon, and instead begin the study from the earliest evidence 
available for Greek rulers, the Homeric poems. The tendency of Greek historians to 
write monographs on Greek tyrants, generally on Pisistratus but more recently on the 
obscure Polycrates, is a particularly problematic way to study tyranny. Monographs 
on individual tyrants compel the historian to substitute speculation for analysis due 
to the scarcity of source material, and to plug the yawning gaps in the historical 
record of early tyrants with often-unreliable later sources. The best historical 
approach to tyranny is to concentrate on the earliest evidence available, collecting 
and utilising as much of this evidence as possible while remaining wary of 
anachronism and hostility in the sources. Studying the phenomenon of tyranny as a 
whole rather than the career of a single tyrant is therefore more effective. This 
approach provides broad patterns of behaviour that can be studied as a pool of 
evidence. 
 
The various causes given by scholars for the rise of Greek tyranny have been 
shown to be unsupported by the evidence. The social and economic factors 
previously believed to have caused the phenomenon have been exaggerated, dated 
too early or simply did not exist in the Archaic period. The one radical change that 
certainly occurred in the political and social structure of Archaic Greece was the 
introduction of the rule-of-law ideology in the seventh century. Despite the fact that 
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there were concerns about the rule of the basileis voiced by Homer and Hesiod, such 
as their potential to engage in corruption or use their strength to seize the private 
property of others, their rule was still regarded as normative in these poems. No 
alternative to their rule was proposed. It was the rule of law that was the crucial 
change that brought about the shift in the way its adherents viewed Greek monarchs. 
The consequences of its establishment, such as division of powers, oversight, 
penalties for corrupt magistrates, limited terms of office etc, were entirely 
incompatible with the rule of one man. Furthermore, the close association between 
the rule of law and the prosperity of the community, voiced most eloquently by 
Solon’s poetry, and the implied consent of the gods to this system, encouraged the 
demonization of the sole ruler. Monarchs in the Archaic period began to be seen as 
threats to the rights, persons and property of private individuals, and no longer as 
benevolent ‘shepherds of the people’. They became the polar opposite of the rule of 
law. The turannoi of Archaic and Classical Greece were those individuals who 
persisted in using the methods of the eighth century to gain and maintain power. To 
understand the nature of Greek tyranny it is therefore essential to recognise the 
parallels between the behaviour of tyrants and the behaviour of Homeric basileis.  
 
Much of the power and status of the Homeric basileus and the Greek tyrant 
was built on their ability to gather and lead military forces. For these rulers military 
success meant increasing popular support and windfalls of booty and slaves. 
Continuing success also justified the extent of their powers and their elevated status 
within the community. The Iliad depicts the basileis receiving land and status 
through their ability to provide military leadership. Conversely defeat, or military 
vulnerability, resulted in the loss of possessions, status or even in the ruler’s death. 
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While participation in warfare and military leadership was one of the most 
significant methods used by basileis and tyrants to gain and maintain power, it 
should not be overemphasised. As we have seen, these rulers engaged with a series 
of practices which contributed to their power and status. The availability of 
mercenaries in the fourth century does not explain the rise in the number of tyrants in 
that period, as tyrants such as Pisistratus and Gelon were militarily successful at a 
time when the evidence for significant numbers of mercenaries is non-existent. 
Classical mercenaries were another useful tool for tyrants but their influence on 
tyranny as a phenomenon should not be over-emphasised. 
 
Possession of substantial amounts of wealth was also essential. The basileis 
sourced treasure items with the agricultural surplus produced from their land, and 
accumulated wealth through raiding and exacting protection payments from the local 
community, a practice possibly continued by Pisistratus. Despite the disinterest of 
the sources in tyrants’ ownership of land, some hint at the ownership of estates. 
Pisistratus’ supporters came from a geographically defined region, suggesting a link 
between the tyrant and the local area, and Gelon’s wife owned at least one estate 
outside Syracuse. Tyrants continued to receive gifts from persons seeking to secure 
their favour, and accumulated booty and slaves from military conquests, while using 
a range of other methods to collect the wealth they needed to sustain their position. 
In some cases this seems to have included taking control over the tax and tribute 
gathering mechanisms of the polis. However, the extent to which tyrant’s private 
fortune was ultimately combined with what might be called public revenue is 
generally unclear. Regardless of the sources of this wealth, it was used deliberately 
to secure the position of the basileus and the tyrant. With it he rewarded supporters, 
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distributed largesse to the community, showed piety by building temples and paying 
for dedications and sacrifices, secured politically meaningful marriage alliances and 
attracted armed supporters and, from the fifth century onwards, paid for mercenaries.  
 
One of the most strikingly consistent parallels between the eighth-century 
basileis and the tyrants is their interaction with religious practice. The Homeric 
basileis attempted to secure the gods’ favour not only for themselves by associating 
themselves with favourable prophecies, but publicly attempted to gain it for their 
communities by dedicating military spoils, providing lavish sacrifices and ensuring 
that religious norms were upheld. Their ability to provide the most expensive 
sacrifices justified their position as protector and head of the community, while 
encouraging popular support through the maintenance of religious norms. Tyrants 
pursued all of these practices. They built temples, commissioned dedications and 
dedicated tithes of their war booty to the gods. The victories of Archaic and Classical 
tyrants at the panhellenic festivals were celebrated in poetry and through 
monumental dedications, earning the victors prestige and popularity at home and 
abroad. Many tyrants were associated with oracles and omens that seem to have 
foretold their future success, suggesting that they sought the same kind of 
superstitious legitimacy as the basileis had done. By engaging with religious norms 
tyrants demonstrated their own piety while offering protection and prosperity for the 
community by using their extensive resources to honour the gods.  
 
The rule of Greek basileis and tyrants was marked by an inevitable reliance 
on close friends and family. Relatives by blood or marriage and friends, usually 
secured through a traditional practice such as guest-friendship, were given 
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subordinate roles by the ruler and key positions within his regime. The loyalty of 
these individuals appears to have been fairly secure and the tyrants’ use of family 
members as army officers, subordinate rulers or officials presents a strong contrast 
with the Athenian systems of election and by lot. Even the earliest Archaic laws, 
which establish term limits for officials and the separation of powers, represent a 
radical departure from the monarch’s appointment of relatives for whatever tasks he 
wished for as long as he wished. The deliberate use of friends and relatives remained 
a consistent method for the maintenance of personal power from the eighth century 
to the fourth. The practice of marriage also produced huge political gains for tyrants. 
Pisistratus is the most immediate example, securing a return from exile and armed 
supporters through his marriages, although Dionysius I also married in order to 
secure the neutrality of at least one Greek polis. Even communities that were free 
from tyranny recognised the significance of this practice. The Athenians were well 
aware of the value of a marriage between a friendly tyrant and a favourable 
candidate, and they attempted to secure a marriage alliance between Evagoras of 
Salamis and Dionysius I that would suit the interests of Athens.  
 
The association between tyrants and the administration of justice has caused 
scholars of the Archaic period to misinterpret this behaviour as social and political 
reform. In reality, the tyrants continued the practices of the Homeric basileis who 
resolved disputes and maintained the norms of their community in return for gifts 
and popular support. This practice directly contributed to their status and the 
maintenance of their power. Herodotus’ tale of Deioces the Mede explains why 
tyrants continued to pursue this practice, describing how Deioces resolved to appear 
just in order to accumulate enough popular support to become a tyrant. This explains 
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the confusing association of tyrants like Cypselus, Periander and Pisistratus with 
anecdotes and prophecies that highlighted their just behaviour. The Archaic and 
Classical tyrants disguised their power by sometimes occupying legitimate offices, 
referring to themselves with legitimate titles, and maintaining features of the rule of 
law, such as assemblies or other civic bodies and institutions. No tyrant seems to 
have referred to himself as a turannos, and tyrants such as Dionysius I and Jason of 
Pherae appear to have made calculated attempts at increasing their power through the 
occupation of legitimate offices that held military and civil authority, while using 
these offices to cloak the tyrannical nature of their power.  
 
The methods these rulers used to gain and maintain power continued from the 
eighth century to the fourth, and were comprised of a broad and highly personal 
series of methods that they employed to take and hold power. Tyrants were not 
reactionary aristocrats, demagogic leaders of the lower classes, or princes appealing 
for a return to ancestral rule. They were the individuals who persisted in using the 
practices of the eighth-century basileis in spite of the existence of the rule-of-law 
ideology. These practices were ultimately aimed at securing popular support within 
the polis for the tyrant himself. This view of Greek tyranny is not a rigid 
categorisation of sole rulers; rather it reflects the very personal nature of the Greek 
tyrant’s power and authority. It allows for the fact that some tyrants preferred to rely 
on some of the above practices more than others, and admits that variables, such as 
the introduction of significant mercenary forces in the fifth century, were also 
adopted and used by tyrants in their quest for power. To claim that Greek tyrants 
were a new, revolutionary or reactionary form of ruler that first appeared in seventh-
century Greece is demonstrably wrong. The spread of the rule-of-law ideology from 
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the seventh century prompted those Greeks who adhered to its principles to view 
monarchy, the rule of one man, as dangerous, violent and lawless. The Greek tyrants 
remained quite consistent in their use of eighth-century practices to gain and 
maintain power. As the word basileus continued to be applied to legitimate public 
office in the Greek world, a new term was needed to describe the unrestrained rule of 
one man. The new word was τύραννος and the Greeks applied it to an old 
phenomenon.  
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